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  PREFACE 
 
                     ;= uk; Z Lr q  i w T;Ur s   jeUr s  r= n sor k %  AZ q w s s s  
                     ;= Sr kLr q  u i w T;Ur s   lok Z Lr=kQyk % fS q w s Z d z; k % AA z  
 
(Manusmriti, III:56) 
 
(Where women are worshipped, there gods dwell, but where they are not honoured, 
no sacred rite yields rewards) 
     Manu said it centuries ago and our Constitution imbibed and made it legal in 
1950. This is one of the imperatives of independence and mandates of Constitution 
that dynamic equality of status and opportunity to women-kind and abolition of 
every practice and system derogatory to the dignity of Indian women must prevail. 
The fact is otherwise. Religion, custom, age-old prejudices, etc. have put Indian 
women in a subservient and exploitable position in many domains of life. Low rates 
of participation in education, lack of economic independence, value biases 
operating against them, etc., have resulted in the women being dependent on 
menfolk and other institutions of authority like the family, neighbourhood and larger 
society. They are usually ignorant of their rights and even if they are not they do not 
have easy access to justice. 
     The issues relating to women are being raised and discussed at various forums 
in recent times. One of them ‘crimes against women’ is gaining more and more 
momentum and recognition, all over. Personal laws govern marriages, divorce, 
inheritance, succession, custody and maintenance. They govern a woman’s rights 
to equality at home. In varying degrees, the personal laws of different religions 
subvert women’s constitutionally guaranteed right to equality. But despite the 
enactment of laws, formulation of reformative legal processes, provision of legal 
aid, PIL, Lok Adalats, women/family counselling centers etc., women in India have 
a long way to go in concretizing the constitutional goals into reality. 
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     A number of legislative measures were enacted towards the femi-justice but 
social structure militated against these enactments. However, there was growing 
realization that the objective could not be achieved by legislation alone. Unless 
women are aware of their rights, they cannot claim and fight for it. Many of the 
problems that an Indian woman faces today arise out of her ignorance of the law as 
well as lack of will to assert her rights. 
     The present thesis is divided into eight chapters and is written with a view to find 
out some of the social evils relating to women since ancient period; to explore the 
legal provisions of the Indian legal system to identify and highlight the efficacy and 
extent of the protection enshrined in these laws; to examine the loopholes in the 
existing legislations and implementation in order to reset our legal objectives and 
redraft the law to have effective and meaningful legislations; critical analysis of the 
laws relating to women and critical evaluation of the judicial response in the 
furtherance and extension of justice to women. 
     India has one of the most impressive set of laws for girls and women, yet little is 
known to women about them. The present work has been written with the specific 
objective of informing a woman, and all those persons and institutions who are 
presently engaged in the task of helping women to get their rightful place in the 
family and society. 
     On the occasion of submission of this thesis, first of all I humbly offer my 
"pranam” to Lord Krishna who by his special grace had inspired me to choose Dr. 
D.D. Dhamelia as my research guide. Magnanimous Dr. D.D. Dhamelia has 
substantially contributed in a masterly manner towards the accomplishment of this 
work, behaving always as an ideal teacher and a conscious guardian. I am really 
grateful to him and shall so remain forever, although the words fail to express the 
magnitude of gratitude I feel for him. 
     I also express my deep sense of gratitude to Prof. N.K. Indrayan, Head, Deptt. of 
Law, Saurashtra University, Rajkot for permitting me to work on this topic and 
availing all facilities required in this regard. 
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     I owe much, what I can tell to Prof. B.L. Sharma, Head, Deptt. of Human Rights, 
Sau. Univ. Rajkot for igniting fire in me to work on this topic. 
     I am deeply indebted to Dr. Rajendra Singh, Head, Deptt. of Geography, 
Bundelkhand PG College, Jhansi who provided the methodology as to write the 
thesis and extended academic patronage to me. 
     I take this opportunity to express my profound gratitude to my colleagues Shri 
S.K. Rai, Shri L.C. Sahu, and Dr. R. L. Parmar for extending their help to me. I am 
also thankful to my evening walking and roaming team consisting of Dr. Arvind 
Agrawal and Dr. Navendra Singh for creating humorous environment in discussing 
the tedious problems. 
     This acknowledgement ceremony would remain unreal and incomplete if I fail to 
express my deep sense of gratitude towards my wife, Smt. Shakuntala Gupta who 
lit the midnight lamp at the time of writing the thesis and to my sons Nilesh and 
Vibhuti who helped me in feeding the work in the computer and all of whom found 
their patience tried repeatedly as the promised vacations vanished because I was 
busy in the work. 
     Thanks are also due to staff of Law Deptt., Shri Santosh, Computer Operator 
and library staff for their timely help. 
                                                                                               
 
(Gupta Dashrath  R.) 
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                                                        CHAPTER-I  
 
INTRODUCTION  
  
      “Justice without force is impotent, force without justice is tyranny – Not being able 
to make what is just strong, we make what was strong just.”—‘Pascal: Pensees’ 
      These words are appropriate for the rights of women, perpetration of domestic violence 
and its unfair justification by patriarchal societies as a “family affair” and, therefore, outside 
the purview of State agencies. The struggle for existence makes the provision of basic rights a 
matter of ‘luxury’. When the basic necessities of life are not assured, how is it possible to 
assure dignity, security and protection to women.  The women imbibe traditional values and 
“sex role ideology” through socialization process. They are made to believe that man is 
superior to woman and woman has no right to protest. Through the socialization and events in 
women’s lives, they acquire feelings of depression, helplessness and poor self- image. The 
woman’s exploitation is the result of interaction between a woman’s personality and her 
environment.1      
      The Constitution of India enjoins equality of sexes but unfortunately Indian society is still 
harsh to women in the same way as it was during the period of Manu. Indian wives continue 
to bear the brunt of physical and mental torture by their husband. Pandit Jawahar Lal Nehru 
aptly remarked, “The greatest revolution in a country is the one that affects the status and 
living conditions of its women. Today, because of the national need, the changing pattern of 
society and the desire to contribute towards the general good, and their own satisfaction and 
economic relief, women are emerging in various fields of service”.2  
     It has been observed that position of women since ages, remained quite pitiable. A society 
in which men decided the fate and fortune of all those who lived under their authority could 
not expectedly grant women any kind of respectable position. She was not given any kind of 
                                                 
1   (Lakshmipathi Raju and Venkateswarlu, “Crimes Against Women: Need for Radical Social Work 
Intervention”, publis hed in Social Welfare, Dec. 2003, Vol.50 No.9) 
2   (Quoted by Padmini Sen Gupta, ‘The Story of Women of India’, 237 (1974) 
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significant role nor a right to voice her grievance in the family. The concept of equality was 
not the governing rule in the early societies. The concept of equality originated in democratic 
set up. She had to depend for her existence and survival on males.  
     The status of women in any legal system is determined by her rights, duties, liabilities vis-
à-vis the society and her family members. It also includes the status of women as regards her 
proprietary rights are concerned. Henry Maine in his “Theory of Status to Contract” uses the 
word ‘status’ to mean both proprietary and personal legal conditions. It is said that no nation 
has held their women in higher esteem than the Hindus. The Vedic period held her in high 
esteem and conferred her an honourable and respectable position. The Rigveda provides a 
glimpse of the position, “We thou queen in thy father-in-laws household”. But the day was 
not far off, she became subservient due to evoluation of Brahmanical doctrines. The 
Brahmanas dominated on Manusmriti and did not allow the women to live an independent life 
of her own. A woman should be under the protection of man during her whole life was the 
theme of Manusmriti. “During maidenhood her father protects her, husband protects her 
during overture and sons protect her during widowhood and thus woman is never free.”1 The 
honour of Hindu woman in Vedic era showed the sign of decay during the period of 
Dharmashastra. 
      Statistics indicate that a Hindu woman in this country do not own property or the 
matrimonial home which belongs either to the husband or to his family members. 
Matrimonial laws of this country also do not contain any significant rights to matrimonial 
property for women. And these laws are strongly linked to religion, which treats woman on 
unequal footing, despite of the fact that constitution guarantees right to equality in all spheres 
of life. The denial of property rights to woman is one of the basic reasons for her harassment, 
exploitation and violence within four walls of famiy as well as outside the home. This denial 
makes her inferior, weak and destitute because whenever she tries to assert her rights she is 
threatened from throwing her out of the property. Woman has no share by birth in either the 
ancestral property or her natal family or that of her husband but have a right to food, clothing, 
                                                 
1   (Manusmriti, IX.3) 
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education and residence till her marriage and a right to maintenance from husbands ancestral 
property.1  
      Despite the Directive Principles enshrined in the Constitution and the increasing number 
of protective laws, crimes against women have continued their upward trend, pushing more 
and more women in to the list of the victims of rape, cruelty, bride burning, prostitution, wife 
beating etc. Deep is the sense of frustration and disappointment of these women but they have 
no other option; quite often grief gives way to anger, insecurity and a very uncertain future. 
The crimes are multi-casual and multi-dimensional. They are the manifestations of a very 
deep-rooted disease, which has socio-economic, cultural and political dimensions. The study 
confirm the initial hypothesis that the role of law in combating these crimes is crucial because 
a woman against whom a crime has been committed is like a person in great pain, she wants 
relief, and she wants it immediately.  
      Right from childhood, marriage is posed as the be-all and end-all of a woman’s life. 
Marriage and motherhood are, practically speaking, the only career option for the majority of 
Indian women, and for which they are groomed from girlhood. Marriage is near universal in 
India. Ninety-five percent of all women are or have been married, the overwhelming majority 
by the age of 18. Most often, within a year they are mothers, and average number of children 
per woman is 3.7.2  So, generally speaking most Indian women do a pretty good job of 
motherhood, whether they like it or not. 
     Whether women work outside the home or not, the burden of housework and childcare fall 
upon them. For millions of women in this country, the drudgery starts from childhood, when 
they should be at school and paying. They toil with their mothers so that the family can be fed 
and perhaps a brother can go to school. The result is that they are two-thirds of India’s 
illiterates. Working conditions are far from congenial. For a start, there is no money in it. 
Wages for housework is unthinkable, and for mothering, almost blasphemous. A great deal 
has been said, and something has also been done, about sexual harassment at the workplace. 
                                                 
1  (Seema Durrani, ‘Hindu Women’s Right to Property’, published in Women’s Link, April-June 2003, 
Vol.9, No.2) 
2   (All figures are based on the 1991 Census) 
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But despite the fact that mothering is a full-time job and housework the only ‘work’ that most 
women do, the home is not considered a workplace. So domestic violence and physical abuse 
don’t fall within the purview of the law. But the home is a rather hazardous place. 
     Women’s ability to create life is a vital service to society but has become their biggest 
liability. They are not allowed to control their own reproductive capacities. Their bodies are 
treated as the property of different men, whether fathers or husbands, to be guarded, used and 
abused. Excessive childbearing wears out their health, their strength and their lives. And yet 
society remains indifferent. To live as a woman is to live in fear of molestation, rape and 
sexual harassment. When they are raped, fingers are pointed at them; as prostitutes it is they 
who are outcasts from society, not the men who degrade them. They are insulted and 
humiliated every day, every hour – on the buses, the streets, at the workplace, at home. They 
are silently burnt to death in the kitchens where they toil. When a man beats his wife her 
neighbours seldom come to protect her. After all – it is her ‘own’ husband who is beating her 
and so each one is tormented in her ‘own’ house. The Committee on the Status of Women in 
India and other investigations since then present alarming evidence of the steadily 
deteriorating life conditions of women since Independence.1 
     The tradition of early marriage is also one of the main impediments in their development. 
This tradition is decades old. Average age of marriage of girls was 13 years in 1931, which 
increased to 17 years in 1977 and 19 years in 1991. In spite of legal prohibition on child 
marriages, the marriages of small girls on ‘Akha Teej’ in Rajasthan is well known to every 
body.2  It is aptly said that child marriage is an evil more grave than Sati because it is far 
more devastating in its consequences and more insidious in its working. For the girl, it leads 
to inadequate socialization, discontinuation of education and great physiological and 
psychological damages due to repeated pregnancy. The Child Marriage Restraint Act remains 
a dead letter because of the prevalent social and religious customs, poor economic conditions 
                                                 
1   (Madhu Kishwar, ‘In Search of Answers’, Manohar Publishers & Distributors, New Delhi (1996) 
2   (Tripathi R.S and Tiwari R.P., “Indian Women : Current Scenario and Future Prospects” in 
‘Perspectives on Indian Women’ ed. by R.S. Tripathi, A.P.H. Publishing Corporation, New Delhi 
(1999) 
 5
and ineffective enforcement machinery. The police, on its part, cannot stop such marriages or 
arrest a person without a warrant or a court order.  
     Nearly 95 percent women continue to stay in a violent marriage, because they do not have 
the social and economic empowerment needed for individual existence. The process of 
socialization of girls and women stresses upon humility and adjustment as virtues and 
rebelliousness is seen as a major vice. This makes women submissive and accepting of their 
fate even if this includes an abusive family. The incidence of violence against women shows a 
soaring graph. The crimes against women in 1999 reported an increase of nearly 102 percent 
over the year 1989. In absolute terms there was an increase of 68,699 cases in 1999 over 
1989. Torture by husband and relatives recorded 278 percent increase during the period 1989-
1999. The incidence of rape cases increased by 69 percent; the cases of molestation accounted 
for 24 percent of total crimes against women. Dowry deaths increased from 4836 in 1990 to 
6699 in 1999, cases under Immoral Traffic (P) Act increased from 7547 in 1994 to 9363 in 
1999.1  
     The prostitution has crossed the threshold of societal tolerance in view of its unwholesome 
impact on society and its sexual morals, norms and values. It is a source of many problems 
including organized trafficking in women and girls, and the growing commodification of 
women’s sexuality. Therefore, the concern regarding the growing business of prostitution and 
its morally corroding and corrupting influence on society is understandable and legitimate. 
The danger of this problem is that it is losing its dreadful and dark form and is making inroads 
into every fact of life as a ‘business’.2   
      Rights and law have played an integral part in the women’s movement for social change 
in India. Legal reform in different personal laws have been effected/modified over the years. 
Lobbying the legislature has often been a strategy by the movement for law reform. But to 
date, only cosmetic changes in various laws have been effected. The underlying oppression 
and unequal power relations, differential expectations of women and men have not been 
                                                 
1   (Source: Crime in India, NCRB, 1992, 1995, 1998 and 1999 published in ‘Social Welfare, 
December, 2003, Vol. 50 No. 9) 
2   (Srivastava S.P., ‘Prostitution – Growing Monster with Many Faces’, published in Social Welfare, 
Aug.-Sept. 2003, Vol. 50 No. 5-6) 
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significantly questioned and changed to bring about changes in the law. The notion of law as 
an end in itself or as a solution to most problems of violence, discrimination etc. (even as a 
last resort), still prevails; this has only perpetuated the unequal status-quo in gender relations. 
Understanding the limits of the law is necessary so as to prevent extreme dependency on the 
law as a solution to most problems.1 Law as a system and institution does not operate in a 
vacuum. The functioning of the legal system is very closely related to the social, cultural, 
economic, normative and political patterns of a society and its people. People need to actively 
participate and co-operate in the functioning of the judicial system. 
     The main objectives of the present research is – (i) to find out some of the social evils 
relating to Indian women since ancient period; (ii) to explore the legal provisions of the 
Indian legal system to identify and highlight the efficacy and extent of the protection 
enshrined in these laws; (iii) To examine the loopholes in the existing legislations and 
implementation in order to reset our legal objectives and redraft the law to have effective and 
meaningful legislations; (iv) critical analysis of the laws relating to women and critical 
evaluation of the judicial response in the furtherance and extension of justice to women. 
       The hypothesis of research work is how far the laws are effective to remove social evils 
relating to Indian women, how far judiciary has contributed to provide justice to women and 
whether more laws are required to be framed or effective enforcement of present laws is to be 
ensured. 
     Since it is a doctrinal research in the field of Femi-Justice in India, this study is based on 
desk study. The researcher has used multi-pronged approach to collect as much relevant 
information as possible through different sources. The study would be purely exploratory and 
evaluative in nature. The details of the tools of research for the collection of secondary data 
will include : Collection and consultation of all available records and literature in various 
libraries of the country including books, projects, reports, decisions of the Courts, debates of 
Lok Sabha and Rajya Sabha, Reports of Law Commission, Acts of Parliament, Legal 
Journals, Legal Digest, Newspapers and other sources as well. The legal material shall be 
                                                 
1   (Schuler M. & Rajasingham, “Legal Literacy: A Tool for Women’s Empowerment”, Washington 
D.C., OEF International, 1992) 
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studies, surveyed and scanned to move ahead. Constitutional stand of justice to women will 
be discussed with reference to customary and statutory provisions. The study will be critical 
analysis of laws and critical evaluation of decided case laws. Since the present study is not 
based on empirical experience, the researcher has selected India as a whole for the present 
study. The main focus of the present research would be on theoretical aspect, which will be 
analysed on the basis of material collected from different sources and decided cases. 
      Chapter I ‘introduction’ of this work deals with regards to the basic problems of the 
women. This chapter introduces the subject. It scans through the whole project and presents 
the preview of the topics that are covered. Indian woman lives in two types of reality, social 
and legal. Legally she can claim perfect equality with her counterpart, the male, but socially 
she is still “the neglected and the oppressed. A deep and analytical study has been made of 
some of prevailing social evils relating to marital, personal, property, maintenance and civil 
life of Indian women. Most of the enactments and personal laws relating to women have been 
critically examined. Finally, the scheme of the thesis writing and chapterisation is also 
outlined in the introductory part. 
      Disparity between men and women stares us in the face and thus several of the questions 
still do not have an adequate and satisfactory answer. In public life like professions, business 
and services, women are not adequately represented. Women are put in longer hours of work 
compared to men and yet do not enjoy equal status or opportunities. The property owned by 
women constitutes a very small fraction of the property owned by men. The maternity is not 
recognized as an essential social function. The rate of suicide and other offences is very high 
among women. Organized religion is one of the main obstacles in the way of liberation of 
women. To that extent religion has been more selfish than sublime. Thus, fairness vanishes 
when it comes to giving a fair deal to the fair sex.  
     Chapter two is devoted to the position and status of Indian women since Vedic period. The 
status of women is discussed under different periods i.e., Vedic society, Smritik era, Pauranik 
, Mauryan , Muslim and British periods. The Paradah system, Satipratha, Child marriages, 
Widow remarriage, education, polygamy and right to property etc. prevalent during those 
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periods are discussed in brief. Role of social reformers and National movement for the 
women’s cause and the legislative efforts to codify the Hindu and Muslim laws during the 
British period is the main theme of this chapter. 
      ‘Manu Smriti’ not only shows contempt for women but goes on to degrade them as slaves. 
Women were considered to devoid of intellect and consciously denied any learning. They 
were denied right to property and were forbidden from performing sacrifices. Religion also 
contributed in a substantial measure to aggravate these inequalities. It was only later during 
the time of Vijnaneswara that the archaic Smriti law was freed from religious fetters and 
changed for the benefit of women. Thereafter social reformers like Lokmanya Tilak, 
Mahatma Phule, Agarkar and Mahatma Gandhi took up the cause of women and took a lead 
in the promotion of female education, re-marriage of widows, elimination of child marriage 
etc. The concept of a widow’s estate was developed in respect of property inherited by her 
from her husband only in 1937. Independence brought in its wake a great consciousness in 
our society for human dignity. It ushered a new era of economic, social and political equality 
for women. By the time our Constitution came to be framed and adopted, a sea change had 
taken place though not in adequate proportion. 
     Chapter three deals with regard to property rights of women and their right to 
maintenance. Part one of this chapter examines the various aspects of her proprietary rights 
such as the characteristic feature of Stridhan, Woman’s Estate, widow’s limited right to 
property under The Hindu Women’s Right to Property Act, 1937 and finally the conversion 
of this property into her absolute estate under Hindu Succession Act, 1956. The rule of 
survivorship as perpetuating inequality, the uncertainty in notional partition and women’s 
right in respect of dwelling house is discussed as an entrenched discrimination against Hindu 
women in law and society. The property rights of Muslim women under Quranic law and 
rights of Christian women under Indian Succession Act, 1925 is discussed in brief.  
      Part two of this chapter also deals with the right of woman to claim maintenance from her 
husband under Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, 1956, Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 and 
under section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and her right to prefer claim for 
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maintenance under civil as well as criminal law simultaneously. The enactment of Muslim 
Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986 to nullify the right of divorced Muslim 
women to maintenance under section 125, Cr.P.C. and thereafter the judicial interpretation to 
declare that Muslim women are entitled to claim maintenance under MWP Act, 1986 as well 
as under Cr.P.C. is made the theme of this chapter. 
     The multiplicity of succession laws in India, diverse in their nature, can be classified in 
two groups. The first set of laws are religion based laws and the other set of laws are man 
made. An analysis of these religion based succession laws they show that they stem from a 
fundamental desire to secure and keep control over property in the hands of men and to assert 
the superiority of one gender over the other. The opposition to the provision of maintenance 
to divorced Muslim women is based on two counts. One is that a Muslim marriage is a civil 
contract. Once the contract itself is terminated the parties are absolved of any responsibilities 
towards one another. The other is that under Islam a divorced woman enjoys an unfettered 
right of remarriage and is entitled to mehr and return of dowry. Both arguments are based on 
legalism but they ought to take care of the economic hardships that she is likely to face after 
the marriage is terminated.  
      Child marriages, the dowry and bride burning, arbitrary divorce and matrimonial offences 
are the focus of chapter four. To eradicate the evil of child marriage, the Child Marriage 
Restraint Act was passed in 1929 but the plight of child-wife is continued and it is further 
aggravated when she becomes a widow and there is no chance of her re-marriage and 
sometimes she will have to be burnt alive. The validity of child marriage, mild and ineffective 
penal provisions for those who conduct any child marriage and no legal provisions for 
performance of preparatory ceremonies of such marriage is discussed herein. 
      Marriages are made in heaven but marriages are mad on earth. The system of dowry has 
ruined many families and created many unhappy homes. To prohibit the evil practice of 
giving and taking of dowry the Dowry Prohibition Act was passed in 1961. It was the first 
penal provision but even today the dowry continues and causes death of a large number of 
married women. Taking the cue from the Supreme Court decision in 1985 in Pratibha Rani  
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case, the appointment of Joint Committee of Parliament to examine the working of dowry 
laws and based on its recommendations the amendments in The Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 
in 1984 and 1986, creation of new Sections 304-B and 498-A in IPC, 113-A and 113B in 
Evidence Act and 198 in Cr.P.C. to deal with the problem of dowry suicides and dowry 
murders is discussed. 
     The grounds of divorce may be looked at from two aspects. First, marriage is an exclusive 
union and if it is not so, it ceases to be marriage. The adultery, cruelty and desertion are 
destructive of the very foundation of marriage as marriage also implies that parties will live 
with each other in harmony and mutual confidence. Secondly, these grounds are the 
matrimonial offences committed by one of the parties to marriage and therefore the marriage 
can be dissolved. The grounds available to both husband and wife, the grounds on which wife 
alone can seek divorce, divorce by mutual consent, non-application of Hindu Marriage Act in 
customary divorce and divorce under special enactments are discussed under Hindu Marriage 
Act. Discriminatory Quaranic law for dissolution of Muslim marriage on conversion to any 
other religion, divorce by triple pronouncement and under intoxication is discussed critically. 
Dissolution of Christian marriage by the husband on wife’s adultery but the wife is to prove 
husband’s adultery coupled with cruelty for seeking divorce is discriminatory on the ground 
of sex alone.  
       Uniform application of Section 494, IPC to all religions and even equally to Muslim men 
and women, abolition of element of mens rea as necessary ingredient for prosecution  and 
following the principle of factum valent in case of second marriage rather to stress upon the 
ceremonies is discussed under the head of Bigamy. Making of every sexual intercourse other 
than the marital as punishable and the right of the wife of adulterer to prosecute her husband 
is the focus of the offence of adultery. The introduction of new ‘domestic violence Act’, 
investigation of cases of cruelty by women police officers and making both wife beating and 
criminal cruelty to be made punishable under section 498A, IPC is critically examined. 
      Chapter five deals with rape law, custom of sati and female infanticide and female 
foeticide. Rape is virtually a living death for a woman. It was Mathura’s judgment of 
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Supreme Court that shocked and outraged the sensibilities of women organizations and as a 
result Criminal Laws (Amendment) Act 1983 was passed to plug the loopholes of rape law. 
The substantial change in section 375 and 376, IPC and introduction of new sections 376-A to 
376-D in IPC to curb the custodial rape, section 114-A in Evidence Act for presumption of 
the victim’s statement and section 327(2) in Cr.P.C. for conducting enquiry in camera are 
discussed in detail. 
      Sati, the custom of burning widows on the funeral pyres of their husbands persisted till it 
was outlawed in 1829. The Commission of Sati Prevention Act, 1987 banning Sati was 
enacted on the recommendations of CSWI report and in the background of Roop Kunwar’s 
case. Roop Kunwar, a university graduate, was burnt alive on her husband’s funeral pyre in 
Deorala, Rajasthan. Making glorification of Sati, attempt to commit Sati as punishable and 
constitution of special courts and constitutional validity of Act are critically dealt with.   
     The development of modern techniques such as amniocentesis and sex-determination tests 
have contributed to the foeticides. Female infanticide was prevalent in higher classes of 
Hindu. The main features and failures of MTP Act, 1971, PNDT Act 1994 and passing of 
Pre-Conception and Pre-Natal Diagnostic Techniques (Prohibition of Sex Selection) Act, 
2002 as a bold step to prohibit the communication to the pregnant woman the sex of the 
foetus have been discussed in this chapter. 
      In the sixth chapter the most prominent problem that Indian women have been facing 
from the ages, the prostitution, women workers in industries and agriculture and sexual 
harassment is taken up for study. Prostitution is the crudest manifestation of societies where 
women are driven to sell their bodies as a means of survival. A critical examination of 
prohibition of traffic of women for immoral purposes under Article 23 of the Constitution, the 
philosophy of Article 38 and 39 to prohibit all kinds of exploitation of women, the failure of 
Suppression of Immoral Trafficking in Women Act (SITA), 1956 and its renaming as 
Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act (PITA), 1986 and its failure to control the evil of 
prostitution, Constitutional validity of PITA and judicial responses has been made in the first 
part. 
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       Indian women are generally considered a second - class wage earners. The role of labour 
laws in protecting women workers and their problems relating to working hours, safety, 
health and welfare measures, maternity benefits and equal remuneration declared as 
fundamental right by the Supreme Court is discussed in this part. 
      The third part of this chapter deals with the women workers in agriculture sector as India 
has been a predominantly agriculture country. A critical study of protective legislations such 
as Constitutional provisions, Minimum Wages Act, The Bonded Labour System Abolition 
Act, The Kerala Agribultural Workers Act, 1974, The Workmen’s Compensation Act and the 
Agricultural Workers (Debt Exemption and Unemployment Relief) Bill has been taken up. 
      The sexual harassment and eve teasing in workplace, streets and public places is taken up 
in the fourth part of this chapter. Women do nothing about it due to fear of losing their jobs 
and prestige of family. The legal provisions for prosecution of sexual harassment cases under 
sections 294, 354 and 509, IPC, Vishaka and AEPC judgments of Supreme Court as turning 
points for women’s rights, judicial trends and drafting a Bill by NCW titled ‘Sexual 
Harassment of Women at Their Workplace (Prevention) Bill, 2003’ is discussed in nutshell. 
       Chapter seven brings out the number of judgments of higher judiciary through which the 
government machinery and enforcements agencies can be put on action and also the 
Parliament can pass the laws in order to eliminate the social evils relating to Indian women 
and upliftment of their status. The role of judiciary is the blueprint of public justice. The 
judiciary has performed a constructive and creative role in interpreting laws and enactments 
related to woman. The judiciary has evolved the doctrine of protective discrimination in 
favour of women a dynamic and living concept. The courts play a creative role in 
harmonizing and balancing the rights and interests of men vis-à-vis women. 
      In the final chapter, conclusions are drawn on the basis of the descriptive analysis made in 
the body of the thesis. In the beginning conclusions are drawn as to specific problems of 
Indian women discussed in the earlier chapters. Then, on the basis of the analytical study 
conducted throughout this work, findings and suggestions are evolved. Finally, some 
persisting problems of Indian women that needs reforms and a projection as to the further 
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research that can be conducted in this field of study as an ongoing process and its relevance to 
our society is also given. 
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CHAPTER-II 
 
POSITION OF WOMEN IN INDIAN SOCIETY 
 
1. Vedic Society.  The women in the Vedic period enjoyed equal status with men and 
independence in action. “miksi es ijk e`’k ek is nHkzkf.k eU;Fkk% A 
                           lokZg  efLe jkse’kk xU/kkjh.kk feokfodk A 
(Let the queen ask the king that she in no way inferior to him. As you impart justice among 
men so I do among women. In previous days wives of kings administered justice to the wives 
of their subject. I be also like them.) 1 
     History has put the emphasis on outstanding women and not woman as a whole. Florence 
Howe in her book “Women and the Power to Change” states that true business of civilization 
has been in the hands of men. On the other hand, the extent to which civilization has been 
built by women, is unacknowledged and unpaid.2 Position of women in the society is the true 
index of its social, economic, political, cultural and spiritual attainments. While tracing the 
history of women through the ages one finds that the role and status of women has been 
labeled as ranging from a position of authority and freedom to that of subservience.3   
     The status of women in early Vedic society is matter of some debate. Certain practices 
such as child marriage seem to have been unknown in early Vedic Society. However, society 
appeared to have been organized patrilineally, and while there were prayers for the birth of 
sons in particular and for praja or offspring in general, there was none for the birth of 
daughter. Further, most of the major deities in the early Vedic pantheon are male,4 which 
could possible indicate male domination on the human plane as well.  
     Vedic era was the golden era so far as equality of status and personal freedom of women 
are concerned. During that period woman enjoyed a fair amount of freedom and equality the 
                                                 
1   (Rigveda M—1, Sukti – 126, S1. – 6) 
2    (Amrita Das, “History of Women in India”, p.1)    
3    (Anjani Kant, “Women and the Law”, A.P.H. Publishing Corporation, New Delhi. (1997), p.25) 
4   (Kumkum Roy, “The Vedic Age (3): Societal Changes,” published in ‘Employment News Weekly’,  
New Delhi, dt. 25.3.89, P. 1) 
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man. Woman studies with men in Gurukul and there are instances of many Brahmavadinis 
like Gosa, Gargi and Matreye who were well versed in Vedas and actively participated in 
intellectal and philosophical discussions and discourses. Brides were free to select their 
grooms. The Vedic hymns informed us that both husband and wife were joint owners of 
family property and a daughter whether married or unmarried retained her right of inheritance 
in the property of her deceased father. Women were actively involved and associated with 
men in every socio-religious ritual and ceremony. The examples of polygamy were rare and 
mainly confined to ruling class. Dowry system was prevalent but only in rich and royal 
families. A wife was regarded as indispensable member of husband’s family and a center of 
domestic world. She proved herself a sincere friend, partner and a guide of her husband. She 
could move freely out of her house and enjoyed freedom of movement by attending fairs and 
festivals, Sabhas and Assemblies of learned persons. Marriage was regarded as indissoluble 
holy union and divorce was unknown except few examples of customary divorce in lower 
castes. Sati-Pratha was not pravelent and a widow could marry again or undertake Niyoga to 
get a son. A woman had an absolute ownership over the property and it was regarded as her 
“Stridhan”. Thus, a woman was regarded as equal partner, friend and equal sharer in joys and 
sufferings of her husband’s life in Vedic era. In social, cultural and education activities she 
enjoyed considerable freedom and more or less possessed equal rights in matters of religion. 
She was considered as human being and enjoyed a status and prestige in the society.1  
2. Smritik Period. In Smritic era the status and position of woman was gradually 
deteriorated. The honourable position and status of a Hindu woman enjoyed in Vedic era had 
gradually started declining. She was regarded as subservient to man and confined to 
household chores and child bearing. The writer of Manu Smriti was very harsh and cruel to 
women and Sudras. There appeared to be paradoxical position so far as status of Hindu 
woman was concerned according to Manu Smriti. Manu presented idealized picture of a 
Hindu wife by saying that “Married women must be honoured and adorned by their fathers, 
                                                 
1    (Tiwari Y.K., “Status of Hindu Women and Efficacy of Protective Legislations”, in “Women, Law 
 and Social Change”, ed. By Shamsuddin Shams, Ashish Publishing House, New Delhi (1991), 
p.21-22) 
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brothers, husband and brothers-in-law, who desire their own welfare. Where women are 
honoured, there the gods are pleased, but where they are not honoured, no sacred rite yields 
rewards.” 1 
     At other place, Manu stated that “there is a vital structural difference between man and 
woman and a woman could not possess an independent status.” “During her whole life a 
woman should be an appendage to male. Father protects her during maidenhood, husband 
during coverture and sons protect her during widowhood and thus a woman is never free.”2  
 
     Manu expected too much from a virtuous wife by merging her personality in the 
personality of her husband. He emphatically stated that, “Even if the husband is immoral, a 
debauch and lacks good qualities the wife must still worship him as if he were God to 
himself.” A woman need not perform any yajna or ceremony or undertake fast for her 
salvation. She will attain better life by service to her husband.”3  Smritkars imposed so many 
obligations on a Hindu woman and restrained her free movement. 
 
     It could not be finally ascertained as to when and for what reasons the position and status 
of Hindu woman had gone down and why she was made subservient and dependent on male. 
The causes of her insubordinate position in socio-economic and educational and religious 
matters were conflicting and inconsistent. Manu imposed manifold duties on a Hindu woman. 
She should be loyal to her husband and even after the death of her husband she should be 
virtuous and if she cohabited with another man after husband’s death, she would be tormented 
by diseases as punishment for her sin. 4 
 
     The injuctions of Manu merged the wife’s individuality with that of her husband and 
recommended strict seclusions for women and rigorous discipline for widows. While 
glorifying motherhood and allowing women all freedom in the management of the household, 
                                                 
1  (Manu Smriti, II: 260). 
2    (Manu Smriti, V: 148) 
3    (Manu Smriti at 154) 
4   (Manu Smriti at 164) 
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he permitted child marriage and polygamy. In the Dharma-shastras women are 
unambiguously equated with the sudras. Even the “Gita” places women, prostitutes and 
sudras in the same category and describes them as being of sinful birth. 
 
     The two major heterodox religions, Buddhism and Jainism supported greater freedom for 
women. Sanghmitra, the daughter of King Ashoka, The Great, established a nunnery in Sri 
Lanka and is remembered even today for her message of universal love. In South India, 
women enjoyed a higher status because of the prevalence of the matriarchal system.1  
3. Pauranic Period. The concept of dual existence and rhythm of cycle of birth, and death 
and rebirth, and theory of Pind Dan threw the Hindu women to a place of subservience, 
whatever they received in the Vedic period, they began to lose in the Pauranic period. It was 
the period of transformation because the role of Hindu women changed substantially. Now, 
marriage began to be treated as Sanskar and a religious act. It became obligatory to marry. 
The marital life was tagged with religion and religion made her dependant because to her 
through marriage alone were granted salvation. Marriage was the only sanskar for her and her 
consent became immaterial. The concept of sonship was affiliated to theory of Pind-dan, and 
for offering the Pind to the deceased the presence of the son was essential. Therefore, the 
women who could not beget a son for the husband suffered indignity and hollowness of her 
physical existence. One can then find a significant change in the attitude of the men towards 
women. The story of desertion, cruel treatment, hostile, callous attitude began to show its 
seeds towards the Hindu women with far reaching effect.2  
     In the epic period, the marriage was not decided somehow or anyhow by the parents, but 
was given due deliberation in respect of choice and selection guided by certain guiding 
principles and rules and not by any personal infatuation or fancy.3  The elaborate Svayamvara 
organized by Janaka with a desire to find the bet warrior of the land as his son-in-law4 is a 
                                                 
1    (Amrit Das, “History of Women in India”, p. 2.  A paper read by her in a Seminar held in I.T.  
College, Lucknow on “Position of Women” in the year 1988) 
2   (Anjani Kant, “Women And The Law”, A.P.H. Publishing Corporation, New Delhi (1997) pp.31-32) 
3   (Shanti Kumar Nanooram Vyas, “India in the Ramayana Age”, Edition 1988) 
4   (II.118.38, 42, Valmiki’s Ramayana) 
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positive proof indicating that the daughter was not in any way an object of indifference in the 
family. 
     In regard to a wife’s relations with her husband, the emphasis was unmistakably on 
faithfulness.1  It was impressed on her that the husband is her mainstay and without him she 
simply could not live.2 The husband enhances the beauty of a female more than her 
ornaments.3 An women’s spiritual guide is her husband, and her only asceticism (tapas) is 
ministering to his comforts.4   
     In the epic period, the woman was entitled to Stridhana. According to Manu and 
Katyayana,5  “What was given before the nuptial fire, what was presented in the bridal 
procession, what has been conferred on the wife through affection, and what has been 
received by her from her brother, her mother, or her father, are ordained the sixfold 
stridhanam or woman’s property.” The Kanya-dhana or bridal gifts offered by parents at their 
daughter’s marriage became her stridhana in modern terminology. This property must have 
remained at the disposal of wife. 
     Another duty of a husband, privilege of the wife, was to share all sacred rites and 
ceremonies. She helped him in discharging two of his debts- namely, to the gods by 
associating with him in sacrifices, and to the forefathers by procreating sons for continuing 
the line. Her character as a saha-dharma-charini indicates recognition of her status as an equal 
partner in man’s code of conduct. A wife, as already, said, was the better-half, the very soul 
of the husband.6  
     The widowhood was the greatest calamity that could befall a woman. The custom of sati, 
or self-immolation by the widow on the husband’s pyre, has little sanction in the Ramayana. 
None of the wives of Dasaratha or Ravana are represented as joining their husbands on the 
pyre. At the death of Dasaratha, Kausalya, in her lamentations exclaims that as a Patrivrata, 
                                                 
1   (Manu, 5/151) 
2   (II, 29. 7; Valmiki’s Ramayana) 
3   (V. 16. 26; Valmiki’s Ramayana) 
4   (II. 118. 2-9; Valmiki’s Ramayana) 
5   (D.B. iv. 1.4) 
6   (II. 37. 24; Valmiki’s Ramayana) 
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she would enter the burning fire embracing the corpse of her husband under cremation; but 
vyavaharikas or persons well-versed in worldly conduct get her removed from the scene.1 
This clearly shows that the practice of sati, though not totally unheard of, was not accorded 
social sanction and was not generally viewed with favour. There is no evidence to indicate the 
presence of a widow was held undesirable or suspicious on festive occasions. Among those 
who welcomed Rama on his return from exile were his widowed mothers, and Rama duly 
offered his respects to them.2  
     The mild form of purda and seclusion assumed the form of a recognized social custom in 
the age of Ramayana. When Sita sets out with her husband for the forest, through public 
thoroughfares, regret is expressed by Valmiki that “a lady, who had so far not been seen even 
by the spirits of the sky, should now become an object of public gaze”.3 This implies that 
royal ladies did not ordinarily leave precincts of the palace in order to avoid curious gaze of 
all and sundry. This practice of seclusion was, however, not insisted upon in emergencies like 
the outbreak of a war, an Svayamvara, sacrifices and marriages. These are the only occasions 
in the Ramayana when women are found moving about freely in public.4   
     The Ramayana furnished a definite instance, first in the history of Indian civilization, of 
royal recognition and prevalence of prostitution. The courtesans were not considered 
inauspicious is clear from the fact that, when Rama returned to Ayodhya from his exile in the 
forest, Bharata ordered a host of ganikas to go out to accord him a fitting reception.5 The 
vesyas, or strumpets, were not only a camp’s ornament but also an intergral part of civil life. 
Ayodhya is described as abounding in excellent courtesans.6  The epic is generally silent 
about the manner in which they practiced their trade but music and dance were universally 
cultivated among them. 
                                                 
1   (II. 66. 12-3, Valmiki’s Ramayana) 
2   (VI. 127. 49-50; Valmiki’s Ramayana) 
3   (II. 33.8; Valmiki’s Ramayana) 
4   ( VI. 114. 28; Valmiki’s Ramayana) 
5   (VI. 127. 3-5; Valmiki’s Ramayana) 
6   (Ganikavara-sobhitam, II. 51. 21; Valmiki’s Ramayana) 
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     Like property, woman had to be constantly protected and guarded;1 complete 
independence was never her right. The first refuge of a woman is her husband, second the 
son, third the relations; no fourth she has.2 A wife and her sons are declared by Rama to be 
under the restraint of their elders.3 The woman’s yogaksema (Maintenance and protection) 
rested completely on the diligent vigil of man.4 Since continuity of the family line was 
considered to be the main object of taking a wife,5 it was a husband’s duty to guard his wife 
carefully; for not well-guard she might bring disgrace to the family.6 Generally woman was 
never an individual capable of taking care of herself; she was to be subject to her husband, 
son or other relatives but women were allowed to take part freely in religious ceremonies, 
shows and entertainments.7  
     Polygamy was almost order of the day among the kings. Most of them whether Aryan, 
Vanara or Raksasa possessed large harems.  Dasaratha is said to have had 350 wives, besides 
the three principal queens.8 It is, however, Rama who has always been looked as the most 
notable exemplar of the ideal of monogamy. As depicted in the Uttarakanda, even after the 
passing away of Sita, Rama did not take a second wife,9 although the custom of the age 
permitted of that. Polyandry, too, is in evidence in the epic age, particularly among the non-
Aryan tribes of South India. In Kiskindha, the Vanara brothers, Vali and Sugriva, had Tara 
and Ruma as their common wives, though they quarrelled about it and excluded each other 
alternatively. Rama punished Vali for his illicit connection with Ruma, which shows that 
polyandry was abhorred by the Aryans. It is important to mention here that Draupadi also had 
five husbands.10  
                                                 
1  (II. 100. 49; Valmiki’s Ramayana) 
2   (II. 61. 24; Valmiki’s Ramayana) 
3   (II. 101. 18) 
4   (II. 53. 3; Valmiki’s Ramayana) 
5   (VII. 3.4) 
6   (III. 50. 7-8; VII. 9. 11; Valmiki’s Ramayana) 
7   (II. 15. 8, 12; Valmiki’s Ramayana) 
8   (II. 34. 13; Valmiki’s Ramayana) 
9   (VII. 99. 7; Valmiki’s Ramayana) 
10   (Anjani Kant, “Women and The Law”, A.P.H. Publishing Corporation, New Delhi (1997), p.45) 
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4. Mauryan Period. The role of women in Mauryan society is of some significance. It was 
taken for granted that their position was subordinate to that of the men. This is particularly the 
case in the type of society envisaged by the Arthasastra. Brahmanical treatises were usually 
severe with women, who, in later works are regarded without equivocation as an inferior 
species.1 The Buddhists were much more human in their attitude. Because the women were 
no independent, therefore, it was observed that “The decision to allow nuns in the Buddhist 
Order was one of tremendous importance, whereas their brahmanical counter parts would not 
even admit of education for women. It has been suggested and with some justification, that 
for a woman life in Buddhist society was not so trying as life in brahmanical society, since 
she was not regarded primarily as a child bearer. The birth of son was not necessary to 
Buddhist ritual as it was to Hindu ritual. Since Buddhist society accepted unmarried women, 
the women tended to be less concerned with finding husbands and consequently less 
subservient. All the same marriage was still regarded as the most suitable occupation for a 
woman. Working women were restricted in their work. The only possibilities seem to have 
been those of performing in circuses and plays, working as domestic slaves, either in private 
homes or in royal palaces, and as a last resort, setting themselves up as prostitutes and 
courtesans. At a later state when Hindus ideas on this matter began to infiltrate into Buddhism 
the woman’s importance even within the home, declined, and the older brahmanical attitudes 
were revived.2  
     The women were entitled to Stridhana, which may consist of vritti, or means of 
subsistence, or abandhya, such as ornaments. Vritti, thus includes bhumi, agricultural land, 
and cash (hiranyadi), above a minimum of 200 Karshapanas,3 which will produce an income 
from its investment.  It was lawful for the husband to make use of his wife’s property against 
emergencies like disease, scarcity, or calamity, and also in warding off dangers, and for a 
religious purpose. In the case of the first four approved kinds of marriage, when the husband 
                                                 
1   (Romila Thaper:”Asoka and the Decline of the Mauryas” II Edition, 11th Impression, 1990, p.86) 
2   (Romila Thaper, “Asoka and the Decline of the Mauryas,” II Ed., 11th Impression, 1990; p.87; See  
also Horner: “Women in Primitive Buddhism”, pp. 22 ff.) 
3   (Vachaspati Gairola, “Arthasastra of Kautilya & the Chanakya Sutra”, 3rd Edition, 1984, p.262) 
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and wife have become parents of two children, then the amount of stridhana spent by them up 
to a limit of 3 years will not be required to be repaid.1 
     A widow devoid of issue may remarry the brother of her husband with the consent of her 
father-in-law.2  She forfeits her property given by her husband and father-in-law if she 
remarries any one against the consent of the latter.3  A widow with a son has to pass her 
property to him in case she remarries.4   
     No doubt, Manu allowed the husband to leave his wife and remarry, but the woman was 
denied this privilege. According to Manu, “A wife who drinks spirituous liquors who acts 
immorally, who shows hatred to her husband, who suffers from an incurable disease, who is 
mischievously inclined, or who wastes his property, may be left by her husband who may 
replace her by another wife.”5  Manu also mentioned certain conditions under which the 
husband can desert his wife for a temporary period. But the above Smritkaras were 
unanimous in confining these rights of divorce and desertion to husband and denying them to 
women who was enjoined to offer unquestioning and unconditional obedience and fidelity to 
her husband in both life and death.6 Kautilya, however, was more rational and human by 
allowing women equal rights with men. He allowed the woman to divorce her husband under 
specified conditions. One of these was that both must consent to a divorce on the ground of 
their standing mutual enmity (Parasparam dveshat mokshah),7 so that they may start afresh in 
their matrimonial career. But Kautilya did not allow divorce when either party was against it. 
According to him, a woman, even if she is full of hostility against her husband, cannot seek 
divorce unless he consents to it. Nor can a husband seek it against his unwilling wife, 
however much he may dislike her. 
                                                 
1   (ibid) 
2   (ibid p.273) 
3   (ibid p. 263) 
4   (ibid p. 262) 
5   (Manusmriti, IX. 80) 
6   (Manusmriti, V.148 151, 154; IX. 77-78; Yajnavalkaya, I.75, 77) 
7   (III.3. See also “Chandra Gupta Maurya and His Times”, Madras University, Sir William Meyer  
Lectures, 1940-41: Radha Kumud Mookerji, 4th Ed., 1966, Reprint; Delhi, 1988, p.161) 
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     At the same time, Kautilya did not allow the wife to separate from her husband where her 
position was insupportable due to the husband being of mean morals (nicha), tainted by the 
commission of the worst sins (Patitah Mahapatakadushitah), or a murderer (Pranabhihanta), 
or impotent (Kliba), or afflicted by consumption (Rajakilbishi), or accused of bribery, or of 
treachery to the king, or where he was away in a foreign country.1  
     There is against, a difference between Kautilya and the later law-givers in regard to 
remarriage of woman. According to Manu, the sacred texts did not allow remarriage of 
widows, and it is condemned by the learned as fit for animals.2  He also stated emphatically 
that a maiden could be given in marriage only once.3  He did not allow a widow even to 
mention the name of another man in connection with marriage.4  Again, the period of absence 
of her husband, however, prolonged, was no excuse for the wife to choose a second husband.5  
     Kautilya treated the absence of husband as a cause for his wife’s remarriage, as has been 
stated above.  The time of such absence differed according to circumstances such as caste, 
whether the woman was a mother or not, or whether she was provided with maintenance. In 
the case of the husband being a Brahmin student who was absent for study abroad, the period 
of waiting was extended to 10 years, and, if she was a mother, to 12 years. Remarriage was 
not permitted where the husband was an officer of the State and was sent abroad on public 
duty. Where the aforesaid period of waiting were exceeded, the wife was permitted to take a 
second husband of the same caste to prevent the extinction of her family.6 The wife might 
also remarry a second husband after her liking where due to the absence of husband, she 
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lacked maintenance and was not maintained by her relations, and was thus compelled to 
remarry as a means of livelihood, or of saving herself against difficulties.1  
5. Mughal Period.  In mughal period the functions and the position of a woman were 
distinctly subordinate and in the long run came to be understood as the service of the male 
and dependence upon him in every stage of life. As a daughter, a woman lived under the 
wardship of her father, as a wife under the tutelage of her husband and as widow under the 
care of her eldest son. In a word her life was state of perpetual wardship and the social laws 
and customs stamped her with a sort of mental deficiency.2 A mother giving birth to a number 
of girls in succession was despised. Amongst some of the Rajput clans the girls were killed at 
the time of their birth. According to James Tod, the famous author of ‘The Annals and 
Antiquities of Rajasthan’, the Rajputs resorted to that practice due to the scarcity of suitable 
matches in the same clan and continuous wars and feuds with the remote tribes together with 
the sentiment that unworthy match lowers the prestige of the bride’s father. The girls were 
considered a liability right from the time of their birth.3  
     As a wife also woman had to follow the commands of the mother-in-law and win other 
members of husband’s family through dedicated service. However, generally in course of 
time the women acquired freedom to manage the household. Even the Muslim wives were 
expected to pull on properly with the mother-in-law failing to do so could lead to divorce. 
The women on family way were treated with great respect by relatives as well as neighbours. 
However, when they actually delivered the child they were not touched by anyone except the 
mid wife. In relation to her husband also the women enjoyed a subordinate position. The final 
word in mot of the matters rested with the husband even though he often consulted his wife 
and give due weight age to her counsel. No social function amongst the Hindus could be 
performed without wife, which was described as the better half of man. In short, even though 
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the wives were accorded a subordinate position to husband they were treated with respect and 
importance.1  
     The position of women in Mughal period can be studied in the following terms: 
Paradah System.     The position of Hindu women who were treated at par with men and 
given a position of pride considerably declined during he medieval period. One of the 
immediate impact of the coming of Muslims in India was the introduction of paradah system. 
Paradah or veiling of women, was a common practice among the Muslims and was adopted 
by the Hindus women under the stress of circumstances. As Prof. R.C. Majumdar has 
observed, “The Hindus adopted paradah as a protective measure to save the honour of their 
women folk and to maintain the purity of their social order. Probably the tendency to imitate 
the ruling class was also a contributory factor for the adoption of paradah by the Hindu 
families.”2  
     Purdah seems to have grown in India during Mughal times, when it became a mark of 
status and prestige among both Hindus and Moslems. The custom of seclusion of women 
spread especially among the upper classes of those areas where Moslem influence had been 
most marked in the great central and eastern block comprising Delhi, the United Provinces, 
Rajputana, Bihar and Bengal. And yet it appears to be odd that purdah has not been very strict 
in the Punjab and in the Frontier Province, which are predominantly Moslem. In the South 
and West of India there has been no such seclusion of women, except to some extent among 
the Moslems.3  
Education.   A word may be said about female education which practically non-existent 
among both Hindus and Muhammadans in Mughal days. The author of Qanun-I-Islam speaks 
of girls being taught the Koran from beginning to end and elementary reading;4 but their 
studies ceased at such an early age that they could not have learnt much. Occasionally also 
the daughters of the imperial house and of rich nobles were given tuition within the precincts 
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of the harem, as for example at the palace in Fatehpur Sikri, in which certain rooms were 
specially set apart for this purpose by Akbar. Some of the ladies so taught distinguished 
themselves in the paths of literature; Babur’s daughter, Gulbadan Begam, wrote the 
Humayun-nama; Humayun’s niece, Salima Sultana, was the author of many Persian poems; 
Jahangir’s queen, Nur Jahan, was highly educated and well versed in Persian and Arabic 
Literature; so also was Mumtaz Mahal, wife of Shah Jahan. Jahanara Begam daughter of Shah 
Jahan, was taught the Koran and the Persian language by a learned Persian lady, Satiun-nissa 
who eventually became sadr or superintendent of the harem; in the same way Aurangzeb’s 
daughter, Zebu-n nissa, was educated by Hafiza Mariam, whose family originally hailed from 
Naishapur in Khurasan. Zebu-n nissa, who inherited her father’s intellect and the family taste 
for literature, was a fine Arabix and Persian scholar, was an expert in calligraphy, and 
collected a valuable library. The garden on the outskirts of Lahore, known as the Char-burji, 
the only remain of which today are semi-ruined gateway, is said to have belonged to the 
princess and to have been the scene of her literary labours. Her literary studies must have 
done much to lighten the captivity, which she underwent by Aurangzeb’s orders, as a 
punishment for her complicity in Prince Akbar’s rebellion, and from which she was only 
released by death in May 1702. One can not help expressing a word of regret that modern 
vandalism in the guise of the constructors of the Rajputana railway should have demolished 
the tomb which Aurangzeb ordered to be built for her remains in the “Garden of Thirty 
Thousand Trees”, outside the Kabuli gate of Delhi.1  
Marriage and Divorce. The Hindus by and large practiced monogamy (one wife), however, 
a small section of Hindu population consisting of princes and wealthy persons married more 
than once. The Hindus of middle class married second time only if their wife proved to be 
barren or died. This was also done with the consent of Brahmans. On the other the Muslims 
who were permitted by Quran to have four wives at a time also generally practiced 
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monogamy. Only rich Muslims took to polygamy (more than two wives) and maintained 
three or four wives at a time.1  
     As a general rule the girls were married at an early age in both the communities. Generally 
they were married at the age of 7 or 8. Usually the girls of middle and lower classes were not 
given much education. However, they were imparted training in domestic affairs, needlework, 
embroidery, cooking etc. The existence of early marriage naturally implied that the selection 
of the bride or bridegroom was made by the parents and the practice of seeing the girls before 
marriage did not exist.2  
     Divorce was rather uncommon among the Hindus, even though it was quite a regular 
feature amongst the Muslims. The divorce amongst the Shias was more regulated than among 
the Sunnis. In matters of divorce the husband enjoyed absolute and unquestioned power, 
while the wives were denied such right. There was also provision for re-union after divorce.3  
     Widow remarriage was virtually non-existent among the Hindus. A Hindu widow had 
either to live a life of celibacy for the rest of the life or burn herself on the funeral pyre of the 
dead husband. According to Al Biruni “they generally choose the latter course. On the other 
hand widow marriage was permitted amongst the Muslims but the widows were given the 
status of a second-rate wife”.4  
Women and the Imperial Household. The imperial harem contained 5000 women, each of 
whom had a separate apartment; and for the purpose of control the women were divided in to 
sections, each under female daroga or commandant, who was responsible for the management 
and discipline of her respective section. The women were paid monthly salaries ranging from 
1000 to 1600 rupees. These salaries, coupled with the wages of staff, guards, etcl, and current 
and miscellaneous charges, brought the expenditure on the harem to very high figure, 
calculatd by Hawkins during Jahangir’s reign at 30,000 rupees a day.5 A body of armed 
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female guards protected the inside of the harem enclosure; outside it were the eunuchs; and 
beyond them again were posted companies of Rajputs. To ensure complete security, other 
troops were employed at a greater distance. The imperial zenana with its women, servants, 
porters, female guards, eunuchs, and military guards practically formed a separate town.   
6. British Period.  The position of women was not satisfactory in the early period of British 
Rule. The reason being that they were the subject of object exploitation and discrimination as 
was ordained in the Sastric texts. The position of women in the words of Shastri appeared to 
be as follows:  “The enforced child-marriages, the exposure of the female children by 
throwing them at the junction of the Ganges and the sea, the violence used to make women 
follow the sati rule and, thus, end their miserable existence, the shameful treatment according 
to a widow the famous kulinism which make marriage a profession rather than a sacrament, 
made woman not only an object of pity but many a woman sighed in the secret recess of her 
heart and wished that she had never been born a woman in the unfortunate country.”1 
According to Altekar, “…Denied the benefits of education, brought up in the authoritarian 
atmosphere, having no opportunities to develop their natural capacities, women became 
helpless, illiterate, narrow-minded and peevish….”2  
     Roy comments on ‘zenana were the places where the woman lay condemned to a lifelong 
prison, a helpless, prostrate and pathetic figure with feeble health, her naturally keen sense 
dulled through inactions without the light of knowledge illuminating her vision, steeped in 
ignorance and prejudice, groping in the dark, martyr in the conventions of society in which 
she was born.’3  
     Cursing the curse of polygamy, Vidyasagar says that “With the coolin Brahmin, the sacred 
rite of matrimony had been notoriously degraded to a system of shameful traffic. These men 
for some sordid gain of some paltry sum visited village after village accepting the hands of 
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scores of maidens, the great majority of whom were destined never to enjoy the blessings of a 
wedded life.”1  
     Condition of Hindu widows, who did not burn themselves to remain alive was very 
pathetic. The Proceedings of the Legislative Council of India remarks that: “Not only must 
she see no man, she must also avoid very approach to ease, finery and pleasure. She must 
neglect the care of her person, must bear no ornaments; her hair must be shaved or, atleast, 
must be worn disheveled. She must not see her face in a mirror, nor use perfume or flowers, 
must not anoint her body; and her dress must be coarse and dirty. The use of any kind of 
conveyance is prohibited. And, she must not rest in bed. Her food is limited as to quantity and 
quality. She must not take more than a single course meal a day. Besides other facts perhaps a 
dozen in a year, a Hindu widow is required to abstain absolutely from food and drink from 
which not even severe sickness can give her dispensation.”2  
     A strange notions developed around women’s education: “Notion of providing the means 
of instruction for female never enters into the minds of parents. A superstitious feeling is 
alleged to exist in the majority of Hindu families, principally cherished by the women and not 
discouraged by men, that a girl taught to write and read will soon after marriage become 
widow…. and the belief is also generally entertained…that intrigue is facilitated by a 
knowledge of letters on the parts of females.”3  
Economically too woman became dependent on men; “The present woman is an atrophied 
limbs of the social organism and specially in civilized society she depends as completely for 
her support and sustenance on the husband as a child does on its mother.”4  
     In Christianity, the myth of creation, which says that Eve was created after Adam to act as 
her companion and helpmate, accords a second place to woman in domestic and social life. 
She has to be subordinate first to her father and then to her husband. The mythic image of Eve 
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as one who tempted Adam to eat the forbidden fruit from the Edn Garden has put a permanent 
stamp over woman as temptress and seducer and has given the husband right to control wife. 
Thus, the status of women was reduced to a “dumb driven cattle”.1  
     The impact of British Rule on Indian women can be studied in following terms: - 
The Renaissance. In the nineteenth century, India began to discover her long cherished ideals 
and cultural self-consciousness. This came to be known as the period of “Renaissance” in 
India. The remodeling of her cultural modes and indigenous values began herein. It meant a 
reawakening, a process of rediscovery, and a reform of the self. The reformers, who 
advocated the emancipation of women, aspired the restoration of such healthy and congenial 
conditions, which once prevailed in the early Vedic period. The renaissance of Indian women 
attained its fruition by “the renewed awareness of Indian’s glorious past.”2  This implies that 
the removal of evils and social practices was perceived not in the light of new liberal thought 
of the west but on the basis of revival of the Vedic feminine ideals, which was thought to be 
truly democratic.3  
     In response to the enlightened Indian public opinion, the British rulers legislated against 
the glaring social evils. Significant legal reforms were abolition of ‘sati’ in 1827, the 
suppression of infanticide in 1725 and 1804, and the removal of restriction on remarriage of 
the widow in 1856. Although these early reforms and legislations were not able to bring 
intended results, they did succeed in creating resurgence among Indian women. Under the 
western impact, Indian women experienced an air of freedom and the stir of the new life. In 
the words of O’ Malley, “profound as has been the penetration of the west in to men’s ideas 
of religion, caste and national status, it has nowhere penetrated more deeply than its 
revaluation of women,” it brought to women a total new concept of themselves as persons 
“individually important and nationally needed.”4  
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     It should be noted that it were men, and not women, who initially heralded women’s 
cause. The leading reformers of the Renaissance period launched a vigorous campaign against 
social evils that affected Indian women. The father of the Indian Renaissance was Raja Ram 
Mohan Roy (774) in West Bengal. He pleaded that it was erroneous to consider women as 
weak in intellect and virtue and deficient in resolution, trustworthiness and control over 
passion.1 He opposed the custom of Sati and polygamy and encouraged widow-remarriage. 
He founded Brahma Samaj in 1828 and used English education to transform the social system 
responsible for the misery of women. In fact, West Bengal produced several other social 
reformers. For instance, Devendra Nath Tagore (1817) and Iswar Chandra Vidya Sagar 
(1820) supported the views of Raja Ram Mohan Roy. Deshab Chandra Sen attacked 
Kulinism, public dances by women, and tried his best to make women men’s true partner in 
life. He brought out a monthly magazine Bamabodhini, exclusively meant for women. He 
denounced polygamy, encouraged inter-caste marriages and opposed purdah system for 
women.2  It was due his courage perseverance that the civil Marriage Act of 172 was passed. 
Rabindra Nath Tagore (1861) and Swami Vivekanand (1863) also supported these views. 
     In Uttar Pradesh, Huzur Maharaj Rai Salig Ram, born in 1829 in Agra, has published a 
fortnightly journal, Prem Patra, wherein he had advocated Indian women’s emancipation, 
highlighted women’s problem and created awareness among the people about the plight of 
women. He opposed purdah and challenged the traditional beliefs that the husband is the 
virtual guru (teacher) of his wife. He did all what we could to remove illiteracy among 
woman.3  
     In Madras Viresalingam devoted himself to the women’s advancement through education 
marriage reforms.4  
     Swamy Dayanand Saraswati, born in Gujrat in 1823, advocated the female education, 
widow remarriage, and marriage by consent, like ancient Swayamvara, and procured 
readmission into Hindu society of those who have once been converted to other religions 
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through Suddhi. He founded the Arya Samaj in 1875 at Bombay.1 Mahadev Govind Ranade, 
born in Bombay 1842 founded Indian Social Conference and supported the cause of women. 
He favoured freedom in choice of marriage partners and wanted to infuse traditional virtues.2 
Behramji Malabari (1853) published a journal, Indian Spectator, to spread his reformist ideas. 
He opposed infant marriage and forced widowhood.3 It was his effort which led to the Age of 
Consent Act 1881 that raised the age of consent to 12 years. Gopal Krishna Gokhale (1866) 
established Servants of Indian Society to carry out the work of social reform. He was deeply 
interested in the propagation of female education. He opposed the seclusion of women.4 Thus 
the male social reformers of the Renaissance differed about the nature and scope of the work, 
but all of them were of the view that women’s lot need amelioration. All reformers had to 
face opposition from the reactionaries in Hindu society. 
     Some outstanding women of the nineteenth century Indian Renaissance struggled against 
heavy odds to pursue their mission of women’s emancipation. For instance, Pandita Ramabai 
(1858-1922) of Maharashtra exhorted women to abandon the evil practice of child marriage, 
to educate themselves, and to do away with wrong meted out to them.5 She fought for the 
right for women and challenged religious orthodoxies on the authority of scriptures 
themselves. Anandibai Joshi (1865), a physician by proession, opposed child marriages and 
wanted to provide proper medical care.6  Francina Sorabjee advocated for female education 
and established many schools for this purpose. Annie Jagannadhan and Rukmabai, both 
physicians by profession, challenged Indian traditionalism and devoted to the service of 
women. Madam Kama (1861-1936), Toru Dutt (1856-1877) and Swarupkumari Devi (1855-
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1932) were other pioneers, among others.1 The major success of the social reformers of the 
period of renaissance was that they created an awakening among Indian women as a result of 
which they themselves came to assume the responsibilities of their own cause and began to 
raise the demand for their proper place in society. 
National Movement.  Gandhi emerged on the Indian political scene in 1918. He appreciated 
qualities of Indian women : “To call women the weaker sex is a libel; it is man’s injustice to 
woman. If by strength is meant moral power, then woman is immeasurably man’s superior. 
Has she not greater intuition, is she not more self-sacrificing, has she not greater powers of 
endurance, has she not greater courage? Without her man could not be. If non-violence is the 
law of our Being, the future is with women”.2  
     Gandhi devoted his attention to women’s cause. He opposed child marriage3 and deplored 
the treatment meted out to Hindu widows.4 He wanted to gave every widow the right to 
marry. He condemned the system of purdah and appealed to the parents to be broadminded. 
For him, the system of dowry was a real drag on society.5 He held men responsible for 
women’s degradation. He wanted to bring women on footing with men.6  
     Gandhi adopted the technique of passive resistance or Satya-Graha.  In the silent suffering 
and self-sacrifice of women Gandhi saw one of the strongest features of Indian women and it 
is that women are by nature more suited to fight with new weapons of non-violence and truth. 
He thought that women by nature are more nonviolent than men. In 1938, he wrote, “I do 
believe that it is woman’s mission to exhibit ahimsa (non violence) at its highest and its 
best…. For women is more fitted than man to make ahimsa. For the courage of self-
sacrificing woman is in any way superior to man, as I believe man is to woman for the 
courage of the brute.”7  
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     Having envisioned these qualities of women, Gandhi thought women’s entry into the fields 
of politics, educations and economics will have a civilizing effect: “Woman is the 
embodiment of sacrifice and suffering, and her advent to public life should, therefore, result 
in purifying it, in restraining unbridled ambition and accumulation of property.”1 Thus, 
Gandhi pleaded for equality and economic independence for women but advised them not to 
practise these rights, for they were fitted to the “brute nature” of man. 
     The All-India Women’s Conference (AIWC), which was founded in 1927, was the product 
of reawakening of women. At its first meet in Poona in 1927, AIWC confined itself to the 
educational programme for women, but it soon enlarged the scope of its activities. 
Unfortunately, a great proportion of its activities was confined only to the passing of 
numerous resolutions: the practical work undertaken to implement those resolutions was, 
however, extremely meager. Thus, the demands embodied in the bold resolution of AIWC 
often remained, in substance, paper demands.2   
The Advent of The Twentieth Century. Throughout the nineteenth century even the most 
advanced men generally returned to unchanged homes, where the senior woman of the family 
held her secular sway over the domestic economy of the household. Her husband could not 
discuss with her affairs of his daily life for, she knew nothing of his external contacts. His life 
was cut into two completely separated halves outside and the inside home.3  
     The situation that prompted women to launch movement in the twentieth century with 
fresh ferment was well described by Rajkumari Amrit Kaur: “The Women’s movement is the 
expression of the instinctive desire of women to rise to full liberty of soul, to the fullest 
development as human beings. To serve whole heartedly, to give without stint, is an essential 
part of the development of free women. We have to battle against apathy, prejudice, and 
ignorance but there is within us now a passion for reform which, I like to believe, has been 
kindled at an altar where burns, the flame of love for God and man.”4 It is implied that 
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women were no longer willing to submit to standards set for them by men the standards that 
have implied complete subordination and even degradation of all classes of women. 
     There were many other women of renown who took the cause of women. Margaret E. 
Cousins (1878-1954) was keenly interested in the progress of female education.1  Margaret 
Nobel (1867-1911), later known as Sister Nivedita, Sarla Devi Chaudhury (1872), Saroini 
Naidu (1879-1949), Rustomji Fairdoonji, Heerabai Tata, S. Muthulakshmi Reddi (1886), 
Durgabai Deshmukh (1909), Rajkumari Amrit Kaur (1929), Vijay Lakshmi Pandit (1900), 
Kamala Devi Chattopadhyay (1903), Begum Sariffa Hamid Ali are some of the most 
prominent names among others, who took part in the national movement and worked towards 
advancement of women.2 These leaders rendered selfless service to the cause of Indian 
womanhood. They projected the free, strong, and courageous image of Indian womanhood. 
The women leader, by and large belonged to the urban high and middle class families. They 
had very little or no touch with rural problems. Hence, they failed to fathom the socio-
economic maladies of their rural sisters. Their attention was focused mainly on education of 
women. Relatively less attention was paid to other problems. And, to some extent, this is the 
case till date. 
     The British rulers did not interfere with the traditional Indian social system, for, their 
purpose was to rule and not to disturb the equilibrium by taking radical steps like reform of 
women. However, in the process of manipulating and serving their own interest, the colonial 
masters introduced English and allowed missionaries to operate. This created an army of men 
who started questioning the utility of age -old social system. And, this subsequently led to the 
reform movement of renaissance period. 
     Sir C.P. Ilbert pointed out that “one of the difficulties in the way of codification of the 
personal laws of Hindus and Mohammedans arises from the natural sensitiveness of Hindus 
and Mohammedans about legislative interference with matters closely touching their religious 
usages and observances.”3 The prejudices of some of the Dharmashastra writers along with 
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the degenerate customs which arose in the Hindu society in course of time under the impact 
of foreign domination, mainly the Muslim rule, were responsible for making the social 
position of Hindu women rather weak and inequitable. They came to occupy an inferior 
position in the eyes of law. This needed to be corrected and, therefore, the legislature enacted 
a number of Statutes designed to improve the lot of women in the Hindu society.The Hindu 
Widow’s Remarriage Act, passed in 1856, was the first important measure in this series. This 
Act legalized the remarriage of the Hindu widows. It was an enabling Act and was passed at 
the instance of a reformist section of the Hindus. Thereafter, the Hindu Women’s Rights to 
Property Act was enacted in 1937. The Act conferred on the Hindu women some limited 
property right than they had in past possessed. It was the beginning for an important piece of 
legislation, which effected revolutionary changes in the domain of Hindu law of joint family, 
coparcenary, partition, inheritance, etc. in course of time. The last statute in this series was the 
Hindu Married Women’s Rights to Separate Residence  and Maintenance Act enacted in 
1946, which enabled a Hindu married woman, without dissolving the marriage, to claim 
separate residence and maintenance from her husband under certain circumstances mentioned 
in the Act. 
     A few statutes were enacted to suppress some objectionable social practices, which had 
come to have the sanction of law and custom amongst the Hindus. The first step in this 
respect was the abolition of the inhuman practice of sati by Lord William Bentinck very early 
in the day. A very conspicuous evil, which was sapping the very vitals of the society, was the 
practice of child marriage. To discourage this practice, the Child Marriage Restraint Act was 
enacted in 1929. 
     A few Acts were passed to relax the rigidity and rigours of the joint family system and to 
amend the law of inheritance. By the Hindu Gains of Learning Act, 1930, all acquisitions 
through learning, whether ordinary or specialized, whether imparted at the expense of joint 
family or of any member there of, became the self-acquired and absolute property of the 
person acquiring the same.  
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      Changes made in the Hindu law were far greater than was the case in the domain of the 
Muslim law. In fact, some of the statutes were passed in order to restore the orthodox doctrine 
of Muslim law and undo the effect of judicial decisions. This can be ascribed to some extent 
to the lack of enlightened public opinion among the Muslims. The first legislative change 
made in the law was in 1913 when the legislature enacted the Wakf Act. This was an attempt 
to undo the effect of a ruling given by the Privy Council in the famous case, Adul Fatah 
Mohamed Ishak v. Roosomoy Dhur Chowdhary,1 in which it was held that wakfs, which were 
founded for “aggrandizement” of family, or gifts, or charity which were illusory, or wakfs 
which were merely nominal were void. The Muslims regarded this judicial dicta as being 
inconsistent with the true view of the Shariat. Therefore, the Wakf Act of 1913, sought to 
bring the law back to the Muslim Shariat law and restored to the Muslims the right to make 
valid wakfs in favour of the family. The communities like Khojas, Memons, Vohras had 
become converts from Hinduism to the Muslim religion. Even though they renounced the 
Hindu religion, they did not renounce the Hindu law completely and in the area of inheritance 
and succession, the Hindu law continued to be administered to them by the courts as a 
customary law. The orthodox Muslim opinion did no relish this position. Therefore, in 1937, 
the Shariat Act was passed which abrogated these customs and brought these communities 
under the Muslim law. In effect, Section 2 of the Act abrogated custom. In all matters except 
agricultural land, the rule of decision among Muslims was to be the personal Law (Shariat).2 
Another piece of legislation was enacted in 1939. The Dissolution of the Muslim Marriage 
Act gave to a Muslim wife the right of judicial separation from the husband, which had been 
denied to her earlier, perhaps because the courts followed mainly the Hanafi School of 
Interpretation of the Muslim law. It appears to be an anachronism that while the Hindu law is 
being shaped according to new ideas, the Muslim law should remain static and be 
unresponsive to those very forces. The Government of India remains chary of making a move 
                                                 
1   (22 I.A. 76) 
2   (A.A.A. Fyzee: Outlines of Muhd. Law, 45. See also M.P. Jain: “Outlines of Indian Legal History”, 
3rd ed. 1972, p.604) 
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suo motu to modify the Muslim law until there arises a strong public opinion amongst the 
Muslims themselves to support it.1                                               
                                                              
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1   (I.L.I.: Proceedings of the Seminar on Reform of Muslim Law (1972). See also an Article of Tahir 
Abbas: “Muslim Personal Law” published in “Swantra Bharat” (Lucknow’s daily News Paper) dated 
29.5.83) 
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                                    CHAPTER - III 
 
WOMEN’S RIGHT TO PROPERTY AND MAINTENANCE 
      
 Property Rights of Hindu Women  
         H k k; k Z  i q=’p =; ,ck / ku k %  Le `r k % AZ q `  
          ;r ~r s  le f / kxPNf Ur ;L; Sr s  rL; rn ~& / ku a AA~ s S s ~ a  
( A wife, a son and a slave, these three even are ordained destitute of property; whatever they 
acquire becomes his property, whose they belong.)1 
     At the valedictory session of three-day convention on Uniform Civil Code P. 
Chidambaram, Minister for Personnel and Administrative Reforms stated: 
“An analysis of the marriage and succession laws of all the religions showed that they  
    stemmed from a fundamental desire to secure    and keep control over property in the hands of 
men and to “assert the superiority of one gender over the other.” 2 
     The above statement is profoundly true. Laws that were avowedly enacted with the 
objective of promoting egalitarianism and to remove discrimination consciously retained 
features that discriminated against women.  Thus, the deprivation of women’s access to land 
and other productive resources continues in a gross form in spite of the apparently far-
reaching changes in the laws of inheritance of the Hindus to give better rights to women.3   It 
is said that the economic status, which is the very foundation on which can be built any 
structure of equality may be understood theoretically, but not in practical life.4It has gained 
more importance in the light of the recent Supreme Court Judgments. In an important case of 
                                                 
1 (Manu and Katyayana D.B. iv.1.4)  
 
2 (The Statesman, October 20, 1986, p.2). 
 
3 (Sivaramayya B. ‘Women’s Access to land and other Productive Resources: Legislative Policy Hunting with 
Hounds and Running with Hare’ in “ Women, Law and Social Change” edited by Shamsuddin Shams, A.P.H. New 
Delhi (1991).   
4 (Sarkar Lotika ; Status of Women and Law as an instrument of Social Change, 25 J.I.L.I., (1983) 262, 267) 
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Pratibha Rani v. Suraj Kumar1, the Supreme Court had declared that the husband was pure 
and simple custodian of the property i.e., Stridhan of his wife and mere fact of joining her 
husband would not indicate that she had entrusted her stridhan to her husband.  If the husband 
misappropriated such property, he should be held responsible for offence of criminal breach 
of trust as has been defined under Section 405 of the Indian Penal Code.  
     The term ‘Stridhan’ includes all kinds of property of which a woman had become the 
owner, whatever the extent of her right over it.2Jimutvahana  restricted  the term to that 
property of the woman over which she had absolute control even during the life of her 
husband.3 
     The text of Manu states that a wife, a son and a slave could have no property and that the 
wealth, which they earn, was acquired for him to whom it belonged.4 But Stridhan property 
belongs to women only.  According to Manu’s commentators “they could not dispose of their 
property independently”.5  Gautama distinctly admitted the right  of a woman to hold a 
separate property and provided for its succession.6  Apasthamba stated that the share of the 
wife consists of her ornaments and the wealth, which she might have received from her 
relations. 
 
     The text of Manu required a righteous King to punish such relatives as thieves who 
appropriate the property of women during their life time.7 
It is clear that from early time Hindu Law recognized the full right of woman to hold separate 
property. 
     Henry Maine in his “Early History of Institutions” states that “It is certainly a remarkable 
fact that the institution seems to have developed among the Hindus at a period relatively 
                                                 
1(AIR 1985 SC 628)  
2 (Mitakshara, 11 xi, 2-3).   
3 (Dayabhaga, iv, 1, 18). 
4(Manusmriti, viii, 416)  
5 (Medhatithi, Vol.IV, 434-5). 
6 (Gautam, XXVIII, 24-26). 
7  (Medhatithi, Vol. IV 434-35. Kallupa on Manu, VIII, 416). 
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much earlier that among the Romans.”1  But he seems to think that it gradually deteriorated to 
an insignificant position.2   
Stridhan  
     The concept of Stridhan is as old as the Rigveda.  The references of Rigveda indicate that 
the woman did hold separate property and had dominion over it.  “How many a maid pleading 
to the suitor who fain would marry for her splendid riches?”3 In this verse, it is quite clear that 
the woman had a separate property , which she could take along with her marriage.  There are 
references of a childless widow going to the place of judgment for getting wealth.4 
The Rigveda Society seems to have recognized the following items of property as constituting 
a woman’s Stridhan : 
(a) Gifts from parents and brothers (Rigveda, I-109.2, 126.3) 
(b) Gifts before the nuptial fire (Rigveda, X- 85.7) 
(c) Gifts in the bridal procession (Rigveda, IX-112.3) 
(d) Earning by mechanical arts (Rigveda, II-17.7) 
      There are also references to daughters growing old in their father’s house and getting a 
share and to a childless widow claiming husband’s property.5  In marriage hymns of the 
Atharva Ved,6 evidence of giving dowry to bride by brother or parents is also clear.  The 
mantra is recited at the time of marriage telling the bride “blest be the gold offered to thee.”  
The Hindu woman of Vedic society did hold her property independently and effectively.  She 
further, had a right to dispose it off according to her own choice.  
     During the Smritis period Stridhan contained what was given before the nuptial fire i.e., 
adhyagni, what was given at the bridal procession (adhyavahanika), what was given in token 
of love (dattam-Pritikarmani) and what was received from a brother, a mother, or a father, are 
considered as the six-fold  property of a woman.7 
                                                 
1 (Viramitrodaya, V 1, 2.). 
2 (P.V. Kane, II History of Dharmashastras, 1953, 321-324). 
3 (Rigveda, X, 27,12.). 
4(Rigveda, I-124-7).  
5 (Rigveda, I-124.7). 
6 (Atharva Veda, IXI-1.2) 
(Manusmriti, IX-184).7  
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     Vijaneshwar has defined the Stridhan in the Mitakshara, as: “That which was given by the 
father, by the mother, by the husband or by a brother and that which was presented by the 
maternal uncles and the rest at the time of wedding before the nuptial fire; and a gift on a 
second marriage or gratuity on account of supersession, and as indicated by the word ‘adya’ 
(the rest), property obtained by inheritance, purchase, partition, seizure and this is stridhan 
according to Manu and the rest.” 1 
     For the purposes of succession, Bombay School divided stridhan into two classes: (i) 
technical, and (ii) non-technical. The technical stridhan means the various kinds of property 
expressly recognized by the Vedic laws and smritis.  Non-technical stridhan includes every 
type of property excluding the technical stridhan.  As to the succession to this property, the 
sons or other heirs alone succeeded to the mothers property, even if there be daughters.2 The 
order of this preference has been approved by Hon’ble Bombay High Court in Mani Lal v. 
Bai Rewa 3 and by the Privy Council in Kesservai v. Hunsraj.4      
     The Dayabhaga of Jimutvahana is the leading authority of the Bengal School.  
Jimutvahana defines stridhan in these words, “that alone is stridhan which she (a woman) has 
power to give, sell or use independently of her husband’s control.” 5 
     Immovable property obtained by a Hindu woman on partition of Joint Family Property 
was not her stridhan in the sense that on here death it did not pass on to her stridhan heirs but 
reverted on her death to the next heir of the husband.6 
     The property inherited by woman from a male was not her absolute property, and it passed 
on her death not to her stridhan heirs but to the heirs of the male from whom she inherited it.7 
     It is equally well settled that the property, which a woman had taken by inheritance from a 
female, was not stridhan for the purpose of inheritance.8 
                                                 
1(Mayukha, Chapter IV, Sec. 10).  
2(Vyavahara Mayukha, translated by V.N. Mandlik (1921), Vol. I. X, 26)  
(1893, 17 Bom.758)3  
4 ((1906) 33 I.A.176). 
5 (Anjani Kant, “Women and the Law”, A.P.H. Publishing corporation, New Delhi (1997)). 
6 (Debi Mangal Prasad v. Madho Prasad, (1912) 391 All.121). 
7 (Bachiraju vVenkatapadu, (1865) 2 MHC, 402) 
8 (Ramasamy Gounder v. Ramaswami Gounder, (1972) 1 MLJ 41) 
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Women’s  Estate 
     The Mitakshara considered all inherited property either from parent’s side or from 
husband’s side as stridhan.  But the Privy Council in a series of decisions held such property 
as women’s estate.  In one set of cases, the Privy Council the Privy Council held that property 
inherited by a female from males, is not her stridhan but women’s estate.1  In another set of 
cases, it took the same view in respect of property inherited from gthe females.  This is the 
law in all the schools except the Bombay school.2 According to Bombay School, the property 
inherited by a woman from females, is her stridhan.3 After the coming into force of the Hindu 
Succession Act, 1956, she takes all inherited property as her stridhan. 
     In Mitakshara jurisdiction, including Bombay and the Dayabhaga School it is an 
established view that the share obtained on partition is not stridhan but woman’s estate. 4 
     The characteristic feature of woman’s estate is that the female takes it as a limited owner.  
However, she is an owner of this property in the same way as any other individual can be 
owner of his or her property, subject to two basic limitations: (a) she cannot ordinarily 
alienate the corpus, and (b) on her death it devolves upon the next heir of the last full owner.5 
In Janki v. Narayanasami6 the Privy Council very aptly observed: “Her right is of the nature 
of right of property, her position is that of owner; her powers in that character are however, 
limited.  So long as she is alive, no one has vested interest in succession.  The whole estate is 
for the time vested in her.7 Like the Karta of a Hindu joint family, she has full power of 
management and she alone is entitled to its entire income.  Her power of spending the income 
                                                 
1 (Bhagwandeen v. Maya Baee, (1867) 11 M.A.I. 487 ; Thakur  Dayhee v.Raj Baluk Ram, (1966) 11 
M.I.A. 140). 
2(Sheo Shanker  v. Devil Saha, (1903) 25 All. 468; See also Gayadin v. Badri Singh, (1943) All. 230).  
3 (Kasserbai v. Hunsraj, (1906) 30 Bom. 431). 
4 (Devi Prasad  v. Mahadeo, (1912) 39 I.A. 121 in Diwan Paras, “Modern Hindu Law” Allahabad Law 
Agency, Faridabad (Har.) 1997). 
5 (Bijay v. Krishna, 44 I.A. 87.). 
6 ((1916) 43 I.A. 207) 
7 (Ramsumran v. Shyam, 1922 P.C.  356).  
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is absolute.1  She need not save, and if she saves, it will be her stridhan.2 She continues to be 
its owner until the forfeiture of estate, by her re-marriage, adoption, death, or surrender. 
     The female owner being a holder of limited estate has limited powers of alienation.  She 
can alienate the property for (a) legal necessity, i.e., for her own need and for the need of the 
dependents of the last full owner.  (b) for benefit of estate, and (c) for the discharge of 
indispensable religious duties such as marriage of daughters, funeral rites of her husband.  In 
short, she can alienate her estate for the spiritual benefit of the last full owner, but not for her 
own spiritual benefit.  It is admitted on all hands that if there be collateral heirs of the 
husband, the widow cannot, of her own will, alienate the property except for special purposes. 
3 
     She has the power of renouncing the estate in favour of nearest reversioners.4 This means 
that by a voluntary act, she can accelerate the estate of the reversioner by conveying 
absolutely the estate and thereby destroying her own estate.This is an act of self-effacement 
on her part and operates as her civil death.  In Natwar v. Dadu5 the Supreme Court held that it 
is the self-effacement by the widow that forms the basis of surrender and not the ex facie 
transfer by which the effacement is brought about.  For valid surrender, it must be of the 
entire estate and  in favour of the nearest reversioner.  When a Hindu female surrenders her 
estate, the estate vests in the reversioners by the operation of law. 
     On the death of the female owner the estate reverts to the heir or heirs of the last full 
owner as if the latter died when the limited estate ceased.6 Such heirs may be male or female.  
They are known as “reversioners”.  The reversioners have the right to sue the woman holder 
for an injunction to restrain waste or that an alienation by the widow is null and void or that 
an alienation made by the widow was improper and did not bind them.7     Section 14 of 
Hindu Succession Act, 1956, has abolished woman’s estate. 
                                                 
1 (ibid). 
2 (Sitaji v. Bijendra, 1954 S.C. 601). 
3 (Collector of Musulipatam v Covery Venkata, (1861) 8  M.I.A. 529). 
4 (Devil Prasad v. Gopal  (1913) 40 Cal. 721 (F.B.) per Mukherjee, J). 
5 (1954 S.C. 61) 
6 (Moni Ram v. Kerry, (1880 ) 7 I.A. 115). 
7 (Bijoy v. Krishna, (1907) 34 I.A. 87).      
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The Hindu Woman’s Right to Property Act, 1937 
      In respect of separate property of a Mitakshara Hindu and in respect of all properties of a 
Dayabhaga Hindu, the Act introduced three widows, viz., intestate’s own widow, his son’s 
widow and his son’s son’s widow as heirs along with the son, grandson and great grandson, 
as also in their default.  The widow took a share equal to the share of a son and, in default of 
the son took the entire property.  If there were more than one widow, all of them together took 
one share.  In case of Mitakshara joint family, the widow took the place of her husband.  The 
validity of the Act was questioned in which the Federal Court held that the Act did not 
operate to regulate succession  to agricultural lands in the Governor’s provices. 1 
     Section 3(2) laid down that in the joint family property the widow of the deceased 
coparcener would have “the same interest as he himself had”.  Section 3(3) gave her limited 
interest known as a Hindu Women’s estate, provided however that she shall have the same 
right of claiming partition as a male owner. This virtually mean abrogation of the rule of 
survivorship in Mitakshara coparcenary. 
     The controversy as to whether the interest of the widow arose by inheritance or by 
survivorship or by statutory substitution or by statutory substitution the Supreme Court held 
that it came into existence by the statutory substitution.2 She was given the same power of 
partition as any coparcener had, but thereby introduced into the coparcenary, and between the 
surviving coparceners of her husband and the widow so introduced, there arises community of 
interest and unity of possession.  But the widow does not, on that account, become a 
coparcener.  Though invested with the same interest, which her husband had in the property, 
she did not acquire the right which her husband could have exercised over the interest of the 
other coparceners.  Because of statutory substitution or her interest in the coparcenary 
property in place of her husband, the right which the other coparceners had under the Hindu 
law of the Mitakshara school of taking that interest by the rule of survivorship remains 
suspended so long as that estate ensures.  But on the death of the coparcener there is no 
                                                                                                                                            
 
1 (Umayal Ali Achi v. Lakshimiachi, (1945) 1 M.L.J., 108). 
2 (Lakshmi v. Krishanvenamma, 1965 S.C.825). 
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dissolution of the coparcenary so as to carve out a defined interest in favour of the widow in 
the coparcenary property.1      
     If a widow did not ask for partition, her interest was subject to fluctuations, and, on her 
death, passed by survivorship to other coparceners.  When she asks for partition, her 
husband’s interest should be worked out having regard to the circumstances obtaining in the 
family on the date of  partition.  If severance took place, the succession would be traced to her 
husband on her demise, on the basis that the property was his separate property.2 If   there was 
a son who was a member of the joint family, the widow would be entitled to the same share as 
the son.  Difficulty, however, arose where the husband held property which was ancestral and 
was survived by the widow and a son or sons who had separated from him.  A question thus 
arises whether in any such cases widow would be entitled exclusively to the property left by 
the husband or should share it equally with his divided son or sons.  The High Courts of 
Orissa and Madras, had taken the view that in such a case the widow was entitled to the entire 
interest to the exclusion of the divided son or sons and the High Court of Bombay had left the 
question open.    
      
     Property held by a sole surviving coparcener of a Joint Hindu family is not his separate 
property if there is a woman in the family who can bring into existence a new coparcener by 
adoption.3 
 Widow should be chaste at the time of husband’s death for inheritance of his property.  Her 
subsequent unchastity is not relevant.4 On the basis of some of the important judicial 
pronouncements the nature and scope of the Woman’s estate is as follows: 
                                                 
1 (Satrughan v. Sabjipuri, 1967 S.C. 272).  
2 (ibid and Parappagari v Parappagari, 1954 Mad. 567).   
 
3 (Manoharlal v. Bhuri Bai, A.I.R.1972 S.C. 1369 in Saxena Sarojini, “Femijuris” India Publishing Co. Indore 
(1994) p.450). 
 
4(Tatu v. Fulbai ; 1990 (2) M.P. Weekly Notes 85 in Saxena’s “Femijuris P.451).  
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(a) Position of a woman was like an owner but her powers to dispose of the property were of 
limited character. 1  
(b) Her estate was an anomalous one, and had been compared to that of a tenant in tail.2 
(c) It would be more correct to say that she held an estate of inheritance to herself and the heirs 
of her husband. 3 
(d) Upon the termination of the estate, the property descended to heirs of the husband as if he 
died at the moment of her death. 
(e) The widow could not of her own alienate the property except for special purposes. 
(f) The restrictions on the widow’s power of disposal of property did not amount to the 
infringement of the fundamental right provided under the Constitution of India.4 
     The woman’s estate has now been converted into stridhan by s.14 Hindu Succession Act, 
1956.  The woman’s estate over which she has possession when the Act came into force (June 
17, 1956) is converted into her absolute estate. 5 
Property Rights of Hindu Woman Under Hindu Succession Act, 1956 
     As pointed out by Justice Kuppuswami ‘the main scheme of the Act is to establish equality 
between male and female in regard to property’.6  The most far-reaching changes that have 
been introduced in the Act are; (1) giving equal rights to sons and daughters in the property of 
the father as well as the mother and (2) abolishing the concept of widow’s estate under which 
a woman was never a full owner but was one for life only. 
     As far as the right to inherit from a male is concerned, the Act lays down that the property 
will be divided in equal shares among the Class 1 heirs.  The Class 1 heirs are the mother, 
widow, sons and daughters.  The other heirs in Class 1 are the heirs of predeceased son or a 
daughter and heirs of a predeceased grandson.  Only if there are no heirs among those given 
                                                 
1 (Janki Ammal v. Narayana Swami,(1915) 432, I.A. 207). 
2 (Moniram Kolita v. Kerry Kolitany (1880) 71 I.A. 115). 
3 (Lala Duni Chand v. Anar Kali, (1946) 73 I.A. 187). 
4 (Hoshiar Singh v. Kowla, AIR 1952 H.P. 42). 
 
 
5 (Sub-section (2) section 14, Hindu Succession Act, 1956).   
 
6 (Mayne’s Hindu Law  & Usage revised by Justice Kuppuswami, 14th ed. (1996), p.1043). 
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in the Act as Class I will it go to the Class II heirs.  The father is the first heir in this second 
category.1 What is intriguing is why there should be a totally separate list of heirs for a 
woman when she dies intestate.  While son, daughter and husband are first to take the 
property, they are followed by the heirs of the husband.  The most unacceptable is that the 
woman’s father and mother come only after that.2 Why is it that, when in the case of the son, 
the mother is a Class 1 heir, where the daughter’s property is concerned she is their in line 
and comes only after the heirs of husband? It is the inclusion of legal provisions such as this 
that perpetuates son preference and biases against the daughter.  Even the heirs of the mother 
come last, after the heirs of the father.3 The only saving provision is that where a female has 
inherited property from her parents, then if there are no sons or daughters or children of 
predeceased son or daughter, it will go to the heirs of her father. 4 
     One interesting change made in the Act is the total removal of unchastely as a 
disqualification. Earlier, unchastity in the case of a widow disqualified her from inheritance.  
In the case of a daughter also, unchastity was a disqualification under the Dayabhaga school 
but not under the Mitakshara school.  But that too has been removed.5 
     Similarly, remarriage of a widow does not divest her of her husband’s property, as was 
laid down in the Hindu Widows Remarriage Act.  When a woman gets a property she 
becomes an absolute heir therefore the question of divesting her does not arise.6  
Rule of Survivorship – Perpetuating Inequality7    
                                                 
1 (Sec. 8 gives the complete list of heirs of Class I and Class II in the Schedule).  
 
2 (Sec.15 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956). 
3 (Lotika Sarkar, ‘Reform of Hindu Marriage and Succession Laws Still the Unequal Sex’ in ‘From 
Independence Towards Freedom Indian Women since 1947’ ed. By Bharti Ray and Aparna Basu, 
Oxford Univ. Press, N. Delhi (1999). 
4 (Sec. 15 (2)(1). 
 
5 (Duncan, Derrett J, ‘Introduction to Modern Hindu Law’, (1963), p.374 in Lotika Sarkar op. cit. supra n.54). 
 
6 Hindu Widows’ Remarriage Act 1856, Sec.2 
 
7 Sec.6 Devolution of Interest in coparcenary property 
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Sec.6 of the Act runs as under: 
     When a male Hindu dies after the commencement of this Act, having at the time of his 
death an interest in a Mitakshara coparcenary property his interest in the property shall 
devolve by survivorship upon the surviving members of the coparcenary and not in 
accordance with this Act:    
     Provided that, if the deceased had left him surviving a female relative specified in class I 
of the Schedule or a male relative, specified in that class who claims, through such female 
relative, the interest of the deceased in the Mitakshara coparcenary property shall devolve by 
testamentary or intestate  succession, as the case may be, under this Act and not by 
survivorship. 
Explanation 1.  For the purposes of this section, the interest of a Hindu Mitakshara 
coparcenary shall be deemed to be the share in the property that would have been allotted to 
him if a partition of the property had taken place immediately before his death, irrespective of 
whether he was entitled to claim partition or not. 
Explanation 2.  Nothing contained in the proviso to this section shall be construed as enabling 
a person who has separated himself from the coparcenary before the death of the deceased or 
any of his heirs to claim on intestacy a share in the interest referred to therein. 
     Thus, it is clear that the rule of survivorship (a product of coparcenary) in favour of male 
(s) is, still retained by the statute, despite its (Act’s) projected tilt towards females.  With the 
result, the Mitakshara law of coparcenary continues to operate (especially in the absence of 
specified female and/or male heir(s) of class 1 of the schedule) to the exclusion of new law of 
intestate succession envisaged by the Act. 1 
     It is fact of common knowledge that a female can neither become a Karta of the 
Mitakshara Hindu joint family nor can she be admitted as a member of its coparcenary.  
While reviewing Katherine Mayo’s book, ‘The Slaves of the God’, in as far back as 1929, 
Jawahar Lal Nehru identified one of the major obstacles in the path of women’s progress and 
that was the Hindu joint family.  He wrote, “The joint Family System of the Hindus, a relic of 
                                                 
1 Ragunath v. Rikhiya, A.I.R. 1985 pat. 29 
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a feudal age, utterly out of keeping with modern conditions, must go and so also may other 
customs and tradition”.1 Emanating from the very concept of coparcenary, the discriminatory 
rule of survivorship is, however, still sustained even by the courts too, as they do not regard it 
hit by the provisions of article 15 of the Indian Constitution.2  It appears questionable on the 
parameters of equality and socio-economic justice. Be that as it may, the Hindu joint family, 
which Nehru used to condemn as “feudal relic” that had to be abolished, exists even today 
and perpetuates inequality in inheritance between sons and daughters. 3 
Notional Partition  -_ an Uncertainty 
    To the aforesaid general rule (that recognizes survivorship), an exception is, of course, 
provided by the very section 6 of the Act.  Accordingly, when an undivided Mitakshara 
coparcener dies leaving behind any of the nine class 1 heirs, referred to in section 6, the law 
of intestate succession as laid down by the Act becomes immediately applicable to his 
undivided share in the coparcenary property. 
The application of the Act will not await its ascertainment and actual division among those 
class 1 heirs who may be entitled to it.  Because, the interest of a Hindu (Mitakshara) 
coparcener shall be deemed (by an essential fiction, or notional partition imported by the law 
under explanation 1 to section 6 of the Act) to be the share in the property that would have 
been allotted to him if a partition of the property had taken place immediately before his 
death, irrespective of whether he (the deceased) was entitled to claim partition or not. 
     At the notional partition all living coparceners as well as the females entitled under the law 
of partition to a share would get the shares due to them; and in addition to this share of 
deceased coparcener would, by succession, go to his living class 1 heirs.4 
                                                 
1 Lotika Sarkar, “Empowering Women”, 363 Seminar (The Nehru Era) 35-40 at 36 (November 1989) 
in Khan Ateeque, “Women’s Right to Property under the Hindu Succession Act 1956 – An Appraisal in 
Indian Egalitarian Perspective” published in M.D.U. Law Journal Vol.1:121 (June-December, 1990) 
p.123. 
2 Nalini v. State of Bihar, AIR 1977 Pat. 171, as cited in Nagpal, R.C., ‘Modern Hindu Law, 
635(Lucknow, 1983. 
3Lotika Sarkar, op.cit. supra n.61 at 33  
4Shrirambai v. Kalgonda, AIR 1964 Bom. 263  
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     Setting the controversy at rest and upholding the extended view of statutory partition under 
section 6 the Supreme Court in Gurupad case gave a pragmatic ruling to the effect that the 
whole coparcenary will stand disrupted the moment one of the coparcenars dies. 1 To be more 
specific, where a coparcener dies leaving behind his widow, two sons and three daughters, the 
Supreme Court has confirmed that  -- 
(a) At a notional partition the deceased as also his wife and two sons would be actually 1/ 4 
share each; 
(b) The 1/4 share allotted to the deceased would, by succession, go equally to his widow, two 
sons and three daughters – each taking 1/4x1/6 = 1/24; and 
(c) Finally the widow and the two sons would get 7/24(1/4+1/24) each and 1/24 would go to 
each of the three daughters.  The Supreme Court, thus, held that partition for the purpose of 
section 6 was not a “proconsul step devised merely for the purpose of working out some other 
conclusions, it was rather to be treated and accepted as a concrete reality”.  In the words of 
Supreme Court (per Justice Chandrachud, as he then was): 
The fiction created by Explanation-1 has to be given its due and full effect.  Once the 
assumption is made that there was partition immediately before the death of the deceased, it 
must permeate the entire process of ascertainment of the ultimate share of the heirs through 
all its stages.  All the consequences, which flow from a real partition, have to be logically 
worked out, The inevitable corollary of this position is that the heir will get his or her share in 
the interest which the deceased had in the coparcenary property at the time of his death in 
addition to the share which he or she received or must be deemed to have received in the 
notional partition. 2 
     This obviously leads to a difference between what a son gets and what a daughter gets 
from the father.  They inherit equally as class-1 heirs by this notional partition but the son in 
addition to this retains his right by birth in the joint family and will get, if he wants a 
partition, a share equal to what his father would have got. 
                                                 
1 Gurupad v. Hirabai, AIR 1978 S.C. 1239 
2 Gurupad case, supra n.64 ibid  
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     The Supreme Court has, thus, made it possible for the main provision of section 6 to be 
subjected to a liberally extended view of its Explanation-1.  Undeniably, the judicial 
exposition reflects a progressive social trend, but the question may be: whether this is what 
the Parliament had intended while enacting section-6 in 1956? 1 
     It was inevitable that this discrimination and the unequal share of sons and daughters in the 
joint family property would lead to a great deal of dissatisfaction.  Taking advantage of our 
being a federal government, five states took positive steps to remedy this situation.  The first 
was Kerala, which followed the Rau Committee’s suggestion and totally abolished the Kerala 
joint family.  The Kerala Joint Family System (Abolition) Act was passed in 1976.  This 
meant after the Act became law no one would have the right to claim any interest in joint 
family property founded on the mere fact that the person was born in the family of the 
ancestors. 
     Andhra Pradesh, Tamil Nadu, Maharashtra and Karnataka have also taken legislative stops 
to remove the discriminatory features of the Mitakshara joint family.  The last three have 
followed the Andhra Pradesh legislation. 
     The Preamble to the Andhra Pradesh legislation states that equality before law is a 
fundamental right and exclusion of the daughter from participation in the Mitakshara joint 
family (coparcenary) by reason of her sex is violative of the right.  The four states have tried 
to remove this discrimination between sons and daughters by providing that that ‘the daughter 
of a coparcener shall by birth become a coparcener in her own right in the same manner as the 
son and have the same rights in the coparcenary property as she would have had if she had 
been a son’.  These four states have therefore retained the right by birth but extended it to 
include daughters.  Whether this is preferable to the Kerala model, which totally abolishes the 
joint Hindu family, may be debatable.2  But one thing is clear, that the Kerala model helps in 
retaining the uniformity that the Rau Committee had stated to be one of the objectives of the 
Hindu Code. 
                                                 
1Mahmood Tahir, ‘Hindu Law’ 43-44 (Allahabad, 1986.  
2 Sivaramayya B. in his article ‘Coparcenary Rights to Daughters: Constitutional and Interpretational 
Issues’ (1997) 3 SCC, Journal Section, p.25 
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Property of female Hindu to be her absolute property 1 
     Sec. 14 cl. (1) of the Act states as follows: 
     That: “Any property possessed by a female Hindu, whether acquired before or after the 
commencement of this Act, shall be held by her as full owner thereof and not as a limited 
owner.” 
     Explanation to section 14 explains the meaning of the term ‘property’ in this context.  The 
Explanation runs as follows: 
     In this sub-section ‘property’ includes both movable and immovable property acquired by 
a female Hindu by inheritance or devise, or at a partition or in lieu of maintenance or arrears 
of maintenance, or by gift from any person, whether a relative or not, before, at or after her 
marriage, or by her own skill or exertion, or by purchase or by prescription, or in any other 
manner whatsoever, and also any such property held by her as stridhan immediately before 
the commencement of this Act. 
     It may be seen that the above definition of property includes all the heads of 
Vijnaneshwar’s enumeration of property. 
     Sub-section (2) of S. 14 retains the power of the any person or court to give limited estate 
to a woman in the same manner as a limited estate may be given to any other person. 
     Property acquired by a Hindu female before the Act as well as after commencement of the 
Act, except that which is covered by sub-section (2), will be her absolute property.  Once her 
limited estate becomes her full estate by virtue of section 14, a Hindu female can alienate it 
by gift of otherwise. 2 
State of Women’s Property acquired before Passing of the Act 
     Section 14 has been given restrospective effect. It converts existing woman’s estate into 
stridhan or absolute estates.  Two conditions are necessary: 
(a) Ownership of property must vest in her i.e., the limited ownership of property must vest 
in her, so that it may be converted into her full ownership; and 
                                                 
1 Section 14 of Hindu Succession Act, 1956 
2Mahabir v. Shashi Bhushan, 1981 Cal. 74.  
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(b) She must be in possession of the estate when the Act came into force. 1 
But she has no right in her deceased husband’s property, except the right of maintenance, that 
property cannot become her absolute property. 2 
     If a female cannot claim any title to the property, then merely by virtue of her possession, 
she cannot become its absolute owner. The words in sec. 14 cl. (1) mean any property owned 
by a female Hindu, i.e., her possession of property must be supported with some kind of legal 
title of ownership i.e. the property must be created in her legally.3  The Supreme Court said: 
“The word ‘possessed’ in section 14 is used in broad sense and in the context means the state 
of owning or having in one’s hand or power”. 4In this case the Supreme Court further 
observed that the position of licensee, lessee, a mortgagee from female owners or the 
possession of a guardian or a trustee or an agent of the female would be possession for the 
purposes of the Act. 
     The word ‘Possession’ means and includes: 
(i) Actual physical possession of property; 
(ii) Constructive possession of property; and  
(iii) Possession in law 5 i.e. a possession, which can be recovered or regained through the 
process of law.  Where a Hindu female is illegally or wrongly dispossessed of the property, 
she would be deemed to be in the possession of property in the eyes of law, because she can 
very much claim it back by the process of law. Thus section 14 cannot be interpreted so as to 
validate the illegal possession of a female Hindu, nor does it confer any title on a mere 
trespasser.6  The word ‘possession’ means and includes a ‘Right to possess’ also. 
     Possession by he woman was necessary but the possession could be actual or constructive.  
In the case of Kalawatibai v. Soiryabai,7 for example, because she was not in possession as a 
limited owner, she could not become an absolute owner. 
                                                 
1 Deendayal v. Raju Ram, AIR 1970 S.C. 1019. 
2 Suraj Mal v. Babu Lal, 1985 Del. 95. 
3 Harak Singh v. Kailash, 1958 Pat.581(F.B). 
4 G.T.M. Kotturswamy v. Setra Veerava, 1959 S.C.577 
5 Mangal Singh v. Smt. Ratno, AIR 1967 S.C. 1786 
6 Eramma v. Verrupana, 1966 S.C. 1879 
7 (1991) 3 SCC 410 
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     In this case the widow had inherited property from her husband prior to 1956.  This meant 
she had only the right for her life with the right to alienate the property for legal necessity.  
She gifted the property to one of her daughters.  This gift could not be described as a legal 
necessity, not as being for ‘ spiritual or charitable purpose’, for which she could alienate the 
property.   Therefore, the 1956 Act could not apply to her to make her an absolute owner.  
After her death, her other daughter challenged the gift and demanded her share as a 
reversioner (father’s heir).  The question was whether the daughter to whom the property had 
been gifted had become an absolute owner after 1956.  The answer was in the negative, as the 
gift by which she came into the property was one, which the mother could give not 
absolutely, as she was not an owner, but one, which would be valid only during the period she 
was alive.  After the mother’s death, the alienation could be legally challenged and the second 
daughter was successful in getting her share. It was observed that section 14 of the Act 
wanted to benefit only those female Hindus who were limited owners in the then existing 
Hindu Law but no more. 
 
Thus all properties acquired by her either before the commencement of the Act or afterwards, 
would be her stridhan property and she would become it absolute owner.  It then should be 
her full fledged and complete property, which on her death would devolve on her own heirs1 
and not revert to reversioners any more.2  She can dispose of that property either by transfer 
inter vivos, or by way of will,3 or it may pass on to her heirs, on her dying intestate. 4 
Post-Act Women’s Property 
     Section 14(2) laid down that if the gift, will or any instrument, decree or order of a civil 
court or award granted only a restricted estate to a Hindu female, she would take property 
accordingly.  In the absence of such an intention, the woman’s grant would be her absolute 
property.  The object of Sec 14 was to remove the disability of Hindu Woman and not to 
                                                 
1 Sec.15 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 
2 Where reversionary rights cease to exist, by virtue of the application of section 14(1) of the Act. 
3Sec. 30 of the Act  
4 Under Secs. 15 and 16 of the Act 
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interfere with contracts etc.  Sub-section (2) was based on the principle of sanctity of 
contracts and grants. 1 
     Where in a partition under an award, which was subsequently, embodied in a decree 
certain properties were allotted to a Hindu female as her share.  The Supreme Court observed 
that Sec. 14(2) did not apply and that Sec.14 should be read as a whole.  It would depend on 
the facts of each case whether the same is covered by sub-section (1) or sub-section (2). 2 
     The question whether a limited estate conferred under a will becomes a full estate by 
virtue of section 14(1), came for consideration before the Supreme Court in Karmi v. Amru.3 
A Hindu, under a registered will, conferred a life estate on his wife Nihali, with the direction 
that after the death of Nihali, properties would devolve on Bhagta and Amru, two of his 
collaterals, Nihali took possession of properties and died in 1960.  On her death her heir 
claimed properties on the assertion that after the coming into force of the Hindu Succession 
Act, Nihali’s life estate became her full estate.  It was held that where only life estate was 
conferred under a will, S.14 (2) would apply, and the estate then would not be enlarged. 4 
     Dowry and traditional presents made to wife at the time of the marriage constituted her 
stridhan, and if the husband or her in laws refused to give it back to her, on her demand, they 
would be guilty of criminal breach of trust. Similarly, any item of stridhan entrusted to them 
at the time of the marriage or thereafter and if they refused to give it to her on demand they 
would be guilty of criminal breach of trust under section 405, Indian Penal Code. 5 
     These two provisions go a long way to make equal status of men and women a reality as 
far as right to possession of property and control over it is concerned.  As explained by Justice 
Bhagwati, 
     “The object of the legislature (was) to wipe out the disabilities from which a Hindu female 
suffered in regard to ownership of property under the old Shastric law, to abridge the stringent 
                                                 
1Santhanam v. Subramanya AIR 1977 S.C. 2024  
2 Seth Badri v. Kanso (1972) 2 SCC 586 
3 AIR 1971 SC 745 
4 See also Appasami v. Sarangapani 1978 SC 1051 
5 Pratibha Rani v. Suraj Kumar 1985 sc 628 
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provisions against proprietors rights which were often regarded as evidence of her perpetual 
tutelage, and to recognize her status as an independent and absolute owner of property”.1 
Women’s Right in respect of Dwelling House  2 
     The other provision of the Act, which deals with ownership of the dwellinghouse, goes a 
long way in nullifying the equal rights given to sons and daughters in both the father’s 
property and the mother’s. The earlier law that is the uncodified law before the Succession 
Act, differentiated not only between sons and daughters, who could never demand a partition, 
but also between daughters.  The unmarried daughter often got preference over the married 
one.  But when such radical changes have been made, it is far from clear why if the father or 
the mother has a dwelling house occupied by the family, the son alone should be given the 
privilege of demanding partition of it and not the daughters.  Drawing their authority from the 
Hindu Shastras,3 the legislators felt the right of partition should not be given to the daughter 
as that might lead to disintegration and fragmentation of the house.  It is inexplicable that if a 
daughter demands a partition, it leads to fragmentation but if the sons do likewise it does not 
lead to any fragmentation.  Even the Supreme Court, which is supposed to be the protector of 
women’s rights, justifies this view.  According to Justice Ramaswamy of the Supreme Court, 
‘ the object is to prevent fragmentation or disintegration of the family dwelling house at the 
instance of the female heir to the hardship and difficulties which the male heir may be put to.4  
The reason therefore appears to be, not to cause any hardship to the male heir, and not really 
to keep the dwelling house intact.  However, the law does provide that if the male heirs have 
divided their shares in the dwelling house then the right of the female heir arises. 5 
     In their efforts to protect the privileged position of the sons, some of the courts have gone 
to the extent of holding that even when there is one male heir and the question of partition is 
                                                 
1V. Tulasamma v. Sesha Reddy (1977) 3 SCC 99 on p.135  
2 Sec.23 of the Act 
3 ‘The disability of female to claim partition when the male members are not willing to effect a partition 
is an echo of the law that prevailed prior to this Act under the Mitakshara under which no female is 
entitled to share on a partition…’  Narashimaha Murthy v. Susheelabai (1996) 3 S.C.C. 644 on p.654 
4 Id. on p.651 
5 Sec.23: ‘the right of any such female heir to claim partition of the dwelling house shall not arise until 
the male heir choose the divide…’ 
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impossible all by himself, the bar on the daughter continues.  The Madras High Court has 
very clearly articulated its male bias in dealing with such a situation.  In its opinion, allowing 
the partition at the insistence of the female heir would cause ‘great injustice to the single male 
heir and the object of the section would be nullified’.1  For good measure they add that ‘the 
hardship that would be caused to the female heir…is certainly relatively less than the injustice 
that would be done to a singly male member.’  It is the privilege of the judiciary not to have 
to explain some of their observation.  In this case they did not explain how they arrived at the 
conclusion that the hardship to the female heir will be less.  Whose hardship will be greater 
when a divorced or deserted or separated woman has to live in the same house as her only 
brother and his family and not have any ownership right, a right that would definitely lead to 
her empowerment? 
     Fortunately, not all states take the above view.  The Orissa High Court was very clear.  To 
debar a female heir from demanding partition from a single male heir will mean a complete 
denial of her rights and ‘the legislature having the female heirs absolute rights by inheritance 
on the one hand could not have taken away the same by the other. 2 
     While the right of residence in the dwelling house is given to the female heirs, there is a 
blatant discrimination among even the daughters.  As Class I heir there is no difference 
among daughters; they may be married or unmarried.  But where the right of residence in the 
dwelling house is concerned there is certainly a difference.  A widowed, divorced, separated, 
deserted or unmarried daughter has the right of residence but not the daughter whose marriage 
may be one only in name.  With the tremendous rise in domestic violence, suicide and murder 
of young married women, a married daughter needs the shelter of her natal home.    
     Now, forty- seven years after the Hindu Succession Act was passed, it is time to examine 
whether these restricted provisions have helped to bring about social justice or whether the 
position of women has remained subordinate. 
Property Rights of Muslim Women 
                                                 
1Madras High Court in 1981 Mad.62  
2 Orissa High Court in 1993 Orissa 36 commented by Paras Dewan in Annual Survey of Indian Law, 
1993, p.166. 
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     As regards economic rights, in Islam woman has her own legal personality and rights.  She 
is not a moon that shines through reflected lights; she is a solar planet having her own 
individuality, which in now way can be absorbed in that of a man.  The Muslim woman, as 
far as her property is concerned, is absolutely free.  The law permits her to make use of her 
material assets in whatever way she pleases.1  Women’s right to property is explicitly stated 
in Sura al-Nisa of the Holy Qur’an as: “To men is allotted what they earn and to women what 
they earn.”2  Islam has bestowed on the woman the right of inheritance and she can claim her 
share as prescribed in the Holy Qur’an.  Her share is completely hers and no one can make 
any claim on it including her father and her husband.  The rights of Muslim women in respect 
of property are as following: 
A. Daughters . In inheritance, the daughter’s share is equal to one half of the son’s in keeping 
with the concept that a woman is worth half a man. She has, however, and has always had full 
control over this property.  It is legally for her to manage, control, and to dispose of, as she 
wishes in life or death 
     Though she may receive gifts from those whom she would inherit from, there should be no 
doubt that the gift is a means of circumventing the inheritance laws of one third of a man’s 
share, since, under Muslim law, the shares of inheritance are very strict. 
     Daughters have rights of residence in parents houses, as well as right to maintenance, until 
they are married. 3 
B. Wives.  In Islamic law a woman’s identity, though inferior in status to a man’s is not 
extinguished in him when she marries.4 Thus she retains control over her goods and 
properties.  She has a right to the same maintenance he gives to his other wives, if any, 5and 
                                                 
1Parveen Shaukat Ali, ‘Status of Woman in the Muslim World’ 18 (Lahore, 1975).  
2 IV: 32 
3 Karim S.A., ‘Shariat Provides Maintenance to Unmarried Daughter’, published in A.I.R. March, 1993 
Journal 44-45. 
See Quran (Soore Bakar, II Para, Rukoo 28, Aiyat 228, and also see Soore Nisa, V Para, Rukoo 6, 
Aiyat 34.4  
5 See Quran, Soore Nisa, IV Para, Rukoo 1, Aiyat 3 
 60
may take action against him in case he discriminates against her.      She has a right to ‘mehr’ 
according to the terms of the contract agreed to at the time of marriage. 1 
     She will inherit from him to the extent of one-eighth if there are children or one-fourth if 
there are none.  If there is more than one wife, the share may diminish to one-sixteenth.  In 
circumstances where there are no shares in the estate as prescribed by law, the wife may 
inherit a greater amount by will.  A Muslim may dispose of one-third of his property though 
not to sharer in the inheritance. 
C. Mothers .  In case of divorce or widowhood, she is entitled to maintenance from her 
children.  Her property is to be divided according to the rules of Muslim law.  She is entitled 
to inherit one-sixth of her deceased child’s estate. 
The position of fair sex in Islam appeared to be quite comfortable and the proprietary status of 
the Muslim female was comparatively far better than the Hindu female.  The Hindu female’s 
dependence on men led her to a degrading position, where as Muslim females received the 
right in property as of right and thus were free from the zone of male dominance in matter of 
property.  Muslim males dominance could be seen in other matters, but as far property rights 
were concerned she enjoyed independence in its enjoyment and disposal.. 
     As regards economic rights, in Islam woman has her own legal personality and rights.  She 
is not a moon that shines through reflected lights; she is a solar planet having her own 
individuality, which in no way can be absorbed in that of a man.  The Muslim woman, as far 
as her property is concerned, is absolutely free.  The law permits her to make use of her 
material assets in whatever way she pleases.2  Islam has bestowed on the woman the right of 
inheritance and she can claim her share as prescribed in the Holy Qur’an.  Her share is 
completely hers and no one can make any calim on it including her father and her husband.  
The Qur’an says: 
     To men (of the family) belongs a share of that which parents and near kindred leave, and 
to  
                                                 
1 ibid, Aiyat 4 
2 Parveen Shaukat Ali, “Status of Women in the Muslim World, 18 (Lahore, 1975).  Women’s right to 
property is explicitly stated in Sura al-Nisa of the Holy Qur’an as: “To men is allotted what they earn 
and to women what they earn,” (IV: 32). 
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     Woman a share of that which parents and near kindred leave, whether it be little or much a 
     Determinate share 1 
Her share in most cases is, of course, one half of the man’s share.  But the fact that a daughter 
receives half the share of a son in inheritance should not be misconstrued as discrimination on 
the basis of sex.  This provision is based on the vast difference in the economic 
responsibilities of the men and women.  In the family that man and woman jointly raise, it is 
the male partner who provides for the children.  That the mother’s share out of the deceased 
person’s inheritance equals that of the father’s clearly negates the theory of blind 
discrimination on the basis of sex.2  Besides, the woman is entitled to claim her dower amount 
from her husband, which once obtained remains her personal property.  It becomes payable as 
soon as the marriage is consummated.  The Holy Qur’an says: 
(a) And give the woman (on marriage) their mahr as a gift (IV: 4) 
(b) If you had given the latter a cantar of gold, i.e. a great amount for mahr, take not the 
least bit of it back (IV; 20). 
     The variation in inheritance rights of men and women is due in the variations in financial 
responsibilities of both the sexes.  The critic who assert inequality of sexes in matters of 
inheritance on the ground that there is no equal distribution of shares must not overlook the 
fact that from a practical point of view there is complete ‘equality of both the sexes’. 3 
     There is no rule in Islam which forbids woman from seeking employment whenever there 
is a necessity for it, especially in positions which fit her nature and in which society needs her 
most.  Examples of these professions are nursing, teaching (especially for children) and 
medicine.  Moreover, there is no restriction on benefiting from woman’s exceptional talent in 
any field.  Even for the position of a judge, it is found that Muslim scholars  (such as Abu 
Hanifa and Al-Taban) holding that there is nothing wrong with it. 4 
Property Rights of Christian Women  
                                                 
1 IV: 7 
2M. Nejatullah Siddiqui, ‘Some Aspects of the Islamic Economy, 123 (Lahore, 1970.  
Mesbah M.T., Bahonar and Lois L Faruqi, “Status of Women in Islam” (1990) Delhi, pp.-39.3  
4 Khursid Ahmad, “Islam – Its Meaning and Message, 141 
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     A sizeable population of native Christians in India till 1865 has no law of succession of 
their own.  While some of them were governed by their customary laws, the others followed 
the English law.1  Indian Succession Act of 1865 was amended and consolidated in the Indian 
Succession Act, 1925.  This Act rearranged and rephrased the applicability provisions of the 
Act of 1865, in the new order under Sec.29.  The general scheme of succession applied to the 
property of: -- 
(a) Jews 
(b) Christians 2 
(c) All Indians (see Sec 21-A) who marry under the Special Marriage Act, 1954 or get 
their marriage registered under this Act; and  
(d) The issue of such marriages. (See Sec.15) 
General Principles of Inheritance 
The Act incorporates the Roman and English Principles of inheritance.  A uniform scheme is 
provided, irrespective of the sex of the intestate.  Consanguinity is the determining factor for 
title to succession and relations by affinity are not included among the list of heirs.  Adoption 
does not confer any right of inheritance.3  In nature a secular Act, it does not make difference 
of religion as between the intestate and the heirs, a disqualification.  Surviving spouse and 
lineal descendants are made primary heir.4  The Act does not prefer agnates over cognates, or 
males over females in general.  The only objectionable provision is the exclusion of mother in 
presence of the father.5   The succession rights of females can be discussed under three heads, 
mother, widow and daughter of an intestate.  As the Act recognizes relabouring only by 
blood, a daughter-in-law is not an heir. 
                                                 
1Abraham v. Abraham, 9 M.I.A. 105.  The Privy Council observed, that, such of those Christians who 
were Hindu converts, and were still following the Hindu customs and manners would be governed by 
the ancient Hindu Law of Succession.  If a convert became completely westernized, it was for him to 
establish, that he had become a member of the East Indian Christian Community and in that case, 
English Law would have applied to his property.  
2 Sohanlal v. A.Z. Maskwin AIR (1929) Lah. 230.  However it is not applicable to Christians domiciled 
in Punjab, part of Bengal 
3Ranbir Karam v. Joginder Chandra AIR (1940) All 135  
4(sec.33).  
5Sec. 27(a).  
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Rights of the Mother 
     The term mother has a reference to the natural mother of an intestate and not his adoptive 
mother.  The mother of an intestate is not primary heir and is, therefore, completely excluded 
in presence of his lineal descendants and also his father.  When she co-exists with the spouse, 
the spouse takes one half and the other half, is shared by the mother, brothers, sisters and the 
children of deceased brothers-sisters of the intestate.  Where only the parents of an intestate 
are present, the father is preferred and succeeds to the property to the complete exclusion of 
the mothers.1     One fails to see the rationale for their unequal placement.  There can be no 
yardstick to measure and determine conclusively, which out of the two was nearer to the 
deceased.  There can be no doubt that the mother plays a bigger role in the bringing up and 
settlement of the children right from their birth, till they attain maturity.  Moreover, the 
mother may, and usually in most of the cases is financially dependent on either the father of 
the intestate and in his absence on the other male relations, while the father usually is 
financially independent.  Further, this unequal placement can cause tremendous hardships in 
cases of separated parents.  Where the parents were separated from each other, either under a 
decree of divorce, or even otherwise and the custody of their children was with one parent, 
but due to the operation of the Act the property of any of these children on their decease goes 
to the other parent.  For example, a Christian couple is separated from each other, under a 
decree of divorce and the custody of their child is given to the mother.  The father re-marries 
and is entirely engrossed in the new family.  The mother brings up the child, educates him 
and sees him, well settled in job.  This child now dies as bachelor, with both the parents 
living.  Now due to the operation of this Act, the complete property will devolve on father to 
the exclusion of the mother, which placed her on an inferior footing.It is totally unreasonable, 
irrational, illogical and even unconstitutional.  2 
Rights of the Widow 
                                                 
1 (Sec. 42) 
 
2 Saxena Poonam Pradhan, ‘Property Rights of Women under the Indian Succession Act, 1925 in 
“Women Law and Social Change” ed. By Shamsuddin Shams, A.P.H., New Delhi (1991) 
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     The widow of an intestate succeeds to his property along with his children and other lineal 
descendents taking a fixed one-third share.1  Her share in absence of the lineal descendants 
with all other kindred 2is fixed one-half.3  Where non of the heirs is present she takes the 
whole of the estate.4   
     Where the total value of the property is less than Rs. 5000, the widow succeeds to the 
whole of the property in absence of the lineal descendants.5  Where the value exceeds Rs. 
5000 she takes, in the first instance Rs. 5000 out of it and the rest devolves by succession in 
which the widow has her usual rights. 
     The sum of Rs.5000 might have been sufficient to fulfil the needs of a widow way back in 
1925, but presently 65 years after the framing of the Act, viewed in light of the present 
circumstances and inflation in prices the ceiling should at least be raised to Rs.50000. 
Rights of the Daughter 
     The daughter of an intestate inherits as his child along with his son and other lineal 
descendants, taking a share, which is absolutely equal to that of the son in all respects,  out of 
the total of two-thirds of the property.The other one-third going to the widow of the intestate.6 
In absence of the widow, the children and the lineal descendants do not have to share the 
property with any of his other relations and they succeed to the whole of the estate.7  This is 
one Act, which does not discriminate between the rights of the daughter and the sons.    
 
                            
 
 
 
                                                 
1 (Sec. 33A) 
2 See Schedule-I 
3 ((Sec. 33(c). 
Sec.33 (b). 
4  
5(Sec. 33-A)  
6 Sec. 33(a) 
7 (Sec.42) 
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WOMEN’S RIGHT TO MAINTENANCE 
 
 Maintenance to Hindu Wife 
      Hindu sages, in most unequivocal and clear terms, laid down that maintenance of certain 
persons is a personal obligation.  Manu declared: “The aged parents, a virtuous wife and an 
infant child must be maintained even by doing hundred misdeeds.1  Brihaspati said, “A man 
may give what remains after the food and clothing of family: the giver of more (who leaves 
his family naked and unfelt) may taste honey at first but afterwards finds it poison.”2  A 
person who indulges in charity or dan at the cost of the maintenance of his aged parents, 
infant children and wife is condemned by the sages: it is like tasting honey which turns out to 
be poison later. 
Under old law the wife’s right to separate maintenance and residence was regulated by the 
Hindu Married Women’s Right to Separate Residence and Maintenance Act, 1946.  That Act 
has now been repealed by Sec.29 of the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, 1956.  Section 
18 of that Act lays down that the wife, whether married before or after commencement of the 
Act, is entitled to be maintained by her husband during her lifetime unless she is unchaste or 
has ceased to be Hindu by conversion to another religion.   
     A wife is entitled to be maintained by her husband, whether he possesses property or not.3  
When a man with his eyes open marries a girl accustomed to a certain style of living, he 
undertakes the obligation of maintaining her in that style.4 The maintenance of a wife by her 
husband is matter of personal obligation arising from the very existence of the relationship, 
and quite independent of the possession by the husband of any property, ancestral or self-
acquired.5 The maintenance being a matter of personal obligation, she has no claim for 
maintenance against her husband’s property in the hands of a transferee from him.  Nor has 
she any claim against the Government, if his property has been attached under secs. 87 & 88 
                                                 
1 (Cited in Mitakshara, II, 175). 
2  (Brihaspati, XV 3. Katyayana and other sages are to the same effect). 
3  (Narbadabai v. Mahadeo (1881) 5 Bom. 99) 
4  (Prem Pratap Singh v. Jagat Pratap Kunwari (1994) All. 118) 
5  (Jayanti v. Alamelu (1904) 27 Mad. 45, 48) 
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of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1898, as the property of an absconder.1 A wife is not 
entitled, during her husband’s life-time, to be maintained either by her relations or by her 
husband’s relations, even if she has been deserted by him unless they have in their possession 
property belonging to her husband.2   
     A Hindu married woman shall be entitled to separate residence and maintenance from her 
husband on the grounds, namely, if he is suffering from any loathsome disease, he is guilty of 
cruelty or desertion, if he married again or ceases to be a Hindu or if he keeps a concubine 
etc.3 A wife, who leaves her home for purposes of adultery, and persists in following a 
vicious course of life, forfeits her right to maintenance.  But if she completely renounces her 
immoral course of conduct, her husband is liable to furnish her with a bare maintenance.4 A 
wife is entitled to maintenance, though her husband may abandon Hinduism.5 Where the 
husband is excluded from inheritance on account of personal disability,6 his wife is entitled to 
maintenance out of the property, which he would have inherited, but for the disability.  But 
her right to maintenance is conditional upon her continued chastity.7 
     In most cases the wives are illiterate and unemployed. In financial matters they had 
remained dependent upon their husbands.  The reason being that the Hindu society had been 
basically a male dominated one.  The biological reproduction and child rearing, typically 
women’s main functions, have contributed to their inferior status in the family set up.  As a 
result of division of labour between the two sexes, women’s economic participation has been 
affected greatly. 
     This type of gender bias discrimination represents ugly face of society because it has a 
dehumanizing effect on persons belonging to a particular sex.  Gender bias results into 
unequal power structures between the two sexes, in which one assumes power over the other 
                                                 
1  (Chatru v. The Crown (1929) 10 Lah. 265) 
2   (Ramabai v. Trimbak (1872) 9 Bom. H.C. 283). 
3   (Section 2 of The Hindu Married Women’s Right to Separate Maintenance and Residence Act 1946) 
4   (Lata v. Narayanan (1863) 1 Mad. H.C.372 and Section 96 of ibid Act). 
5   (Mansha v. Jiwan (1884) 6 All. 617) 
6  (Sec. 98) 
7   (Yashvantrav v. Kashibai (1888) 12 Bom. 26, Mitakshara, chap. II Sec. 10, paras, 14, 15. Dayabhaga 
chap, v. para. 19) 
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thus making the ‘other’ a ‘weaker sex’.  A section of intelligentsia has devoted itself to the 
deeper understanding and analysis of gender inequalities.  
     The concept of maintenance itself is a matter of hatred for the reason that it perpetuates the 
position of the wife as a financial parasite and has an unpleasant psychological effect in the 
attempt to make women ‘financially independent’.  However, one will have to concede that in 
view of the lack of employment in this country, the social situation of women, maintenance 
will have to be accepted as a necessary evil.1 
Legislative Provisions  
     There are a number of legislative enactments through which a Hindu wife is entitled to 
claim maintenance from her husband.  The proceedings under these statutes are of civil and 
criminal in nature.  These enactments are: 
A. Section 18 of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956; 
B. & C.  Sections 24 and 25 of the Hindu Marriage  
Act, 1955  (The maintenance under these provisions can be claimed only when a case is 
pending, under the Act, in the Court of law.) ; and 
D.  Section 125 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973. 
     Thus, the proceedings under (A) to (C) are civil in nature and in respect of  (D) above they 
are criminal in nature.  The wife is entitled to prefer claim for maintenance under civil as well 
as criminal law simultaneously.  In case the maintenance is denied under Criminal Procedure 
Code, it will not be a ground to deny the same under Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act or 
Section 18 of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act.  Both provisions operate in 
different spheres.2  
(A) Maintenance under S.18 Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956. 
        The term ‘maintenance’ has been defined in S.3 (b) of the Hindu Adoptions and 
Maintenance Act, 1956 to include (i) in all cases, provision for food, clothing, residence, 
                                                 
1   (See, Article on ‘Maintenance’ by Rani Jethamalani, Advocate Supreme Court, Report of Seminar 
on Amendment to the Prohibition of Dowry Act and Protection of Abandoned Women & Children, 
Mahila Dakshta Samiti, 1979 p 68). 
2   (Surjit Kaur v. Tirth Singh AIR 1978 P&H 112). 
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education and medical attendance and treatment; (ii) in the case of an unmarried daughter, 
also the reasonable expenses of and incident to her marriage. 
        A Hindu wife is entitled to be maintained by her husband during her life time.1 She shall 
also be entitled to live separately from her husband without forfeiting her claim to 
maintenance under the following circumstances2: 
(a) if he is guilty of desertion, that is to say, of abandoning her without reasonable cause 
and without her consent or against her wish or of willfully neglecting her; 
(b) if he has treated her with such cruelty as to cause a reasonable apprehension in her 
mind that it will be harmful or injurious to live with her husband; 
(c) is suffering from a virulent form of leprosy; 
(d) if he has any other wife living; 
(e) if he keeps a concubine in the same house in which his wife is living or habitually 
resides with a concubine elsewhere; 
(f) if he has ceased to be a Hindu by conversion to another religion; 
(g) if there is any other cause justifying her living separately. 
The first part of the section informs a time honoured social obligation of the husband and the 
corresponding right of the wife.  The right of the wife to claim maintenance is an incident of 
the status of matrimony.  The section emphasizes that when once the relationship of husband 
or wife is established, the wife gets the entitlement to maintenance.  Though the claim to 
maintenance or the obligation of the husband to maintain the wife springs from the 
consortium of the wife with the husband, under certain circumstances enumerated in the 
section, where the wife is allowed by the statute to live separately from her husband, the wife 
will not lose her right to maintenance.3 
     The wife when immature, has been living with her parents, she is to be maintained by her 
husband.  In granting maintenance to wife the courts feel concerned and take notice of the 
hard realities of life to which a divorcee is subject to.  This attitude is clearly reflected in the 
                                                 
1   (Section 18 of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956) 
2 (Section 18(2) of the Act) 
3   (Sivankutty v. S Komalakumari, AIR 1989 Ker 124) 
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Rajasthan Court judgment in Smt Shanti Devil v. Raghav Prakash, 1 Justice Guman Mal 
Lodha, observes as under: 
     “It will have to be accepted as a hard social reality that the position, status and life of a 
divorced Hindu wife in Hindu society so far, is very miserable and pitiable.  She is 
economically and socially poor and had great disadvantage in as much as the society looks 
down against her.”  The court further observes that the divorced wife is a cursed human being 
abhorred by society and in this particular case she being illiterate she would not be able to 
earn anything and remarriage is also very difficult.  On an argument by the husband that her 
parents are very rich, the court retorted that, “even if the argument is accepted that the parents 
are rich it is well known that the parents cannot do much in the matter of maintenance of a 
divorced daughter.  Moreover, the parents are facing problem of life of such daughter in all 
matters and ultimately, in the net analysis, the divorced daughter would be left along, cursed 
by the society and a burden on herself both, socially and economically.  She may or may not 
have any shelter to live in it and bread to eat.” 
     Once a wife is divorced, her remedy to seek maintenance is at the time of divorce in a 
matrimonial petition or subsequent thereto is only under Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 and she 
cannot have any recourse under Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956, inasmuch as 
the precondition for application of Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956, for a wife to 
seek maintenance is that the marriage must be subsisting.2                                                      
(a) Grant of Interim maintenance 
     There are conflicting opinions expressed by different High Courts about the powers of the 
Courts to grant interim relief of maintenance to wife by virtue of S.151 of Civil Procedure 
Code. 
     First view:  According to the authors of the first view the Courts cannot grant interim 
relief under inherent powers recognized by S.151, C.P.C., as the provisions of this section 
extend to the procedural matters only.  In Ramchandra v. Sanehalata Dei,3 the Orissa High 
                                                 
1 (AIR 1986 Raj. 13) 
2   (Panditrao Chimaji Kalure v. Gayabai, 2001 (3) Femi-Juris C.C. 320 Bom HC (Aurangabad Bench) 
3  (AIR 1977 Orissa 96 (DB) 
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Court took the view that the court has no inherent jurisdiction to grant relief until the claim is 
determined on its merits and that can be done only after the final hearing in the suit.  
Accordingly, to grant relief in an interim application would be to grant relief, which can 
properly be granted only by the ultimate determination in the suit and the decree following 
thereon.  Anyhow, the court observed, “it is not appropriate to set limitations on court’s 
inherent powers by indicating circumstances where it can be and where it cannot be 
exercised.” 
     Though the court observed that in trying the case undwer S.18 of the Act, the court has no 
inherent jurisdiction, guardedly, it was qualified to emphasise that ‘ordinarily’ the court has 
no inherent jurisdiction.1 
     It is submitted that one is not in a position to understand the true content of the Division 
Bench decision when it said that the court had no power to exercise inherent jurisdiction 
‘ordinarily’. 
     Second View:  According to this view the Courts cannot be prohibited to exercise the 
inherent powers under S.151 CPC.  In Narsingh Das v. Mangal Dubey,2 Mahmood J. said: 
“courts are not to act upon the principle that every procedure is to be taken as prohibited 
unless it is expressly provided for by the Code but on the converse principle that every 
procedure is to be understood as permissible till it is shown to be prohibited by the law.  As a 
matter of general principle prohibitions cannot be presumed. 
     The same view is taken in Sivankutty v. S Komalakumari,3 by the Kerala High Court 
which held, “though there is no express provision in the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance 
Act for grant of interim maintenance pending final decision in the proceeding seeking 
maintenance from the husband, there is no prohibition against granting such relief.  The 
power to grant such interim allowance is implicit, ancillary and necessary corollary to the 
power to grant such interim allowance in suitable cases.” 
                                                 
1   (Sivankuttty v. S Komalakumari, AIR 1989 Ker 124) 
2  (ILR (1882) 5 All 163 (FB) 
3 (AIR 1989 Ker 124) 
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     The interim relief is granted to a person on the footing that said person is prima facie 
entitled to the right on which is based the claim for the main relief as well as the interim 
relief.1  The width and amplitude of the inherent power are co-extensive with necessity. The 
power to grant interim maintenance is also implicit in S.18 of the Act.  The court cannot 
ignore considering the sad reality of long delay in the final disposal of the litigation.    
     In Indar Mal v. Babu Lal,2 the Rajasthan High Court allowed an application for interim 
maintenance applying the provisions of S.151 CPC.  It said, “Grant of maintenance allowance 
is for preserving the existence of an individual who is not able to support himself.  Though 
there is no express provision in the Act for grant of interim maintenance allowance there is no 
prohibition against granting such relief.  The grant of interim relief does not in any way 
prejudice the substantial rights of the parties.”  
     Interim Maintenance for wife and children under Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 
1956, Secs. 18 and 20, have to be put in same position as the hunband/father and maintenance 
to be in tune with their status and mode of living to which they were used to before 
separation.3 
(b) When husband is indigent person:  
Though the Hindu husband’s duty to maintain his wife arises from the personal law and the 
same finds recognition under Section 18 of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, if it 
happens to be indigent person or becomes one, he cannot be compelled to pay maintenance to 
the wife.  It is a misfortune that has to be shared by the wife also.4 But the husband cannot 
absolve himself from the liability to maintain his wife by merely saying that his financial 
condition is not good.  If he is an able bodied person he should make efforts to earn 
something or whatsoever he can. 
 c) The Quantum  
     The amount of maintenance would have to be fixed by taking a rational and balanced view 
of various factors.  The court has to be guided by the relevant provisions of the Act and the 
                                                 
1   (Rekha DeepakMalhotra v. Deepak Jagmohan Malhotra AIR 1999 Bom 291) 
2  (AIR 1977 Raj 160) 
3    (Tilak Kumari and another v. Anand, (2001) 3 Femi-Juris C.C. 127 (Del) H.C.) 
4   (Sivankutty v. S Komalakumari, AIR 1989 Ker 124) 
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object of Sections 18 and 23.  Thus, the court has to bear in mind the status of the parties, 
reasonable wants of the claimant, the income and property of the claimant and the number of 
persons whom the husband has to maintain.  The amount of maintenance should aid the wife 
to live in a similar style as she enjoyed in the matrimonial home but it should not be punitive 
in nature.  In Rekha Deepak Malhotra v. Deepak Jagmohan Malhotra,1 the Court upheld the 
interim maintenance of Rs. 7500/- per month to award to the wife on the basis of the 
enjoyment of high standards of life by husband and wife both.  The Court has to take a 
general view, and try to fix an amount which would be by and large acceptable to both the 
husband and the wife.  
     It was held in a case2 that for determining quantum of interim maintenance to wife, the 
status of her parents is totally irrelevant consideration. After marriage it is the status of the 
husband which is determinative of the quantum of maintenance to be given to the wife.  After 
the marriage a girl adopts matrimonial home and gets attuned to the living standard of her 
husband.  She is identified with the family of her husband.  She acquires here husband’s 
family name.  If she has to suffer his miseries, she has right to enjoy his affluency also.  
Therefore, if the husband is wealthy and leading opulent life, his wife also has right to be the 
partner in his prosperity and live with same standards and equal dignity.  It does not lie in the 
mouth of the husband, after separation of the spouses, to say that wife is no longer entitled to 
the standard in which she has been living with the husband and that she should re-adopt the 
standard of her parental home.  Thus in such cases of maintenance of deserted wives coming 
to the Court, the Court is to apply the principles of equity.  Equity means evenness, fairness 
and justice.  The Court cannot be insensitive in such matters and leave the wife in penury 
after the husband has deserted her. 
d) Forfeiture of the claim of maintenance: 
Under sub-section (3) of section 18 the wife will forfeit her claim to maintenance with 
separate residence if she does not lead a life of good character.  She will have to prove herself 
                                                 
1  (AIR 1999 Bom 291) 
2 Smt. Meenu Chopra v. Deepak Chopra,  ((2001) 3 Femi-Juris C.C. 27 Del H C) 
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chaste as she continues to be the wife even though living separate because she is claiming 
maintenance being wife. 
     Another ground upon which she will be losing her right to maintenance is conversion to 
another religion.  Since the maintenance is to be granted under Hindu personal law the party 
to whom the maintenance is granted should remain Hindu.  Conversion to any other religion 
disentitles her to claim maintenance.1 
(B) Pendente Lite Expenses Under S.24 Hindu Marriage Act, 1955.   
Where in any proceeding under this Act it appears to the court that either the wife or the 
husband, as the case may be, has no independent income sufficient for her or his support and 
the necessary expenses of the proceedings, it may, on the application of the wife or the 
husband, order the respondent to pay to the petitioner the expenses of proceeding, and 
monthly during the proceeding such sum as, having regard to the petitioner’s own income and 
the income of the respondent, it may seem to the court to be reasonable.2  
     Any maintenance which is granted during the pendency of the proceedings is known as 
pendente lite, interim maintenance or temporary maintenance. 
     In Prem Nath Sarvan v. Smt. Prem Lata Sarvan 3 it has been held that where the wife has 
been denied maintenance in proceedings under S.125 Cr.P.C. it is no ground for denying it 
under Section 24 of HMA.  Both the provisions operate in different spheres.4 Any amount 
awarded under S.125, Criminal P.C. is adjustable against amount awarded in matrimonial 
proceedings under S.24 of the HMA as alimony to wife.5 
     The true scope of ‘during the proceeding’ occurring in S.24 of HMA it was held in Jai 
Rani v. Om Parkash,6 “Where on a petition under S.9 by the husband for restitution of 
conjugal rights an application under S.24 was made by the wife for maintenance pendente lite 
and litigation expenses the husband was ordered to pay a certain sum as litigation expenses 
                                                 
1   (Section 24 of the Act) 
2   (Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955) 
3 (AIR 1988 Del 50) 
4 Surjit Kaur v. Tirth Singh, AIR 1978 P&H 112 
5   (Sudeep Chaudhary v. Radha Chaudhary, AIR 1999 SC 536) 
6   (AIR 1984 Del H C 301) 
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and maintenance and on failure of the husband to pay the amount the proceedings were 
stayed.  The wife would be entitled to recover from the husband monthly maintenance 
allowance only up to the date, the stay was ordered but not after that.  It could not be said that 
the wife can calim maintenance allowance as long as the husband’s petition is not dismissed 
or decreed.” 
     In similar matter, which came up for consideration before the Madras High Court in P.S. 
Devarajan v. R. Geetha,1 the Court took contrary view. In a petition for conjugal rights, the 
Court ordered interim maintenance and litigation expenses to be paid by the husband to the 
wife and subsequently on husband’s failure to pay the amount the Court stayed all the further 
proceedings, and held that the husband would be bound to pay the interim maintenance even 
during the period while the proceedings were stayed by the Court. The Court further held that 
when the application is kept pending, the effect of the stay is only that the petitioner will not 
be entitled to proceed with the matter till he complies with the direction and the application 
filed by him still continues on the file.  The words “during the proceeding” means, during the 
pendency of the proceeding.  A stay will not put an end to the litigation.  The application was 
still pending and the husband would be bound to pay interim alimony even during that period. 
In holding so the Court followed a decision of the Supreme Court.2 
     It is submitted that the view taken by the Madras High Court appears to be the correct 
view, as by ordering a stay of proceedings, the application filed by the petitioner is not 
terminated and there is a possibility of getting it revived, once the petitioner complies with the 
direction. Therefore, the liability to pay interim maintenance, under S.24 of the HMA subsists 
“during the proceeding” which necessarily means even after the stay of proceedings. The 
Court further observed that once it is found that the proceedings have not come to an end and 
the Court has ordered only stay of proceedings, the application filed by the petitioner is kept 
on the file.  Where Court orders that no orders will be passed thereon it is not terminating the 
proceeding.  It is also well settled that once the petitioner complies with the direction, the 
order of stay also gets automatically vacated and the application also gets revived.  
                                                 
1  (AIR 2000 Mad 440) 
2  Shree Chamundi Mopeds Ltd. V. Church of South India Trust.  (AIR 1992 SC 1439) 
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Judicial Activism 
     Maintenance under S.24 can be claimed either by the husband or by the wife and not by 
the children.  But by judicial activism the children have also been allowed to apply for 
maintenance under the provisions of section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. 
     There is no doubt that under section 24 of the Act the child cannot claim maintenance and 
it is only either of the two spouses who can make a claim.  At the same time, it is clear that a 
claim can be made for maintenance of a child during a proceeding under the Act and the 
Court can in exercise of powers vested in it by Section 26 of the Act pass such interim orders 
in any proceeding under the Act, from time to time, as it may deem just and proper with 
respect to the maintenance and education of minor children, consistently with their wishes, 
wherever possible.1 
     Very recently, in Padmja Sharma v. Ratan Lal Sharma,2 the Supreme Court has held that 
where both the parents of the child are employed both are obliged to pay maintenance and not 
only father of child.  The maintenance should be made in proportion to their salaries. 
(C) Permanent Alimony and Maintenance under S.25 Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. 
     According to Section 25 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 any court exercising jurisdiction 
under this Act may, at the time of passing any decree or at any time subsequent thereto, on 
application made to it for the purpose by either the wife or the husband, as the case may be, 
order that the respondent shall, pay to the applicant for her or his maintenance and support 
such gross sum or such monthly or periodical sum for a term not exceeding the life of the 
applicant as, having regard to the respondent’s own income and other property of the 
applicant the conduct  of the parties and other circumstances of the case, it may seem to the 
court to be just, and any such payment may be secured, if necessary, by a charge on the 
immovable property of the respondent.3                
                                                 
1   (Smt. Kamlesh Arora v Jugal Kishore Arora, AIR 1990 P&H 168) 
2  (AIR 2000 SC 1398) 
3  (Section 25(1) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955) 
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     If the court is satisfied that there is a change in the circumstances of either party at any 
time after it has made an order under sub-section (1) of S.25 it may, at the instance of either 
party, vary, modify or rescind any such order in such manner as the court may deem just.1 
     The Bombay High Court has held that in determining the income of the party Income-tax 
return is not sole guide.2 
     The decree of maintenance under S.25 does not get extinguished with the death of 
husband. Decree is executable against estate of husband in hands of heirs and there is no 
personal liability.  The decree of maintenance indicates that maintenance was payable during 
the lifetime of the widow.  To make such a decree contingent upon the life of the husband is 
contrary to the terms and the spirit of the decree.3 The spouse who voluntarily incapacitates 
himself from earning is not entitled for grant of maintenance.4 In this case the husband who 
stopped his business of running auto-richshaw was held not entitled for maintenance from his 
wife. 
     Permanent alimony can be granted on the “passing of a decree” only and not on the 
annulment of marriage. The expression “passing of a decree” refers to the decree of divorce, 
restitution of conjugal rights or judicialseparation and not the passing of a decree through 
which the petition itself is dismissed.5  But a contrary view has been taken in Sadanand 
Sahadev Rawool v. Sulochana Sadaand Rawool.6 The observations of the hon’able court are 
worth noting. The court observed, “Here depriving the respondent of the alimony granted to 
her would be to leave her destitute, for she certainly does not have the means to live.  The 
only relation she has in the world is a brother who is not in a position to give her succour 
which I infer from the fact that she has put up with all manner of humiliation rather than take 
refuge with her brother.  Where a woman is so defenceless, it would be a travesty of justice if 
technicalities prevail and deprive her of the small consolation which she has got by way of 
                                                 
1   (Section 25(2) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955) 
2  (Vinod Dulerai Mehta v. Kanak Vinod Mehta, AIR 1990 Bom 120) 
3  (Nagamma v. Ningamma, AIR 1999 Kar. 432) 
4  (Govind Singh v. Vidya AIR 1999 Raj 304. 
5  (Ramganatham v. Shyamala, AIR 1990 Mad 1) 
6  (AIR 1989 Bom 220) 
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future alimony.”  It is submitted that the Bombay High Court’s view is the correct 
preposition. In another case1 where a decree of nullity of marriage was obtained by the 
husband on ground of his impotency and epilepsy and not due to any defect or default in wife, 
section 25 was held to be applicable.  Wife is entitled to maintenance. 
     If the court is satisfied that the party in whose favour an order has been made under this 
section has remarried or, if such party is the wife, that she has not remained chaste, or, such 
party is the husband, that he has had sexual intercourse with any woman outside wedlock, it 
may at the instance of the other party vary, modify or rescind any such order in such manner 
as the court may deem just.2 
(D) Section 125 of the Criminal ProcedureCode, 1973 
Section 125.  Order for maintenance of wives, children and parents. 
(1) If any person having sufficient means neglects or refuses to maintain – 
(A) His wife, unable to maintain herself; Or 
(B) His legitimate or illegitimate minor child whether married or not, unable to 
maintain itself; Or 
 (C) His legitimate or illegitimate child (not being a married daughter) who has attained 
majority, where such child is, by reason of any physical or mental abnormality, or injury 
unable to maintain itself; Or 
(C) His father or mother, unable to maintain himself or herself. 
 
A magistrate of the first class may, upon proof of such neglect or refusal, order such person to 
make a monthly allowance for the maintenance of his wife or such child, father or mother, at 
such monthly rate not exceeding five thousand rupees on the whole, as such magistrate thinks 
fit, and to pay the same to such person as the magistrate may from time to time direct; 
     Provided that the magistrate may order the father of minor female child referred to in 
clause (b) to make such allowance, until she attains her majority, if the magistrate is satisfied 
that the husband of such minor female child if married, is not possessed of sufficient means. 
                                                 
1  (Gopalakrishnan Nair v. Thembatty Ramani, AIR 1989 Kerala 331) 
2  (Section 25 (3) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955) 
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     Explanation: For for purposes of this chapter – 
(a) “Minor” means a person who, under the provisions of the Indian Majority Act, 1875 is 
deemed not to have attained his majority; 
(b) “Wife” includes a woman who has been divorced by, or has obtained a divorce from, 
her husband and has not remarried. 
(2) Such allowance shall be payable from the date of the order, or, if so ordered, from the 
date of the application for maintenance. 
(3) If any person so ordered fails without sufficient cause to comply with the order, any such 
magistrate may, for every breach of the order, issue a warrant for levying the amount due in 
the manner provided for levying fines, and may sentence such person, for the whole or any 
part of each month’s allowance remaining unpaid after the execution of the warrant, to 
imprisonment for a term which may extend to one month or until payment if sooner made; 
 Provided that no warrant shall be issued for the recovery of any amount due under this 
section unless application be made to the court to levy such amount within a period of one 
year from the date on which it become due: 
Provided further that if such person offers to maintain his wife on condition of her living with 
him, and she refuses to live with him, such magistrate may consider any grounds of refusal 
stated by her, and may make an order under this section notwithstanding such offer, if he is 
satisfied that there is just ground for so doing. 
Explanation: If a husband has contracted marriage with another woman or keeps a mistress, it 
shall be considered to be just ground for his wife’s refusal to live with him. 
(4) No wife shall be entitled to receive an allowance from her husband under this section if 
she is living in adultery, or if, without any sufficient reason, she refuses to live with her 
husband, or if they are living separately by mutual consent. 
(5) On proof that any wife in whose favour an order has been made under this section is 
living in adultery, or that without sufficient reason she refuses to live with her husband, or 
that they are living separately by mutual consent, the Magistrate shall cancel the order.   
 
 79
Persons entitled to Maintenance 
     According to Section 125(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure the following persons are 
entitled to claim maintenance under the circumstances to be mentioned later. 
(1) The wife. The wife, who is unable to maintain herself, is entitled to claim maintenance.  
She may be of any age-minor or major.  The term ‘wife’ includes a woman who has been 
divorced by or has obtained divorce from her husband and has not remarried.1 This section 
has to some extent overruled the personal law so far as proceedings for maintenance are 
concerned.  The Mohammedan Law allowing maintenance to divorced wife during the period 
of iddat i.e. three months from divorce, did not bar grant of relief u/s 125 for period beyond 
Iddat and until her remarriage.2 This extended definition of ‘wife’ had been considered 
necessary in Muslim Law in view of the existence of some peculiar rules permitting a 
husband to divorce his wife at any time at his will.  The inclusion of ‘divorced wife’ in the 
definition of ‘wife’ was intended to prevent the unscrupulous husbands frustrating the 
legitimate maintenance claims of their wives by just divorcing them under the above said 
personal laws and was aimed at securing social justice to women belonging to the poorer 
classes.3                                                       
Shah Bano’s Case 
     The position of divorced muslim women in India was thoroughly examined in the 
landmark judgement of the Supreme Court in Mohd. Ahmed Khan v. Shah Bano Begum.4 It 
was observed that Section 125 of Criminal Procedure Code was enacted in order to provide a 
quick and summary remedy to a class of persons who were unable to maintain themselves.  
Under the Muslim Personal Law, the husband is bound to pay Mehr to the wife as a mark of 
respect to her.  He may settle any amount he likes by way of dower upon his wife, which 
cannot be less than ten Dirhams, which is equivalent to three or four rupees.  But, one must 
have regard to the realities of life.  Mehr is a mark of respect to the wife.  The sum settled by 
                                                 
1  (Explanation (b) to Section 125(1)) 
2  (Sahida Begum v. Mh. Mofizul Haque 1986 Cri. L.J. 103 Gauhati) 
3   (Joint Committee Report, P.xiii) 
4  (AIR 1985 SC 945) 
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way of Mehr is generally expected to take care of the ordinary requirements of the wife, 
during the marriage and after.  But these provisions of the Muslim Personal Law do not 
countenance cases in which the wife is unable to maintain herself after the divorce. This 
appears to be not a fair proposition. Because the Muslim Personal Law, which limits the 
liability of the husband to provide for the maintenance of the divorced wife to the period of 
iddat, does not contemplate or countenance the situation envisaged by Section 125 of 
Criminal Procedure Code after divorce, where she is unable to maintain herself till 
remarriage, if it is so, it would be wrong to hold that the Muslim husband, according to his 
personal law, is not under an obligation to provide maintenance, beyond the period of iddat, 
to hisdivorced wife who is unable to maintain herself otherwise.  In fact, if the divorced wife 
is able to maintain herself, the liability of the husband to provide maintenance for her ceases 
with the expiration of the period of iddat.  Otherwise she is entitled to take recourse to Section 
125 of the Criminal Procedure Code.  Thus the law is that there is no conflict between the 
provisions of Section 125 and those of the Muslim Personal Law on the question of the 
Muslim husband’s obligation to provide maintenance for a divorced wife in case she is unable 
to maintain herself.  It is also important to mention here that a man may marry a woman for 
love. Mehr and provision for maintenance is a symbol of respect paid to her on wedlock.  But 
he does not divorce her as a mark of respect.  Therefore, deferred Mehr, a sum payable to the 
wife out of respect cannot be a sum payable ‘on divorce’. Thus, there is no escape from the 
conclusion that a divorced Muslim wife is entitled to apply for maintenance under Sec.125 
and that Mehr is not a sum which, under the Muslim Personal Law, is payable on divorce.  
     But, again the position of Divorced Muslim women in India became degraded by the 
enactment of Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986.1 The divorced 
Muslim wife’s claims are now to be governed by this Act.  It is however, possible for the 
Muslim spouses to opt to be governed by Sections 125-128 Criminal Procedure Code, by 
virtue of a provision under Section 5 of the Muslim Women (Protection of rights on Divorce) 
Act, 1986. Section 5 states as follows: 
                                                 
1 (Veena Madhav Tonapi: “Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986 – An 
illustration of Legislative Supermacy over Judiciary” published in AIR 1995 Journal 135) 
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     “If, on the date of the first hearing of the application under sub-section (2) of section 3, a 
divorced woman and her former husband declare, by affidavit or any other declaration in 
writing in such form as may be prescribed, either jointly or separately, that they would prefer 
to be governed by the provisions of sections 125 to 128 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 
1973, and file such affidavit or declaration in the court hearing the application, the Magistrate 
shall dispose of such application accordingly. 
     Explanation: - For the purpose of this section, “date of the first hearing of the application” 
means the date fixed in the summons for the attendance of the respondent to the application.” 
     This has been observed that the said Act has not been in the interest of Muslim women 
because a Muslim husband will never like to be governed by the provisions of Criminal 
Procedure Code. 
     However, some of the High Courts have held that the above Act did not take away the 
Muslim wife’s right to claim maintenance under Sec.125 of the Code.1 
     In Danial Latifi v. Union of India,2 the Supreme Court of India gave a landmark judgement 
by interpreting Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act 1986, Secs. 3 and 4, 
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 Secs 125 and 127 (3)(b) and upon the constitutional 
validity of the Act.  By interpreting the provisions of M.W. Act, 1986, the Court held that: - 
     “A Muslim husband is liable to make reasonable and fair provision for the future of the 
divorced wife which obviously includes her maintenance as well. Such a reasonable and fair 
provision extending beyond the iddat period must be made by the husband within the iddat 
period in terms of Section 3(1)(a) of the Act. Liability of Muslim husband to his divorced 
wife arising under Section 3(1)(a) of the Act to pay maintenance is not confined to iddat 
period. A divorced Muslim woman who has not remarried and who is not able to maintain 
herself after iddat period can proceed as provided under Section 4 of the Act against her 
relatives who are liable to maintain her in proportion to the properties which they inherit on 
her death according to Mulsim law from such divorced woman including her children and 
parents. If any of the relatives being unable to pay maintenance, the Magistrate may direct the 
                                                 
1  (Ali v. Sufairi, 1988 (2) KLT 94) 
2   ((2001) 3 Femi Juris C.C. 20 (SC)) 
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State Wakf Board established under the Act to pay such maintenance. The provisions of the 
Act do not offend Arts 14, 15 and 21 of the Constitution of India.”1 
     Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986, Section 3(1) does not bar 
maintenance right of Muslim divorced woman to claim maintenance from her husband and 
right is not limited to the period of iddat.  There is no conflict between provisions of Section 
125, Cr.P.C. and those of Muslim Personal Law on question of Muslim husband’s obligation 
to provide maintenance of his divorced wife not able to maintain herself.  Right given to a 
divorced Muslim woman to claim maintenance under Section 125, Cr.P.C is not curtailed by 
provisions of M.W. Act, 1986. A reasonable and fair provision extending beyond iddat period 
must be made by husband within iddat period in terms of Section 3(1) of M.W. Act, 1986. 
M.W. Act has no section, which nullifies order passed by Magistrate under Section 125, 
Cr.P.C. The conclusion is that the provisions of M.W. Act as made available to the divorced 
Muslim woman are in addition to the claims available to them under Section 125of Cr.P.C. In 
this case order of Magistrate granting compensation to divorced wife and her minor son was 
upheld.2 The Court further held that Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is a 
measure of social justice and is specially enacted to protect women and children and falls 
within the Constitutional sweep of Article 15 (3) reinforced by Article 39 of the Constitution. 
The object of Section 125 is to prevent vagrancy and destitution.  The right to maintenance 
conferred by this section is a statutory right which the Legislature has created irrespective of 
nationality or creed of the parties. It provides a quick and summary remedy to a class of 
persons who are unable to maintain themselves and is applicable to all persons belonging to 
all religions and has no relationship with the personal law of the parties. 
     Definition of wife cannot be stretched associated or linked to nullity of marriage envisaged 
under Sections 11 or 12 of Hindu Marriage Act.  It is solely confined to situation of divorce 
only till remarriage.3  “ A wife in fact” with all legal presumption of being a ‘wife’ in ‘law’ 
operating in her favour is entitled to invoke the section unless the illegality or the invalidity of 
                                                 
1   (Section 3 and 4 of M.W. Act, 1986) 
2  (Abdul Latif Mondal v Anuwara Khatun, (2002) 1 Femi-Juris C.C. 1, Cal. HC) 
3  (K. Shivrama v. K Bharathi, 1986 Cr.L.J. 317) 
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her marriage is apparent on its face with irresistible clarity and without any scope of any 
doubt or dispute.1 
     It is now well settled that wife can claim only one maintenance.  Though there are 
different forums open to her to claim maintenance, yet there cannot be parallel running 
different maintenance orders for one and the same time.  Only one of them is enforceable and 
the others remain just declarate in dormacy or consumed.2 
(2) Female Child.  A minor child, male or female, if unable to maintain itself, is entitled to 
claim maintenance.  It is immaterial whether such a child is legitimate or illegitimate, or 
whether married or unmarried.3 Here ‘minor’ means a person who, under the provisions of the 
Indian Majority Act, 1875 is deemed not to have attained his majority.4 The child may be 
male or female.  A minor married girl may be entitled to claim maintenance from her husband 
or her father (or may be from both) provided the other necessary conditions are satisfied.  If 
the husband of a minor married female child is not possessed of sufficient means, the father 
of such female child will be required to make allowance for the maintenance of such female 
child until she attains her majority.5  
     Even after attaining majority a legitimate or illegitimate child is entitled to claim 
maintenance if by reason of any physical or mental abnormality or injury it is unable to 
maintain itself.  However, a married daughter is not entitled to maintenance under section 125 
of the Cr.P.C., if she has attained majority.  In such cases the responsibility of maintaining her 
is that of the husband and not of the father.6 
     The provisions of Section 125, Cr PC are applicable irrespective of the Personal Law and 
it does not make any distinction whether the daughter claiming maintenance is Hindu or 
Muslim. However, a daughter would cease to have benefit of the provisions under Section 
125, Cr PC on attaining majority, though she would be entitled to claim the benefits further 
                                                 
1  (Purna Bahadur v. Santa Bista, 1984 Cri. L.J. 1145 Sikkim) 
2   (Sudershan Kumar v. Smt. Deepak, 1986 Cri. L.J. NOC 52 (Punj & Har.). 
3  (Section 125(1)(b). 
4  (Explanation (a) to Section 125(1). 
5  (Section 125(1)(b). 
6  (Section 125(1)(c). 
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under the Statute/Personal Law. Thus, even if once a child gets the benefit of this provision, 
he or she, cannot be deprived of his or her rights to get the benefit under any other law, 
particularly the provisions of the HMA Act, 1956 or under any other Statute/personal Law. 
The Court does not interfere with this order because it will amount to miscarriage of justice 
and great inconvenience to her.1 
(C) Mother. A mother, unable to maintain herself, is entitled to claim maintenance from her 
son.  Section 125(1) of the Cr.P.C. does not specifically provide for the liability of a daughter 
to maintain the parents.  This gave rise to a conflict of opinion among the High Courts on the 
question of liability of daughter.2 It has now been decided by the Supreme Court holding that 
the daughter whether married or unmarried would also be liable to maintain the parents.  The 
Court pointed out that apart from any law, the Indian Society cast a duty on the children to 
maintain the parents and that social obligation equally applied to daughter.3 It is not quite 
clear from the section whether “father or mother” will also mean “adoptive father” or 
“adoptive mother” or “step father” or “step mother”. According to Section 3 (20) of the 
General Clauses Act, 1897 the word ‘father’ shall include an “adoptive father”; and though 
the term mother had not been similarly defined, it had been held that the term “mother” 
included “adoptive mother”.4 However, it has also been held that having regard to the object 
and intention of Section 125, the term ‘mother’ will have to be given its natural meaning, and 
that it would not include a “step mother”.5 This question came to be re-examined by the 
Andhra Pradesh High Court and it has been reiterated that the term mother would not include 
step-mother.6 This position appears to be quite logical. 
                                                 
1   (Dr. Jagdish Jugtawat v. Smt. Manjulata and others (2001) 1 Femi-Juris C.C. 381 (Raj). 
2  (Rajkumari v. Yashoda Devil, 1978 Cri.L.J. 600 (P & H HC), Areefa Beevi v. Dr. K. M. Sahib, 
 1982 Cri.L.J. 412 (Ker.). 
3  (Vijaya Manohar Arbat v. Kashirao Rajaram Sawai, (1987) 2 SCC 278: 1987 SCC (Cri.) 354: 1987 
 Cri LJ 977) 
4  (Baban v. Parvatibai, 1978 Cri. LJ 1436, 1440 (Bom HC) 
5  (Rewalal v. Kamlabai, 1986 Cri LJ 282 (MP HC). See for contra. Pitei Bewa v. Laxmidhar Jena, 
1985 Cri LJ 1124 (Ori HC). 
6  (Ayyagari Suryanarayana Vara Basada Rao v. A.S. Venkatakrishna Veni, 1989 Cr. LJ 673 (AP 
 HC). 
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     In Jayram Paswan v. Sumitra Devil & Anr.,1 the Court held that the word ‘mother’ in 
clause (d) of sub-section (1) of Section 125, Cr PC cannot mean the step-mother also.  The 
concept of Mother would include only the natural Mother and not a step-mother.  This view 
gathers subsistence from the decision in the case of Debendra v. Karunamoyee reported in 
1977 Cal HN 87 of this Court wherein it has been held that a Mother would not include a 
step-mother and necessarily, it follows that such a step-mother would not be entitled to any 
order of maintenance. The Supreme Court had also endorsed the said view.2  In this case the 
Court held that even by an analogy from the General Clauses Act, 1897, Father would include 
an adoptive father; an adoptive mother may also be included in the expression of a Mother, 
but not a step-mother.  However, the Supreme Court in the said decision held that as Section 
125, Cr PC intended to achieve a social purpose of liberal construction to fulfil the intention 
of the Legislature should be given and consequently, to achieve the said object a childless 
step-mother may claim maintenance from her step-son; provided she is a widow or her 
husband, if living, is also incapable of supporting and maintaining her. 
     The statutory claim of mother for maintenance is not dependent on her having discharged 
parental obligations during childhood of son. Mother who is having no sufficient means can 
claim maintenance from her son even though her husband is alive. If mother has two or more 
children, she can claim maintenance from anyone or both of them.  Choice is given to parents 
and it is not the choice of son or sons.3 The Court further held that it is not out of place to 
remember the mandate of Manu in the matter of maintenance of parents, wife and child.  
Manu said, “the aged parents, a virtuous wife and an infant child must be maintained even by 
committing a hundred misdeeds”.  Manu does not speak of solitary duty, it is moral duty of a 
person to maintain aged parents, virtuous wife and infant child.  In discharge of this pious 
duty, Manu went to such an extent that he made hundred misdeeds pardonable. During the 
course of time, this moral duty assumed a legal character and the Legislature, therefore, 
enacted Section 125 of Cr PC. 
                                                 
1  ((2001) 3 Femi-Juris C.C. 31 (Cal HC) 
2  (Kirtikant D. Vadodaria v. State of Gujrat and another, 1996 SCC (Cr) 762) 
3  (Mahendra Kumar v. Gulabbai, (2001) 3 Femi –Juris C.C. 216 (Bom HC)  
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Persons from Whom Maintenance can be Claimed 
     Section 125(1) of Cr. P.C. required only a husband or a father or a son or a daughter, as the 
case may be, to pay maintenance to the respective persons namely, wife, child, father or 
mother, under certain circumstances.  Section 125 did not contemplate the mother to pay 
maintenance to father or son and daughter, as the case may be.1 
     According to the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, either a husband or wife, if separated or 
divorced, can ask the other for alimony.2 
     In H. J. Mascreen v. Dr. (Mrs.) R.K Mascreen3 it has been held that under the Code, the 
duty of maintaining the child is cast upon the father and no such duty is cast on the mother 
either under the Code or any other law even though her income is double the income of the 
father and she has custody of the children. 
Essential Conditions for Granting Maintenance 
     There are following essential conditions for granting maintenance: 
(1) Sufficient Means to Maintain. According to Section 125(1) of the Cr PC the person from 
whom maintenance is claimed must have sufficient means to maintain the person or persons 
claiming maintenance.  The ‘means’ contemplated are not confined only to visible means 
such as land and other property or employment.  If a person is healthy and able bodied, he 
must be held to have the means to support his wife, children and parent.4 The husband cannot 
refuse to maintain his wife on the ground that he has no sufficient means. Since the fact of 
‘means’ is within the special knowledge of the husband, the burden to prove this fact is on the 
husband and not on the wife. 5 
(2) Neglect or Refusal to Maintain. The person from whom maintenance is claimed must 
have neglected or refused to maintain the person or persons entitled to claim maintenance. 
Neglect or refusal to maintain may be by words or conduct. It may be express or implied.6 
                                                 
1  (Rajkumari v. Yashoda Devil, 1978 Cri LJ 600, 601 (P & H HC). 
2  (Section 24 of Hindu Marriage Act, 1955) 
3  (A.I.R. 1956 Mad 154), 
4  (Basant Kumari Mohanty, 1982 Cri LJ 485 (Ori HC). 
5  (Shivaji R Gaikwad v. Jijaba Shivaji Gaikawad, 1986(1) crimes 108 (Bom). 
6  (Bhikaji v. Maneckji (1907) 5 Cri. LJ 334, 336 (Bom HC) 
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Burden of proving Neglect is on the claimant.1 The wife is justified in refusing to live with 
her husband if there are sufficient reasons like husband beating and ill-treating her under 
influence of liquor and earlier his two marriages ended in divorce 2 or the husband is living 
with another woman.3 Wife’s refusal to live with her husband on the ground of his impotency 
was held to be a just ground as contemplated by the second proviso to Sec. 125(3) and it was 
further held that in such a case wife is entitled to claim maintenance from her husband 
according to his means.4 
     A husband who makes it difficult for the wife to live with him and who fails to maintain 
her when she lives elsewhere, ‘neglects’ or refuses to maintain the wife.  A husband cannot 
expect any self-respecting wife, in keeping with modern ideas, to share the conjugal home 
with a mistress or another wife.  Thus the offer of a husband, who has taken a second wife, to 
maintain the first wife on condition of her living with him cannot be considered to be a 
bonafide offer and the husband will be considered to have neglected or refused to maintain 
the first wife.5 Even where the husband, by virtue of the personal law applicable to him, is 
entitled to marry a second wife while the first marriage subsiss, the first wife may be justified 
in considering the second marriage itself a ground for living separately and seeking 
maintenance from the husband.6 It has been observed that the term ‘maintenance’ means 
proper maintenance and it should not be narrowly interpreted, looking after the person in need 
of maintenance and showing concern for his physical and spiritual well being. It includes 
clothing, medical treatment, academic pursuits and a decent living.7                                                                                                                                        
(3) Person Claiming Maintenance must be unable to maintain himself or herself. Section 
125 is in fact for destitutes only.  In other words, if a woman is a prosperous woman, she does 
not come under the purview of S.125 of the Code. The rationale behind the provisions of 
section 125 is that any woman who is likely to be a potential danger to herself and on account 
                                                 
1  (Dasarathi Ghosh v. Anuradha Ghosh, 1988 Cri. LJ 64 (Cal HC) 
2 (Manmutty v. Beepa-1 humma 1981 (Ker. HC) 
3  (Dharamishthaben v. Hasmukhbhai 1990 Cri. LJ 2132 (Guj) 
4  (Siraj Mohd. Khan v. Hafizunnisa 1981 Cri. LJ 1430 (SC) 
5  (Bishambhar Dass v. Anguri, 1978 Cri. LJ 385 (All HC) 
6  (Begum Subanu alias Sairabanu v. K.M. Abdul Ghafoor (1987) 2 SCC 285) 
7  (Purnasashi Devil v. Nagendra Nath, AIR 1950 Cal 465, 466). 
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of her destitution, is a potential danger to the society, therefore, must be taken care of, by 
those who have a moral responsibility to do so. The true object of Section 125 is mainly to 
prevent vagrancy. Under Section 125(1)(a) maintenance allowance cannot be granted to every 
wife who is neglected by her husband or whose husband refuses to maintain her, but can be 
granted only if the wife is unable to maintain herself.1 Wife, need not specifically plead that 
she is unable to maintain.2 However, in a case where the wife is hale and healthy and is 
adequately educated to earn for herself but refuses to earn and claim maintenance from 
husband, it has been held that she is entitled to claim maintenance but that her refusal to earn 
under the circumstances would disentitle her to get full amount of maintenance.3  
     The father is bound to maintain the child, whatever be the position of the mother.  The 
child must, however, be in existence, which means that no maintenance can be claimed on 
behalf of an unborn child. If the child is of such a tender age that it is inconceivable to think 
that it can do any work to earn its livelihood then such a finding in the order is not called for 
interference as it is to be concluded as a writing on the wall.4  
     The expression “unable to maintain herself” in S.125(i)(a) only connotes that the wife has 
no other means or source to maintain herself. It has nothing to do with her potential earning 
capacity. If her potential earning capacity is considered the whole provision will become 
inworkable and will result in defeating the very object of the legislature.  It will involve 
revering and endless enquiry about her physical ability, capacity as well as avenues and 
opportunities available to her for earning her livelihood. This was never intended by the 
legislature.  Maintenance cannot be refused merely because wife is educated and capable of 
securing employment.5  
     A wife’s petition cannot be dismissed because she has relations or friends willing to 
maintain her merely because a woman in distress has to depend on others’ for having a shed 
to take shelter or in order to avoid starvation, she takes to living on wages or runs from 
                                                 
1  (Manmohan Singh v. Mohindra Kaur, 1976 Cri LJ 1664 (All HC). 
2  (Udaivir Singh v. Vinod Kumari 1985 Cri LJ 1923 (All HC). 
3  (Abdulmunaf v. Salima, 1979 Cri LJ 172 (Kant HC). 
4  (Norbet v. Kerketa 1971  Cr. LJ 1496). 
5 Ashok Kumar v. VI Addl Sessions Judge 1981 Cr LJ 2357. 
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market to market for the sale of some grains of food to earn a very small profit to have her 
food to save life, it cannot be said that she not “unable to maintain herself” within the 
meaning of S.125 and would be therefore, entitled to maintenance. 1 
     The circumstances, which debar a wife to claim maintenance, are as follows: 
(a) The right of maintenance to wife is subject to the rule that she must be chaste and 
has not remarried.2  The words “if she is living in adultery” undoubtedly connotes a course 
of adulterous conduct more or less continuous. An occasional lapse would not be sufficient 
reason for refusing maintenance within the ambit of section 125(4). There must be clear proof 
of the adultery. A suspicion nurtured by the husband will not disentitle the wife to receive 
maintenance under the Code since sub-section (4) is in the nature of an exception to main 
section and the husband must prove that the wife is living in adultery.3 
The words “is living in adultery” in sub-section (4) of S.125 Cr.P.C. would not take into its 
fold stray instances of lapses from virtue it would not also mean that the wife should be living 
in adultery on the date of the petition. The proper interpretation would be that there should be 
proof of adulterous living shortly before or after the petition, shortly being interpreted in a 
reasonable manner viewing in the light of the facts of the case.4 Sec. 125(4) of the Cr. P.C.  
contemplated a continuous course of conduct on the part of the wife with the adulterer or 
paramour and that a single act of unchastity or a few lapses from virtue will not disentitle the 
wife from claiming maintenance from her husband. 5 
(b) Wife must not refuse without sufficient reasons to live with her husband.6  It may be 
noted that if a husband has contracted marriage with another woman or keeps a mistress, it 
shall be considered to be just ground for his wife’s refusal to live with him.7 When the 
husband denies the parentage of the child he indirectly refers to the unchastity of his wife.  
The accusation of adultery is sufficient cause for refusal on the part of the wife to reside with 
                                                 
1 Raibari v. Mangaraj 1983 Cri. LJ 125 (Orissa) 
2 Smt. Hamidan v. Mohd. Rafiq, 1993(11) (Part-I) L.C.D. 226 (228). 
3 Rachita R. Raut v. Vasanta Kumar Raut 1987 Cri. L J 655. 
4 Satish Kumar Arora v. Smt. Varsha Arora, 1983(2) Crimes 882(All). 
5 Jiban Krishna Das v. Renu Das (2001) 2Femi-Juris C.C. 261 (Cal). 
6 S.125 (4). 
7 Explanation to S.125 (3). 
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the husband.1 Imputation of unchastity made by the husband for the first time was held 
sufficient to constitute cruelty.  Such events subsequent to filing of complaint should also be 
considered in granting maintenance.2 What could be considered as a sufficient reason for the 
wife’s refusal to live with her husband would depend upon the facts and circumstances of the 
case. 
(c) The Wife must not be living separately by mutual consent 3 A divorced wife cannot, 
however, be characterized as a wife living separately by mutual consent.  She is a person who 
lives separately from her former husband by virtue of a change in status consequent upon the 
dissolution of the marriage.4. However, in the case of divorce by mutual consent if the wife 
had relinquished her right to maintenance she cannot later claim maintenance.5. The 
expression “wife” in sub-section (4) of Section 125 does not have the extended meaning of 
including a woman who has been divorced.  This is for the obvious reason that unless there is 
a relationship of husband and wife there can be no question of a divorcee woman living in 
adultery or without sufficient reason refusing to live with her husband. After divorce there is 
no occasion for the woman to live with her husband. Similarly, there would be no question of 
the husband and wife living separately by mutual consent because after divorce there is no 
need for consent to live separately.  In the context, therefore, S. 125(4) does not apply to the 
case of a woman who has been divorced or who has obtained a decree for divorce. Therefore, 
a wife who obtains divorce by mutual consent and who has not remarried can not be denied 
maintenance by virtue of Section 125(4).6 
Procedure  
 Proceeding under Section 125  may be taken against any person in any district, where he is, 
or where he or his wife resides, or where he last resided with his wife, or as the case may be, 
with the mother of the illegitimate child.7  An application under Section 125 must positively 
                                                 
1 Mango v. Mangtu, 1976 Cri LJ 93, 94 (HP HC). 
2Shakuntala v. Rattan Lal, 1981 Cri LJ 1420 (HP HC).  
3 (Sec. 125(4). 
4 Ravindran v. Sakunthala, 1978 Cri LJ 1049 (Ker HC) 
5 Sharwan Sakharam Ubhale v. Sou Durga Sharawan Ubhale, 1989 Cri LJ 211 (Bom HC) 
6 Gurmit Kaur v. Surjit Singh Alias Jeet Singh (1996) 1 SCC 39(41). 
7 (Section 126(1) 
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aver that the applicant is unable to maintain herself, in addition to the fact that the husband 
has sufficient means to maintain her and that he has neglected or refused to maintain the 
wife1. No period of limitation has been prescribed for filing an application for maintenance2 
All evidence must be adduced in the presence of the husband unless the Magistrate has 
dispensed with his personal appearance.3 All evidence is to be recorded in the manner 
prescribed for summons cases. (Ibid) If the magistrate is satisfied that the person against 
whom an order for payment of maintenance is proposed to be made is willfully avoiding 
service, or willfully neglecting to attend the court, the Magistrate may proceed to hear and 
determine the case ex parte.4 Any ex parte order so made may be set aside (a) for good cause 
shown; (b) on an application made within 3 months from the date thereof subject to 
appropriate terms including terms as to payment of costs to the oppsite party.5 The time limit 
of 3 months begins from the date of the knowledge of the ex parte order to the aggrieved 
party and not from the date of the passing of that order.6.The court in dealing with 
applications under Section 125 of Cr. P.C. may make an appropriate Order as to costs.7. An 
inquiry under Sections 125-126 of Cr.P.C., is not a trial, nor the result of such inquiry can be 
considered as a conviction or acquittal.  Therefore Section 300 of t he Code does not apply 
and a second application under Section 125 is not barred.8 It has been held by the Court that 
the second application was maintainable when the first application had been dismissed on the 
basis of a compromise.9  
Nature of Proceedings under Section 125 of Cr.P.C. 
     The proceedings u/s. 125 are essentially of a civil nature. The fact that the provisions occur 
in the Cr.P.C. and not civil Procedure Code and the fact that the recalcitrant opposite party 
who suffers the order of maintenance and does not obey the order may have to go to prison, 
                                                 
1 Zubedabi v. Abdul Khader, 1978 Cri L J 1555 at p 1557 (Kant) 
2Mithu Devil v. Siya Choudhary, 1975 Cri LJ 1694, 1695 (Pat HC).  
3  (Section 126(2) of the Code) 
4 Balan Nair v. Bhavani Amma Valsalamma, 1987 Cri LJ 399 (Ker). 
5 Proviso to S. 126(2). 
6 Meenakshi Ammal v. Somasundara Nadar, AIR 1970 Mad 242 at p 24) 
7 (Section 126(3) 
8 Nafees Ara v. Asif Saadat Ali, AIR 1963 All 143) 
9 Mango v. Mangtu 1976 Cri LJ 93,94 (HP HC). 
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will not change the nature or proceedings from Civil to criminal proceedings under chapter IX 
of the code, stand on a different footing. The person against whom claim for maintenance is 
made is not accused of any offences, nor can be convicted or sentenced.  The court has a duty 
to inform his about the proceeding and of his right to appear and contest.  In such a claim 
service of proceedings in terms of chapter VI is not the requirement of law.  If respondent is 
living abroad service of notice by registered post or through foreign embassy is valid.1. Relief 
to be given is of a civil nature only and the criminal process is applied for the purpose of 
summary and speedy disposal in the interest of society so that helpless wife and children are 
not left on the road.  The magisrate cannot hold a preliminary inquiry before issuing notice to 
the opposite party, nor is the case to be decided on principles applicable to the trial of an 
accused in a criminal case.  The proceedings are of a civil nature and the parties are 
competent witnesses. The Code does not make failure to maintain wife and children 
punishable.  The person against whom an application is made under this section is not 
charged with the commission of an offence. 
Section 125 and Art. 15(3) and 39 of the Constitution. 
     Though S.125 benefits a distressed father also, main thrust of the provision is to assist 
women and children in distress. That is fully consistent with Art.15 (3) of the Constitution, 
which states that the prohibition contained in the Article shall not prevent the State from 
making any special provision for women and children.  Art.39 of the Constitution also can 
take note which states, inter alia, that state shall in particular direct its policy towards securing 
that the citizen men and women equally have the right to an adequate means to livlihood, that 
children are given opportunities and facilities to develop in a healthy manner and in condition 
of freedom and dignity and that childhood and youth are protected against exploitation and 
against moral and material abandonment.2  
S.125 and Maintenance under Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 
     Parties whose marriage has been annulled under S.12 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 can 
no long enjoy the status of husband and wife under S.125 of the Code and application for 
                                                 
1 Balan Nair v. Bhavani Amma 1987 Cri.L.J. 399) 
2 Jagir Kaur v. Jaswant Singh AIR 1963 SC 152 
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maintenance is not maintainable.1. Marriage performed of Hindu woman with a Hindu male 
with a living spouse after Hindu MarriageAct, 1955 is null and void and the woman is not 
entitled to maintenance under S.125 Cr.P.C. but a boy born to such marriage is entitled to 
maintenance.2 Proceedings under S.9 of Hindu Marriage Act is not a bar to proceeding under 
S.125 Cr.P.C. 3 
     The remedies u/s. 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act and under S.125 Cr.P.C. are not 
alternative but they are concurrent and optional to the party entitled to make avail of.  They 
are remedial measures intended to alienate the hardship that be caused to either spouse. The 
mere possibility of availability of the remedy under S.24 of the HMA does not take away the 
power and jurisdiction of the Court under S.125 Cr.P.C. to grant relief.4. The fact that order 
has been passed u/s. 125 Cr.P.C. does not take away the jurisdiction of the Matrimonial court 
u/s. 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act. The two remedies could co-exist.5  
     Section 125 Cr.P.C. does not lay down either that the existence of decree for maintenance 
by a civil court will bar the jurisdiction of a Magistrate to entertain a petition for maintenance 
or that if there had been an earlier decree by a civil court a Magistrate must confine his award 
only to the quantum fixed by the Civil Court.6. Where there is Civil Court decree allowing the 
quantum of maintenance and when in execution substantial part of her husband’s land was 
sold in such a situation, the Magistrate ought not to have entertained wife’s application u/s. 
125 or should have issued appropriate order u/s. 127(2) of the Code.7 
Maintenance and Validity of Marriage  
     In case where validity of marriage is disputed in maintenance proceedings the Magistrate 
should neither sit as a civil court and decide this dispute nor should dismiss the petition 
leaving the wife to establish her status as wife in a civil court.  On proof of solemnization of 
marriage between the parties with essential customary rites and ceremonies the other 
                                                 
1Krishna Gopal v. Usha Rai 1982 Cri.L.J. 901 (Del.)  
2 Bakulabai v. Gangaram 1988(i) Crimes 587 SC) 
3 Rajendra Pd. Gupta v. State of U.P.1990 Cri.L.J. 1912 
4 S.S. Murty v. A. Tejo Sayasathimani 1984 Cri.L.J. 439(All) 
5Kuttappan v. Thanka 1985(2) Crimes 849(Ker).  
6 Shri Kuldeep Kumar v. Smt. Chandra Kanta, 1984(i) Crimes (Delhi) 173) 
7 Bhagya Narain v. Mayadevi 1990(i) Crimes 270 
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requirements like neglect and refusal having been established the Magistrate, who is 
empowered and conferred with jurisdiction to provide maintenance to a wife unable to 
maintain herself should award maintenance to the wife leaving the husband to establish 
validity of marriage in a competent civil court.1  
Maintenance and Second Marriage  
     No self-respecting woman would like that her husband may contract a second marriage.  If 
second, third or even fourth marriage is permissible under Mohammedan law, a 
Mohammedan male may indulge in that luxury.  At the most he may not be liable for the 
offence of bigamy.  But if such a behaviour proves to be an irritant to his wife and if the same 
becomes a source of mental agony to her, he cannot take shelter under his personal law and 
say that he is not liable to pay maintenance to his wife.  In such a case, Mohammedan wife 
would surely be entitled to live separate and claim maintenance solely on the ground that the 
very idea of contracting second marriage is abhorrent to her mind and therefore, the second 
marriage by her husband causes mental agony and cruelty to her. Moreover expl. to S.125 (3) 
gives an indication of the intention of the legislature.2 
Mehar & Maintenance.  
     Even by harmonizing payments under personal and customary law with the obligations 
under S.125 to 127 of the Code, the conclusion is clear that the liquidated sum paid at the 
time of divorce must be a reasonable and not an illusory and will release the quondam 
husband from the continuing liability only if the sum paid is realistically sufficient to 
maintain the ex-wife and salvage her from destitution. The policy of the law abhors neglected 
wives and destitute divorcees and S.127 (3)(b) takes care to avoid double payment one under 
custom at the time of divorce and another under S.125. A farthing is no substitute for a 
fortune nor waive consent equivalent to intelligent acceptance.3 
 
                                                 
1 Rudramma v. H.R. Puttuveenabha, 1987 Cri.L.J. 677. See also A.A. Balasundaram v. A 
 Vijayakumari 1991 Cr.L.J. 2254). 
2 Banabibi v. Sikandar Khan 1983 Cri.L.J. 1382(Guj) and Narayan Sahu v. Sushma Sahu 1992(1) 
Crimes 66) 
3 Fuzlunbi v. K Khadar Vali 1980 Cri.L.J. 1249) 
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CHAPTER – IV 
 
EVILS RELATING TO MARITAL AND DOMESTIC LIFE 
 
 
1.   Child marriages. 
     Problems of major importance for women are linked with marriage. Issues like age at 
marriage, procedures for contacting and executing marriage, customs of dowry and 
wealth…divorce and separation, widowhood and remarriage are vitally relevant for assessing 
women’s status.1 All these questions and many more are attached with the validity of 
marriage.  Marriage, whether considered as a sacrament or a contract, gives rise to status.  It 
confers a status of husband and wife on parties to the marriage, and a status of legitimacy of 
the children of marriage.2 
     In view of the importance of marriage as a social institution and the benefits accruing 
therefrom it is framed by public policy and the law. It has been said, “marriage is an 
institution which is the foundation of the family and of society, is basic to morality and 
civilization and therefore, is of vital interest to society and the States. On the secular side 
marriage as an important institution requires to be regulated by law.”3 Lord Westbury 
emphasized this importance when he observed in Shaw v. Gould 4 that: 
     “Marriage is the very foundation of civil society, and no part of the laws and institution of 
a country can be of more vital importance to its subjects.” 
                                                 
1Report of the Committee on the ‘Status of Women’in India, 1974, p.62)  
2Diwan, Paras, Hindu Law (1981), p.75)  
3 Singh Ranvir, ‘Women and Compulsory Registration of Hindu Marriage : Need for Uniform 
 Legislation’ in “Women, Law and Social Change” ed. By Shamsuddin Shams, A.P.H. New Delhi 
 (1991) p.40) 
4 ((1868) L.R. H.L. 55.) 
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The regulation of marriage has assumed importance and the State must make efforts to 
control the social aspects of marriage. 
     The child marriages are rampant, particularly in northern India, is a well-recognised fact 
and as such, the curse continues to plight the lives of such girls. The child partners of marital 
bondage are victims of the blind customs and superstitions still persisting in large segments of 
the rural countryside and in certain urban concentrations among the weaker socio-economic 
groups. When the baby girl is three or four years of age, her marriage is fixed and once 
marriage is done, the girl will not be allowed to go to school. Her home is the school for the 
girl. The study-course is to respect the elders, know how to cook, look after her brothers, etc. 
Before girl is sent to her husband’s house her father has to collect a sizable dowry, which 
symbolically marks the transfer of the burden from one family to another. At the age of 14 or 
15, girl child is sent to her husband’s house for child bearing. So, the girl child, in real sense, 
does not become the wife or life partner of her husband, but she becomes a son-producing 
machine of her in-laws and husband. If she bears a girl, the husband is not satisfied and often 
she becomes the target of abuse and torture. In case of death of the husband, the girl child-
wife becomes a widow and there is no chance of her re-marriage. In the state of Rajasthan, 
the girl child will have to be burnt alive with her husband. The burning of Roop Kanwar is the 
example of this horrid system. The ‘sati’ she was forced to commit is being projected as a 
heroic deed to be observed and taken as an example. The gory sight of burning Roop Kanwar 
was witnessed by so many people with hardly a murmur, hardly a word of objection. This 
shows the height of fanaticism, conservativeness and male domination in Indian Society. 1 
     Child marriage is one of the burning problems in Indian Society.  Many girls of 7-12 years 
are married with bridegrooms who are just one or two years senior in age to the brides. This 
practice is more common in some of the villages of Bihar and Rajasthan. This type of 
marriage is not performed in a concealed manner, rather it is well attended by relatives of 
both the parties as well as a large number of invitees. Child marriages in a group are also seen 
at some religious places in Bihar. The practice of child marriage in Bihar is more common in 
                                                 
1Benjamin Joseph, “Socio-religious Status of Girl Child in India” in “Girl Child in India” ed. By  
Leelamma Devasia and V.V. Devasia, Ashish Publishing House, New Delhi (1991), p.82).  
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scheduled castes, such as Bhuia, Chamar, Dusadh, Pasi etc. and some lower castes like Barhi, 
Beldar, Koeri, Kumhar, Yadav etc. Most of the brides and bridegrooms were in the lap of 
their parents. Also, it was reported that about ninety per cent marriages held in some villages 
of Rajasthan were illegal considering the prescribed age of marriage, i.e., 18 years for girls 
and 21 years for boys.1 
     The question arises why such marriages take place at all and what could be done to wean 
the people away from the evil practice.  The evil thrives because of illiteracy and many other 
causes the most important of which is the anxiety of the parents to marry off girls as soon as 
possible.  In many States where illiteracy is much higher, like in Rajasthan, the practice of 
child marriage is carried on with impunity. The day of ‘Akha Teej’ is D-day for all parents 
who have minor girls. On that day they want their own salvation and freedom from anxiety of 
girls growing up in their families with the attendant risks and problems they visualize.  
Sometimes social customs and wishes of the community as a whole also prevail upon parents 
who succumb to pressures for getting their daughters/sons married at a minor age.2  
     A girl who has till recently been freely frolicking around in her parents’ village and is then 
suddenly catapulted onto a new stage where she has to play the role of a deaf, mute actor in a 
long veil, and be seen only as two working hands with a womb. If she is only a child when 
she moves to her new home, she may find the backbreaking work harming her physically, but 
if she has already matured into a woman with an individual personality, she undergoes major 
adjustment problems. One other important factor causing parents to marry their daughters 
before the minimum age is attained is the need felt by families having more than one daughter 
so that wedding expenses are cut down. By marrying two daughters in one go, parents save on 
some of the expenses like wedding feasts, meals for close relatives attending the marriage and 
the like.  Parental anxiety about grown up (14 years and above) daughters going astray unless 
married off is yet another cause forcing the less educated or illiterate persons to lead their 
female children to the sacrificial fire well before they attain the ideal age for marriage. The 
                                                 
1(Krishna K.P., “Some Victimization of Female Children in Indian Society” in “Girl Child in India” 
 ed. By Leelamma Devasia and V.V. Devasia, Ashish Publishing House, New Delhi (1991), p.121).  
2 (Joshi Uma, “Child Marriage: Causes and Prevention”, in ‘Social Welfare’, January 2000, Central 
Social Welfare Board, New Delhi). 
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result is that on Akshay Tritiya or Akha Teej thousands of children are married in the most 
blatant violation of law, which bans this practice.1. 
     According to sociologists, early marriage is part of wider practice of female seclusion 
through their subordination to men and deprivation of equal access to social and material 
resources which destroy their psyche to think, to question and to act independently. The 
villagers have immense faith in this centuries old tradition and so see no logic in 
discontinuing this practice.  Second, farmers are free from harvesting and they have money in 
their pockets, which makes it easy for them to organize the child marriages. Third, if one 
family has got three or four male kids then they can all be married off in one go. Fourth, 
illiteracy amongst the men and women in Rajasthan has prevented them for being unaware of 
the fall-out of such child marriages, which robs them of the opportunity to grow in their life. 
The people in Bihar have a feeling that there is no point in spending huge amount on 
education of girls. Instead the same may be spent on their marriage. They may not have to 
give so much dowry because the girl is illiterate. It is also thought that since the boy is going 
to look after the girl, the father of the girl has to pay more dowry. 2 
      Despite the claims of the government, thousands of child marriages were solemnized in 
about thirty of Rajasthan’s districts on the auspicious occasion of Akha Teej. The centuries 
old tradition of child marriages still continues because of illiteracy, backwardness and 
poverty.  Except for some social organizations, no political party or individual has been able 
to wage war against this social stigma which contributes in furthering imbalances in the social 
fabric in the society. Most politicians fight shy of touching this sensitive subject as it could 
cost them very heavily during the elections. 3 
     A hamlet in Mohanpur village of Kalyani subdivision (W.B.), populated almost entirely by 
karmakars, the blacksmiths, shot into infamy when five-year-old Anju was married off to a 
two-year-old dog on July 10, 2000. Parents of Anju were arrested alongwith Barun Dutta, 
master of dog named Bullet. Anju’s parents see media as the culprit and blame it for their 
                                                 
1 ibid. 
2 (Supra n252. Benjamin Joseph) 
3 (Hindustan Times, New Delhi, dated April 20, 1999). 
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misfortune. “All of you gave this simple thing too much publicity.  It was nothing – Anju was 
accident-prone and God told me in my dreams that she’d be free of evil spirits if I married her 
off to an animal. Such cases have happened in the past. But the media presented a wrong 
picture.” Anju was admitted to a primary school soon after her ‘marriage’. Her classmates 
started teasing her as a “dog’s wife” and some seniors suggested she walk on all fours. She 
left the school and is being stigmatized for life.1  
Provisions for Restraint of Child Marriages  
     To eradicate the evil of child marriage, the Child Marriage Restraint Act was passed in 
1929. The object is to eliminate the special evil, which had the potentialities of dangers to the 
life and health of a female child, who could not withstand the stress and strains of married 
life, and to avoid early deaths of such minor mothers. This Act was passed with a view to 
restrain the solemnization of child marriage.2 
     Under Sec.2 (a) ‘Child’ means a person who, if a male, is under twenty-one years of age, 
and if a female, is under eighteen years of age. “Child marriage” means a marriage to which 
either the contracting parties is a child.3 “Contracting party” to a marriage means either of the 
parties whose marriage is or is about to be thereby solemnized.4 “Minor” means a person of 
either sex who is under eighteen years of age. 5 
     The penal provisions do not invalidate the fact of marriage nor do the penal provisions 
apply to a child.  Its section 3 provides that, whoever, being a male above eighteen years of 
age and below twenty one, contracts a child marriage shall be punished with simple 
imprisonment, which may extend to fifteen days, or with fine which may extend to one 
thousand rupees, or with both. 
     Whoever, being male above twenty-one years of age contracts a child marriage shall be 
punished with simple imprisonment, which may extend three months and shall also be liable 
to fine. 
                                                 
1 (Hindustan Times, New Delhi, dated December 5, 200). 
2 (Preamble of the Child Marriage Restraint Act, 1929) 
3 (Sec. 2(b). 
4 (Sec.2(c). 
5(Sec.2 (d).  
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     In the Indian social set-up a male adult can be imputed greater sense of foreseability of the 
consequences of this social evil of child marriage and in this context the punishment 
prescribed by the law to deter them is too mild in effect specially in this era of social justice 
when penology has become more reformative than deterrent. 
     Whoever performs, conducts or directs any child marriage shall be punished with simple 
imprisonment, which may extend to three months and shall also be liable to fine, unless he 
proves that he had reasons to believe that the marriage was not a child marriage.1  Though 
their liability under the criminal law is that of the abetters, but it should not preclude their 
direct responsibility for the offence and suitable amendment should be made in the Act to 
punish them as principal offenders. If this social evil is to be eradicated the role of such 
intermediaries should be brought to book with deterrent punishment. The present law is 
lukewarm in this regard. 
     Consummation of ‘Gauna’ is not part of marriage ceremony. The marriage being complete 
before the consummation, a person may be convicted under this Act, though consummation 
has not taken place. 
     Where a minor contracts a child marriage any person having charge of the minor, whether 
as parent or guardian or in any other capacity, lawful or unlawful, who does any act to 
promote the marriage or permits it to be solemnized, or negligently fails to prevent it from 
being solemnized, shall be punished with simple imprisonment which may extend to three 
months and shall also be liable to fine provided that no woman shall be punishable with 
imprisonment.2 Under this section, it is presumed that where a minor has contracted a child 
marriage, the person having charge of such minor has negligently failed to prevent the 
marriage from being solemnized. Minors are incapable of entering into any valid contract and 
marriage under the Hindu law is not a contract. So the words ‘where a minor contracts a child 
marriage’ in section 6(1) ought not to be literally interpreted as per its dictionary meaning but 
ought to be understood as meaning “where a child marriage” takes place or where a minor 
enters into a child marriage. 
                                                 
1 (Section 5) 
2 (Section 6) 
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     The child bride or the child bridegroom is a mere passive actor in such a marriage and the 
active participants are the parents, guardians or the custodian of such children.  As the law is 
not mindful about the active culpability of these persons, this Act has not yielded the desired 
results. The imposition of fine only lacks the deterrent effect, which is needed most in such 
cases. Further this Act does not take into account the performance of preparatory ceremonies 
of such a marriage like engagements etc. Some provision should be made in this Act to 
prevent and punish such actions also if they culminate in child marriage.  
     It is noteworthy that a contravention of the provisions of the Act does not render the 
marriage invalid, as the validity of the marriage is a subject beyond the scope of the Act. A 
marriage under the Hindu Law by a minor male is valid even though the marriage was not 
brought about on his behalf by the natural or lawful guardian. The marriage under the Hindu 
law is a sacrament and not a contract. The minority of an individual can operate as a bar to his 
or her incurring contractual obligations, but it cannot be an impediment in the matter of 
performing a necessary “Sanskara”. A minor’s marriage without the consent of the guardian 
can be held to be valid on the application of the doctrine of factum valet. 
     Section 7 provides that the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 shall apply to offences 
under the Act as if they were cognizable offence for the purpose of investigation. 
Notwithstanding anything contained in section 190 of the Cr.P.C. 1973, no court other than a 
Metropolitan Magistrate or a Judicial Magistrate of the First Class can take cognizance of, or 
try, any offence under this Act. 
Limitation.  No Court can take cognizance of any offence under this Act after the expiry of 
one year from the date on which the offence is alleged to have been committed.  This further 
dilutes the efficacy of the law. 
Injunction Section 12 empowers the Magisrate to issue injunction-prohibiting marriage in 
contravention of this Act. The court may issue an injunction against any of the persons 
mentioned in Section 3, 4, 5 and 6 of this Act prohibiting such marriage. 
     This injunction shall not be issued against any person unless the court has previously given 
notice thereof to the person concerned and has afforded him an opportunity to show cause 
 102
against the issue of the injunction.  This requirement of the law may defeat the purpose of 
social justice where there is imperative need of judicial intervention to save the welfare and 
interest of the child.  No doubt frivolous petitions by interested persons may sometimes result 
in dislocation of arrangements in genuine cases and such victims may also face social 
humiliation but this can be safeguarded by making deterrent provisions in the Act for those 
who move such frivolous petitions. 
     The court may either of its own motion or on the application of any person aggrieved, 
rescind or alter any order made under sub section 12(1). When such an application is 
received, the court shall afford the applicant an early opportunity of appearing before it either 
in person or by pleader; and if the court rejects the application wholly or in part, it shall 
record in writing its reasons for so doing. 
Disobedience of Injunction Order.  Disobedience of injunction is punishable with 
imprisonment up to three months or with fine up to one thousand rupees or with both. 
     Despite this legislation we notice that Child marriage is still customary in our villages. The 
implementation of this Act is mostly confined to cities. Therefore, this evil is still rampant in 
India. 
     This Act does not provide for a separate machinery to bring to book such offences. But 
Gujrat State has made local amendment in this Act and has provided that the State 
Government shall appoint child marriage prevention officers, whose duty shall be to prevent 
such marriage being performed and to collect evidence for the effective prosecution of 
persons for such contraventions. 
Validity of Marriage. The child marriage is valid, but by enacting this Act the Legislature 
has disapproved performance of such child marriages and has made its performance 
punishable in law. To incur expenses for performing such a ceremony, which is a criminal 
act, cannot be taken to be legal necessity for which a Karta of the family is empowered under 
the Hindu Law to effect an alienation.1  Similarly, in a case the property was alienated for 
defraying the marriage expenses of minor ward, who on attaining majority assailed the 
                                                 
1(Ram Jash Agarwalla v. Chand Mandal, I.L.R. (1937), 2, Cal. 764)  
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alienation as not binding on him as it was not done for legal necessity. The High Court upheld 
the contention laying down the preposition that since marriage had taken place in 
contravention of the Child Marriage Restraint Act, such expenses or repayment of such a debt 
cannot constitute legal necessity under the Hindu Law.1 
     But Allahabad High Court has dissented from this view in Parasram v. Naraini Devil.2 In 
that case also it was argued that as the suit property was mortgaged to perform the marriage 
of a minor member of the joint Hindu family, it is not binding on the members of that family, 
as it does not fall within the ambit of legal necessity. This argument was rejected by the 
Court. Ashthana, J.  Observed: 
     “It is difficult for me to agree with the view of the learned Judges of the Bombay and 
Calcutta High Courts as adumbrated in the cases cited above. With respect to the learned 
Judges I think the marriage of Hindu male below eighteen years of age with a Hindu girl 
below fifteen years of age is not invalidated or rendered illegal by the force of the Child 
Marriage Restrain Act of 1929. It will remain a valid marriage binding under the Hindu Law 
if otherwise performed under any recognized form of Hindu Law. It would be seen that the 
Child Marriage Restrain Act only restrains a marriage of minors and that is its objective, but 
does not prohibit the marriage rendering it illegal or invalid. It punishes those persons who 
arrange that marriage and actively participate in celebrating it. The minor spouses who get 
married are not punished under The Act. Once it is held that the marriage itself is not illegal 
or invalid under the Child Marriage Restrain Act, 1929, and then a debt incurred by the major 
members of the family for marrying a minor member of the family will not be for an illegal 
purpose as the marriage is legal and the debt is incurred for the marriage. It may be punished 
for their act in making arrangements for celebration of the marriage. I do not see any good 
reason, therefore, to hold that if in a Hindu joint family a Karta or major member of the joint 
Hindu family incurs a debt for performing the marriage of a minor, who is below the age 
                                                 
1 (Tatttya Mohvaji v. Rabha Dadaji, AIR 1953 Bom 273 and Rambhau v. Rajaram, AIR 1956 Bom. 
 250) 
2 (AIR 1972 All. 357) 
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prescribed under the Child Marriage Restrain Act, 1929, will be incurring a debt for illegal 
purposes as the marriage which would be performed would yet be binding and legal.”  
     Under this Act the performance of child marriage is made an offence punishable under the 
Law. But this Act does not contain any provision wherein such a marriage is rendered invalid. 
The validity of marriage is beyond the scope of the Act. Even on the application of the 
doctrine of factum valet such a marriage can be held to be valid.1 
Proof of Marriage Ceremonies. Mere allegation about marriage of child is not enough, the 
complainant must prove that the said marriage has been solemnized according to Law or 
according to the custom of the community, to which the parties belong. A mere semblence of 
marriage will not make anybody liable for the said offence.2 
This Act and Mohammedan Law. Under Mohammedan Law every Mohammedan who has 
attained puberty i.e. the age of 15 years, and who possesses a sound mind may enter into a 
contract of marriage. Marriage of persons of unsound mind and those who are minors 
according to Mohammedan law may be contracted by their guardian. Under Mohammedan 
law marriage is a civil contract and not a sacrament. So even under Mohammedan law 
marriage contracted by a minor is valid and legal. But there is no provision in the Child 
Marriage Restraint Act, where Mohammedans are exempted from the operation of this Act. In 
Haidar Rahimmo v. Issa Rahiman3, Mohammedans were prosecuted for solemnizing child 
marriage, though the complaint was dismissed, on the ground that at that time they were not 
residents of British India, wherein this Act was in operation. (The marriage was performed in 
Hyderabad). 
Distinction between Sections 5 and 6. Section 5 of the Act provides punishment for those, 
who perform, conduct or direct any child marriage, while section 6 postulates that where a 
child contracts marriage, any person having charge of the minor, who does any act to promote 
the marriage, or permits it to be solemnized or negligently fails to prevent it from being 
                                                 
1 (Sivanandy v. Bhugavathyamma, AIR 1962 Mad. 400) 
2 (State of Mysore v. S.S. Indi 1971 Cri. L.J. 1812) 
3(A.I.R. 1938 Nag. 235)  
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solemnized shall be liable to punishment. In Ganpatrao v. Emperor,1 Ganpatrao’s daughter 
aged 9 years was married to Shivaji grandson aged 11 years. On being prosecuted the lower 
courts held Ganpatrao guilty of the offences punishable under sections 5 and 6 and sentenced 
him to pay a fine of Rs.250/- on each count. It was argued before the Hingh Court that father 
of the bride cannot be convicted under section 5 of the Act, if he is convicted under section 6 
of the Act for performing the said child marriage, Niyogi AJC upheld the contention and 
observed:  
     “The question is whether the legislature intended to impose a double penalty on the parent 
or guardian. It may be argued as has been done by the courts below, that the two offences are 
distinct, namey (1) arising out of the performance of the child marriage, and (2) on account of 
doing any act to promote the marriage or permitting the solemnization. In my opinion to treat 
those two offences as separate would be highly unreasonable. It is the fundamental principle 
of criminal law that a man cannot be punished twice for the same offence or for a substantive 
offence and its abetment such as aiding, instigating or not preventing the offince.” 
     He further observed that it would be unreasonable to attribute to the legislature an 
intention to award punishment to the guardian for doing any act to promote the marriage 2 and 
also to punish him for taking part in performance of marriage3. According to him since the 
father by giving the bride in kanyadan has promoted the child marriage he is liable for 
conviction only under section 6 of the Act, and thereby his conviction and sentence under 
Section 5 was set aside. This interpretation is more correct as it is more near to the spirit of 
Art. 21 of the Constitution. 
Sections 2(a), 3 to 6, 7 to 9 and 10 and Sections 200, 202, 203, 204 of the Cr.P.C.   Once a 
complaint is preferred alleging an offence under provisions of the Act before the Magistrate 
competent to take cognizance, the Magistrate has to proceed with the complaint in accordance 
with the provisions of the Code and in the light of Section 10 of the Act. There is conflict 
because under Scheme of chapter XV of the Code, it is open to a Magistrate to issue process 
                                                 
1 (A.I.R. 1932, Nag. 174) 
2(Section 6)  
3(section 5)  
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even without conducting an enquiry or directing an investigation. Under Section 10 of the Act 
the Magistrate cannot issue process unless he himself conducts an enquiry u/s. 202 Cr.P.C. or 
direct a subordinate Magistrate to make such an inquiry. To the extent of the conflict the 
provisions of Section 10 of the Act will override the provisions of chapter XV of the Code.1 
     Now it is well settled that an enquiry u/s. 202 Cr.P.C. takes place only after the court has 
taken cognizance of the offence of the complaint. Cognizance is taken when the Magistrate 
applies his mind to the facts alleged in the complaint. Cognizance is of the offence and is not 
of the offender. Once the Magistrate takes cognizance of an offence, it is his duty to find out 
whether he should proceed further in the matter by issuing process to the offender. 2 
     Cognizance of offence as contemplated by Section 9 is taken the moment Magistrate 
applied his mind to the complaint before ordering preliminary enquiry under Section 10 and 
not when process is issued to accused after the preliminary enquiry u/s. 10 of the Act.3  
     Limitation for taking cognizance on complaint under Child Marriage Act, 1929 is one year 
from the date of alleged marriage. When the Magistrate issues summons, he takes cognizance. 
4 
     The restrictions of age for marriage have legally been disregarded under the Child 
Restraint Marriage Act as well as under Hindu Law. It is true, legislation lays down the base 
for social change, but it may be submitted that by merely passing an Act and then allow and 
watch it being violated can cure nothing but perpetuate the existing situation. The continuance 
of child marriages specially in rural areas on mass scale with pomp and show, without any 
fear of being punished under law, is nothing but a teasing illusion, a mockery of present legal 
system. One is sure to be critical of a law which lays down minimum age for marriage, S. 18 
of H.M.A. and Sections 3 and 4 of Child Restraint Marriage Act, of which even provides for 
punishment, but is least serious about its implementation. It is clear that the Parliament has 
not attempted to prohibit child marriages because a marriage in contravention of section (ii) is 
still valid. It is neither void nor viodable. However, there is a lone bold and remarkable 
                                                 
1 (S.K. Moidoo & Ors. V. Vayyapratha Kunnath Magan andanother, 1983  (2) Crimes 444 (Kerala). 
2 (Gangadharan v. Rajindran 1986 (2) Crimes 346 (Kerala). 
3 (M.P. Gangadharan v. T.A. Rajendran, 1987 Cri.L.J. 1765 (Ker.). 
4 Kunhabdulla v. Kunhammed, 1988 (2) Crimes 166 (Ker.) 
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decision from Andhra Pradesh High Court in the case of Gadela v. Gadera1, which laid that a 
minor’s marriage is violation of the Hindu Marriage Act shall be void ab initio. In fact this 
High Court has deviated from all past precedents in this respect. Prof Tai rightly remarks: 
     For the first time in the history of social reforms in India a religious marriage in violation 
of the statutory requirement as to the age of the parties has been declared to be null and void.2      
     It is healthy trend set by the judiciary and hope it is maintained to prohibit child marriages. 
Though this decision is not going to operate as a uniform law for all Hindus and obviously for 
other communities, the legislature should amend the law suitably and try to curb child 
marriages with all vigour and reasonable force, in the interest of a healthy society and nation. 
As the things stand at present legislation alone cannot bring about social change and abolish 
centuries old practices, overnight. It is strong and concentrated public opinion also that can 
put an end to such harmful practices. It is submitted here that the compulsory registration of 
marriages will help greatly in putting an end to such marriages as at the time of marriage 
parties to the marriage should be asked to enter respective age of the persons marrying. It may 
be provided that any marriage solemnized in contravention of the age clause shall not be valid 
one. Moreover, D.C. Pande rightly points out:3  
     “…that in order to achieve the purpose of the legislation in meaningful way, the law 
should aim to discourage and deter primarily, those persons whose decision and action 
ultimately lead to the performance of child marriage. The child bride or the child bridegroom 
are mere passive actors in the matter of child marriage and the active participants are the 
parents or those who perform or attend the celebration so as to endorse the parental actions.” 
 
2. The Dowry and Bride Burning  
The dowry is a deep-rooted evil in the society. It started as customary presents with love and 
affection. In olden days, it was customary to give some presents to the bride and bridegroom 
and relations out of affection and good intention used to provide the couple something to fall 
                                                 
1(AIR 1975 A.P. 193)  
2 (Mahmood Tahir, “Marriage Age in Hindu Law”, 2 Ku. L.J. (1976), p.164) 
3 (Report of the committee on the’ Status of women in India’ (1974), preferring compulsory 
 registration of marriages pp.114-15) 
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back upon in case of need. The system started at a time when girls were generally not very 
much educated and even if they were educated they were unwilling to take up gainful 
employment there was also less opportunity for them either to supplement the family income 
or to become financially independent.1 There was yet another reason for such customary gifts. 
The daughter then was not entitled to a share in the joint family properties when she has a 
brother. Hence the father out of affection or other consideration used to give some cash or 
kind to the daughter at the time of marriage. The right of the father to give a small portion of 
even the family property as gift to the daughter at the time of her marriage was recognized. 2 
     In the olden days in the Hindu Community dowry in the modern sense was totally 
unknown. Man and woman enjoyed equality of status and society looked upon women as 
living goddesses. Where ladies lived in peace, harmony and with dignity and status, Gods 
were believed to be roaming about in human form. When a bride was brought into the family, 
it was considered to be a great event and it was looked upon as bringing fortune into the 
family not by way of dowry but on account of the grace the young lady carried with and 
around her. 3 
Dowry is another social evil, which has its roots very deep in the society. Almost every day 
comes to light a case of torture, harassment and above all death of a young female because of 
the inability to meet the ever increasing and unquenchable thirst of the husband or his family 
for dowry. In spite of the fact that it is always in the news, dowry deaths are continuing 
unabated, for the simple reason that the laws are weak and ineffective.  
     Marriages are not made in Heaven but marriages are mad on earth. In our tradition-ridden 
society two of the most pernicious evils are dowry and extravagant marriages. So much so, in 
many cases parents are unwilling to spend on their daughter’s education just to save money 
for the dowry and the elaborate marriage rituals. For instance, one of the four daughters of a 
government servant in Tamil Nadu became mad when her father could not arrange her 
marriage even at the age of 33. The reason; he could not meet the dowry demand of the 
                                                 
1 (Bhatnagar J.P., ‘Law Relating to Women and Their Rights’ p.323, Ashoka Law House, New Delhi 
 (1998) 
2 (1987) 24 ACC 564) 
3 (1985) 2 DMC 451: 1985(2) Crime 758 (SC) 
 109
prospective bridegroom.1 This is the plight of the middle-class. A few years ago a young girl 
had to donate her blood (a rare group) at a suburban Bombay Hospital to meet minimal 
marriage expenses, which her indigent parents could not afford. This is the lower-class woe-
marriage at any cost, even debt for a lift time.2 The members of rich community give so much 
dowry that many girls remain unmarried. The demands may include 50-100 tolas of gold, car, 
fridge, washing machine, air-conditioner, T.V., a flat to live and even a return trip to States. 
Lavish wedding ceremony, a grand reception, and whatever else the bridegroom and his 
henchman can think of asking. No wonder begetting a baby girl is looked upon as a curse in 
India. 
     Dowry is a term, which is rarely used for negotiations. Wedding gifts or a similar term is 
used for dowry and our religious pundits acquiesce with them. Every community has its own 
gift systems. However, what is common is that it is usually the brides side, which has to bear 
the brunt. A girl has to take so many items to her in-laws that the bride’s mother has to collect 
things right from the day when the girl is born. The reason for these twin evils according to 
Mrs N.A. Gokaran, a lecturer in Family and Child Welfare at the Tata Institute of Social 
Sciences, is attitude. “In the present day youth I see a lot of desire for the acquisition of 
wealth with the least effort. Thus, they embrace the custom of dowry by which they not only 
get the wife but every-thing.3  
     There is no evidence to suggest that dowry was introduced as a voluntary gift, as symbol 
of filial affection for a daughter who was leaving home at marriage. But there is every 
evidence to show that it was introduced as a “nazarana”, a unilateral transfer of resources by a 
girl’s family at her marriage to the groom’s family in recognition of their home permanently. 
4 
 
 
                                                 
1(The Times of India, February 1, 1981)   
2(The Times of India, February 1, 1981)  
3(The Times of India, February 1, 1981)  
4 (Singh, Nalini, “Why Dowry Spells Death”, in The Indian Express Sunday edition Nov. 1(1981), p.1 
 (Express Magazine). 
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Dowry Harassment: Its Beginning  
     The modern dowry system has reached gargantuan proportions, it however had a humble 
beginning, as stray incidents show. A groom would refuse to proceed with the marriage 
rituals half way through unless the demand for either a cycle, radio or a watch was not met. 
This not only created, confusion as the bride’s kin went around arranging the item at zero 
hour, but also caused an embarrassment to them. The girl’s parents succumbed to this hold up 
due to social and economic pressure because in olden days marriage was the only career for 
women. Parents were always too eager to get their daughters married lest they remain a 
burden on the family for the rest of their lives.  
     The modern system of dowry is a problem of a highly conformist culture, which makes it 
almost impossible not only for dowry seekers but also for the dowry victims to desist from 
such an evil practice. If a particular boy is opposed to accept dowry, the girls parents insist. A 
non-dowry marriage will lower their status amongst the relatives or will prove that the son is 
worthless. 
     This system of dowry has ruined many families and created many unhappy homes. Of late 
it has been seen that not only brides but also prospective teen-aged girls, out of sheer 
frustration, seeing the worried look on the face of their parents all the time, are driven to 
commit suicide. Some cannot reconcile themselves to the unbearable trauma or making an 
exhibition of themselves1 and parading before the prospective in-laws only to be rejected 
because the demands of dowry are too high. 
Fighting Dowry Through Legislation  
Provisions of Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961  
     The object of this Bill is to prohibit the evil practice of giving and taking of dowry. This 
question has been engaging the attention of the Government for some time past, and one of 
the methods by which this problem, which is essentially a social one, was sought to be 
tackled, was by the conferment of improved property rights on women by the Hindu 
Succession Act, 1956. It is, same time ensures that any dowry, if given, does ensure for the 
                                                 
1 (Reference to suicide committed by three sisters in Kanpur by hanging themselves and other incidents 
which keep happening) 
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benefit of the wife will go a long way to educating public opinion and the eradication of this 
evil. There has also been a persistent demand for such a law both in and outside Parliament. 
Hence, the present Bill. It, however, takes care to exclude presents in the form of clothes, 
ornaments, etc. which are customary at marriages, provided the value thereof does not exceed 
Rs. 2000. Such a provision appears to be necessary to make the law workable. 
     It was the first penal legislation to ban this evil practice, but after four decades dowry 
continues to be the pivot around which all Indian marriages revolve and has resulted in the 
death of a large number of married women. The Committee on the Status of Women in India 
had observed that even the educated youths are grossly insensitive to the evil of dowry and 
unashamedly contribute to its perpetuation.1 The government felt seriously concerned about 
the problem of dowry and harassment and torture of women for more dowry. It issued 
instructions to the State Governments and Union Territory Administrations with regard to 
thorough and compulsory investigations into cases of dowry deaths and instructed them to 
step up anti-dowry publicity. 
Joint Committee of Parliament  
     By the later half of the seventies it was realized that the brutal murders and agonizing 
deaths by burning of the brides were directly connected with dowry and the Act of 1961 had 
not been able to achieve the desired goal. A Parliamentary Committee was appointed to study 
in detail the defects of the Act and recommend amendments after an empirical survey. The 
Committee went into the problem in great length. It examined the working of Dowry 
Prohibition Act, 1961. Taking the cue from the Supreme Court decisions, specially the 
decision in Pratibha Rani2 case, the Joint Committee of Parliament recommended a number of 
changes. There was pressure from social organizations and demands from women’s groups 
and the press, to prevent inhuman treatment to women in the name of dowry. As a 
consequence of such demands the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961was amended in 1984 and 
again in 1986. The important recommendations of the Committee, for dealing with cruelty to 
a married woman, by the husband or the relatives of the husband, for not getting sufficient 
                                                 
1 (Preface note, the statement of the objects and reasons to Act 63 of 1984) 
2(AIR 1985 SC 628)  
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dowry were given effect by introducing various changes in the IPC, Cr. PC and the Indian 
Evidence Act.1 These amendments, deal with the problem of dowry suicides and dowry 
murders. 
     The Dowry Prohibition Act goes to the farthest limit of creating criminal offences in order 
to prescribe the giving or taking of dowry as a consideration for marriage or demanding or 
abetting the same. What this statute intended to eradicate was this kind of corruption and 
commercialization of the concept of dowry.2  
Summary of Act  
     The Act consists of only ten sections. Section 1, pertains to the title, extent of territorial 
jurisdiction and commencement. Section 2 defines dowry. Sections 3 and 4 pertain 
respectively to the offence and penalty of giving and taking of dowry and of demanding 
dowry. With respect to the offence of demanding dowry directly or indirectly, Section 4 also 
provides that prior sanction is required to prosecute under this section. Section 5, deals with 
the invalidity of an agreement for giving or taking of dowry and Section 6 with what is to 
become of the dowry 
once received. Section 7 and 8 pertaining to cognizance of cases and offences, have already 
been dealt with in detail earlier. Section 9 provides the rule making power and Section 10 the 
repeals.3  
Definition of Dowry  
     In this Act “dowry” means any property or valuable security given or agreed to be given 
either directly or indirectly – 
(a) by one party to marriage to another party to the marriage; or 
(b) by the parents of either party to a marriage or by any other person to either party to the 
marriage or to any other person; 
at or before or anytime after the marriage 
                                                 
1 (Reference to Sections 304-B and 498-A IPC, 113-A and 113-B Indian Evidence Act and 198 Cr. P 
 C) 
2 (AIR 1982 P & H 372) 
3 (1983 Crimes 737) 
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in connection with the marriage of the said parties, but does not include dowry or mahr in the 
case of persons to whom the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) applies.1  
     Practically everything paid or agreed to be paid or demanded to be paid in connection with 
marriage has been brought within the purview of the definition.2 Dowry is property, which a 
woman brings to her husband at marriage.3 Dowry does not include Mehr. There is no denial 
of the fact that the parties are Muslims and, therefore, the Mehr amount could be settled 
between the parties. In what terms the parties may have settled the Mehr, was not known. The 
complaint was silent on this point. Suffice it to say, some presentation from the husband’s 
side to the wife’s side for finalizing the marriage may itself not indicate any criminal 
intention punishable under Sec. ¾ of the Dowry Prohibition Act, because the amount 
equivalent to it may very well be the Mehr amount.4  Dowry does not include Tribunal’s 
awarded compensation arising out of motor accident to the previous husband and was paid to 
the wife.5  
     In Order to bring a case under Sec.2 or 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act it is necessary to 
show that any property or valuable security was given or agreed to be given to either party to 
marriage for his relation before or after the marriage.6 Only those articles are ‘ dowry’ which 
are given or agreed to be given as regards the reason or motive for solemnization of marriage. 
For ‘marriage’ obviously means for the act of marriage or in other words for solemnization of 
marriage.7 It is apparent from the definition of dowry that it is necessary that the property or 
valuable security, so as to constitute the dowry must be given as consideration for the 
marriage.8  
     The expression “dowry” is defined by unamended Section 2 of the Act, means anything 
which is given, either directly or indirectly, by one party to a marriage to the other party to the 
                                                 
1 (Section 2 (wef 2-10-1985) and further amended by Act 43 of 1986) 
2 (1993 (II) DMC 10) 
3 (Cambridge Dictionary) 
4 (1990 (27) ACC 376) 
5 (1981 Cr. L.J. 233 (Punj) 
6 (Sanker Prasad Sharma v. State 1990 East Cri. C 689 (Cal) 
7 (ibid) 
8 (ibid) 
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marriage or by the parents of either party to a marriage or by any other person to either party 
to the marriage or to any other person “at or before or after the marriage as consideration for 
the marriage of the said parties.”1  
     The expression ‘consideration’ has a known connotation in the law of Contract, from 
where it has apparently been lifted by the draftsmen. The choice of this expression is rather 
inappropriate and its use in the context of dowry is unfortunate and has led to avoidable 
judicial controversies because it incorporates in a socially necessary legislation a purely 
commercial concept, which is wholly foreign to the purpose sought to be achieved by the 
legislation. The position has since been somewhat retrieved by the substitution of the 
expression. Dowry means in Section 2 is only property, which is given or agreed to be given 
at or before or after marriage as consideration for marriage. Demand subsequently raised with 
view to smooth sailing and continuance of post marital relations will not fall within the 
definition of dowry.2 Mere demand of dowry is not an offence under Dowry Prohibition Act. 
To make it an offence in Dowry Prohibition Act it should be either given or agreed to be 
given but mere demand of dowry may be an offence under Section 198-A I.P.C.3 
Penalty For Giving or Taking Dowry4 
(1) If any person, after commencement of this Act gives or takes or abets the giving or taking 
of dowry, he shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than 
five years and with fine which shall not be less than fifteen thousand rupees or the amount of 
the value of such dowry, whichever is more.  
     Provided that Court may, for adequate and special reason to be recorded in the judgement, 
impose a sentence of imprisonment for a term of less than five year. 
(2) Nothing in sub-section (1) shall apply to, or in relation to— 
(a) Presents which are given at the time of marriage to the bride (without any demand 
having been made in that behalf); 
                                                 
1 (1984 (2) Crimes 584) 
2(Kuljit Kaur & others v. Khemsingh, 1985 (i) Crimes 712 (Patna)  
3 (Shankar Prasad Shaw v. State 1991 Cri. L.J. 639) 
4 (Section 3 wef 8th September, 1986) 
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Provided that such presents are entered in a list maintained in accordance with the rules made 
under this Act; 
(b) Presents which are given at the time of a marriage to the bridegroom (without any 
demand having been made in that behalf); 
Provided that such presents are entered in a list maintained in accordance with the rules made 
under this Act: 
Provided further that where such presents are made by or on behalf of the bride or any person 
related to the bride, such presents are of a customary nature and the value thereof is not 
excessive having regard to the financial status of the person by whom, or on whose behalf 
such presents are given. 
     If some dowry items, which were demanded as consideration for the marriage, are not 
given at the time of the marriage but are given after the performance of the marriage even 
then such person taking such dowry would be deemed to have committed offence punishable 
under Sec.3 of the Act.1 The object is only to put an end of social evil of given and taking 
dowry after the commencement of the Act but of the dowry paid prior to the commencement 
of the Act is asked to be returned, it is not opposed to any of the provisions of the Act/or to 
the public policy.2  
Penalty for Demanding Dowry 3 
     If any person demands, directly or indirectly, from the parents or other relatives or 
guardian of a bride or bridegroom, as the case may be, any dowry, he shall be punishable with 
imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than six months, but which may extend to 
two year and with fine which may extend to ten thousand rupees; 
     Provided that the Court may, for adequate and special reasons to be mentioned in the 
judgment, impose a sentence of imprisonment for a term of less than six months.  
     The Supreme Court in L.V. Jadhab v. Shankerrao4 observed thus: 
                                                 
1(1990 (I) DMC 416 (Delhi)  
2 (1985 SCC 204) 
3 (Section 4 of Dowry Prohibition Act, 961) 
4 AIR 1983 SC 1219 
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     “We are of the opinion that having regard to the object of the Act and a liberal 
construction has to be given to the word ‘dowry’ as used in Sec. 4 of the Act to mean that any 
property or valuable security which if consented to be given on the demand being made 
would become dowry within the meaning of Sec.2 of the Act. We are also of the opinion that 
the object of Sec.4 of the Act is to discourage the very demand for property or valuable 
security as consideration for a marriage between the parties thereto. Section 4 prohibits the 
demand for ‘giving’ property or valuable security, which demand, if satisfied, would 
constitute an offence under Sec.3, read with Sec.2 of the Act. There is no warrant for taking 
the view that the initial demand for giving property or valuable security would not constitute 
an offence and that an offence would take place only when the demand was made again after 
the party on whom demand was made agreed to comply with it.” 
     Every demand of dowry whenever repeated constitutes another offence and thus the dates 
of commission of the offence under Sec.4 would be when the demand was made initially and 
also when the said demand was repeated afresh.1 Prima facie the furnishing of a list of 
ornaments and other household articles at the time of the settlement of the marriage amount to 
demand of dowry within the meaning of Sec.2 (1) of the Act.2  
     The Apex Court has, in categorical terms, held that the offence under Section 4 of the Act 
is completed when demand for dowry is made and consent for meeting the demand is not 
necessary.3  
Ban On Advertisement4  
     If any person – 
(a) Offers, through any advertisement in any newspaper, periodical, journal or through any 
other media any share in his property or of any money or both as a share in any business or 
other interest as consideration for the marriage of his son or daughter or any other relative.  
(b) Prints or publishes or circulates any advertisement referred to in Clause (a). 
                                                 
1 1990 (I) DMC 416 (Delhi) 
2 1988 SCC (Cr) 854 
3 Pandurang Shivram Kawathkar v. State of Maharashtra, (2001) 3 Femi-Juris C.C. 34 (Bom) 
4 Sec.4-A inserted by Act 43 of 1986 
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He shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than six months, 
but which may extend to five years, or with fine, which may extend to fifteen thousand 
rupees. 
     Any agreement for the giving or taking of dowry shall be void.1   
Dowry to be for the benefit of the wife or her heirs 2  
Where any dowry is received by any person other than the woman in connection with whose 
marriage it is given, that person shall transfer it to the woman— 
(a) If the dowry was received before marriage, within three months after the date of marriage; 
or 
(b) If the dowry was received at the time of or after the marriage within three months after the 
date of its receipt; or 
(c) If the dowry was received when the woman was a minor within one year after she has 
attained the age of eighteen years; 
And pending such transfer shall hold it in trust for the benefit of the woman. 
(2) If any person fails to transfer any property as required by sub-section (1) within time-limit 
or as required by Section (3), he shall be punishable with imprisonment for six months or fine 
or with both. 
(3) Where the woman, entitled to any property under sub-section (1) dies before receiving it, 
the heirs of the woman shall be entitled to claim it from the person holding it for the time 
being. 
Provided that such woman dies with seven year of her marriage otherwise than due to natural 
cause, such property shall – 
(a) If she has no children, be transferred to her parents, or 
(b) If she has children, be transferred to such children and pending such transfer, be held in 
trust for such children. 
(3-A) Where a person convicted for failure to transfer any property, has not transferred such 
property, the court shall, in addition to awarding punishment, direct such person to transfer 
                                                 
1 Sec.5 of the Act 
2Section 6 of the Dowry Prohibition Act  
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the property to such woman and if such person fails to comply, an amount equal to the value 
of the property may be recovered from him as if it were a fine. 
(4) Nothing contained in this section shall affect provisions of Section 3 or Section 4. 
     The recipient is required in law to hold the dowry proceed for the benefit of the female. 
1 The recipient of the dowry proceeds is required in law to transfer the same to the wife within 
the prescribed period failing which he is liable to be prosecuted on a complaint by her at a 
place where she resides.2 Where the property was received prior to three months or complaint 
was filed after a year of the marriage, the proceeding will not be maintainable for refund of 
the dowry proceeds.3 A proceeding under Section 406, Indian Penal Code can be initiated at a 
place where the property was received or where it was retained or where the occurrence took 
place.4 Where the ornaments were given by the husband at the time of his marriage to the 
wife, held the question of their alleged misappropriation by him did not arise. 5 
Section 6 of the Act and Section 406, Indian Penal Code—Misappropriation   
     Retention of dowry proceed by the husband followed by their non- return gives rise to a 
cause of action, which is of civil nature.6 If a person or persons could not be proceeded 
against under the Dowry Act, cognizance of any offence under the Indian Penal Code be 
taken if facts warranted the same. In that case prosecution under Section 406, Indian Penal 
Code was held to be justified.7  
     Every partner has dominion over property by reason of the fact that there is a partner. This 
is kind of dominion which every owner of property has over his property. But it is not 
dominion of this kind, which satisfies the requirements of Section 405. In order to establish 
‘entrustment of dominion’ over property to an accused person the mere existence of that 
person’s dominion over property is not enough. It must be further shown that his dominion 
was the result of instrument. Therefore, as rightly pointed out by Harris, C.J., the prosecution 
                                                 
1 (AIR 1975 Ker 129) 
2 (1978 Cr L J 362) 
3 (1976 Cr LT 386 (Punj) 
4(1980 HLR 373)  
5 (1981 Cr LT 276 (Punj) 
6 (1983 Hind LR 433 (P&H) 
7 (1979 Cr L J 493) 
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must establish that dominion over the assets or particular assets of the partnership was, by a 
special agreement between the parties, entrusted to the accused person. If in the absence of 
such a special agreement a partner receives money belonging to the partnership he cannot be 
said to have received it in a fiduciary capacity or in other words cannot be held to have been 
‘entrusted’ with dominion over partnership properties.1  
     What needed is the true legal relationship of the husband and wife qua the property 
individually owned by each within the four walls of the matrimonial home? Does the wife 
stand entrusted with the property belonging to her husband individually and vice versa the 
husband stands entrusted with such property vesting in the exclusive ownership of the wife? 
The question has to be examined against the backdrop of the matrimonial home and it has 
come up for exhaustive consideration earlier before a Full Bench in ILR (1977) 1 Punj & Har 
642 which refer to the authoritative enunciation therein: - 
     “To my mind, the idea of the matrimonial home appears to lie at the very center of the 
concept of marriage in all civilized societies. It is indeed around it that generally the marriage 
tie revolves. The home epitomizes the finer nuances of the marital status. The bundle of 
indefinable rights and duties, which bind the husband and the wife, can perhaps be best 
understood only in the context of their living together in the marital home. The significance of 
the conjugal home in the marriage tie is indeed so patent that it would perhaps be wasteful to 
elaborate the same at any great length. Indeed, the marital status and the conjugal home have 
been almost used as interchangeable terms.” 
Cognizance of Offence2  
(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973 (2 of 1974) 
(a) No court inferior to that of a Metropolitan Magistrate or a Judicial Magistrate of the first 
class shall try any offence under this Act; 
(b) No court shall take cognizance of an offence under this Act except upon- (i) its own 
knowledge or a police report of the facts which constitute such offence, or 
                                                 
1 (AIR 1965 SC 1433) 
2 (Section 7 of the Dowry Prohibition Act) 
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(ii) A complaint by the person aggrieved by the offence or a parent or other relative of such 
person, or by any recognized welfare institution or organization; 
 
(c) It shall be lawful for a Metropolitan Magistrate or Judicial Magistrate of the first      class 
to pass any sentence authorized by this Act on any person convicted of any offence under 
this Act. 
 
Explanation: - For the purpose of this sub-section, “recognized welfare institution or 
organization” means a social welfare institution or organization recognized in this behalf by 
the Central or State Government. 
(2) Nothing in Chap XXXVI of the Code of the Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), shall 
apply to any offence punishable under this Act. 
(3) Notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the time being in force, a statement 
made by the person aggrieved by the offence shall not subject such person to a prosecution 
under this Act. 
     The expression-takingtaking cognizance of an offence’ means the court deciding to 
proceed against the offender with a view to determine his guilt. It was also held that in 
cognizable cases, the state for taking cognizance comes when the police submits the charge-
sheet and that an order for investigation by a Magistrate, be it in connection with a non 
cognizable or cognizable offence, does not amount to taking cognizance of the case so also 
the order of the Magistrate for arrest and jail custody or order granting bail does not amount 
to taking cognizance.1 By taking cognizance means judicial application of mind by the 
Magistrate to the facts mentioned either in the complaint or the police report, as the case may 
be, for taking further action.2  
     Police report is deemed to be a complaint in view of explanation to Section 2(d) Cr. P.C. 
1973.3  
                                                 
1 (AIR 1950 All 626) 
2(1985 Cr L J 377 (Del)  
3 (Nanjana v. State of Karnataka, 1987 Cri. L.J. 1386) 
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Jurisdiction: Place  
     Father of the wife filed a complaint in Delhi Court u/s. 4 of the Act complaining about 
post marital dowry demands made by the husband, his parents, brother and his wife. Jullundur 
is the situs of matrimonial home. Husband filed a petition for divorce in Jullundur Court on 
the ground of cruelty against the wife. Post marital demand of dowry is an offence under 
Section 4 of the Act. Complaint of post marital demand of dowry can be filed only at 
Jullundur, which is the place of matrimonial home, where such a demand was made. 
Jurisdiction of a Court is primarily based on the allegations with which a party, seeking the 
intervention of the Court, whether a plaint in civil proceedings or a complaint in a criminal 
court, comes to the court. The court quashed the proceedings against accused’s parents and 
directed the trial court to find ourt whether accused had demanded any dowry after marriage 
in Delhi.1  
Sanction. Prosecution can be initiated only if previous sanction is obtained from District 
Magistrate.2 But according sanction is not an idle formality. Sanctioning authority must apply 
his mind to the facts of case. From the sanction order, if it is not evident that the sanctioning 
authority has taken into consideration the facts and circumstance of the case, and has merely 
granted permission to the complainant to lodge the complaint, it is not a valid sanction order.3 
To take cognizance of an offence under Section 4 of the Act, sanction of District Magistrate is 
not necessary after 1984 amendment (As amended by Act 63 of 1984).4  
Limitation. A police report disclosing commission of offences under Section ¾ of Dowry 
Prohibition Act 1961 is a complaint under Section 2(d) of Cr.P.C. read with Section 7(b) of 
the Act and as such report is filed beyond the period of one year from the date of the 
commission of the offence, it is not cognizable.5 Offence under Section 6 of the Act is not 
continuing offence, it is subject to limitation prescribed under Section 7(b) of the Act. 6 
                                                 
1 (Madanlal v. Amarnath 1984 (2) Crimes 584) 
2 (Hari Charan Paswan v. State of Bihar 1984 Cri. L.J. 50 (Patna) 
3 (Nurun Nisa Begum v. Hasina Khatoon and others 1984 (2) Crimes 353 (Orissa). 
4 (Harinder Kaur v. State of Punjab, 1989 Cri. L.J. 1032) 
5 (Nanjanna v. The State of Kar. 1987 (1) Crimes 210 (Kar) 
6 (Gursharan Singh v. Gursharan Kaur II (1989) DMC 18) 
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Offence to be cognizable for certain purposes and to be non-bailable and non-
compoundable. The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), shall apply to offences 
under this Act as if they were cognizable offences for the purposes of investigation of such 
offences; and for the purposes of matters other than matters referred to in Section 42 of the 
Code; and the arrest of a person without a warrant or without an order of a Magistrate. Every 
offence under this Act shall be non-bailable and non-compoundable.1  
     Civilized society has to preserve on the one hand an individual is personal dignity and on 
the other the general interests of the society at large and the concept of bail is an interposition 
between the two, seeing through both without undermining one or the other.2 The tests to be 
applied by courts in granting bail is by reference to many considerations, such as, the nature 
of the accusation, the evidence in support thereof, the severity of punishment on conviction 
which would entail the character behavior means and standing of the accused, etc.3  
     Where any person is prosecuted for taking or abetting the taking of any dowry under 
Section 3, or the demanding of dowry under Section 4, the burden of proving that he had not 
committed an offence under those sections shall be on him.4 Section 8-A is not violative of 
Article 14 of the Constitution, as it also lays down a rule of evidence casting burden of proof 
on the accused only when the basic ingredients of the section are proved by the prosecution.5  
Dowry Prohibition Officers 6 
     The State Government may appoint as many Dowry Prohibition Officers as it thinks fit 
and specify the areas in respect of which they shall exercise their jurisdictions and powers 
under this Act. Every Dowry Prohibition Officer shall exercise and perform the functions 
such as to see that the provisions of this Act are complied with, to prevent the taking or the 
demanding of dowry, to collect such evidence as necessary for the prosecution. 
 
                                                 
1 (Section 8 of The Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961) 
2 (AIR 1993 SC 1) 
3 (AIR 1984 SC 1503) 
4 (Section 8-A of The Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961) 
5  ((1994) 1 DMC 356 (Kant) 
6 (Section 8-B of the Act) 
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Dowry Demand a Continuing Offence  
     In Hakam Singh v. State of Punjab 1 the question of limitation for the non-return of the 
dowry items was discussed, the Court held that this Section is analogous to the offence under 
Section 406 IPC. It is a continuing offence. As long as the dowry items are not returned there 
is no limitation. In Harbans Singh v. Gurcharan Kaur 2 the Court asserted that every demand 
for dowry whenever repeated constitutes a new offence. The date of the commission of the 
offence under Section 4 would be when the demand was made initially and also when such 
demand was repeated afresh. The wording of Section 4 of the Act do not make a demand for 
dowry, which has been made prior to the marriage, an offence. If some dowry items are not 
given at the time of the marriage but are given afterwards, it is an offence under Section 3(d). 
The demand made before marriage is time barred. The case is not barred if the items could 
not be given before marriage and were agreed to be given afterwards. Under Section 2 of the 
amended Act in 1984 the demand is an offence irrespective of its acceptance. 
     The Orissa High Court in Baikunthnath v. State of Orissa3 held that the dowry demand 
after one year of marriage is time- barred. Under Section 7 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 
prior to its amendment in 1984, this was the limit yet under Section 473 of the Cr.P.C. the 
Court could take cognizance of the facts and circumstances of each case and if the delay was 
satisfactorily explained or it was necessary in the interest of justice the court could waive the 
lapse.  
 
FIGHT AGAINST BRIDE BURNING  
 
     The fight against bride burning started with efforts to banish dowry, which was pin-
pointed as the root cause of the dowry deaths. Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 was amended to 
make the penal provisions more stringent but it was soon realized that these changes were not 
                                                 
1 (1990) I DMC 343 P&H) 
2 (Cr.L.J. 1990 Delhi 1591) 
3  ((1990) Cr.L.J. 2626 (Ori) 
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enough. Dowry deaths maintained their upward spiral in spite of all legislative efforts to curb 
them. 
     One important reason for the ineffectiveness of the Act was, perhaps, a major defect in the 
IPC in the definition of cruelty, which preceded all cases of bride burning or suicides by 
newly wedded brides. Indian Penal Code defined cruelty as a conduct, which resulted in 
physical and bodily injury to a person.1 A wife had to undergo medical examination and 
produce evidence that physical injury was inflicted upon her. The subjection of a wife to 
mental cruelty was considered a ground for her to seek divorce but it was not a ground for any 
penal action to be taken against the husband. Further, though the demand for dowry was 
punishable under the Dowry Act, the harassment inflicted by the husband and his family was 
not punishable under the Penal Code. Often the harassment and torture was so much that the 
wife was left with no option but to commit suicide in order to put an end to all the misery. 
Many times it was the husband and the in-laws who eliminated the wife from the scene by 
murdering her and deposing that it was a case of accidental death. It was very difficult to 
prove it since the crime was committed in the privacy of the house and the culprits had all the 
time to create evidence of accidental death by removing all the incriminating clues. 
Cruelty by Husband or Relatives of Husband  
     In 1983 a new Chapter, XX-A, was inserted in IPC vide Criminal Law (Second 
Amendment) Act, 1983 and Section 498-A was added. It made both physical and mental 
cruelty by husbands or the relatives of the husband a cognizable and non-bailable offence. It 
also stipulated a sentence of imprisonment up to three years and a fine. The term cruelty was 
explained as any willful conduct of the husband or the in-laws, which causes physical or 
mental injury to a man. 
     The new Section has made harassment and torture for dowry a criminal offence. Earlier, it 
was very difficult to punish the accused persons on this ground even in extreme cases. Now 
any conduct, which is of such a nature, as is likely to drive a woman to commit suicide or to 
cause grave injury to her life or limb or health is cruelty. But a limiting factor of this offence 
                                                 
1  (Section 338 IPC) 
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is that the Court can take cognizance of this offence only upon a police report or when a 
complaint is made by the aggrieved woman or her relatives.1  
     In Inder Malik v. Sinita Malik2 The Constitutional validity of this Section was challenged. 
It was contended that it gives arbitrary powers to the police and the Courts and that this 
Section offends against Article 14. The words ‘cruelty’ and ‘harassment’ are very vague, any 
person can be arbitrary hauled up for committing an act of harassment. It was also contended 
that Section 498-A offends against the principle of double jeopardy inasmuch as the demand 
for dowry or any property is punished under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act also. The 
Court held that according to the Dowry Prohibition Act mere demand of dowry is punishable, 
under Section 4(2) the element of cruelty is not essential. Section 498A deals with the 
aggravated form of this offence. The question of arbitrary power does not arise. Cruelty is 
well defined and its content is well known, in fact, many words occur in legal provisions and 
they are interpreted by the Courts, wide discretion has been given to the Courts in this matter. 
If giving discretion to the Court means arbitrary powers then many provisions will have to be 
declared ultra vires, there is no conflict with Article 14 of the Constitution. Section 498-A 
IPC is a step towards ensuring that the unlimited privileges of a husband in the holy 
relationship of marriage are rendered justiciable by criminal courts when his inhuman 
behavior jeopardize the mental and physical well-being of the wife. 
Postmortem Essential Part of Evidence   
     One major defect in law was the disappearance of evidence whenever a woman died under 
suspicious circumstances. Her body was hastily cremated by her in-laws leading to the 
destruction of evidence but no legal action could be taken against them. The existing laws 
prescribed vague and indefinite situations under which the police officer was required to send 
the body for medical examination.3 There was no explicit law to help the relatives of the 
woman who died under suspicious circumstances at her in-law’s house. This defect has been 
rectified. Section 174 of the Cr.P.C. has been amended to make it obligatory for the police 
                                                 
1   (Section 198A Cr.P.C.) 
2  ((1986) Cr.L.J. 1510) 
3  (Section 174 Cr.P.C. as it was before the Criminal Law (Second) Amendment Act, 1983) 
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officers to send the body for medical examination whenever the case is one of suicide by a 
woman within seven years of her marriage or her death is under suspicious circumstances. 
Postmortem is mandatory when there is any doubt regarding the cause of death or the police 
officer considers it expedient for any other reason. According to the amended provisions, 
medical examination is mandatory if the case relates to the death of a woman within seven 
years if her marriage or even if any or her relatives makes a request for it. This amendment 
tries to ensure evidence of the offence to be available to the woman’s relatives to prosecute 
her in-laws so that the criminals will not be able to escape the legal process, as often 
happened in the past, due to lack of supportive evidence.  
     According to the rules framed by the Government to implement this amendment, 
instructions have been issued by the Home Ministry in all the States that the disposal of the 
body of a young married woman should not be permitted unless the police issues a no 
objection certificate after it has been seen by the parents, the guardians or the close relatives 
from the bride’s side. 
     Suggestions were made by the Joint Parliamentary Committee to appoint Dowry 
Prohibition officers to be assisted by an advisory board constituting of not more than five 
welfare officers outs of which two should be women. However, the setting up of such boards 
or appointment of such officers has not been carried out in most of the States. The 
requirement of Dowry Prohibition Officers to ensure effective implementation of the Dowry 
Act was reiterated in 1986 but most of such posts are still lying vacant and only a few Dowry 
Prohibition Officers were appointed. 
Dowry Death: A Crime Per Se  
     It took more than a decade of struggle at various levels to make Dowry Death a specific 
crime and to provide direct penal action for such deaths. In 1986 ‘Dowry Death’ was 
incorporated in the Penal Code. A New Section, 304-B was added to IPC. Taking a cue from 
past experience, this Section provides for tiding over various difficulties that were faced by 
the prosecution for proving this crime and getting the culprits punished. This Section is 
attracted ‘when the death of a woman is caused by burns or bodily injury or occurs otherwise 
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than under normal circumstances and this occurrence is preceded by cruelty or harassment by 
the in-laws in connection with a demand for dowry. 
     According to these amendments,1 whenever a married woman dies within seven years of 
her marriage under suspicious circumstances and it is proved that she was harassed for dowry 
then it shall be presumed that the in-laws or the husbands are responsible for the dowry death. 
     Earlier, the bride or her parents did not come forward to testify that they had paid dowry 
when a dowry offence was reported by any social welfare organization because both the giver 
and the taker were culprits in the eye of law. Now, the statement made by the aggrieved 
person will not subject him to prosecution under the Act. Advertisements in newspapers or 
other media offering shares in property or business, or money in consideration of the marriage 
of a son are banned. The person giving such advertisements and the printer or publisher will 
be liable to sentence of imprisonment and fine. 
     The new Section along with the changes made in the Cr.P.C., and Section 498-A IPC were 
expected to strengthen the hands of the judiciary in getting the culprits of this heinous crime 
punished. 
Death by Burns Otherwise Than Under Normal Circumstances  
     Section 304-B IPC will be attracted whenever a woman dies within seven years of her 
marriage and there is evidence that she was harassed by her in-laws or the husband in 
connection with the demand for dowry. It is immaterial whether she committed suicide or was 
murdered. In Soni Babubhai v. State of Gujrat2 it was held that both these expressions are 
covered by the term otherwise than under normal circumstances. In Mst. Premwati v. State of 
M.P.,3 the accused were the mother-in-law and the husband of the unfortunate bride Sunita 
who had died of poisoning within the two years of her marriage. The accused were charged 
under Section 304-B and 306 IPC. The court held that Section 304-B will be attracted not 
only when death is caused by someone but when it occurs unnaturally. The accused will be 
guilty of dowry death if this occurrence is preceded by cruelty or harassment by the in-laws or 
                                                 
1  (304-B IPC, 113-A and Section 113-B Indian Evidence Act) 
2  ((1991) 4 SCC 298) 
3   ((1991) Cr.L.J. 268 (MP) 
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if this torture is in connection with dowry demand; if the connection between the two is 
established, mere occurrence of death is enough, though the death may not have been caused 
by the in-laws. “The framers intend and contemplate the liability of the occurrence of death of 
the bride to be fast3ened on the in-laws though they did not cause it, by creating a fiction. If 
the husband or his relations create such circumstances as would compel a person to choose 
death as the only way of getting out of the misery, such treatment would also attract Section 
304-B”.  
Deemed To Have Caused The Death  
     “If at all the framers of law would have intended the liability to be fixed on the person 
actually causing death there would have been no necessity of using the expression ‘and such 
husband or his relative shall be deemed to have caused the death’ at the end of Sub-Section 
(1) of Section 304-B IPC. It suggests that the framers had intended and contemplated the 
liability of the death being fastened on the in-laws.” A division bench decision of the Andhra 
Pradesh High Court in Public Prosecutor v. Tota Basava Punniah1 supports this view. This 
was a case of death by hanging within three years of the marriage. Evidence showed that 
dowry was demanded. The Court held that even if it is a case of suicide Section 304-B IPC is 
attracted.  
     But in Atula Ravinder and Others v. State of AP2 it was proved that the accused was 
harassing the deceased and making demand for dowry, and there was evidence to show that 
the deceased was subjected to cruelty within the meaning of Section 498-A IPC the Court did 
not punish the accused. The marriage had taken place in 1984. At the time of marriage a 
demand was made for Rs. 10,000 but the parents has paid only Rs. 8,000 and had promised to 
pay the balance later. They could not pay. This was the reason for the husband and his parents 
to harass the deceased. 
     The wife died in 1987, ‘within seven years of her marriage’. The body showed some 
external injuries. The parents were informed and the report was lodged. Both courts below 
held that the offence under Section 304-B was made out. The Supreme Court said that a 
                                                 
1   ((1989) Cr.L.J. 2320 (AP) 
2   (AIR 1991 SC 1142) though 
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perusal of Section 304-B IPC shows that one of the essential ingredients that has to be 
established is that death was otherwise than under normal circumstances. In this case there is 
no doubt that the other circumstances, that the death occurred within seven years of the 
marriage and that before the death they had harassed her for dowry, were established. 
‘Coming to the other ingredient we find that the prosecution has miserably failed to establish 
that death was otherwise than under normal circumstances.’ The learned counsel appearing 
for the State, however, submitted that the deceased was young and the death was not due to 
natural causes nor it was due to an accident and the only inference that can be drawn is that it 
was otherwise than under normal circumstances. The Apex Court asserted that ‘in a case of 
this nature where the prosecution has failed to establish that it was an unnatural death it 
cannot be surmised that it must be due to unnatural circumstance. In this context the framing 
of the charge and the circumstances that are put to the accused under Section 313 Cr.P.C. also 
assume importance. The charge was under Section 302 IPC and the contents of the charge are 
to the effect that death was only due to asphyxia. In the examination under Section 313 it was 
not even indicated that the death could be due to poisoning. In any event, in view of the facts 
and circumstances regarding the death, it has become very difficult, rather impossible to hold 
that the death was otherwise than under normal circumstances and consequently we are 
constrained to hold that this important aspect of Section 304-B is not met out. Consequently 
the appellants are entitled to acquittal of the said offence.’  
     This decision of the apex court, is not in keeping with the spirit of Section 304-B and is 
based on too much technicalities and hair splitting. There was a history of harassment for 
dowry and the Court itself upheld the conviction under Section 498-A IPC for harassing the 
deceased and making demand for dowry. It agreed that there was evidence showing that the 
deceased was subjected to cruelty within the meaning of Section 498-A IPC and upheld the 
punishment of imprisonment of two years under Section 498-A but acquitted the accused of 
the charge under Section 304-B. The presumption under 113-B was totally ignored. 
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     If enactments specially passed to protect women are not interpreted in the spirit in which 
they are enacted then a very bleak future awaits the dowry victims. This decision is in direct 
contrast with the decision of Premwati v. State of MP1   
Abetment to Suicide  
A person will be guilty of abetment to suicide and committing dowry death if he creats such a 
situation that the woman is led to put an end to her own life. Where the woman categorically 
stated in her dying declaration that the accused mother-in-law maltreated her and taunted her 
for not bringing enough dowry and this led her to take the extreme step, it was held that the 
accused was guilty of abetment to suicide.2   
     In Wazir Chand v. State of Haryana3, Veena was married to Wazir Chand’s son Kanwar 
Singh in 1983. She died of burn injuries within less than a year of her marriage. It was alleged 
that the cause of death was dowry. The Supreme Court on appeal held ‘it is clear that if any 
person instigates any other person to commit suicide and as a result of such instigation the 
other person actually commits suicide the person causing the instigation is liable to be 
punished for abetting the commission of suicide. A plain reading of provision shows that 
before a person can be convicted of abetting the suicide it must be shown that the person 
committed suicide. 
     In this case there is no satisfactory evidence on the basis of which a conclusion could be 
reached with reasonable certainty that the accused committed suicide. The accused could not 
therefore be convicted under Section 306 IPC. However with regard to Section 498-A the 
Court held that there was ample evidence that repeated demands were made inter alia by the 
husband and father-in-law on Veena and her parents for articles of dowry and money. There 
was also evidence that Veena made statements immediately after her marriage right up to the 
time of her death that she and her parents were being harassed for dowry. Such decisions by 
the apex court are not very encouraging. It gives a feeling that our Courts ignore the basic 
realities of Indian life. 
                                                 
1   ((1991) Cr.L.J. 268 (MP) 
2   (Nirmala Devil v. State of Haryana, 1983, Cr.L.J. NOC 230 (P&H) 
3   (AIR 1989 SC 376) 
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      In Brijraj Premchand v. State 1 the main issue was whether the victim-committed suicide 
out of will or it was a case of abetment to suicide. The trial court had held instigation to be the 
cause of suicide but the High Court acquitted the accused. The Supreme Court after 11 years 
of filing the appeal against the acquittal reversed the judgment of the Punjab and Haryana 
High Court and convicted the accused.  
     Justice Natrajan and Ahmadi convicted the accused but made the jail sentence to that 
already undergone by Premchand. The court imposed a fine of Rs. 20,000 out of this Rs. 
18,000 was to be given to the wife’s father who was maintaining the child. According to facts 
of this case. The wife Veena was married to Premchand in 1973 and died of burns in 1975. 
Veena Rani’s married life was unhappy all through. Her lawyer husband harassed her for 
more money. The last straw was the demand of cash for scooter. She pleaded her inability for 
making the payment immediately. The husband told her that he did not care even if she went 
to hell but he wanted immediate payment. When Veena Rani stated in despair that she had 
enough of torment and she preferred death to a life of constant torture and tension, The 
accused “added fuel to fire” says the judgment, by remarking that “she may put an end to her 
life the very same day and she need not wait till the next day to quit this world.” Veena Rani 
set herself on fire after this quarrel. This clearly amounted to abetment to suicide which was 
liable to be punished with life imprisonment. The Supreme Court found him guilty on the 
evidence produced and changed the sentence imposed by the High Court.  
     In State of Punjab v. Iqbal Singh and others 2 the facts clearly revealed that the relations 
between husband the wife were stained since long. Soon after marriage demands for dowry 
and ill-treatment of the wife started. In 1977 she sought police protection and had complained 
of ill-treatment and danger to her life to the police. She was intending to take divorce but 
apprehended bloodshed and danger to her children. Her busband had kept up the pressure for 
extra money and stepped up the demand after the demise of her father on learning that the 
mother had got money from the provident fund. 
                                                 
1  (AIR 1989 SC 377) 
2  ((1991) 3 SCC 1) 
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     Since the demand was not met she was tortured. She was severely beaten up on the day 
prior to suicide, but before dying she wrote a letter to the Commissioner of Police telling him 
‘about the demand of Rs. 35,000 and the ill-treatment by the husband and his addiction to 
alcohol. The mother-in-law and sister-in-law both conspired to make false accusations against 
her. They had actually conspired to kill her but their plan flopped. She decided to prevent the 
agony of beatings and requested the police to extend the protection to her mother and brother. 
She also wrote a letter to her mother giving graphic details of the torture that she was 
suffering. 
     The Supreme Court held that it cannot be said that the husband did not realize where he 
was leading his wife to by his willful conduct. An atmosphere of terror was created. It 
amounted to intentionally aiding the suicide. It was also pointed out that Section 113-A 
Indian Evidence Act, being a rule of evidence, would apply to incidents prior to December 
1983, with retrospective effect. (Obiter) 
     The Court asserted that ‘ even if Section 113-A IEA is not applicable in the absence of 
proof as to the occurrence having taken place within seven years of marriage, the legislative 
intent is clear from Section 304-B and 498-A IPC and Sections 113-A and 113-B IEA. The 
sole intention of these Sections is to curb dowry deaths with a firm hand. This has to be kept 
in mind in deciding controversies under Section 306 IPC. The husband was consistently 
making dowry demands from his wife, beating and harassing her, and creating an atmosphere 
of terror for her, consequently the wife set herself and her three children ablaze. 
     The Supreme Court held that on facts, the husband and his wilful conduct created an 
atmosphere, which forced the wife to commit suicide. The husband and his relations knew too 
well that they were creating a situation, which will drive the woman to commit suicide, and 
she actually did it. In such a case the conduct will tantamount to inducing or provoking or 
virtually pushing a woman into a desperate situation of no return which would compel her to 
put an end to her miseries by coming suicide. 
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     In Smt. Sarla Prabhakar Waghmere v. State of Maharashtra,1 the Bombay High Court 
asserted that is not every harassment and every type of cruelty that would attract this Section. 
It must be established that the beating and harassment was with a view to force the wife to 
commit suicide or to fulfil the illegal demands of her husband or in-laws. 
     Section 498-A IPC AND section 113-A Evidence Act were introduced2 to combat the 
growing menace of dowry deaths, and to raise a presumption regarding abetment to suicide 
by a married woman. ‘Whenever a woman commits suicide within seven years from the date 
of her marriage and it is shown that the husband or the relatives of her husband had subjected 
her to cruelty, the court may presume, having regard to all other circumstances of the case 
that such suicide has been abetted by her husband or by such relative of her husband and the 
onus of proving his innocence will be on the accused.’ 
Section 304-B IPC and 306 IPC  
     In Rajesh Mehta v State,3 the Delhi High Court held that ingredients of Sections 304-B 
and 306 IPC are not so different and distinct so as to say that the charges under both these 
sections cannot be framed against an accused. Under Section 304-B, IPC the death of a 
woman caused by burns, injury or otherwise that in normal circumstances within seven years 
of her marriage becomes punishable if it is shown that soon before her death, she was being 
subjected to cruelty or harassment for or in connection with any demand of dowry. On the 
other hand, if a woman commits suicide upon abetment of an accused, the offence under 
Section 306 IPC may be made out. In case of the death of a woman, the difference, therefore, 
between Sections 304-B and 306, IPC primarily remains in regard to the demand of dowry, 
which is an essential ingredient of Section 304-B IPC and is not so for the purpose of an 
offence under Section 306 IPC. Section 304-B IPC can be taken as an aggravated form of 
Section 306 IPC in regard to the death of a woman, who is harassed on account of dowry 
demand and dies within seven years of her marriage. If in a trial under Section 304-B IPC, 
dowry related harassment or cruelty is not proved or it is shown that the woman had been 
                                                 
1   ((1990) Cr.L.J. 407 Bombay) 
2    ( Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1983) 
3   ((2001) 3 Femi-Juris C.C. 46(D) Del HC) 
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married for a period of more than seven years, the offence would not fall under Section 304-B 
IPC, but may fall within the ambit of Section 306 IPC, which deals with cases in which an 
accused by his conduct incites, provokes or virtually pushes the woman into a desperate, 
situation where she is compelled to put an end to her life by committing suicide, it, therefore, 
can be safely said that the offences under Sections 304-B and 306 IPC are neither quite 
distinct nor they belong to two different categories.  
     Alternative charge under Sec 306, IPC also ought to have been framed against the 
petitioner, if statement of witnesses under Sec 161 Cr.P.C. and other materials on record 
showing that petitioner might have abetted the suicide of his wife.1  
     In Sunil Bajaj v. State of M.P.,2 the Apex Court held that in case of dowry death if the 
proof regarding demand of dowry is missing and no evidence led about subjecting deceased 
to cruelty by husband in relation to demand of dowry and also crucial and necessary 
ingredient that deceased was subjected to cruelty or harassment by husband soon before her 
death for or in connection with demand of dowry not established, judgment of conviction 
unsustainable as it suffers from infirmity and illegality.  
     Section 306, IPC read with Section 113-A of Evidence Act is wide enough to take care of 
an offence under Sec. 304-B also. But the latter is made a more serious offence by providing 
a much higher sentence and also by imposing a minimum period of imprisonment as the 
sentence. In other words, if death occurs otherwise than under normal circumstances within 7 
years of the marriage as a sequel to the cruelty or harassment inflicted on a woman with 
demand of dowry, soon before her death, Parliament intended such a case to be treated as a 
very serious offence punishable even unto imprisonment for life in appropriate cases. It is for 
the said purpose that such cases are separated from the general category provided under Sec. 
306, IPC (read with Sec. 113-A of the Evidence Act) and made a separate offence.3  
 
 
                                                 
1   (Rajesh Mehta v. State, (2001) 3 Femi-Juris C.C. 46(E) Del. HC) 
2   ((2001) 3 Femi-Juris C.C. 5 (SC) 
3  (Satvir Singh v. State of Punjab, (2001) 2 Femi-Juris C.C. 80(C) SC) 
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Section 304-B, 306 and 498-A, IPC  
     Death caused by pouring kerosene oil and setting deceased on fir. Demand of dowry and 
deceased being harassed on account of inadequacy of dowry and non-fulfilment of demands 
established and proved. Nothing on record to suggest that fire was accidental. Chain of 
evidence and circumstances brought out by prosecution lending assurance to the deduction 
that deceased was harassed on account of dowry leading her to take extreme step of 
committing suicide. The trial court held the appellants guilty under Sections 304-B and 498-
A. The High Court held that the judgment of the trial court does not suffer from any 
infirmity.1  
     Young married lady was harassed, ill-treated and instigated to commit suicide. She jumped 
before running train, received serious injuries but did not die. After examining various penal 
provisions, accused persons were found to have committed offence under Section 498-A. 
Their conviction for offences under Sections 306, 304-B and 116, IPC were set aside.2  
     Section 498-A and 306 are independent and constitute different offences. Merely because 
an accused is held guilty to be punished under Section 498-A IPC, it does not mean that on 
same evidence he must also be held guilty of having abetted the commission of suicide by 
woman concerned.3  
     Suicide was committed by a newly bride. Happening on date of occurfrence is very 
material for purpose of recording a finding on question of abetment. On day of incident, 
husband told deceased that she was free to go wherever she wished and wanted to go. Wife 
committed suicide. Conduct of accused improbabilises theory of his having abetted suicide. 
Accused is not guilty of abetment of suicide.4  
     The police discourage family members from filing a case under section 304-B unless the 
circumstances are too compelling. This is probably the reason why most of the cases of dowry 
deaths are filed under Section 498-A or 306 IPC. According to a survey two hundred and 
forty seven women were killed for dowry, in a span of nine months in Maharashtra alone. 
                                                 
1   (Rama Tyagi & Ors.  V. State, (2001) 3 Femi-Juris C.C. 13 (Del) 
2   (Satvir Singh v. State of Punjab, (2001) 2 Femi-Juris C.C. 80 ((D) SC) 
3   (Ramesh Kumar v. State Chhattisgarh (2001) 3 Femi-Juris C.C. 36(F) SC) 
4    (ibid) 
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While there was every reason to believe that these were pre-planned murders, they were all 
registered as cases of suicide or accidental deaths.1  
 
Burden of Proof in Dowry Death  
     The introduction of Sections 304-B in IPC and 113-B in the Evidence Act has shifted the 
burden of proving the innocence on the person against whom there is an allegation of causing 
dowry death. This was to combat the difficulty in adducing evidence for the crime of dowry 
death and to overcome other legal hassles. 
     In Ashok Kumar v. State of Rajasthan,2 it was asserted that dowry killing is a crime of its 
own kind where elimination of the daughter-in-law becomes an immediate necessity if she 
and her parents are not able to satiate the greed and avarice of the husband and his family. 
“Eliminate the bride and everything is resolved automatically is the guiding principle in such 
cases. The time and place of the unnatural death of Asha at her in-laws small house with at 
least six inmates was not disputed. It was proved that she did not die of accident nor had she 
committed suicide. Burning by stove, gas or even by fire-wood may not be unusual due to the 
synthetic wear which has become very common. But when the post mertem report indicates, 
was in this case that the smell of kerosene was coming from the body and even burnt hair 
smelt of kerosene oil then it only belied the statement of her sister-in-law that she was burnt 
while she was preparing tea. It also ruled out the remotest possibility of an accident.  
     Asha Rani was burnt for Rs. 5000 or an auto, which her father of seven daughters could 
not afford even though he suffered the ignominy of seeing her being beaten in his presence in 
his own house. Both the courts had concurrently held that her in-laws were regularly and 
continuously pestering her for bringing cash for an auto and on their failure to satisfy the 
demand she was subjected to maltreatment and torture and was finally burnt to death. 
     In Jaspal Singh v. State of Punjab,3 it was held that the accused caused the death of his 
wife on account of greed to obtain a motorcycle from his in-laws. A clear testimony of 
                                                 
1   (Femina, March 8-22, 1987 p. 17) 
2   (AIR 1990 SC 2134) 
3   ((1984) Cr.L.J. 691 SC) 
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medical evidence showed that the death was caused due to asphyxia as a consequence of 
strangulation and the body was subsequently burnt. An aunt of the deceased and the 
panchayat members deposed that the accused was not happy with the dowry received by him 
and was maltreating the deceased. Another witness, the Sarpanch deposed that the accused 
confessed before him, that in a fit of anger he had strangulated his wife to death and thereafter 
set fire to her body in the house. There was not even a suggestion on animosity of the 
prosecution witness against the accused nor was there any nexus with the complainant. 
Presumption Under Evidence Act Retrospective  
     The Supreme Court asserted that the provisions of Section 113-A of the Evidence Act do 
not create a new offence, nor dies it create any substantial right. It is merely a matter of 
procedure, to provide evidence, so it is retrospective in its operation and will be applicable to 
this case.  
     The apex court referred to Halsbury’s Law of England 1 and asserted that all statutes other 
than those which are merely declaratory or which relate only to matters of procedure or of 
evidence, are prima facie prospective and retrospective effect is not to be given to them unless 
by express words or necessary implication it appears that this was the intention of the 
legislature. 
     As a measure of protection for the dowry victims Section 113-B Evidence Act has been 
inserted by the Dowry Prohibition (Amendment) Act, 1986. Whenever the question is 
whether a person has committed the dowry death of a woman and it is shown that soon before 
her death such a woman had been subjected to cruelty by such person or in connection with 
any demand for dowry, the court shall presume that such person has caused the dowry death. 
     As a result of these amendments and the presumptions, the law regarding dowry deaths has 
become very stringent yet the murderers still harass the brides and try to get away by 
circumventing the laws. Most of the cases of bride burning are registered as cases of 
accidental deaths with the connivance of the police. 
                                                 
1  (Halsbury’s Laws of England, 44th Edition, Vol. 4 p. 570) 
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     In Surinder Kaur v. Delhi Administration,1 the accused was tried for murdering his wife by 
pouring kerosene oil over her and setting her ablaze. The incident occurred ten months after 
marriage. The accused took the plea that the death accidental but the dying declaration clearly 
stated that the accused was in the habit of ill-treating and torturing her for more dowry. On 
that fateful morning also, he had abused and ill-treated her for not bringing enough dowry.  
     The Supreme Court held that ‘the recovery of the stove with its lid removed and burnt 
match sticks from the kitchen of the appellant’s house clearly goes to show that the kerosene 
oil of the stove has been poured over Chandrakanta and then a lighted match stick had been 
applied to her. ‘If the deceased had sustained the burn injury due to accident or due to 
attempted suicide, it is incomprehensible that she would have accused her husband of having 
set fire to her after pouring kerosene oil on her.’ 
Implications of Motive  
     Normally in a case where only circumstantial evidence is available one starts looking for 
motive and opportunity to commit the crime. If the evidence shows that an accused having a 
strong motive had an opportunity to commit the crime and the established circumstances on 
record, considered along with the explanation, if any, of the accused, exclude a reasonable 
possibility of anyone else being the real culprit, then the chain of evidence can be considered 
to be complete so as to show that within all human probability the crime must have been 
committed by the accused. The proof of motive goes a long way to tilt the scale against the 
accused, which provides the foundational material to connect the chain of circumstances.2  
Dying Declaration: Reliability in Dowry Death  
     The general principle on which this species of evidence is admitted is that they are 
declarations made in extremity, when the party is on the point of death and every motive to 
falsehood is silenced and the mind is induced by the most powerful consideration to speak the 
truth: a situation so solemn and so awful that it is considered by law as creating an obligation 
equal to that which is imposed by a positive oath administered by a court of justice.3  By 
                                                 
1   (AIR 1987 SC 692) 
2   (Bhupender Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1988 SC 1011) 
3   (As per Eyre, L.C.B. in R v. Woodcock, (1789) 1 Leech 500) 
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enacting Section 32(a) Indian Evidence Act the legislature in its wisdom has placed a dying 
declaration on par with evidence on oath because when a man is in danger of losing himself it 
is not likely that he will tell a lie or involve an innocent person. The circumstances which lend 
strength and assurance to a dying declaration are: that it was recorded by a competent 
magistrate after taking proper precautions, that it is taken down in the exact words in which it 
was spoken and that it was made shortly after the assault when there was no opportunity of its 
being coloured by the impression of others. Dying declaration is admissible because the 
victim is the principal eye witness to the crime and the exclusion of her evidence might defeat 
the ends of justice. The dying declaration is sufficient to found a conviction.1  The statement 
of the deceased recorded in the injury report that it was a case of a dowry death was accepted 
as reliable and trustworthy.2  
     Two contradictory dying declarations were made by the deceased. In previous dying 
declaration deceased stated that she was not burnt by accused. In subsequent dying 
declaration made before SHO she made allegations against accused that she was burnt by 
accused, by pouring kerosene on her body. Both dying declarations bear no certification of 
any doctor. Prosecution case was doubtful. Both dying declarations cannot be regarded or 
termed as dying declarations in strict and true sense. No reliance can be placed on the dying 
declarations. Death of deceased appears to be accidental and no homicidal or suicidal. 
Prosecution case not proved beyond all reasonable doubt and finding of trial court convicting 
accused for offences under Secs. 304-B and 498-A, IPC set aside.3   
Dying Declaration and Indian Ethos  
     Legally, other conditions being the same, all dying declarations stand, on equal footing yet 
dying declaration in cases of dowry death is different from normal dying declarations. A 
critical study of such statements made in bride burning cases shows that in cases of suspected 
dowry deaths whenever the dying declaration referred to an accident, which was responsible 
for the death and not the in-laws or the husband, it was not true, though this wrong statement 
                                                 
1  (Padmbaben Shamalbhai v. State of Gujrat (1991) 1 SCC 744) 
2   (Ashok Kumar v. State of Rajasthan (1991) 1 SCC 166) 
3  (Mahavir Singh & Ors. V. State of Rajasthan (2001) 3 Femi-Juris C.C. 152 (Raj.) 
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was not out of some foul motive or desire to mislead the court. It had its well-springs in some 
very noble sentiments and the ethos of Indian culture. ‘A wife will never blame her husband,’ 
he is the lord and the master, a virtual god on earth. She will rather blame herself for his 
misdeeds even if he has tortured her all her life and ultimately burnt her to death to get rid of 
her. If, as a result of the changing norms and values or the pangs of conscience to tell the 
truth, she holds her husband responsible she will first forgive him and plead for him to be 
forgiven by the Court also. In Somnath v. State of Haryana1 after recording the statement that 
her husband had burnt her, the wife mercifully pleaded that the husband should not be beaten 
or punished. In Vasant v. State of Maharashtra,2 the court said, ‘this is a sentiment too 
touching for tears and stems from the values of culture of Indian womanhood. A wife when 
she is set on fire by her husband, true to her tradition does not want the husband to be 
punished.’ 
     Thus dying declarations have a very unique and critical position in cases of bride burning, 
these statements should not be accepted on their face value as they do not disclose the actual 
cause of death. This is the result of the training, which has been ingrained in women over the 
centuries. She will like to take the blame for all his (her husband’s) faults on herself. Probably 
this sentiment becomes so powerful on the death bed that she often makes a wrong statement 
about the whole affair. It is very rare, that too in extreme cases, when she blames her 
husband. 
     The empirical survey of decided cases reveals that in cases, where the husband, because of 
his brutal behaviour, fears that the wife may blame him or his parents in her dying 
declaration, he threatens her with dire consequences to herself, her children or her loved ones 
if she tells the truth. This threat is so over-powering that she has no courage to come out with 
the truth even in the last moments of her life. In such a situation instances of conflicting dying 
                                                 
1  (AIR 1980 SC 1226) 
2   (AIR 1980 SC 1270) 
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declarations are not uncommon. The judge should read between the lines and interpret the 
dying declaration with an eye on the social reality of the life of an Indian woman.1  
Dying Declaration Recorded by Police  
     “Dying declaration recorded by a police officer during investigation is admissible under 
Section 32 Indian Evidence Act in view of the exception provided by Sub-section (2) of 
Section 162 Cr.P.C. but is better to leave such dying declaration out of consideration unless 
the prosecution satisfies the court why it was not written by the magistrate or the doctor.2  
     Dying declaration can be relied upon if the prosecution satisfies the court that it could not 
have been recorded by the doctor or the magistrate. It is not prudent to base the conviction on 
a dying declaration made to an investigation officer. It is a practice, which should be 
discouraged.3   
Public Response  
     The public response to dowry crime is often ambivalent. The experience of Subhadra 
Butalia’s, a woman activist from Saheli is typical, “I was having lunch one day when I heard 
a loud quarrelling and then a scream from a house across the street. I went out and saw a 
woman burning in the window. The neighbours had gathered in the street to watch. Many of 
them seemed undisturbed. People were saying that ‘it was just a domestic issue’ or ‘the 
woman must have had a loose moral character.’ The woman died soon afterwards in the 
hospital. 
     According to the noted social worker and President of the SOS of India, Mrs. Tara Ali 
Beg, ‘This phenomenon of burning young girls for dowry does not exist anywhere else in the 
world. Indians must examine the cruelty inherent in the long and unquestioned traditions 
pertaining to conjugal relations. As more Indians join the new middle class, more families 
will enter the confusing borderland between the feudal and the modern. Young middle class 
couples may adorn their homes with coloured TVs and VCRs, but they are still thrown 
together as strangers and the women are told to accommodate their emotions to the often 
                                                 
1   (Saxena Shobha, ‘Crimes Against Women and Protective Laws’, Deep and Deep Publications, New 
Delhi (1995) pp.146-147) 
2  (1984) 1 Crimes 108) 
3   (Atul Gandhia v. State of Assam, (1990) Cri.L.J. 1049) 
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brutalizing climate of the traditional home. A major shift from the patriarchal system is highly 
desirable.’  
 
3. Arbitrary Divorce 
  
Once it came to be established that marriage was a civil contract, it was the logical next step 
to recognize that it was also a dissolute union. However, when marriage came to be accepted 
as a contract, it was not regarded like an ordinary contract. It is because marriage has always 
been considered as a social institution. It is asserted that there is a social interest in the 
presentation and protection of the institution of marriage. This is the main reason why the 
institution of marriage is hedged in with all-round protection. Under the law of evidence, 
communication between husband and wife is regarded as a privileged communication. The 
domestic life as such is accorded protection by multifarious laws. It was, therefore, inevitable 
to consider marriage as a special contract and being a special contract, the marriage could not 
be put to an end like an ordinary contract.1 This may be illustrated from English law. In 
England divorce was recognized for the first time in the year 1857.2  
     The grounds of divorce may be looked at from two aspects: (i) Marriage is an exclusive 
union and if it is not an exclusive union, it ceases to be marriage. Adultery destroys the very 
foundations of marriage. Marriage also implies that parties will live with each other in 
harmony and in mutual confidence. Cruelty, or an apprehension of cruelty, undermines this 
basic requirement of marriage. Basic assumption of marriage is that both the parties will live 
together: if one party deserts the others, this basic assumption no longer exists. Thus, 
adultery, cruelty and desertion are destructive of the very foundation of marriage. (ii) Looked 
at from another angle, these grounds are the matrimonial offences committed by one of the 
parties to marriage. Some notion of criminality is involved. In that sense, divorce is regarded 
as mode of punishing the guilty party who had rendered himself or herself unworthy of 
consortium. This gave rise to the guilt or offence theory of divorce. According to this theory, 
                                                 
1   (Diwan Paras, ‘Modern Hindu Law’, Allahabad Law Agency, Faridabad,(1997) p.62) 
2   (The Matrimonial Causes Act, 1857) 
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a marriage can be dissolved only if one of the parties to marriage has, after the solemnization 
of the marriage, committed some matrimonial offences. This implies that the parties, though 
free to enter into a wedlock, are not equally free to get out of it. Adultery, cruelty and 
desertion were the only three grounds of divorce. Later on insanity was added as a ground of 
divorce. Insanity did not fit in within the framework of guilt of matrimonial offence theory as 
it is a misfortune rather than a misconduct. This led to renaming of the guilt theory as fault 
theory.1  
Dissolution of Marriage Under Hindu Marriage Act, 1955  
Divorce put the marriage to an end, parties revert back to their unmarried status, and are once 
again free to marry.2  
     The Marriage Laws (Amendment) Act, 1976 makes the grounds of divorce and judicial 
separation common. An aggrieved party, if he or she so chooses, may sue for divorce or 
judicial separation. 
     The Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 originally, based divorce on the fault theory and enshrined 
nine fault grounds in Section 13(1) on which either the husband or the wife could sue for 
divorce, and two fault grounds in Section 13(2) on which wife alone could seek divorce. By 
an amendment of 1964, by recasting last two clauses of Section 13(1), viz. clauses (viii) and 
(ix), two grounds of breakdown of marriage were also recognized. The marriage Laws 
(Amendment) Act, 1976 has inserted two additional fault grounds of divorce or wife and a 
new Section 13-B under which divorce by mutual consent, on the lines of the Special 
Marriage Act, 1954, is recognized. Thus, in the Modern Hindu Law the position is that all the 
three theories of divorce are recognized and divorce can be obtained on the basis of any one 
of them. Further, the customary mode of divorce is also retained.3   
                                                 
1   (Diwan Paras, ‘Modern Hindu Law’, Allahabad Law Agency, Faridabad (1997) pp. 62-63) 
2   (ibid.) 
3  (ibid) 
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     Marriage cannot be dissolved on a ground not specified in the Act.1  Divorce proceedings 
can be continued even after the death of one of the parties to the marriage and the decree shall 
be binding upon the legal representative.2  
Fault Grounds of Divorce  
(i) Desertion.3  “The expression ‘desertion’ means the desertion of the petitioner by the other 
party to the marriage without reasonable cause and without the consent or against the wish 
of such party, and includes the willful neglect to the petitioner by the other party to the 
marriage, and its grammatical variations and cognate expressions shall be construed 
accordingly.”4  Probably the shortest possible definition is desertion means permanent 
forsaking or abandonment of one spouse by the other without reasonable cause and 
without the consent of the other. Desertion is a total repudiation of obligations of 
marriage. Desertion is a withdrawal not only from a place, but also from a state of things. 
The constituent elements of desertion are the factum of separation, intention to desert, 
desertion should be without any reasonable cause, desertion should be without the consent 
of the other party and the statutory period of two years must have run out before a petition 
is presented.5  
Most of the cases of desertion relate to out typical joint family background in which the wife, 
not able to adjust, had left the matrimonial home or had been forced to leave it.6  In most 
cases, the wife’s defence in a husband’s petition on the ground of her desertion had been that 
she was turned out of the house.7  
     In constructive desertion the deserting spouse may continue to stay in the matrimonial 
home under the same roof or even in the same bedroom. In our country, in many a home the 
husband would be guilty of exclusive conduct towards his wife by completely neglecting her 
                                                 
1   (Rajender v. Anita, 1993 Del 135) 
2   (Vadalasethi v. Vadalasethi, AIR 1994 AP 13) 
3   (Section 13(1)(ib), Hindu Marriage Act) 
4   (Explanation to sub-section (1) of Section 13, Hindu Marriage Act) 
5  (Bipin Chandra v. Prabhawati, 1957 SC 176) 
6   (Roshanlal v. Basant,  (1967) 69 PLR 566) 
7  (Mato v. Santram, 1961 Punj 152) 
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to extent of denying her all marital rights but still the wife, because of social and economic 
conditions, may continue to live under the same roof.1  
      Divorce sought by husband on the ground that wife deserted him and treated him with 
cruelty by making false allegations against him, the trial court found that it was not wife who 
deserted husband but it was conduct of husband which forced wife to reside separately and it 
was husband who was treating wife with cruelty having contracted another marriage as was 
admitted in compromise. Husband is not entitled to decree of divorce.2   
 (ii) Cruelty. 3 
                 The modern law takes the view that the objective is to accord protection to the 
innocent party. Nagging and scolding and even incompatibility of temperament have been 
held to be included in cruelty, despite Denning L.J.’s warning that “if the doors of cruelty 
were opened too wide, we should soon find ourselves granting divorce for incompatibility of 
temperament”. The learned judge warned “the temptation must be resisted lest we slip into a 
state of affairs where the institution of marriage itself is imperiled.” 4 
     No precise definition of cruelty exist, nor is it possible to do so. Cruelty may be subtle or 
brutal. It may be physical or mental. It may be by words, gestures, or by mere silence.5  The 
starting point of definition of cruelty is “conduct of such a character as to have caused danger 
to life, limb or health, bodily or mental, or as to give rise to a reasonable apprehension of such 
danger”.6 The Marriage Law (Amendment) Act, 1976 which makes cruelty a ground for 
divorce, has changed the wording of the clause thus: Respondent has treated the petitioner 
with cruelty.7   
     In the modern law cruelty is classified as physical cruelty and mental cruelty.8 In Ashok v. 
Santosh 1 during intercourse (probably on account of husband’s failure to complete coitus), 
                                                 
1   (AIR 1964 SC 40) 
2   (Gurmeet Singh v. Kasushalya Bai, (2001) 3 Femi-Juris C.C. 233 (P&H) 
3 (Section 13(1)(ia), Hindu Marriage Act) 
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7 (Section 13 (1)(ia), Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 and see also 59th Report on the Law Commission) 
8   (Jyotish Chandra v. Meera, 1970 Cal 260) 
 146
the wife used to pull the flaccid penis of her husband. The Delhi High Court held this to 
amount to cruelty, as pulling of the flaccid penis can cause extreme pain, if carelessly and 
contemptuously done; such pulling of the flaccid penis is a species of inappropriate impulse, 
which results in excessive pain and thus amount to physical cruelty. 
     So far as mental cruelty is concerned the Supreme Court defined mental cruelty as that 
conduct which inflicts upon the other party such mental pain and suffering as could make it 
not possible for that party to live with the other. In other words, mental cruelty must be of 
such a nature that the parties cannot reasonably be expected to live together.2  
     The Marriage Laws (Amendment) Act, 1976 has changed the definition and meaning and 
scope of cruelty perceptively. Now the clause runs: the respondent has treated the petitioner 
with cruelty. The Indian courts have expanded horizon of cruelty. Some illustrative cases are 
as: false accusations of adultery or unchastity,3 wife quarrelling with mother-in-law,4 demand 
of dowry,5 persistent refusal to have marital intercourse,6 willful refusal to sexual intercourse 
and impotency, 7and drunkness etc. 
     Wife refusing to cook food as and when required and insulted husband in presence of his 
relations and friends and a criminal case was also registered against husband and his relations 
on report of wife, which ended in discharge of husband. Evidence of husband corroborated by 
witnesses and no reason shown to disbelieve the evidence produced by husband. Finding of 
Family Court granting decree of divorce in favour of husband is confirmed.8  
(iii) Adultery 9 
     Before the coming into force of the Marriage Laws (Amendment) Act, 1976 “living in 
adultery” was a ground of divorce. On the other hand, a petitioner could obtain a decree of 
judicial separation, if he could show that his spouse, after the solemnization of the marriage, 
                                                                                                                                            
1  (AIR 1983 Del 63) 
2   (Bhagat v. Bhagat, AIR 1994 SC 710) 
3  (Kusumlata v. Kapta Prasad, AIR 1965 All 280) 
4   (Yashodabai v. Krishnamoorthy, 1992 Lamt 368) 
5  (Sobha v. Madhukar, AIR 1988 SC 1291) 
6   (Shankuntala v. Om Prakash, AIR 1981 Del 53) 
7  (Rita v. Balkrishna Nijhawan, AIR 1973 Del 200) 
8  (Smt. Rukmni Devil v. Badri Narayan, (2001) 3 Femi-Juris C.C. 192 (Raj.) 
9  (Section 13(1)(i), Hindu Marriage Act) 
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had sexual intercourse with any person other than his spouse”. Now adultery simpliciter has 
been made ground of divorce as well as of judicial separation. The present clause has been 
worded thus –“has, after the solemnization of the marriage, had voluntary sexual intercourse 
with any person other than his or her spouse.”1  
     The following is the accepted meaning of adultery in matrimonial law: “Adultery may be 
defined as consensual sexual intercourse between a married person and a person of the 
opposite six, not the other spouse, during the subsistence of marriage.” 2 
     Under the Indian law adultery is also criminal offence. But the definition is different. 
Section 497, IPC defines it thus: “Whoever has sexual intercourse with a person who is and 
whom he knows or has reason to believe to be the wife of another man without the consent or 
connivance of that man, such intercourse not amounting to the offence of rape, is guilty of 
adultery.” The criminal action is filed not against the wife but against the adulterer. The wife 
is not guilty of offence, not even as an abettor. In the matrimonial court when a petition is 
filed for the matrimonial relief of judicial separation or divorce, on the ground of adultery, the 
main relief is sought against the spouse and not against the adulterer, though, in most systems, 
adulterer, if known, is a necessary party to proceedings and must be made a co-respondent.3 It 
may be emphasized that the matrimonial court is not such concerned with the knowledge of 
the respondent that co-respondent was not his or his spouse. Thus if the co-respondent had 
intercourse with a married woman personating to be her husband and the respondent taking 
him to be her husband had intercourse with him, she is not guilty of the matrimonial offence 
of adultery, though the co-respondent may be guilty of criminal offence of adultery. One 
single act of adultery is enough for divorce or judicial separation.4  
     It is also an established rule that it generally difficult to adduce direct evidence of adultery 
and usually the circumstantial evidence is sufficient.5 When a person says that he saw the 
                                                 
1   (ibid) 
2 Reydon on Divorce  (10th ed.) 172) 
3   (High Court Rules the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, require that the adulterer should be made a co-
respondent) 
4   (Rajender v. Sharda, AIR 1993 MP 142) 
5   (Sanjukta v. Lame, 1991 Ori. 39) 
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respondent and adulterer sleeping together in the night, it is sufficient proof of adultery. Mere 
allegation are not sufficient. 1 
     Mere allegation that wife committed adultery without naming the adulterer is not 
sufficient. Person with whom wife had illicit relationship should have been named and made 
party in proceedings.2  
 
            (iv) Insanity 3 
     Insanity is a ground both for judicial separation and divorce. The Marriage Laws 
(Amendment) Act, 1976 has changed the language of clause (iii) of S.13 (1) completely. The 
clause now lays down that a petitioner may get a decree of divorce if the respondent “has 
been suffering continuously or intermittently from mental disorder of such a kind and to such 
an extent that the petitioner cannot reasonably be expected to live with the respondent.” 
Explanation to the clause defines “mental disorder” as “mental illness, arrested or incomplete 
development of mind, psychopathic disorder on any other disorder or disability of mind and 
includes schizophrenia.”4  
            (v)Leprosy 5 
     The Marriage Laws (Amendment) Act, 1976 has made leprosy a ground both for judicial 
separation and divorce. No duration of leprosy is specified. Under the clause, the petitioner is 
required to show that the respondent has been suffering from virulent and incurable leprosy. 
With the advance in medical science, leprosy is now mostly curable in its early stages. It 
seems that some period must elapse when virulent leprosy becomes incurable. Malignant or 
venomous leprosy is called virulent leprosy.6  
             
 
                                                 
1  (Raju v. Baburao 1996 Mad. 260) 
2    (Easwaran v. Mani, (2001) 2 Femi-Juris C.C. 75 (Mad) 
3 (Section 13(1)(iii), Hindu Marriage Act) 
4   (Tarlochan v. Jit, 1986 P. and H. 379) 
5 (Section 13(1)(iv) 
6   (Annapurna v. Nabakishore, 1965 Ori. 72) 
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                (vi)Veneral Disease 1 
     Venereal disease to be a ground for divorce or judicial separation must be in a 
communicable form. The Marriage Laws (Amendment) Act, 1976 had done away with the 
duration of the disease (originally it was required to be of three years’ duration), and has also 
omitted the words, “disease having not even contracted from the peritioner” which overruled 
in Section 10(1)(d), but these words did not exist in Section 13(1)(v). One was apt to say that 
divorce could be obtained even if the disease was contracted from the peritioner, but judicial 
separation could not be.2  
            (vii)Conversion 3 
     If the respondent has ceased to be a Hindu by conversion to another religion, divorce may 
be obtained. Under the clause two conditions must be satisfied: (i) respondent has ceased to 
be a Hindu, and (ii) he has converted to another religion.  
     A person does not cease to be a Hindu merely because he declares that he has no faith in 
his religion. A person will not cease to be a Hindu if he does not practice his religion, or does 
not have faith in his religion or renounces his religion or leads an unorthodox life, so much so 
even if he eats beef and insults all Hindu gods and goddesses. He will also not cease to be a 
Hindu even if he expresses his faith in another religion and even starts practicing another 
religion. Such a person will continue to be a Hindu. Thus, ceasing to be a Hindu is hardly 
material except in the context of conversion.4  
This ground will be available only when the respondent converts to a non-Hindu faith, such as 
the Christianity, Islam or Zoroastrianism and such conversion can take place when the 
respondent undergoes the formalities prescribed by the faith to which he seeks conversion. 
The conversion of the respondent to a non-Hindu faith does not amount to automatic 
dissolution of marriage. The petitioner has to file a petition to obtain a decree of divorce.  If a 
petitioner choose to continue to live with his spouse who had converted to another religion, 
                                                 
1  (Section 13(1)(v), Hindu Marriage Act) 
2   (Diwan Paras, ‘Modern Hindu Law’, Allahabad Law Agency, Faridabad (1997), p.141) 
3  (Section 13(1)(ii), Hindu Marriage Act) 
4   (Chandrashekara v. Kulndaivelu, AIR 1963 SC 185) 
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there is nothing to debar him from doing so.1 Even assuming that husband converted himself 
into Islam and changed his name to Abdullah, it cannot be said that the marriage between 
himself and his first wife has been dissolved. The conversion by itself does not give him a 
right to marry another lady, unless it has been made out that the conversion is by conviction. 
Even assuming that the husband has ceased to be a Hindu, he is not entitled to divorce under 
Section 13(1)(ii) of the Hindu Marriage Act on the ground that he himself got converted from 
Hinduism to Mohammadianism. The language of the section is very clear and it states that on 
the petition presented by a spouse, either the husband or the wife for a decree of divorce on 
the ground that the “other party has ceased to be a Hindu by conversion to another religion.”2  
            (viii)Adoption of Religious Order 3 
     Hindus recognize Sanyasa Asharma as the last of the four asharmas into which the life of a 
Hindu is organized. Under Hindu law where a person enters into a religious order renouncing 
all worldly affairs, his action is tantamount to civil death.4 A person does not become a 
sanyasi by merely declaring himself a sanyasi or by wearing clothesordinarily worn by 
sanyasi. He must perform the ceremonies necessary for entering the class of sanyasis: without 
such ceremonies he cannot become dead to the world.5   
     One of the ceremonies that is performed before one enters this ashrama is one’s own 
funeral rites. The sanyasi gives up his name and assumes a new name: in other words, 
entering into a Sanyasa ashrama means not merely renunciation of the world and worldly 
things, but also renunciation or rather an end of one’s worldly life led in Grihasth Ashrama or 
the life lead in the Vanprastha Ashrama. Entering into the Sanyasa Ashrama in the old age is 
in accordance with Hindu religion. A person may enter into a holy order even at the young 
age and it is not contrary to Hindu religion. Therefore, one may ask that if Sanyasa Ashrama 
is in accordance with Hindu religion as to why it has been made a ground for divorce. The 
reason seems to be that one can follow the religion faith or belief one has, but it should not 
                                                 
1  (Diwan Paras, ‘Modern Hindu Law’, Allahabad Law Agency, Faridabad (1997) pp.141-142) 
2   (Smt. Ventipalli Neelaveni v. Venkateshwar Rao and Others  1989(1) Crimes 19) 
3  (Section 13(1)(vi), Hindu Marriage Act) 
4   (Mulla, ‘Principles of Hindu Law’ (13th ed.), N.M. Tripathi Pvt. Ltd., Bombay (1970), p.688) 
5   (Teeluck v. Shama (1964) 1 W.R. 209) 
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amount to hardship to one’s spouse. And when one spouse leaves the other, even by 
becoming a Sanyasi, it prima facie causes hardship to the other party. Looked at from this 
angle, to become a Sanyasi is nothing but desertion and probably an extreme form of 
desertion, where there is no hope that the Sanyasi spouse will ever return to resume 
cohabitation. This seems to be the reason for making it a ground for divorce.1  
     To constitute ground for divorce both conditions must be satisfied. If a person renounces 
the world, such as when he ceases to take any interest in worldly affairs or retires to a single 
room or ceases to take any interest in cohabitation or takes a vow of celibacy or, in short, he 
or she ceases to have any social intercourse, yet he does not join a holy order, it would not be 
covered under the clause as the second condition has not been fulfilled. Just because a person 
has become a chela does not mean that he has joined a holy order.2  
     A person enters into holy or religious order when he undergoes the ceremonies and rites 
prescribed by the order, which he enters.3 It is difficult to visualize a situation when a person 
enters into a holy order and still does not renounce the world. But if a person enters into a 
holy order, yet comes home, howsoever degraded he may be in the eyes of religion or society, 
and resumes cohabitation or after entering into the holy order continues to cohabit, then also 
the ground will not be available, because though he has entered a religious order, he has not 
renounced the world and Section 13(1)(vi) clearly lays down: the other party has renounced 
the world by entering any religious order. 
     The Hindu texts applicable to the disinheritance of ascetics do not apply to Sudras, unless 
a usage to that effect is established. The reason is that a Sudra cannot enter the order of Yati 
or Sanyasi.4 Therefore, this ground of divorce is not applicable to Sudras.  
            
 
 
                                                 
1   (Diwan Paras, ‘Modern Hindu Law’, Allahabad Law Agency, Faridabad (1997), p.142) 
2   (Govind v. Kuldeep, 1971, Del 151) 
3   (Sital Das v. Sant Ram, 1954 SC 606) 
4   (Harish Chandra v. Atir Mahmud (1913) 40 Cal. 545, 18 I.C. 474, in Mulla, ‘Principles of Hindu 
Law’, N.M. Tripathi Pvt. Ltd., Bombay (1970) p.157) 
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               (ix)Presumption as to Death1  
     a person is presumed to be dead if he is not heard of as alive for seven years or more by 
those who would have normally heard from him or about him had he been alive.2  Similarly, 
Section 13(1)(vii) Hindu Marriage Act lays down that the other party has not been heard of as 
being alive for a period of seven years or more by those persons who would naturally have 
heard of it, had that party been alive. The burden of proving that such a person is not dead but 
alive lies on him who affirms it.  
     If the other spouse on the basis of presumption of death assumes that he or she has become 
a widower or widow and therefore marriage stands dissolved or he or she contacts second 
marriage, the second marriage will not be valid and the spouse can also be prosecuted for 
bigamy. To avoid the risk of missing spouse re-appearing rendering the second marriage void, 
clause (vii) of Section 13(1) provides that a petitioner may obtain a decree of dissolution of 
marriage on this ground. Once the marriage is dissolved the petitioner is free to marry again 
and even if the missing spouse return the next day of the passing of the decree or much before 
the second wedding, he can do nothing. It may be noted that if the second marriage is 
performed on the basis of presumption of death without getting a decree of divorce, no person 
other than the missing spouse can question the validity of the second marriage.3  
Wife’s Special Fault Grounds of Divorce  
     Originally, Section 13(2), Hindu Marriage Act provided for only two special grounds on 
which wife alone could seek divorce. The Marriage Laws (Amendment) Act, 1976 has added 
two more fault grounds. Thus, under the modern Hindu law, a wife may petition for divorce 
on any one of the following four grounds (of these, the first two existed in the Act of 1955 
and the last two were added by the Act of 1976) : 
(a) Pre-Act Polygamous Marriages. In the case of any marriage solemnized before the 
commencement of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, that the husband has married again before 
such commencement or that any other wife of the husband married before such 
                                                 
1   (Section 13(1)(vii), Hindu Marriage Act) 
2  (Section 108 of Indian Evidence Act) 
3   (Nirmoo v. Nikkaram, AIR 1968 Delhi 260) 
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commencement was alive at the time of the solemnization of the marriage of the petitioner, 
provided in either case the other wife is alive at the time of the presentation of the petition.1  
In 1955 this ground was a logical consequence of the introduction of monogamy in Hindu 
law. The Hindu Marriage Act did not rightly render the pre-Act polygamous marriages void, 
but provided (and still provides) relief of divorce to any wife of polygamous marriage. Since 
this ground relates to the policy of monogamy, the husband will not be allowed to plead any 
conduct or disability on the part of the wife-petitioner so as to bar relief.2  
Under this clause any wife (former or latter) of the polygamous marriage may seek divorce, 
only requirements is that the time of the presentation of the petition, at least, one more wife 
should be alive.3  It is obvious that the ground will be available if both the marriages are 
valid. Under this clause it can happen that all the wives may present a petition for divorce and 
may obtain a decree of divorce, since the requirement is that at the time of the presentation of 
the petition one more wife should be alive.4   
A wife of polygamous marriage cannot be deprived of her right of divorce on the ground that 
prior to the commencement of the Act, she entered into a compromise with her husband to 
continue to live with him; nor can a husband take the plea that her conduct or disability is a 
bar to her claim to divorce.5  Similarly the fact that the wife knew of the second marriage of 
her husband when it was performed could not be pleaded as an estoppel against her in her 
petition for divorce on this ground.6  It is submitted that since the policy of law is to enforce 
monogamy, Section 23, Hindu Marriage Act cannot be marshaled to bar wife’s petition for 
divorce.7  
                                                 
1  (Section 13(2)(i), Hindu Marriage Act) 
2   (Nirmos v. Nikkaram, AIR 1968 Delhi 260) 
3  (Under the Bombay and Madras divorce legislation, it was a ground of divorce through only for the 
first wife) 
4  (Venkatamma v. Venkateswami, 1963 Mys 118) 
5   (Leela v. Anant Singh, AIR 1961 Raj 178) 
6  (Lalithamma v. Kanna, 1966 Mys 178) 
7   (Nirmoo v. Nikkaram, AIR 1968 Del 260) 
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(b) Unnatural Offences. The husband has, since the solemnization of the marriage been 
guilty of rape, sodomy or bestiality.1  
Commission of the offence of rape, sodomy or bestiality by the husband gives the wife a right 
to divorce him. Rape is a criminal offence under Section 375-376, Indian Penal Code. 
Sodomy and bestiality are unnatural offences under Section 377, IPC, and a person guilty of 
these offences can be prosecuted in a criminal court. However, under Hindu law these are 
recognized as special grounds of divorce for the wife, and the husband has no right to divorce 
the wife if she is found guilty of the commission of any of these offence,2 though commission 
of any of these offences may amount to cruelty to him, if it hurts his feeling and affects his 
health.3  However, one cannot be guilty of raping his own wife, unless she is below fifteen 
years.4 Sodomy or bestiality is committed when one has carnal intercourse against the order 
of nature with any man, woman or animal.5 If a man commits sodomy on his own wife 
without her consent, then it would amount to the matrimonial offence of sodomy with in the 
meaning of the clause.6 When a wife sues her husband for divorce on his ground of 
commission of rape, sodomy or bestiality, it is not necessary for her to show that he was 
prosecuted or convicted for the offence. Even if the husband has been acquitted by the 
criminal court, she can, in divorce proceedings, establish his guilt and obtain relief. On the 
other hand, even if the husband has been convicted by a criminal court, the wife will have to 
prove the offence de novo in the matrimonial proceedings, and then alone she will be entitled 
to the decree of divorce. 
(c) Non-resumption of cohabitation after a decree of maintenance.  The new sub-clause 
(iii) of Clause (2) of Section 13, Hindu Marriage Act lays down that if a wife has obtained an 
order of maintenance in proceedings under Section 125, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 or 
a decree under Section 18 Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956 and cohabitation 
                                                 
1 Section 13(2)(ii), Hindu Marriage Act) 
2   (ibid) 
3   (Section 13(1)(ia), Hindu Marriage Act) 
4   (Exception to Section 375, Indian Penal Code) 
5   (Section 377, IPC) 
6   (Bamption v. Bamption, (1955) 2 All ER 766; Swarma Kumari v. M.B. Chowdary, 1996 MP 104)   
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between parties has not been resumed for one year or upwards after the passing of the order 
or the decree, as the case may be, then the wife can sue for divorce on that ground. It is 
evident that this provision enables the wife along to sue for divorce and the husband has no 
such right. 
(d) Repudiation of Marriage.  The Marriage of the petitioner-wife was solemnized 
(whether consummated or not) before she attained the age of fifteen years and she has 
repudiated the marriage after attaining that age but before attaining the age of eighteen years.1 
It may be recalled that in Hindu law a marriage is neither void nor voidable on the ground of 
age, but is a valid marriage. Now this clause provides some relief to those Hindu girls who 
were married below the age of fifteen years. No such relief is provided for a boy who is 
married below the age of fifteen or eighteen or twenty one years. Section 13(2)(iv) requires 
that the marriage should be repudiated by the wife before she attains the age of eighteen 
years. A petition on this ground can be obviously filed after she attains the age of eighteen 
years.2  
This provision is similar to the provision of Section 2(vii) of the Dissolution of Muslim 
Marriage Act, 1939 where a similar ground of divorce is provided for the Muslim wife who 
was married below the age of fifteen. However, under Muslim law it is also essential that the 
marriage has not been consummated, before she repudiated it.  
     Petition for divorce by wife on the ground that her marriage was solemnized when she was 
below 15 years and had repudiated the marriage before attaining the age of majority. Wife 
failed to prove by documentary evidence that she was below 15 years at the time of marriage. 
Husband was also free to produce evidence in rebuttal but failed. Evidence of wife in absence 
of any rebuttal can be accepted. Wife has not lived with husband for a day even after attaining 
majority and she thus repudiated the marriage before becoming major. Decree of divorce 
granted in favour of wife.3  
 
                                                 
1   (Section 13(2)(d), Hindu Marriage Act) 
2   (Bathula v. Bathula, 1981 AP 74; Savitri v. Sitaram, 1986 MP 218) 
3   (Reena Devil (minor) v. Mohinder Singh, (2001) 3 Femi-Juris C.C. 231 (P&H) 
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Irretrievable Breakdown Grounds  
     Originally based as divorce was on the g uilty theory, the divorce could be obtained if one 
of parties to the marriage was guilty of a matrimonial offence and the other was innocent. In 
1964 by the Hindu Marriage (Amendment) Act, a form of breakdown theory was introduced 
in Hindu Law by modifying the last two clauses of Section 13(1), viz. clauses (viii) and (ix). 
These clauses have been modified by the Marriage Laws (Amendment) Act, 1976 under 
which the period of two years has been reduced to one year. Section 13(1A)1 runs as under: 
      Either party to a marriage, whether solemnized before or after the commencement of this 
Act, may also present a petition for dissolution of marriage by a decree of divorce on the 
ground; (i) that there has been no resumption of cohabitation as between the parties to the 
marriage for a period of one year or upward after the passing of a decree for judicial 
separation in a proceeding to which they were parties; or 
(ii) that there has been no restitution of conjugal rights as between the parties to the marriage 
for a period of one year or upward after the passing of a decree for restitution of conjugal 
rights in a proceeding to which they were parties. 
     As is evident, either party can seek divorce. The question of guilt or innocence of either 
party does not arise. In such a case no useful purpose will be served in finding out as to which 
of the two is guilty or innocent. If two-in-oneship has ended, the marriage should be dissolved 
at the instance of either party.2 The period of one year in either cases commences with effect 
from the decree of the trial court granting restitution or judicial separation.3   
     The 1964 or 1976 amendment to the Act has not touched Section 23, as to its application 
to all matrimonial causes, including divorce under Section 13(1A). The result has been that 
when irretrievable breakdown of marriage clause came for interpretation most of the High 
Courts applied Section 23(1)(a) and took the view that if the petitioner is found guilty of any 
wrong, he would not be granted divorce, even though there is a full compliance to the clause.4  
Thus where the husband obtained a decree of restitution but did not allow the wife to comply 
                                                 
1   (Sub-section (1-A) inserted by Act 44 of 1964, S.2, w.e.f. 20.12.1964) 
2   (Diwan Paras,’Modern Hindu Law’, Allahabad Law Agency, Faridabad (1997) p.146)   
3   (Leelawati v. Ram Sewak, AIR 1979 All 285) 
4   (Shakuntala v. Sardari, 1972 P&H 70; Laxmibai v. Laxmichand, 1968 Bom 332) 
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with it and when later on he sued for divorce on the ground of non-compliance of the decree 
for the statutory period,1 the court refused to grant him divorce, as they felt that it would 
amount to giving him advantage of his wrong of his not allowing the wife to comply with his 
decree was such a wrong.  
     In a recent case illustrating the application of Section 23(1)(a) to the irretrievable 
breakdown ground, the husband filed a petition of divorce on the ground of wife’s adultery, 
about six months after he had obtained a decree for restitution of conjugal rights. While the 
divorce petition was pending, one year’s period was completed as provided under Section 
13(1-A)(ii), and he filed another petition for divorce under Section 13(1-A)(ii) on the basis of 
non-restitution of conjugal rights for a period of one year after the passing of the decree of 
Restitution. The husband was probably in a hurry; he wanted to obtain divorce on whatever 
ground he could lay hand at. On this hurry or undue haste, the court came to the conclusion 
that granting of petition of the divorce under Section 13(1-A)(ii) would amount to giving him 
an advantage of his own wrong, as in the opinion of the court, the wife was prevented from 
complying with the restitution decree on account of his petition for divorce on the ground of 
wife’s adultery; no self-respecting wife would go to her husband’s house while her husband 
had sued her in the court alleging adultery on her part. Certainly, the husband’s petition for 
divorce on wife’s adultery in the intervening period was new factor, a distressing factor, but 
this as well as all other facts of the case lead to the inevitable conclusion of breakdown of 
marriage, and if that was the position what efforts, ugly or mean he made should not matter. 
Wife would gain nothing by keeping this empty shell of marriage.2  
     If technical view of Section 23(1)(a), Hindu Marriage Act, is taken, there will be hardly a 
petition under Section 13(1-A), where divorce could be granted. Thus, a spouse who obtained 
a decree for restitution of conjugal rights fails to entreat the other spouse to join him, or a 
spouse against whom a decree had been obtained fails or refuses to comply with it, he or she 
will be in the wrong and the petition for divorce under Section 13(1-A) will fail. On the other 
hand, if he successfully entreats the other spouse to join him in the former case, and if he 
                                                 
1   (Geetha v. Sarveshwara, AIR 1983 AP 111) 
2    (O.P. Mehra v. Saroj, AIR 1984 Del 159) 
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complies with the petition in the latter case, there is left no cause of action to file a petition for 
divorce. It appears that when the Amendment of 1964 was debated in Parliament, no one gave 
any thought to the possibility of the applicability of Section 23 to a petition under Section 
13(1-A). Since the divorce structure in the original Hindu Marriage Act was based on fault 
theory – it is in that structure only that Section 23 has any relevance – and when a new 
structure of irretrievable breakdown of marriage was laid down, the projecting arm of Section 
23 was not cut down but rather allowed to cast it shadow; the courts applied Section 23 to the 
irretrievable breakdown of marriage basis of divorce also. They overlooked the spirit and the 
law behind Section 13(1-A), and, adhered as they do to mechanical jurisprudence, applied 
Section 23, in the result Section 13(1-A) was almost rendered nugatory.1  
     However, the courts are trying to make the provision work. In Madhukar v. Sarla,2 the 
Bombay High Court, and recently in Geeta v. Serveshwara,3 the Andhra Pradesh High Court 
observed that wrong or disability of the petitioner should be subsequent to the passing of the 
decree. The Gujrat High Court held that the continuance of the same wrong such as adultery, 
on the basis of which the decree for judicial separation was passed was not a wrong inhibiting 
the relief under Section 13(1-A).4 Nor was it essential that the petitioner should have made 
any effort of resumption of cohabitation after a decree for judicial separation.5 Husband’s 
refusal to or failure to make efforts at resumption of cohabitation or his failure to pay alimony 
does not amount to his taking advantage of his own wrong.6  
     Divorce can be granted on any of the grounds mentioned in Sec.13. Divorce on any other 
ground not mentioned in Section 13 would be an act without any sanction of law. Court 
cannot go beyond law. Irretrievable break down of marriage is not made a ground under 
Section 13 and such ground by itself cannot be a ground for divorce.7  
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Sections 13(1-A), 13(1)(ia) and 13(1)(ib) and 23(1)(a)  
 In V. Sreedevi v. V. Varadarajan,1 the Madras High Court held that the provisions of Section 
23(1)(a) of the Act, undoubtedly prevent any party from taking advantage of his/her own 
wrong and there can be no doubt that no party to a marital dispute can be allowed to take that 
advantage. However, the question here is to whether the husband is taking advantage of his 
own wrong. This court is of the view that there is no question here in this case of the husband 
taking advantage of his own wrong. The husband is merely relying on a right created by the 
Statute by Sec. 13(1-A) wherein the pendency of the decree for judicial separation for more 
than one year can be a valid ground for the decree of divorce, it has to be remembered that it 
was the husband, who sued his wife for a decree of divorce. For one reason or the other that 
decree was not given, but he was certainly able to get the decree for judicial separation. This 
decree for judicial separation was based on his plea that his wife had been behaving in a cruel 
manner 2 with him. Unfortunately for the appellant, wife has remained silent and did not 
challenge the decree thereby in a way she has accepted the finding of the Court that she 
behaved in a cruel manner with husband. Under such circumstances, such a decree that 
remained for more than one year and therefore, has remained pending and within this one 
year if there is no marital resumption between the husband and the wife, the husband would 
certainly become entitled to pray for a decree of divorce.3  Once this position is clear, then the 
wife cannot now raise a plea that she did not join the company of the husband because he was 
living with some other lady.4 In fact this issue was not framed by the trial court and appellant 
wife remained silent about non-framing of such an issue. The Madras High Court held that 
decree for divorce granted under Section 13(1-A) in favour of husband is valid. Because there 
was no resumption of cohabitation between the parties since more that one year after passing 
of decree for judicial separation. Wife’s pea that it was husband who prevented cohabitation 
and was living with another woman not accepted and plea based on Section 23(1(a) also was 
                                                 
1    ((2001) 2 Femi Juris C.C. 60 (Mad) 
2  (Section 13(1)(ia), Hindu Marriage Act) 
3  ( Section 13(1A), Hindu Marriage Act) 
4(Adultery under Section 13(1)  
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not accepted because wife did not file appeal against decree of judicial separation and allowed 
it to become final, giving right to husband under Section 13(1-A) to get decree of divorce.  
     Petition for divorce was filed by husband on the ground of desertion and cruelty by wife. 
Husband was living with another lady, found leading adulterous life. Such conduct of 
husband compelled wife to live with her parents. Husband’s offer to keep wife with him 
found full of hollowness. He cannot be allowed to take advantage of his own wrong conduct. 
His humiliating treatment with wife disentitles him from obtaining relief of divorce.1 
       
Divorce by Mutual Consent  
     Section 13-B, Hindu Marriage Act lays down that a petition for divorce by mutual consent 
may be presented jointly by both the spouses with the following averments: (i) that they have 
been living separately for a period of one year. ; (ii) they have not been able to live together, 
and ; (iii) they have mutually agreed to live separately.2  
     All the above conditions should be fulfilled before divorce can be granted.3 
     There is no requirement of law that at the time of presentation of the petition the statement 
of parties should be recorded.  It is not necessary that parties should be living under separate 
roofs. They might be living in the same house but not as separate husband and wife.4 “They 
have not been able to live together” means that there is state of complete break down of 
marriage.5  In this case the Supreme Court has held that a party could withdraw her or his 
consent unilaterally. It is submitted that this view is not correct considering our social 
background where lot of pressure may be exercised on a party to withdraw. 
     After the presentation of the petition, the parties are required to wait for six months though 
not for more that eighteen months, and then to move a motion in the court that divorce be 
granted.6  If no motion is moved within eighteen months, the petition shall stand dismissed. 
                                                 
1   (Chetan Dass v. Kamla Devil, (2001) 2 Femi Juris C.C. 6 (SC) 
2   (Girija v. Vijay, AIR 1995 Kder 159) 
3   (Leela v. Mahadev, AIR 1919 Bom 105) 
4   (Sureshtha Devil v. Om Prakash, AIR 1992 SC 1904) 
5   (ibid.) 
6   (Section 13-B(2), Hindu Marriage Act) 
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The period of 18 months is an upper limit for the withdrawal of the petition.1  But the court 
has power to grant divorce even after the expiry of that time or even before the expiry of six 
months if other conditions are fulfilled.2  
     A compromise application agreeing to divorce submitted by the parties can be a basis of 
divorce. In Indrawal v. Raman,3 the Allahabad High Court observed that such a compromise 
is not unlawful, though petition should not be collusive. It is submitted that a petition for 
divorce by mutual consent is always a compromise petition, and in broad sense it is 
“collusive”. 
Divorce Under Special Enactments And Customary Divorce  
Section 29(2), Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 retains the customary grounds and mode of divorce 
that have existed for the coming into force of the Hindu Marriage Act. Similarly, grounds of 
divorce recognized under special enactments are also preserved. Thus under the modern 
Hindu law, in respect of the Pre-Act as well as post-Act marriages:  (i) the customary mode 
and forum of divorce are still available, and (ii) the grounds and forum of divorce under 
special enactments are also preserved. 
Divorce under Custom.  
     Under Hindu law divorce was recognized only under custom before Hindu Marriage Act. 
Divorce under custom, was available unless a particular ground or mode of divorce was found 
to be contrary to public policy or morality. The Supreme held that ancient and unbroken 
custom of divorce would be recognized and a valid marriage could be dissolved by customary 
mode of divorce. To such divorces, neither one-year’s bar to divorce (the fair trial rule) under 
Section 14, nor any of the bars laid down in Section 23, or Sections 24, 25 and 26, and, in 
short, no provision of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 applies to such divorce.4 No petition in 
the court is required. The customary divorces may still be obtained through the agency of 
gram panchayat or caste tribunal or cast panchayats, by private act of parties, orally or in 
writing, or under an agreement, oral or written, such as bill of divorcement, tyaga-patra or 
                                                 
1   (K.K. Rao v. Kamalakshmi, AIR 1983 Kant 235) 
2   (Ravi v. Sharda, AIR 1978 MP 44) 
3   (AIR 1981 All 151) 
4   (Shankuntalabai v. Kulkarni, AIR 1989 SC 1309)   
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farkat-nama.1 A custom recognizing divorce must fulfil all the tests of valid custom. A 
custom permitting divorce to one spouse against the wishes of the other is void, being 
unreasonable and against public policy.2  
     The Gram-Panchayats and cast-panchayats continue to exercise jurisdiction over 
customary divorces. How the jurisdiction is exercised and when the courts of law may 
interfere in their adjudication is well illustrated by Pemabai v. Channolal.3 The marriage of 
parties was dissolved by the Panchayat on the basis of mutual consent of the parties. 
Subsequently, the wife filed a suit in a court of law for a declaration that the marriage still 
subsisted on the averment that when she gave her consent for divorce she was only fourteen 
years old and was not capable of giving a valid consent. Rejecting the suit, the court observed 
that the wife had at that time sufficient understanding, and since such divorces were 
recognized in the caste, the marriage stood dissolved.  
     The court can look into the question as to whether the gram panchayat had the jurisdiction 
and as to whether the principles of natural justice were followed. This is the ground as to 
when and how the courts may interfere in a customary divorce.4  
     Divorce under recognized custom is upheld by courts if not opposed to public policy. 
Finding of the trial court that there cannot be a customary divorce after advent of Hindu 
Marriage Act is an erroneous finding of law.5  
Divorce under Special Enactments. Much before the Hindu Marriage Act came into force, 
in the erstwhile States of Travancore and Cochin, several statutes were passed to regulate 
marriage and divorce in some castes or group of castes. In some these enactments,6 divorce 
by mutual consent or by a deed executed by the parties is recognized. Among the matrilineal 
communities, such as marumakhathayama and aliasantana, marriage has always been 
considered to be dissoluble by mutual consent. Some special enactment of the Madras 
                                                 
1  (Chukna v. Lacuma, (1969) 2 SCWN 605; Balwinder v. Gurpal, AIR 1985 Del 14) 
2   (Gurdit v. Angrej, 1968 SC 142; Diwan Paras, ‘Customary Law (1991), Chapter IX) 
3   (AIR 1963 MP 57; Madho v. Shakuntala, 1972 All 119) 
4   (Kishanlal v. Prabhu, AIR 1963 Raj 95) 
5   (P. Mariammal v. Padmanabhan, (2001) 3 Femi-Juris C.C. 303 (Mad) 
6   (Some of these statutes are: Madras Aliasantana Act, 1924; Travancore Ezhava Act, 1925; Cochin 
Nayar Act, 1931; Madras Marumakkathatya Act, 1933; Cochin Marumakkathayamma Act, 1938) 
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Province and the erstwhile States of Travancore and Cochin regulated marriages and divorce 
in these communities. These enactments have not been repealed by Hindu Marriage Act, 
1955.1 When divorce is sought under these enactments none of the provisions of the Hindu 
Marriage Act applies to it. Neither one year’s bar to divorce, nor any bars under Section 23, 
Hindu Marriage Act apply to such divorces. Similarly, the provisions of Section 24, 25 and 26 
do not apply.2  
 Fair Trial Rule of Divorce 
     Following the English matrimonial law,3  Section 14, Hindu Marriage Act enacts, what is 
known as, the fair trial rule. Section 14, as amended by the Marriage Laws (Amendment) Act 
1976 lays down that no marriage may be dissolved unless period of one year (originally it was 
three years period at par the Matrimonial Causes Act, 1950) has elapsed since the 
solemnization of the marriage, though in the case of exceptional hardship to the petitioner or 
exceptional depravity on the part of the respondent, the marriage may be dissolved earlier.4  
This is based on the assumption that is the duty of every married person to give fair trial to 
the marriage. It is likely that at the initial stages of their marriage, parties may not be able to 
adapt themselves to the new situation and circumstances of married life, and it may happen 
that in the heat of passions, in rash moments, they may take the irretrievable step of getting 
the marriage dissolved and may repent later one. It is believed that after living together for 
some time the spouses will have opportunity knowing each other, may be able to adapt to the 
new situation, may be able to adjust with each other’s temperament and needs, and to new 
life. But, if after the expiry of the period of fair trial, parties do not succeed in their 
endeavour, they may get their marriage dissolved.  
     It is submitted that the rationale of this rule is understandable in respect of divorce by 
mutual consent but not in respect of divorce based on the guilt of the respondent.  For 
instance, if within a fortnight of the marriage the respondent commits adultery, should the 
                                                 
1   (Ayyapan v. Paraketty, 1971 Ker 44 (FB)) 
2   (Prema v. Ananda, 1973 Mys 69) 
3    (Section 3 of the Matrimonial Causes Act, 1950 contains a similar provision, though period is three 
years.) 
4   (Section 14(1), Hindu Marriage Act) 
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petitioner to wait for another eleven months and fifteen days?1 The Law Commission in its 
59th Report recommended 2 for the repeal of the provision, but Parliament chose to retain it, 
though it reduced the period to one year. 
     The term ‘exceptional hardship’ and ‘exceptional depravity have not been defined in the 
Matrimonial Causes Act, from where they have been borrowed nor they have been defined in 
Hindu Marriage Act, but they have been qualified by the word ‘exceptional’ which means 
“beyond the ordinary run of complaints which come before the court.”3 Depravity implies 
some moral guilt and if moral guilt is lacking, the conduct cannot be called depraved. For 
instance, incurable insanity may not amount to exceptional depravity, yet it may amount to 
exceptional hardship. It is also possible that the same thing may amount to exceptional 
depravity as well as exceptional hardship. For instance, a respondent converts to, say Islam 
and insists that meat, including beef, must be cooked in the same kitchen. The petitioner is a 
strict vegetarian. This may be a case of exceptional depravity on the part of the respondent as 
well as of exceptional hardship for the petitioner. But mere conversion would not amount to 
exceptional depravity.4  
     In the English case Bowman v. Bowman,5 certain general rules have been propounded as 
to what amounts to exceptional hardship or exceptional depravity. This case has been 
followed by the Madras High Court in Meghanatha v. Susheela.6 It has been laid down in that 
decision that if more than one matrimonial offences are committed, it will normally be a case 
of exceptional hardship or depravity. In case the respondent has not committed two 
matrimonial offences, but his conduct is reprehensible, or goes much beyond the matrimonial 
offence, it may again amount to exceptional hardship or exceptional depravity. 
 
 
                                                 
1    (Diwan Paras, ‘Modern Hindu Law’, Allahabad Law Agency, Faridabad (1997), p.152) 
2  (The 59th Report, Paras 2,4.) 
3   (Reynod on Divorce, cited in Meganath v. Susheela, AIR 1957 Mad 423) 
4   (Venna v. Prem, AIR 1972 Cur L J 93) 
5   ((1949) All ER 127) 
6   (AIR 1957 Mad 423) 
 165
 Remarriage After Divorce  
     Proviso to Section 15, Hindu Marriage Act as enacted originally laid down that “it shall 
not be lawful for the respective parties to marry again unless at the date of such marriage at 
least one year has elapsed from the date of the decree in the court of the first instance.” The 
High Courts expressed the view that a marriage in violation of the proviso was void.1  
     The section now lay down  “When a marriage has been dissolved by a decree of divorce 
and either there is no right of appeal against the decree or, if there be such a right of appeal, 
the time for appearing has expired without appeal, it shall be lawful for either party to 
marriage to marry again.2  
     The provision still seems to be clumsy. It should be clearly laid down that if appeal has 
been made (including an appeal to the Supreme Court by special leave) to an appellate court, 
the parties are not free to marry again till the disposal of the appeal. Recently, in Chandra 
Mohini v. Avnash Prasad,3 the Supreme Court said that the Section applies to the provision of 
special leave and the parties should wait till the disposal of the appeal to the Supreme Court 
and the marriage performed in violation of Section 15 will be void. Section 15 does not apply 
to decrees in nullity proceedings.4 
Divorce Under Muslim Law  
     Islam is perhaps the first religion in the world, which has expressly recognized the 
termination of marriage by way of divorce. In England divorce was introduced only hundred 
years back. In India among Hindus, it was allowed only by Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. Before 
the passing of this Act divorce was not recognized by Hindu Law.  Divorce among the 
ancient Arabs was easy and of frequent occurrence. In fact, this tendency has even persisted 
to some extent, in Islamic Law in spite of the fact that Prophet showed his dislike to it. It was 
regarded by the prophet to be the most hateful before the Almighty God of all permitted 
                                                 
1  (Lila v. Laxmi 1968 All LJ 683) 
2   (Section 15, Hindu Marriage Act) 
3   (AIR 1987 SC 581) 
4   (Zamboo v. Malti, AIR 1974 Cal 260) 
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things; for it prevented conjugal happiness and interfered with the proper bringing up of 
children.1  
     According to Amir Ali, the Prophet of Islam is reported to have said, “With Allah, the 
most detestable of all things permitted is divorce” and “if woman be prejudiced by a 
marriage, let it be broken off.”  
     Divorce, desertions and polygamy give sleepless nights to Muslim women. While a 
Muslim woman has to go to court to seek divorce, her husband does not even need to seek 
legal recourse for pronouncing talaq. “Under the Muslim law, there is no check, no law 
against desertions and unilateral divorce of women” says Seema M Mustafa, a women’s 
rights activists and journalists demanding that divorce should not be allowed without the 
wife’s consent.2 A two-day conference on “Challenges before Humanity in the 21st Centuary” 
at Jamia Hamdard, which was attended by a galaxy of Muslim intellectuals, declared that the 
sole reason of Muslim backwardness was triple talaq and polygamy phenomena.3 
Talak: Meaning 
     Talaq is an act of repudiation of marriage by the husband in exercise of his power, which 
has been conferred on him. The term divorce includes all separation s for causes originating 
from the husband.4  
     Talaq in its original sense means repudiation or rejection but under Muslim Law, it means 
a release from the marriage tie, immediately or eventually. It is a generic name for all kinds of 
divorce; but is particularly applied to the repudiation by or on behalf of husband. In 
Moonshee Buzloor Rahim v. Lateefutoon Nisa,5 it was said that under Muslim law talaq is the 
mere arbitrary act of a Muslim husband who may repudiate his wife at his own pleasure with 
or without cause. He can pronounce the talaq at any time. It is not necessary for him to obtain 
the prior approval of his wife for the dissolution of his marriage. 
A. Divorce by Husband   
                                                 
1   (Ahmad Aqil, ‘Mohammadan Law’, Central Law Agency, Allahabad (1997), p.99) 
2    (“Codify Shariah to stop Divorce, Desertions” published in Hindustan Times dated 09-7-200) 
3   (“Triple Talaq, Ploygamy bane of Muslims”, published in Hindustan Times dated 01-4-2001) 
4   (Ali Khan v. Jafar Hussain, AIR 1932 Oudh 34 at 38) 
5   (8 MIA 397) 
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The contract of marriage under the Mohammedan law may be dissolved in any one of the 
following ways: (1) by the hyusband at his will, without the intervention of a Court; (2) by 
mutual consent of the husband and wife, without the intervention of a Court; (3) by a judicial 
decree at the suit of the husband or wife.1  
  Capacity For Divorce.   Any Mahomedan of sound mind, who has attained puberty, may 
divorce his wife whenever he desires without assigning any cause.2  
Oral or Written Talak.  A talak may be effected orally (by spoken words) or by a written 
document called talaknama.3 No particular form of words is prescribed for effecting a talak. If 
the words are express (Saheeh) or well understood am implying divorce no proof of intention 
is required. If the words are ambiguous (Kinayat), the intention must be proved.4  It is not 
necessary that the talak should be pronounced in the presence of the wife or even addressed to 
her. In a Calcutta case the husband merely pronounced the word “talak” before a family 
council and this was held to be invalid as t he wife was not named.5  
     A talaknama may only be the record of the fact of an oral talak; or it may be the deed by 
which the divorce is effected. The may be executed in the presence of the kazi6 or of the 
wife’s father or of other witnesses. The deed is said to be in the customary form if it is 
properly superscribed and addressed so as to show the name of the writer and the person 
addressed. If it is not so superscribed and addressed it is said to be in unusual form. If it is in 
customary form it is called ‘manifest’ and intention to divorce is presumed. Otherwise the 
intention to divorce must be proved. If the talaknama is customary and manifest it takes effect 
immediately even though it has not been brought to the knowledge of the wife.7 If a 
talaknama is communicated to the wife within a reasonable time, this was sufficient though it 
                                                 
1  (Mulla, ‘Principles of Mahomedan Law’, N. M. Tripathi Private Ltd. Bombay (1972) p.293) 
2   (Ahmad Kasim v. Khatun Bibi (1932) 59 Cal 833; Hedaya, 75, Baillie, 208-209) 
3   (Ma Mi v. Kallander Ammal (1927) 54 I.A. 61, 5 Rang.) 
4    (Asha Bibi v. Kadir (1909) 33 Mad) 
5   (Furzund Hussein v. Janu Bibee (1878) 4 Cal 588) 
6   (Sarabai v. Rabiabai (1905) 30 Bom 537) 
7   (Ahmad Kasim v. Khatoon Bibi (1932) 59 Cal 833) 
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si not necessary. But as in the case of an oral talak, communication may be necessary for 
certain purposes connected with dower, maintenance etc.1  
Different Modes of Talak. A talak may be effected in any of the following ways :- 
(1) Talak Ahsan. This consists of a single pronouncement of divorce made during a tuhr 
(period between menstruations) followed abstinence from sexual intercourse for the period of 
iddat. When the marriage has not been consummated, a talak in the ahsan form may be 
pronounced even if the wife is in her menstruation. Where the wife has passed the age for 
periods of menstruation the requirement of a declaration during a tuhr is inapplicable ; 
furthermore, this requirement only applies to an oral divorce and not a divorce in writing.2  
(2) Talak hasan.  This consists of three pronouncements made during successive tuhrs, no 
intercourse taking place during any of the three tuhrs. The first pronouncement should be 
made during a tuhr, the second during the next tuhr, and third during the succeeding tuhr.3  
(3) Talak-ul-bidaat or Talak-I-badai.  This consists of – (i) three pronouncements made 
during a single tuhr either in one sentence, e.g., “I divorce thee thrice,” or in separate 
sentences, e.g., “I divorce thee, I divorce thee, I divorce thee”4; or  (ii) a single 
pronouncement made during a tuhr clearly indicating an intention irrevocably to dissolve the 
marriage, e.g., “I divorce thee irrevocably”.5  
When Talak Becomes Irrevocable. 6 
(i)A talak in the ahsan mode becomes irrevocable and complete on the expiration of the 
period of iddat  
(ii) A talak in the hasan mode becomes irrevocable and complete on the third pronouncement, 
irrespective of the iddat. 
                                                 
1   (ibid) 
2   (Chandbi v. Bandesha 1961 A.B. 121) 
3   (Mulla, ‘Principles of Mahomedan Law’, N.M. Tripathi Pvt. Ltd. Bombay (1972) p.297) 
4   (Sarabai v. Rabiabai (1905) 30 Bom 537) 
5   (ibid) 
6  (Hedaya, 72-73 ; Baillie, 206-207, 226) 
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(iii) A talak in the badai mode becomes irrevocable immediately it is pronounced, irrespective 
of the iddat.1 As the talak becomes irrevocable at one, it is called talak-I-bain, that is 
irrevocable talak. 
     Until a talak becomes irrevocable, the husband has the option to revoke it, which may be 
done either expressly, or implied as by resuming sexual intercourse.2  
     In the absence of words showing a different intention, a divorce in writing operates as an 
irrevocable divorce (talak-I-bain), and takes effect immediately on its execution.3  
Talaq by Tafweez (Delegation of Power).  Although the power to give divorce belongs 
primarily to the husband, he may delegate the power to the wife or to a third person, either 
absolutely or conditionally, and either for a particular period or permanently. The person to 
whom the power is thus delegated may then pronounce the divorce accordingly. A temporary 
delegation of the power is irrevocable, but a permanent delegation may be revoked. The 
husband may in person repudiate his wife, or he may delegate the power of repudiating her to 
a third party, or even to the wife and such a delegation of power is called tafweez.4  
Stipulation by wife for Right  of Divorce.  An agreement made, whether before or after 
marriage, by which it is provided that the wife should be at liberty to divorce herself in 
specified contingencies is valid, if the conditions are of a reasonable nature and are not 
opposed to the policy of the Mahomedan law. When such an agreement is made, the wife 
may, at any time after the happening of any of the contingencies, repudiate herself in the 
exercise of the power, and a divorce will then take effect to the same extent as if a talak had 
been pronounced by the husband.5  
                                                 
1   (Rashid Ahmad v. Anisa Khatun (1932) 59 I.A.)   
2   (Hedaya, 103-104 ; Baillie, 287-288) 
3   (Sarabai v. Rabiabai (1905) 30 Bom. 537) 
4  (Baillie, 238, in Mulla, ‘Principles of Mahomedan Law’, N.M. Tripathy Pvt. Ltd., Bombay (1972) 
p.299) 
5   (Hamidoola v. Faizunnisa (1882) 8 Cal 327; Safiudddin Sekh v. Mst. Soneka Bibi (1955) Assam I) 
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Talak under Compulsion.   If the words of divorce used by the husband are “express”, the 
divorce is valid even if it was pronounced under compulsion,  or in a state of voluntary 
intoxication, or to satisfy his father or some one else.1 
Ila.  Divorce by Ila is a species of constructive divorce which is effected by abstinence from 
sexual intercourse for the period of not less than four months pursuant to a vow. According to 
Shafei law, the fulfillment of such a vow does not per se operate as a divorce, but gives the 
wife the right to demand a judicial divorce.2  
Zihar.  Zihar is a form of inchoate divorce. If the husband compares his wife to his mother or 
any other female within prohibited degrees the wife has a right to refuse herself to him until 
he has performed penance. In default of expiation by penance the wife has the right to apply 
for a judicial divorce. Cases of zihar are unknown in India and it has been doubted by text 
book writers whether the wife’s rights under zihar would be enforced by Courts in India. But 
the law of zihar has now received statutory recognition.3  
Khula and Mubara’at.  A marriage may be dissolved not only by talak, which is the 
arbitrary act of the husband, but also by agreement between the husband and wife. A 
dissolution of marriage by agreement may take the form of Kulha or Mubara’at. 
     “ A divorce by Khoola is a divorce with the consent, and at the instance of the wife, in 
which she gives or agrees to give a consideration to the husband for her release from the 
marriage tie. In such a case the terms of the bargain are matters of arrangement between the 
husband and wife, and the wife may, as the consideration, release her dyn-mahr (dower) and 
other rights, or make any other agreement for the benefit of the husband.”4 Failure on the part 
of the wife to pay the consideration for the divorce does not invalidate the divorce though the 
husband may sue the wife for it.5  
                                                 
1   (Mulla, ‘Principles of Mahomedan Law’, N.M. Tripathi Pvt. Ltd., Bombay (1972), pp.301-302; 
Hedaya, 75, 76; Baillie, 208-210) 
2   (Baillie, 296-304; Hedaya, 109; Sura XXXIII and Sura LVIII of Koran) 
3   (Section 2 of the Shariat Act, 1937) 
4   (Monshee Buzul-ul-Raheem v. Luteefutoon-Nisa (1861) 8 M.I.A. 379, 395) 
5   (ibid) 
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     A Khula divorce is effected by an offer from the wife to compensate the husband if he 
releases her from his marital rights, and acceptance by the husband of the offer. Once the 
offer is accepted, it operates as a single irrevocable divorce (talak-I-bain), and its operation is 
not postponed until execution of the Khulanama.1  
     A Mubara’at divorce like khula is dissolution of marriage by agreement, but there is a 
difference between the origins of the two. When the aversion is on the side of the wife, and 
she desires a separation, the transaction is called Khula. When the aversion is mutual, and 
both the sides desire a separation, the transaction is called mubara’at. The offer in a 
mjubara’at divorce may proceed from the wife, or it may proceed from the husband, but once 
it is accepted, the dissolution is complete, and it operates as a talak-I-bain as in the case of 
khula.2  
     ‘Khoola’ means to put off, as a man is said to khoola his garment when he puts it off. In 
law it is the laying down by a husband of his right and authority over his wife for an 
exchange.3  Mubara’at means mutual release. 4 
     A muslim marriage may be dissolved by pronouncing talak. It may also be dissolved by an 
agreement between the husband and wife. When it is the latter it is known as khula.5 
     Unless it is otherwise provided by the contract, a divorce effected by khula or mubara’at 
operates as a release by the wife of her dower, but it does not affect the liability of the 
husband to maintain her during her iddat, or to maintain his children by her.6  
Apostasy from Islam.  Before the Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act, 1939, apostasy 
from Islam of either party to a marriage operated as a complete and immediate dissolution of 
the marriage.7  
     Under Section 4 of the Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act, 1939, however, mere 
renunciation of Islam by a married woman or her conversion to any other religion cannot by 
                                                 
1   (ibid) 
2   (Mulla, ‘Principles of Mahomedan Law’, N.M. Tripathi Pvt. Ltd., Bombay (1972), p.304) 
3   (Baillie, 306; Hedaya, 112) 
4  (Baillie, 306; Hedaya, 116) 
5   ( Ghansi Bibi v. Ghulam Dastagir (1968) I Mys. L.J. 566) 
6   (Baillie, 306-307; Hedaya, 116) 
7   (Sarwar Yar Khan v. Jawahar Devil 1964 (i) Andh. W.R. 60) 
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itself operate to dissolve her marriage but she may sue for dissolution on any of the grounds 
mentioned in Section 2 of the Act.  
     Section 4 only applies to the case of apostasy from Islam of a married Muslim woman, and 
apostasy of the Muslim husband would still operate as a complete and immediate dissolution 
of the marriage.1 
     The provisions of Section 4, however, do not apply to a woman converted to Islam from 
some other faith, who re-embraces her former faith.2 In such a case, the law as it stood before 
the Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act, 1939, will apply, and the conversion will operate as 
a dissolution of the marriage.3   
     Apostasy from Islam of the Husband operates as a complete and immediate dissolution of 
the marriage.4 
B – Judicial Divorce at Suit of Wife 
     The Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act, 1939 was passed in order to consolidate and 
clarify the provisions of Muslim law relating to suits for dissolution of marriage by women 
married under Muslim law and to remove doubts as to the effect of the renunciation of Islam 
by a married Mulsim woman on her marriage tie. The Act lays down the following grounds of 
divorce: (1) the whereabouts of the husband are unknown for a period of four years; (2) 
failure of husband to provide for maintenance of the wife for a period of two years; (3) 
sentence of imprisonment on husband for period of seven years; (4) failure without 
reasonable cause to perform marital obligations; (5) impotence of husband; (6) insanity of 
husband; (7) repudiation of marriage by wife; (8) cruelty of husband; and (9) any other 
grounds recognized by Mulsim law.5 
     Section 4 of the Act deals with the effect of the apostasy from Islam of a married Muslim 
woman. It is submitted that the grounds are independent of each other, and on proof of any 
one of them, a decree for dissolution of marriage can be made.  
                                                 
1   (Iqbal Ali v. Mt. Halima (1939) All 296) 
2   (Section 4 proviso 2, Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act, 1939) 
3  (Sarwar Yar Khan v. Jawahar Devil 1964 (i) Andh. S.R. 60) 
4   (ibid) 
5    (Section 2, The Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act, 1939) 
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Absence of Husband. The wife is entitled to obtain a decree for the dissolution of her 
marriage if the whereabouts of the husband have not been known for a period of four years; 
but a decree passed on this ground will not take effect for a period of six months from the 
date of such decree, and if the husband appears either in person or through an authorized 
agent within that period and satisfies the Court that he is prepared to perform his conjugal 
duties, t he Court must set aside the decree.1  
Failure to Provide Maintenance.  The wife is entitled to obtain a decree for the dissolution 
of her marriage if the husband has neglected or has failed to provide for her maintenance for a 
period of two year.2  
     Failure to maintain the wife need not be willful. Even if the failure to provide for her 
maintenance is due to poverty, falling health, loss of work, imprisonment or to any other 
cause, the wife would be entitled to divorce. Mere inability of the husband to maintain his 
wife is no longer a ground for refusing a divorce.3  The wife’s suit for divorce was dismissed 
as it was found that she was neither faithful nor obedient to her husband.4 So also was the 
wife’s suit dismissed where the wife, who lived separately, was not ready and willing to 
perform her part of marital duties.5  
     The Bombay High Court has held that though there is no provision in the Dissolution of 
Muslim Marriage Act, 1939, for obtaining divorce by consent of both the parties, by not 
refuting the allegations made by the wife in the plaint with respect to cruelty and neglect and 
by filing consent terms inter alia for the maintenance of the children, the defendant is deemed 
to have accepted all the allegations made against him and and therefore, the decree is actually 
deemed to have been passed under Section 2(ii) of the Dissolution of Muslim Marriage Act, 
1939. Moreover, the Court cannot and should not show leniency to a father who does not care 
for the welfare of his children.6  
                                                 
1    (Section 2(i) read with proviso (b) of the Dissolution of Muslim Marriage Act, 1939) 
2   (Section 2(ii), Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act, 1939) 
3   (Manak Khan v. Mt. Mulkhan, 1941 A.L. 167) 
4   (Mt. Khatijan v. Abdulla (1942) Kar. 535) 
5   (Jamila Khatun v. Kasim Ali 1951 A.N. 375) 
6   (Rukhsana Saifuddin Kachwala & Ors. V. Saifuddin Fakhruddin Kachwala, (2002) 2 Femi-Juris 
C.C. 257(A) (Bom) 
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Imprisonment of Husband.  The wife is entitled to obtain a decree for the dissolution of her 
marriage if the husband has been sentenced to imprisonment for a period of seven years or 
upwards, but no decree can be passed on this ground until the sentence has become final.1  
Failure to perform Marital Obligations .  The wife is entitled to obtain a decree for the 
dissolution of her marriage if the husband has failed to perform without reasonable cause his 
marital obligations for a period of three years.2 
Impotence of Husband.  The wife is entitled to obtain a decree for the dissolution of her 
marriage if the husband was impotent at the time of the marriage and continues to be so; but 
before passing a decree on this ground the Court is bound, on application by the husband, to 
make an order requiring the husband to satisfy the Court within a period of one year from the 
date of such order that he has ceased to be impotent, and if the husband so satisfies the Court 
within such period, no decree can be passed on the ground of his impotence.3  
Insanity of Husband.  The wife may obtain a decree for the dissolution of her marriage if the 
husband has been insane for a period of two years or is suffering from leprosy or a virulent 
veneral disease.4  
Cruelty of Husband.  The wife is entitled to a decree for the dissolution of her marriage if 
the husband treats her with cruelty, that is to say: (a) habitually assaults her or makes her life 
miserable by cruelty of conduct even if such conduct does not amount to physical 
illtreatment; or (b) associates with women of even repute or leads an infamous life; or (c) 
attempts to force her to lead an immoral life; or (d) disposes of her property or prevents her 
exercising her legal rights over it; or (e) obstructs her in the observance of her religious 
profession or practice ; or (f) if he has more wives than one, does not treat her equitably in 
accordance with the injunctions of Quran.5  
                                                 
1   (Section 2(iii) read with proviso (a), Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act, 1939) 
2    (Section 2(iv), Dissolution of Muslim Marriage Act, 1939; Said Ahmad v. Sultan Bibi (1943) A. 
Pesh 73) 
3   (Section 2(v) read with proviso (c), Dissolution of Muslim Marriages, Act, 1939) 
4   (2(vi), Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act, 1939) 
5   (Section 2(viii), Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act, 1939) 
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     Where a husband has gone out of India leaving two wives in India, and he provides 
maintenance for one and not for the other, that amounts to inequality of treatment and the 
case falls under this clause.1  
     Property in the sense of a substantial portion of a wife’s property and its disposal in the 
sense of getting rid of that property not for the wife’s benefit but for the selfish ends of the 
husband not with the object of meeting a pressing need but more in the sense of waste and 
this also when done with the object of depriving the wife of her property and not with her 
consent.2 
Grounds of Dissolution recognized by Mahomedan Law.  The wife is entitled to a decree 
for the dissolution of her marriage on any other ground, which is recognized as valid for the 
dissolution of marriages under Muslim law.3 Incompatibility of temperaments and hatred of 
the wife for her husband are not recognized by Muslim law as grounds of divorce.4  
Li’an or imprecation.  Li’an is testimony confirmed by oath and accompanied with 
imprecation.  Under the pure Mahomedan law, if a man charges his wife with adultery, he 
may be called upon, on the application of the wife, either to retract the charge or to confirm it 
by oath coupled with an imprecation in these terms: “The curse of God be upon him if he was 
a liar when he cast at her the charge of adultery”.5  
     The wife is entitled to sue for a divorce on the ground that her husband has falsely charged 
her with adultery (Li’an). She must file a regular suit for dissolution of her marriage as a 
mere application to the Court is not the proper procedure.6  If the charge is proved to be false, 
she is entitled to a decree, but not if it is proved to be true.7 A charge of adultery does not of 
itself terminate the marriage. The marriage continues until the decree is passed.8  
                                                 
1    (Mt. Umat-ul-Hafiz v. Talib Hussein (1945) A.L. 56) 
2   (Zubaida Begum v. Sardar Shah (1943) 219 I.C. 587; (1943) A.L. 310) 
3   (Section 2(ix) of the Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act, 1939) 
4   (Umar Bibi v. Mohammad Din (1944) Lah 542) 
5   (Mulla, ‘Principles of Mahomedan Law’, N.M. Tripathi Pvt. Ltd., Bombay, (1972(p.315) 
6   (Ayesha Bibi v. Abdul Gani (1934) 59 Cal L.J. 466) 
7   (Zafar Hussain v. Ummat-ur-Rahman (1919) 41 All. 278, 49 I.C. 256)   
8   (Jaun Beebee v. Beparee (1865) 3 W.R. 93) 
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     A retraction of the charge by the husband at or before the commencement of the hearing 
disentitles the wife to a decree, but she is entitled to a decree if the retraction is made after the 
close of the evidence or of the trial.1   
C – Effects of Divorce 
     The following rights and obligations arise on the completion of a divorce, whatever may 
be the mode of divorce: - 
(1) Right to Contract Another Marriage.  If the marriage was consummated, the wife 
may marry another husband after the completion of her iddat; if the marriage was not 
consummated, she is free to marry immediately and no iddat of divorce. If the marriage was 
consummated, and the husband had four wives at the date of divorce including the divorced 
wife, he may marry another wife after completion of the iddat of the divorced wife.2 
(2) Dower Becomes Immediately Payable.  If the marriage was consummated, the wife 
is entitled to immediate payment of the whole of the unpaid dower, both prompt and deferred. 
If the marriage was not consummated, and the amount of dower was specified in the contract, 
she is entitled to half that amount.3  If no amount was specified all that she is entitled to is a 
present of three articles of dress. 
(3) Mutual Rights of Inheritance Cease.  Either party is entitled to inherit from the other 
until the divorce becomes irrevocable. Immediately the divorce becomes irrevocable, mutual 
rights of inheritance cease, except where the divorce was pronounced during the husband’s 
death-illness, in which case the wife’s right to inherit continues until the expiry of her iddat, 
unless she was repudiated at her own request.4  
(4) Cohabitation Becomes Unlawful.  Sexual intercourse between the divorced couple is 
unlawful after the divorce has become irrevocable. The offspring of such an intercourse is 
illegitimate, and cannot be legitimated by acknowledgement.5  
                                                 
1   (Ahmed v. Bai Fatma (1931) 55 Bom 160, 128 I.C. 909) 
2   (Hedaya, 128, 32; Baillie, 350-351, 34-35 in Mulla, ‘Principles of Mahomedan Law’, N.M. Tripathi 
Pvt. Ltd., Bombay (1972) p.317) 
3   (Tajbi v. Nattar Sherif (1940) 2 M.L.J. 345) 
4   (Sarabai v. Rabiabai (1905) 30 Bom 537, 547-548) 
5  (Rashid Ahmad v. Anisa Khatun (1932) A.P.C. 20) 
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(5) Remarriage of Divorced Couple.  (i) Where the husband has repudiated his wife by 
three pronouncements, it is not lawful for hims to marry her again until she has married 
another man, and the latter has divorced her or died after actual consummation of the 
marriage. The presumption of marriage arising from an acknowledgement of legitimacy does 
not apply to a remarriage between divorced persons unless it is established that the bar to 
remarriage created by the divorce was removed by proving an intermediate marriage and a 
subsequent divorce after actual consummation.1 Even if a remarriage between the divorced 
persons is proved, the marriage is not valid unless it is established that the bar to remarriage 
was removed; the mere fact that the parties have remarried does not raise any presumption as 
to the fulfillment of the above conditions.2  A marriage without fulfillment of the above 
conditions is irregular, not void.3  
(ii) In all other cases, the divorced parties may remarry as if there had been no divorce either 
during the iddat or after its completion.4 
 
Divorce Under The Indian Divorce Act, 1869 
 
     In marital relief and divorce among the Christians is governed by the Indian Divorce Act, 
1869/ The Act is applicable where both the petitioner and respondent profess Christian 
religion.5 
When Husband may petition for Dissolution of Marriage.  Any husband may present a 
petition to the District Court or to the High Court, praying that his marriage may be dissolved 
on the ground that his wife has, since the solemnization thereof, been guilty of adultery.6  
                                                 
1    (ibid) 
2   (Akhtaroon-nisa v. Sharintoollah (1867) 7 W.R. 268) 
3   (Baillie, 151) 
4   (Mulla. ‘Principles of Mahomedan Law’, N.M. Tripathi Pvt. Ltd., Bombay  (1972) p.319) 
5   (Section 2, The Indian Divorce Act, 1869) 
6   (Section 10, The Indian Divorce Act, 1869) 
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When Wife may Petition for Dissolution of Marriage.  (Section 10, The Indian Divorce 
Act, 1869)  Any wife may present a petition to the District Court or to the High Court, 
praying that her marriage may be dissolved on the ground that: -- 
(a) the husband has changed his religion from Christianity to some other religion and has 
gone through a form of marriage with another woman; or 
(b) the husband has been guilty of ‘incestuous adultery’. ‘Incestuous adultery’ means adultery 
committed by a husband with a woman with whom, if his wife were dead, he could not 
lawfully contract marriage by reason of her being within the prohibited degrees of 
consanguinity (whether natural or legal) or affinity.1 Consanguinity refers to blood 
relationship. The extent of prohibited degrees of consanguinity has not been defined. 
Similarly, affinity also refers to relationship outside blood relationship but the extent of 
prohibited degree of relationship has not been clearly stated;2 or 
(c) the husband is guilty of “bigamy with adultery”. Bigamy with adultery means “adultery 
with the same woman with whom bigamy was committed.”3 A person is said to commit 
bigamy when he marries again with a spouse living. Adultery means having sexual 
intercourse with a person of the opposite sex where one of them is married. ; or 
(d) the husband is guilty of marriage with another woman with adultery.  “Marriage with 
another woman” means “marriage of any person, being married, toady other person, during 
the life of the former wife, whether the second marriage shall have taken place with India or 
elsewhere.4 In other words, contracting of another marriage by the husband, while the first 
wife is living, would be covered here; or 
(e) the husband is guilty of rape, sodomy or bestiality. ; or 
(f) the husband is guilty of adultery coupled with such cruelty as without adultery would be 
enough to entitle the woman to what is known as divorce a mensa et toro or what would 
amount to judicial separation; or 
(g) the husband is guilty of desertion, without reasonable excuse, for two years or more.  
                                                 
1   (Sections 3(6), The Indian Divorce Act, 1869)   
2   (Srivastava T.N., ‘Woman and The Law’, Intellectual Publishing House, New Delhi (1985) p.96) 
3   (Section 3(7), The Indian Divorce Act, 1869) 
4   (Section 3(8), The Indian Divorce Act, 1869) 
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Every decree for dissolution of marriage made by a District Judge shall be subject to 
confirmation by the High Court. Provided that no decree shall be confirmed under this section 
till after the expiration of such time, not less than six months from the pronouncing thereof, as 
the Hingh Court by general or special order from time to time directs.1  
Scope of Section 10, The Indian Divorce Act, 1869   
     Under provisions of Section 10 the husband is entitled to a dissolution of marriage on the 
ground of the wife’s adultery, but the wife is not so entitled unless she proves that the 
husband’s adultery is coupled with cruelty, bigamy or desertion. Thus the provision is 
discriminatory on the ground of sex alone and would be ultra vires Art.15 of the Constitution. 
Any discrimination on the ground of any liability, inability, disability or incapacity of women 
resulting from the peculiarities of their sex would amount to discrimination on the ground of 
sex alone.2 
     Wife finding her husband lying with another woman in same bed, wife was tortured, 
assaulted and not provided with food. Husband is guilty of adultery and cruelty. Cruel 
treatment by husband, wife and child not provided with food and maintenance. Wife leaving 
matrimonial home, in these circumstance it was held that wife was deserted by husband.3  
     Wife was taken to Dhamam in Saudi Arabia. Wife’s letter written to her father showing 
that when they landed at Saudi Arabia, husband left for gambling and came next day early 
morning. Husband used to lock the house from outside when he goes out and wife remains 
alone in house. No air conditioner or telephonic facility. Creditor from whom borrowed 
money were knocking at door demand back money. Father of wife sent money on demand 
fearing untoward happening with his daughter and her child. Wife and child sent back India. 
Thereafter there was no contact between husband and wife. Husband has not even cared to 
look after the child and provide maintenance. Wife proved the factum of non-resumption of 
                                                 
1   (Section 17, The Indian Divorce Act, 1869) 
2   (Swapna Ghosh v. Sadanand Ghosh, A.I.R. 1989 Cal I) 
3   (Swapna Ghosh v. Sadanand Ghosh, AIR 1989 Cal. I) 
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cohabitation. Wife compelled to leave Saudi Arabia because of cruel treatment of husband. 
Husband neglected and deserted the wife. Wife entitled to decree of divorce.1  
     In Ms. X v. Mr. Z & Anr. ,2 the petitioner has filed a petition for dissolution of marriage 
on the ground of cruelty and adultery against respondent No. 1 under Section 10 of the Indian 
Divorce Act. The said petition is being contested on the ground of counter-allegations of 
similar nature.   
      Respondent No. 1 contends that case of the petitioner is that respondent No.1 had 
adulterous affair with respondent No. 2 and the Respondent No. 1 on the contrary asserts that 
petitioner had adulterous affairs with one Jose Thomas. The petitioner admitted a tubular 
pregnancy, which was terminated on 30.12.1994 at All, India Institute of Medical Sciences 
and records and slides of tubular gestation of the petitioner have been kept reserved in the 
AIIMS. 
     The respondent No.1 asserts  that he is not the father of the same and seeks that a DNA 
test would establish as to who is the father of the aborted foetus. The petitioner contends that 
the courts in India under Criminal Procedure Code or under Indian Evidence Act, do not have 
the authority to order DNA test in civil and quasi-civil matters in particular, where it is to 
establish the paternity even of living child. The order of the court to conduct the DNA test 
would be in violation of the Constitutional and legal rights of the petitioner. The Delhi High 
Court held: 
“Right to privacy, though a fundamental right but cannot be taken to be an absolute right. So 
far as DNA test is concerned, foetus is not a part of body of petitioner as it has already been 
discharged from the body of petitioner and preserved in AIIMS. Petitioner cannot claim that it 
affects her right of privacy. Adultery being alleged to be one of grounds of divorce, petitioner 
cannot resist request of respondent No.1. Petitioner cannot be compelled to be a witness 
against herself. Something that she herself has discharged, probably with her consent, is 
claimed to be subjected to DNA test. It cannot be termed that petitioner has any right of 
privacy. Directions issued for conducting DNA test at the cost of respondent No.1. 
                                                 
1   (Lini Mohan John v. Mohan John, (2001) 3 Femi-Juris C.C. 312 (Ker) 
2   ((2002) 2 Femi-Juris C.C. 11 (Del) 
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     Section 10 treats Christian wives differently on the ground of religion and sex. Christian 
woman to prove adultery to put an end to marriage even if she succeeded in proving cruelty 
whereas husband can break marital bond if he succeeds in proving adultery along. Such a 
discrimination per se is violative of Arts. 14 and 15 of the Constitution.1  
Overwhelming evidence on record showing wife is living in adultery with ‘P’. Once husband 
and a witness saw them through window of house in compromising position. Wife and 
adulterer raised counter-allegations against husband. Allegations placed by wife and adulterer 
proved to be thoroughly baseless, concocted and raised with an object to save themselves 
from allegations of adultery. Passing of decree of divorce in favour of husband on drawing 
conclusions after proper appreciation of evidence cannot be interfered with.2 
4. Bigamy  
Section 494 of the Indian Penal Code lays down the law as to ‘ marrying again during the life 
of the husband or wife’.  According to this Section, whoever marries again during the life 
time of the husband or the wife shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for 
a term which may extend to seven years and shall also be liable for fine. 
     This section does not apply to any person whose marriage with such husband or wife has 
been declared void by the competent court, nor to any person who contracts a marriage during 
the life of a former husband or wife, if such husband or wife shall have been continually 
absent for seven years provided it is in the knowledge of the person with whom such marriage 
is contracted.3   
     Section 494, IPC makes punishable that marriage which under English law is known as 
‘bigamy’. This section applies to all Hindus, Christians and Parsis whether male or female. 
But in case of Muslim it applies only to females but not to males because under Muslim 
personal law a male can have four wives at a time but a female is not permitted to have more 
than one husband at one time.4  
                                                 
1   (Debra Clare Seymour v. Pradeep Arnold Seymour, (2002) 2 Femi-Juris C.C. 298(A) (Del) 
2    (Sunil Masih v. Smt. Elizabeth Daisy Masih, (2002) 1 Femi-Juris C.C. 48(A) (MP) 
3   (Exception to Section 494, Indian Penal Code) 
4   (Mishra S.N., ‘The Indian Penal Code’, Central Law Publications, Allahabad, (1997) p.546) 
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     This section declares bigamy to be a criminal offence. Its aim is to check sexual 
immorality. It warrants equality in sexual relationship and protects the woman from 
exploitation by males. The Hindu Marriage Act through Section 17 reinforces the concept of 
monogamy. Christians, Parsee, and Muslim females all are governed by rules of monogamy, 
which is a must for conjugal happiness and domestic peace.1  When a person contracts a 
second marriage while the first marriage is still subsisting, he will be guilty of bigamy if it is 
proved that the second marriage was a valid one, i.e., the ceremonies required by law or by 
custom had been actually performed.2  This section would come into play only if the second 
marriage becomes void by virtue of the fact that is had taken place in the lifetime of one of 
the spouses.3 Section 494, IPC makes no distinction on the basis of religion. It applies to 
Hindus,4 Jews and Parsees 5 and Muslim females. A Muslim wife marrying during the 
subsistence of an earlier marriage can be punished under this Section. Similar is the case of a 
Muslim, who marries a fifth time during the subsistence of four earlier marriages. A Muslim 
male who marries under the Special Marriage Act, 1954, is liable to punishment under this 
Section if he marries for the second time.6 This section applies only to those cases where the 
second marriage is void because it is performed during the lifetime of the spouse. It does not 
apply to cases where polygamous marriages are permitted. The punishment provided by this 
section cannot be evaded by pleading Islam unless the plea is found on some exemption 
recognized by law.7  To constitute the offence of bigamy under Section 494, IPC, the 
following four conditions must be fulfilled.  
(1) The Accused was Already Married. The accused must have been married to some 
person when he or she contracted second marriage. The first marriage must be a valid 
                                                 
1   (Saxena Shobha, ‘Crimes Against Women and Protective Laws’, Deep and Deep Publications,  
New Delhi (1995) p.280) 
2   (Gopal Lal v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1979 SC 713) 
3   (ibid)  
4   (Section 17 Hindu Marriage Act, 1955) Christians,  (Christian Marriage Act, 1972) 
5  (Parsee Marriage and Divorce Act, 1936) 
6   (Gogi Reddy Samby Reddy v. Gogi Reddy Jayamma, AIR 1972 AP 158)   
7   (Shiahibuddin Imbichikoya Thangal v. Ahmed Koya, 1971 KLT 68) 
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marriage it must be subsisting.1  If the first marriage is invalid or it has ceased to exist, no 
offence shall be committed by contracting a second marriage. Divorce dissolves a valid 
marriage; hence divorced persons are entitled to remarry. Under Muslim law a woman, on 
termination of her marriage either by death or divorce is required to observe iddat before 
contracting second marriage. But if she marries second time before completing her iddat she 
will not be guilty of bigamy.2  
     If the parties to the marriage happened to be Muslims and there is a contract between 
husband and wife at the time of marriage which empowers the wife to divorce herself in 
specific contingencies and she exercises that power on the happening of any one of them, the 
divorce will take effect as it is has been pronounced by the husband. No declaration from a 
Court of law would be necessary. A marriage with a girl after such a divorce is not covered 
by this section.3  
     Mens rea i.e. guilty knowledge is a necessary element of the offence under this section. 
Where an accused when he contracts the second marriage acts on the bonafide belief that his 
marital ties with his previous spouse has been severed under the deed of divorce entered into 
between the parties he is entitled to acquittal of the charge of bigamy.4  
(2) First Marriage was Valid.  For attracting the provisions of this section it is 
necessary that his or her first marriage was valid. If the first marriage is void then both partner 
are free to go through second valid marriage. The validity of first marriage shall be 
determined on the basis of the personal law to which they belong.  If the first marriage is 
voidable and a decree of nullity has not been pronounced by a competent Court of law section 
494 shall come into operation. 
(3) Both the Partners to Marriage must be Alive.   It must be established that at the time of 
second marriage, the previous valid marriage must be subsisting, that is both the partners to 
marriage must be alive.5 Under Muslim and Christian personal laws a valid marriage is 
                                                 
1   (Smt Padi v. Union of India, AIR 1963 H.P. 16) 
2   (Abdul Ghani v. Azizul Huq (1911) 39 Cal. 409) 
3   (Siraj Mian v. A Majid 1953 Cr.L.J. 1504) 
4   (Sankaran Sukumaran v. Krishnan Saraswaty 1984 Cr.L.J,. 317 Ker.) 
5   (Usman v. Budhu, AIR 1942 Sind 92) 
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terminated by death of either spouse and second marriage is permissible. Similarly under 
Hindu law, on the death of one spouse the living spouse can contract a second marriage and 
he or she will not attract the penal provision of this Section.  A marriage entered into by a 
Hindu with second wife after Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 during life time of his first wife is 
void by virtue of Section, 11 and 17 of this Act and hence subsequent marriage by wife with 
another is no offence under this section.1  
(4) The Accused married Another Person.  This Section comes into operation when the 
accused having been married once and marriage still subsisting has gone through marriage 
second time. The word ‘ marries’ used in this section means “marries by some form of 
marriage known to and recognized by the law”.  The Supreme Court has observed that these 
words must mean “whoever marries validly”. If the marriage is not a valid one according to 
the law applicable to the parties no question of its being void by reason of its taking place 
during the life of wife or the husband of the person arises. If the marriage is not a valid 
marriage it is not marriage in the eye of law.2   
          The Supreme Court has observed that in a bigamy case the essential ceremonies 
constituting second marriage must be proved. Mere admission of marriage by the accused is 
not evidence of it for the purpose of proving marriage in an adultery or bigamy case.3 If the 
second marriage is not solemnized in the form recognized by the law it would be simply an 
adulterous union.4  A second marriage during the life time of the first husband and without 
the first marriage being annulled by divorce or in some formal manner recognized by caste 
usage as equivalent to divorce is an offence under Section 494. Such a second marriage 
though recognized by custom is against public policy and cannot be recognized by the 
courts.5 
 
 
                                                 
1   (Smt Padi v. Union of India, AIR 1963 Him. Pra. 16) 
2   (Bhaurao (1965) 67 Bom. L.R. 423 S.C.) 
3      (Kanwal Ram v. The H.P. Administration, AIR 1966, SC 614) 
4   (I.L.R. (1963) Cut. 464) 
5   (Narayan v. E. AIR 1932 Mad 561) 
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Proper Form of Marriage Necessary for Conviction  
    In BhauraoShankar Lokhande and Another v. State of Maharashtra,1 the Supreme observed 
that   the word solemnization means, in connection with a marriage ‘ to celebrate the marriage 
with proper ceremonies and in due form’. merely going through the ceremonies with the 
intention that the parties be taken to be married, will not make the ceremonies prescribed by 
law or approved by any established custom.   
   In several bigamous marriages, the consent of the first wife, for remarrying is taken in 
writing. It is not worth the paper on which it is written yet in most of such cases the first wife 
feels morally bound to keep her words.   In a case the judicial magistrate of Kangra permitted 
a husband to remarry on producing the permission of the first wife in writing. The District 
Judge after knowing the case suo motu referred the case to the High Court, which quashed the 
order of the judicial magistrate holding that the consent of the wife cannot validate a 
marriage, which is prohibited by law.2  
     Alleged marriage took place in accordance with provisions of Sec 7-A, Hindu Marriage 
Act, 1955. Marriage performed in accordance with customs applicable to parties. No proof 
from both sides that ceremony of ‘saptapadi’ was an essential one to make it a valid marriage. 
Saptapadi not an essential ceremony for a valid marriage as per personal law applicable. Held, 
accused had committed offence of bigamy as it was done during subsistence of his earlier 
marriage.3 
Conversion from Hinduism.  An apostate from Hinduism is not absolved from all civil 
obligation and the matrimonial bond remains in existence. Hindu law does not recognize 
polygamous marriage, therefore, if a Hindu woman who has a living Hindu husband marries 
either a Muslim or Christian even after embracing Islam or Christianity commits bigamy.4  
Conversion from Islam.  When a person apostates from Islam his marriage comes to an end 
and the wife will not be guilty of bigamy if she goes through second marriage. However, now 
under section 4 of the Dissolution of Muslim Marriage Act, 1939, renunciation of Islam does 
                                                 
1   (AIR 1965 SC 1564) 
2   ( Santosh Kumar v. Surjit Singh, AIR 1990, HP 77) 
3   (S Nagalingam v. Sivagami, (2001) 3 Femi-Juris C.C. 15(A) SC) 
4  Badansa Rowther v. Fatima Bai, 26 M.L.J. 260) 
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not by itself operate to dissolve her marriage, after conversion she would be required to obtain 
a decree for the dissolution of her marriage on any one of the grounds mentioned in Section 2 
of the Act. 
     Husband contracted second marriage after securing an ex parte decree divorcing his 
divorcing his first wife. Husband cannot possibly be convicted for offence under Section 494, 
IPC. Subsequently ex parte decree of divorce set aside. Criminal proceeding pending against 
Husband for offence under Section 494, IPC being only an exercise of futility quashed.1  
     Accused (husband) contracted second marriage during subsistence of his first marriage. 
Complainant, being father of first wife is competent to file complaint in view of proviso © to 
Section 198(1), Cr.P.C. and complaint is maintainable.2  
The shortcomings of the laws, both procedural and substantive, relating to offences connected 
with marriage result in the culprits going scot-free.3 Bigamy is a non-cognizable offence. The 
customs relating to marriage ceremonies are so varied that uniformity is not only illusive but 
impossible. According to Shastric law Panigrahan, Vivah Homa and Saptapadi are most 
important ceremonies, which make a marriage complete and irrevocable. But the views of 
various High Courts differ from each other regarding the importance of these ceremonies.  
     The conservative attitude of the courts makes the present situation very depressing. Legal 
provisions become ineffective by a rigid interpretation. In Shanti Mani Devil v. Lingraj 
Mohanrao,4 and Godawari v. State of Maharashtra5 the court held that even without strict 
proof of the earlier marriage the provisions of Section 494 IPC can be invoked, but proof of 
lawful performance of the second marriage is essential. 
Aggravated Form of Bigamy.  Whoever commits the offence defined in the Section 494 
having concealed from the person with whom the subsequent marriage is contracted, the fact 
                                                 
1   (Krishna Gopal Divedi v. Prabha Divedi, (2002) 1 Femi –Juris C.C. 97 (SC) 
2    (Hansraj Rasewat v. Des Raj, (2002) 2 Femi-Juris C.C. 47 (A) (P&H)) 
3   ( Shivramaiyya, B : Annual Survey of India, 1981, p.317)   
4    (1982 Cr.L.J. 1567) 
5   (1985 Cr.L.J. 1472) 
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of the former marriage, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term, 
which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine.1  
     Section 495 deals with the aggravated form of bigamy. When a married man by posing 
himself as an unmarried man, induces an unsuspecting woman to become, as she thinks his 
wife, but in reality his concubine he is guilty of one of the most cruel frauds that can be 
conceived. Such a man should be punished with exemplary severity.  This offence is 
committed when the accused uses deceit in not giving the necessary information or purposely 
concealing the fact of his first marriage from his second wife. In such cases, the second wife 
honestly continues to believe herself to be legally wedded wife but she in for the greatest 
shock or her life when she realizes that she possesses no status. There are several unreported 
cases of this nature. In most of the cases the usual plea of the husband is that he married under 
parental pressure as he had no guts to accept the fact of the first marriage before his parents.2  
     In Yamunabai v. Anantrao,3 Yamunabai married Anantrao in Jun 1974. Anantrao had 
earlier married one Leelabai, who was live and with whom his first marriage was subsisting. 
The accused had deceitfully concealed the fact of the first marriage from Yamunabai, who 
lived with the accused for a week but left him on ground of ill-treatment. She filed an 
application for maintenance. Her status was precarious. It is very difficult to conclusively 
prove the fact of an earlier marriage. 
     In such cases it is mostly the poor and illiterate women who suffer. Both the wives are 
deprived of the conjugal love and happiness as well as the matrimonial home. The need of a 
roof over their head makes women reconcile to the cruel fate4 for the other course is to be on 
the street. Most of the time the natal family is unwilling to take her back the victimized wife, 
the initial sympathy fades away very fast. 
                                                 
1   (Section 494, Indian Penal Code, 1860) 
2    (Saxena Shobha, ‘Crimes against Women and Protective Laws’, Deep and Deep Publications, New  
Delhi, (1995) p.286-287) 
3   (1988) 1 SCC 530) 
4    (Vasudha Dhagamvar, “The Law protects neither the wife nor the Mistress”, Times of India, April  
24, 1988, p.9) 
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     If we are to effectively root out polygamy from this country we must amend Section 494, 
IPC and Section 17 of the Hindu Marriage Act in such a way that anyone who goes through a 
form of marriage during the life time of his or her spouse will come within the mischief of the 
offence of bigamy. At the same time last portion of the proviso to Section 50 of the Evidence 
Act should also be deleted which says  “or in prosecutions under section 494, 497 or 498 of 
the Indian Penal Code.”1  
5. Adultery  
Adultery is a flagrant violation of a woman’s dignity. The legal provisions and the social 
attitudes reinforces her subordinate status in society. She is the property of her husband and 
cannot even fight independently to regain her lost prestige.2  
Object of Section 497, IPC.  The main object of Section 497 IPC is not so much to afford 
protection to the husband or the guardian, as to inflict punishment on those who interfere with 
the sacred relationship of marriage. The restriction under the procedural law is not intended to 
afford immunity to the offender but to prevent a person unconnected with the woman from 
giving publicity to a matter which neither the husband nor the guardian is willing to agitate.3  
Adultery is an infringement of the rights of the husband. It is an anti-social and illegal act and 
any peace-loving citizen or any person of good morals would not like that adultery should be 
permitted to be indulged in before his very nose.4  
Whoever has sexual intercourse with a person who is and whom he knows or has reason to 
believe to be the wife of another man, without the consent or connivance of that man, such 
sexual intercourse not amounting to the offence of rape, is guilty of the offence of adultery, 
and shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to 
five years, or with fine or with both. In such a case the wife shall not be punishable as an 
abettor.5  
                                                 
1    (Jagdish Dixit v. Ravindra Dixit, 1991 Cr.L.J. 1697) 
2    (Saxena Shobha, “Crimes Against Women and Protective Laws, Deep and Deep Publications, New  
Delhi, (1995) p. 295) 
3   (Rathni Padyachi, in re AIR 1917, Mad. 220) 
4   (Hatim Khan v. State  AIR 1963, J & K, 56) 
5   (Section 497, The Indian Penal Code, 1860) 
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     This section punishes the offence of adultery committed with a married woman without 
the consent or connivance of her husband.  The main feature of this offence is that male 
offender alone has been made punishable.1  This offence is committed by a third person 
against a husband in respect of his wife. If an act of sexual intercourse takes place between a 
married man and an unmarried woman or with a widow or with a married woman whose 
husband consents to it, this offence shall not be deemed to have been committed.  It is not 
required for an offence under this section that the offender should know whose wife the 
woman is but he must know that she was a married woman.2  
     This section regards adultery as an infringement of the rights of the husband towards his 
wife therefore it is an offence. No court can take cognizance of this offence unless there is a 
complaint by the husband. Adultery is not an offence per se.  It is an offence only when it is 
without the consent and connivance of the husband. To sustain a conviction under this section 
the complainant must not only prove that the accused has sexual intercourse with his wife but 
also the fact that the act was done without his consent and connivance.3  
Woman must be married.  Since in an offence of adultery marriage is an ingredient, 
therefore, the fact of marriage must be established fully.4 It must be established that the 
marriage as an event took place and the parties are not simply living together. The particular 
number of witnesses must be examined to prove the fact of marriage. The evidence of the 
husband and wife that marriage between them took place is not sufficient to prove it.5  
Connivance.  Connivance is the willing consent to a conjugal offence or a culpable 
acquiescence in the course of conduct reasonably likely to lead to the offence being 
committed.6 It is an act of the mind. It implies knowledge and acquiescence. According to the 
Allahabad High Court, connivance is a figurative expression meaning a voluntary blindness 
to some present act or conduct, to something going on before the eyes or something which is 
                                                 
1   (Z.A. Aziz v. State of Bombay, AIR 1954 SC 321) 
2   (Madhub Chander Giri, (1873) 21 S.R. (Cr.) 13) 
3    (In re C.S. Subtramanian, AIR 1953, Mad. 422) 
4   (Dalip Singh v. R., AIR 1949 All 237) 
5   (Aziz Khan v. Ekram Hussain, AIR 1937 Pat. 219) 
6   (Stroud’s Judicial Dictionary, Vol.1 P. 580) 
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known to be going on without any protest or desire to disturb or interfere with it.1  Where the 
woman has been abandoned by her husband an inference of connivance cannot be drawn by a 
Court of law.2  In a case the husband was driven out from his house by his wife and the 
accused lived with her. The husband though saw this but filed complaint only after 18 months 
since cohabitation commenced. The delay in filing complaint was not explained by the 
husband, therefore, his act was held amounting to connivance.3  
Wife is not Punishable as Abettor of Adultery, A Discriminatory Offence.   Under 
Section 497, IPC, wife is not punishable as abettor because authors of the Code were of the 
view that Indian Society is of different kind which may well lead a man to pause before he 
determines to punish the infidelity of wives.4  
     This definition and the way this offence of adultery has been treated in IPC reveals the 
anti-women bias in our society. It does not confer any right on the wife to prosecute the 
husband who has committed adultery. It does not provide for punishment in cases where the 
husband has sexual relations with an unmarried woman, obviously it confers freedom upon 
husbands to be licentious by gallivanting with unmarried women since they are nobody’s 
property (the father or brothers are regarded as trustees). It has been argued that the intention 
of the legislature in framing this provision was to legislate on the offences against the sanctity 
of the matrimonial homes, but it failed to appreciate that the sanctity will be violated if either 
of the partners resorted to extra marital sex.5  
     In case of adultery by the wife, the husband is given a right not only to seek divorce but 
also to prosecute the man who had illicit relation with his wife. But when the husband 
commits the same offence the wife is not given any right to prosecute either her husband or 
his mistress. The only legal course open to wife is to seek separation after establishing the 
adultery of her husband. This is clear case of discrimination where the husband is given more 
                                                 
1    (Munir (1925) 24 ALJR 155) 
2   (Pothi Gollari v. Ghanni Mondal, AIR 1963 Orissa, 60) 
3   (ibid) 
4    (Mishra S.N., “The Indian Penal Code”, Central Law Publications, Allahabad, (1997) p. 552) 
5    (Saxena Shobha, “Crimes Against Women and Protective Laws”, Deep & Deep Publications, New  
Delhi (1995), p. 295-296) 
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than one option for protecting his matrimonial rights while denying similar options to the 
wife. Apparently the second option of prosecuting the other man is given to the husband to 
satisfy his “male ego”. On the other hand the wife is left either to brood in silence tolerating 
the immoral acts of her husband or opt for the painful decision of breaking her home. There is 
no other way for her to protect her matrimonial harmony.1    
Constitutional Validity of Section 497, IPC  
In Sowmithri Vishnu v. Union of India and another,2 “it was contended that section 497 is 
violative of Ar.14 and 15 of the Constituion on the ground that it makes an irrational 
classification between men and women in that: - 
(i) it confers upon the husband the right to prosecute the adulterer but it does not confer any 
right upon the wife to prosecute the woman with whom her husband has committed adultery; 
(ii) it does not confer any right on the wife to prosecute the husband who has committed 
adultery with another woman; and 
(iii) it does not take in cases where the husband has sexual relations with an unmarried 
woman with the result that the husbands have, as it were, a free license under the law to have 
extra marital relationship with unmarried woman. 
     But the Supreme Court rejected these arguments and held that it cannot be said that in 
defining the offence of adultery so as to restrict the class of offender to men, any 
constitutional provision is infringed. It is commonly accepted that it is the man who is seducer 
and not the woman. The court further observed that this position may have undergone some 
change over the years, that women may have started seducing men but it is for the legislature 
to take note of this transformation and amend section 497 appropriately. 
     It was further contended that since section 497 does not contain provision for hearing wife, 
therefore, it is violative of Art.21 of the Constitution i.e. freedom of personal liberty. In 
connection with this question the court observed that this section is not violative of Art. 21 
because, although this section does not contain provision for hearing of married woman with 
whom the accused is alleged to have committed adultery but if she makes an application in 
                                                 
1    (Saxena Sarojini, “Femi Juris”, India Publishing Company, Indore, (1994), p. 103-104) 
2   ((1985) Cr.L.J. 1302 S.C.) 
 192
the trial court that she should be given opportunity of being heard, she would be given that 
opportunity. Neither substantive nor adjective criminal law bars the Court from affording a 
hearing to a party which is likely to be adversely affected by the decision of the court directly 
or indirectly.” 
     Constitutional validity of Art. 14 are governed and must be read with other provisions, 
which set out the ambit of fundamental rights. Sex is a sound classification and although there 
can be no discrimination in general on that ground, the Constitution itself provides for special 
provisions in the case of women and children.  Art. 14 and 15 read together validate the 
impugned clause in Section 497, IPC.  It was also held that “be it realized that Section 497, 
IPC is so designed that a husband cannot prosecute the wife for defiling the sanctity of the 
matrimonial tie by committing adultery. Thus the law permits neither the husband of the 
offending wife to prosecute his wife nor the wife to prosecute the offending husband for 
being disloyal to her. Thus both the husband and the wife are disabled from striking each 
other with the weapon of criminal law.1  
There is no discrimination based on sex.   While the outsider who violates the sanctity of 
matrimonial home is punished and if the outsider is a woman she is not punished. There is 
thus reverse discrimination in favour of the woman rather than against her. Thus there is no 
discrimination against the woman in so far as she is not permitted to prosecute her husband. A 
husband is not permitted because the wife is not treated an offender in the eye of law. The 
wife is not permitted as Section 198(1) read with Section 198(2) does not permit her to do so. 
In the ultimate analysis the law has meted out even handed justice to both of them in the 
matter of prosecuting each other or securing the incarceration of each other. Thus no 
discrimination has been practiced in circumscribing the scope of section 198(2) and 
fashioning it so that the right to prosecute the adulterer is restricted to the husband of the 
adulteress but has not been extended to the wife of the adulterer.2  
6. Torture Against Womanhood (Wife-beating and Cruelty)  
                                                 
1    (Yusuf Abdul Aziz v. State of Bombay, AIR 1954 SC 31) 
2    (V. Ravathi v. Union of India, (1988) DMC 359) 
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The violence and cruelty against women has many facets, which are not even recognized by 
law. Cruelty and wife beating a crime, which goes, unreported. Husbands who ill-treat their 
wives do it with utter impunity because neither the police nor the public will interfere in a 
matter, which is so private. Far from being a haven of safety and security, society has become 
a cradle of violence and most the violence is directed against one of the most ‘equal’ partners, 
the wife, by her husband. The law has lagged behind to come over the problems. The law of 
Evidence does not recognize the basic fact that wives suffer from a special kind of violence of 
which only they are the victims, it occurs within the four walls of the house and cannot be 
easily proved because of the nature of the crime and the overwhelming social compulsions.1  
     For a man, beating his wife is a private privilege of marriage, a way to unload himself of 
all the angers and frustrations of his daily life, without any fear of reprisal. For a woman 
battering and ill-treatment by a husband is regarded almost like a concomitant of marriage, 
something as routine and inevitable as doing the house work, bearing children etc. Most of 
the women sincerely believe that a husband has a right to beat his wife, she is after all his 
property. It is mostly assumed that the wife must have done something to deserve the beating. 
Family members, friends and neighbours who know about domestic violence think it better to 
draw a curtain over the whole episode and leave the spouses alone to forge out a comprise or 
to forget and forgive.2  
     The Leaking of family matters out of the house was an added instigation for more severe 
beatings and cruel behaviour.  Wives do not resort to protective measures because fighting 
back results in more severe beating. It creates security problems for the victim as well as her 
relatives and there is the risk of the husband getting annoyed and the situation getting out of 
control beyond the reach of conciliatory measures.3  
     Blackstone4 has stated that the husband is empowered to correct his wife in the same 
moderation as a man is allowed to correct his apprentice or children. Blackstone’s approval 
                                                 
1    (Saxena Shobha, “Crimes Against Women and Protective Laws”, Deep and Deep Publications, New  
Delhi (1995) p. 172) 
2    (ibid) 
3   (Rajrani v. State, (1984) 2 Crime 623 (Del) 
4   (Commentaris on the Laws of England (1775) 
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“limited” a man’s right to chastise his wife with a stick no thicker in circumstance than his 
thumb, so his right came to be known in popular parlance as the ‘rule of the thumb’.  
Criminal Cruelty Under Section 498-A, IPC.  
“Whoever, being the husband or the relative of the husband of a woman, subjects such 
woman to cruelty shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three 
years and shall also be liable to fine. 
Explanation. For the purposes of this section, “cruelty” means – 
(a) any willful conduct which is of such a nature as is likely to drive the woman to 
commit suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or health (whether mental or 
physical) of the woman; or 
(b) harassment of the woman where such harassment is with a view to coercing her or any 
person related to her to meet any unlawful demand for any property or valuable security or is 
on account of failure by her or any person related to her to meet such demand.”  
Cruelty: Meaning. The term “cruelty” has been given a defined meaning in Section 498-A 
IPC under two heads. Under Clause (a) in order to constitute cruelty it is not enough that the 
conduct of the accused is willful and is officially unjust to the woman but is further necessary 
that the degree of intensity of such unjust conduct on the part of the accused is such as is 
likely to cause grave injury or danger to her life or limb or to her mental or physical health.1  
The definition of cruelty is circumscribed by the explanation. In view of clause (a) to the 
explanation, it must be a willful conduct, which postulates an abstinate and deliberate 
behaviors on the part of the offender. The conduct, besides being willful, must result in the 
likelihood of driving the woman concerned either to commit suicide, or to cause grave injury 
or danger to life, limb or health.  
Harassment for dowry also answers cruelty. When repeated demands for dowry articles and 
money on newly married bride and on her parents were made and the wife stated after her 
marriage till her death about the demand for dowry and wife’s family members collected 
                                                 
1   ((1992) 1 Crimes 850) 
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large number of dowry articles from her husband’s residence after her death, the husband and 
mother-in-law are liable to be convicted under Section 498-A, IPC. 1 
Mental Cruelty. In an agonizing case, a married woman was beaten routinely by the husband 
and the in-laws for not being able to produce a male child for six years. She had given birth to 
three daughters in the hope of begetting a son, which was not destined. She was so much 
harassed and beaten that finally she agreed to let her husband marry another girl without a 
protest. It seemed the best solution to her, at least she will have a roof over her head and the 
beatings will stop. This was her belief because most of the time the husband was annoyed 
seeing only daughters around him. He openly admitted that the worry of not having a son was 
eating him up and that he had become violent in frustration.2    
     Levelling of false allegations regarding the incapability of the wife to conceive a child by 
the husband in divorce petition would amount to mental cruelty under Section 498-A, IPC.3  
Cruelty – What Amount to.  Husband cut his wife’s tuft because of not fulfilling the 
unlawful demand by her husband. With regard this incident in the dark night in house, the 
neighbours cannot be expected to witness the cutting tuft, so the version about cutting the tuft 
is accepted even in the absence of direct evidence and conviction under Section 498-, IPC is 
confirmed.4  
     Cruelty does not necessarily mean physical chastisement. Section 498-A, IPC and Section 
113-A of the Evidence Act are of wide amplitude. Explanation appended to Section 498-A, 
IPC explains as to what cruelty means. It should not be narrowly construed so as to suggest or 
embrace acts of physical torture alone.5  
     In Vadde Rama Rao v. State of A.P.6 the accused V. Rama Rao had gone with his wife to 
the house of his father-in-law for demanding additional dowry. Father-in-law showed his 
inability to meet the demand. Thereafter husband was coming back and his wife voluntarily 
                                                 
1   (Wazir Chand v. State of Haryana, AIR 1989 SC 378) 
2   (Legal Aid Cell, case reported in November 1990 in Saxena Shobha, “Crimes Against Women and  
Protective Laws”, Deep & Deep Publications, New Delhi (1995) p. 184) 
3   (1991 Cr.L.J. 2049 (P&H) 
4   (E Srinivas v. State 1988 (2) APLJ 5 (Short notes) 
5   (Girijashankar v. State of MP, 1989 C. Cri. J. 72) 
6   (1990 Cri.L.J. 1666 (A.P.) 
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followed him. At the bus stand the accused went out for urinal and after return he found the 
deceased missing. He went even to his father-in-law’s house to inquire whether the deceased 
wife came back since she was missing. He made search with father-in-law and his relatives. 
Eventually her dead body was found in a well. It was held that from the facts and the conduct 
of the accused an offence under section 304-B is not made out because the conduct of the 
accused excluded his presence when the deceased went near the well. The prosecution has not 
succeeded in excluding the possibility of death by accident due to slip into the Koneru (well). 
Since there was ample proof of cruelty to wife for additional dowry, accused was held guilty 
under clause (b) of Section 498-A, IPC. 
     Mere demand of dowry may not be an offence under Section 4 of Dowry Prohibition Act, 
1961 but it is an offence under Section 498-A of the Indian Penal Code. For an offence under 
the Dowry Prohibition Act dowry should either be given or agreed to be given but Section 
498-A covers even mere demand for dowry as it is covered by Sub-clause (b) of explanation 
to that section.1  
     Wife was unable to do house hold work after she underwent tubectomy operation. 
Constant beatings of deceased proved by post-mortem report. Orial evidence of beating was 
confirmed by medical evidence. Beating by husband was held to cruelty. Accused was liable 
to conviction for offence of cruelty under Section 498-A, IPC.2  
Litigative Cruelty.  Cruelty was inflicted through litigative process. Malicious and vexatious 
litigation was instituted against wife out of a sense of vindictiveness. Wife was humiliated 
and tortured through execution of search warrants and seizure of personal property. It was 
held that section encompasses even such class of cruelty committed through the litigative 
process.3  
Section 498-A, 304-B, 116 and 306, IPC.   Young married lady was harassed, ill-treated and 
instigated to commit suicide. She jumped before running train, received serious injuries but 
did not die. After examining various penal provisions, accused persons were found to have 
                                                 
1    (Sankar Prasad Shaw v. State, 1991 Cri.L.J. 639 (Cal) 
2    (State of Rajasthan v. Gopal, (2001) 3 Femi-Juris C.C. 289(B) (Raj) 
3    (Smt. Madhuri Mukund Chitnis v. Mukund Martand Chitnis, 1992, Cri.L.J. 111) 
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committed offence under Section 498-A. Their conviction for offences under Sections 306, 
304-B and 116, IPC were set aside.1  
     Section 498-A and Section 306, IPC are independent and constitute different offences. 
Merely because an accused is held guilty to be punished under Section 498-A, it does not 
mean that on same evidence he must also be held guilty of having abetted the commission of 
suicide by woman concerned.2   
Constitutional Validity of Section 498-A, IPC.  In Inder Raj Malik and Others v. Mrs. 
Sumita Malik,3 it was contended that this section is ultra vires Art. 14 and Art. 20(2) of the 
Constitution. There is the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961, which also deals with similar type of 
cases, therefore, both statutes together, create a situation commonly known as double 
jeopardy. But Delhi High Court negatived this contention and held that this section does not 
create situation for double jeopardy. Section 498-A is distinguishable from Section 4 of the 
Dowry Prohibition Act because in the latter mere demand of dowry is punishable and 
existence of element of cruelty is not necessary, where as Section 498-A deals with 
aggravated form of the offence. It punishes such demands of property or valuable security 
from the wife or her relatives as are coupled with cruelty to her. Hence a person can be 
prosecuted in respect of both the offences punishable under section 4 of the Dowry 
Prohibition Act and this section. It is just a case similar to Section 5(2) of the Prevention of 
Corruption Act and Section 409, IPC. 
     Violence, which is dowry, related is viewed in a special light. Special protective laws are 
enacted in the form of Sections 304-B and 498-A to deal with it and Section 11-A and 113-B 
have been inserted in the Evidence Act to make the proof easier but no such law exists to 
facilitate proving with beatings. There are many cases where the wife is beaten mercilessly, 
harassed or even killed but dowry is not the main issue. 
                                                 
1   (Satvir Singh v. State of Punjab, (2001) 2 Femi –Juris C.C. 80 (D) (SC) 
2    (Ramesh Kumar v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2001) 3 Femi-Juris C.C. 36(F) (SC) 
3    ((1986) Cr.L.J. 1510 (Del) 
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     In Mangal Singh v. Astate of Rajasthan,1 the accused troubled, scolded and beat his wife 
because he wanted a modern wife and his present wife was quite conservative in her thinking 
in the sense that she could not be a company to him in smoking and drinking or submit to his 
demands of making a public display of their love, but she was a very decent lady. He beat her 
ruthlessly, tortured her and burnt her to death for no other reason except that she could not 
become smart and look modern. The husband thought her to be a definite hindrance in his 
getting a modern wife, so he used all cruel means, including beating and insulting to get rid of 
her when he did not succeed he killed her in the most ruthless manner. 
Matrimonial Cruelty Under Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 
     Various contributory factors like age-differential, education and employment play a 
causative role in shaping the matrimonial relation between the spouses. Follwing are some of 
the factors that amout to cruelty under Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. “Cruelty” under Hindu 
Marriage Act is simpliciter is a ground for divorce and judicial separation.2 After the 
amendment of 1976, the provision is not qualified by any limiting words. 
(1) Sex-Difficulties.  Sexual difficulties such as denial by the spouse to have sexual 
intercourse, excessive intercourse or intercourse against the will of the wife may lead to 
cruelty against the wife. In Srikant v. Anuradha,3 it was established that the failure to lead a 
sexual life was due to the inability, “incapacity and the sexual weakness of the husband.” It 
was held that it is one of “the essential and principal obligations” on the part of the husband to 
satisfy the sexual urge of his wife, which is a natural instinct. Then refusal of the husband was 
held as a failure to comply with one of the essential obligations of the marital life. It was 
observed that, “this is nothing but subjecting the respondent to disgrace and it will have 
adverse effect upon her mental condition and thereby it will adversely affect her health.4  
                                                 
1   ((1985) Cr.L.J. 602) 
2   (Section 13(1)(ia) and Section 10, Hindu Marriage Act, 1955) 
3   (AIR 1980 Kat 8) 
4   (Ibid). 
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When a sexual intercourse is not possible due to ill health of a spouse, it may not amount to 
cruelty and a refusal to undergo treatment may amount to an intentional denial of sex and 
hence it is cruelty.1  
The inability of a spouse to have conjugal intercourse may amount to ‘impotency’ under the 
Hindu Marriage Act. Impotency is one of the grounds for annulment of the marriage under 
the Act.2  Impotency is the incapacity to consummate the marriage or to have conjugal 
intercourse.3  In this case the husband was unable to consummate the marriage and the wife 
continued to be virgin till the date of her petition. The court passed a decree of annulment on 
the ground of impotency.  In a case the wife had no vagina and it was artificially constructed 
which was undersized. The court held that the husband cannot be said to have the normal 
satisfaction coming from a sexual intercourse. The wife was held to be impotent. It follows 
that incapacity for sexual intercourse or the situation where coitus is difficult or painful 
amounts to impotency.4  
Childlessness or inability to bear and beget children does not however, amount to impotency, 
Raghavchariar observes: 
    “Barrenness is said in no sense to be synonym of impotency and even the removal of  
     The genital organs cannot be said to render the wife incapable of entering into the  
     Marriage.” 5 
The carnal intercourse with a human being generally consists in penetration per anus and it is 
an offence.6 such an act may amount to cruelty against wife since any conduct of the husband, 
which causes disgrace to the wife or subjects her to a course of annoyance and indignity 
amounts to legal cruelty.7  
                                                 
1    (Jai Lal Abrol v. Sarla Devil, AIR 1978, J&K 69) 
2   (Section 12(1)(a), Hindu Marriage Act) 
3   (Usman v. Inderjit, AIR 1977 P&H 97) 
4   (Lakshmi Devi v. Babulal, AIR 1973 Raj 89) 
5   (N.R. Raghachariar’s Hindu Law 1001, Madras Law Journal Office, Madras (196) 
6   (Section 377, IPC) 
7   (Jagdish Lal v. Shyama Madan, AIR 1966, All. 150) 
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(2) Drinking or Drug Addiction.    Under the Hindu law, drunkenness is not an independent 
ground of any matrimonial relief. In Chand Narian v. Smt. Saroj1 the husband who was 
addicted to drinking used to beat the wife and insisted on her to take to non-vegetarian and 
drinking habits. It was held that more consumption of alcohol by the husband may not 
ordinarily be a reasonable excuse for the wife to withdraw from his society, but when it is 
coupled with violence it may be a sufficient justification for her refusal. It was further held 
that causing physical hurt to the wife, obstinate insistence that the wife must eat meat and 
drink wine cumulatively constitute cruelty both physical and mental. It follows that excessive 
drinking may amount to cruelty it is no more endurable to the wife.  
       (3) Age-Differential. The Hindu Marriage Act lays down the lowest age of marriage for men 
and women, which are twenty-one and eighteen years respectively.2  There is however no 
provision under the Act which prescribes the age differential of the spouses at the time of 
marriage. 
The Act, while prescribing lowest age of marriage for man and woman maintains the 
difference of three years in the age for men and women, it is conceivable that a new provision 
may be added in the Act prescribing that the age differential between the spouses should not 
be more that five years. By doing this, the likelihood of the sexual and psychological 
maladjustments between the spouses is reduced to a considerable extent. In fact, the presence 
of sexual problems between the spouses having high age differential justify such an 
amendment under the Act.3 
(4) Illiteracy or Low Education Level.  Education has an important bearing on the total 
personality of a person. In India, illiteracy or a low education level is not an independent 
ground for matrimonial reliefs. Illiteracy coupled with an act effecting the health, mental or 
physical of the spouse may amount to cruelty. In Shanta Devil v. Raghav Prakash,4 the wife 
was illiterate and used to smoke. The husband was a lecturer. The wife one day burnt the 
                                                 
1   (AIR 1975 Raj 88) 
2   (Section 5(iii), Hindu Marriage Act) 
3    (Chahar S.S., “Matrimonial Cruelty: Addition of New Species”, in  “Women and The Law:  
Problems and Prospects” ed. By R.K. Raizada, Law Department, M.D. University, Rohtak (1996) 
4   (AIR 1986 Raj 13) 
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hand written copy of husband’s thesis. The court held that the habit of smoking does not 
amount to cruelty to the husband. The act of the wife burning the thesis of her husband was 
held as an act of great cruelty and divorce was granted to the husband. 
       (5) Employment. Unemployment results in stresses in families and leads to violence between 
spouses. Unemployment per se is not cruelty under the Hindu Marriage Act, denial or inability to 
provide proper food and clothing to the wife may however, amount to cruelty.  In a case the 
husband is lethargic and does no work or refuses to work, provides no money for the household he 
commits ‘cruelty’. Referring to Goblins v. Goblins 1 it was observed: 
“If without just cause or excuse the husband or the wife persists in doing things which he or 
she will probably not tolerate and which no ordinary person will tolerate it will amount to 
cruelty. If for instance, the husband is lethargic, does no work, parasitical, selfish or callous, 
provides no money for the household or refuses to undertake paid employment to meet 
household expenses, he on the ground of cruelty is likely to meet the same fate as Gollins did 
in England.”2 It follows that refusal to work, earn or to provide money to the wife may 
amount to cruelty, as the law imposes duty on the husband to maintain his wife. 
Wife’s employment per se does not amount to cruelty despite the fact that she earns more or 
holds a more prestigious job than her husband. Wife’s refusal to leave her job and join at her 
husband’s place of residence does not amount to withdraw from his society.3  It follows that 
wife’s employment may not amount to cruelty and her refusal to resign does not tantamount 
to a withdrawal from her husband’s society so long as she is willing to visit and cohabit with 
her husband and has no intention of breaking off the marriage. 
Under the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 cruelty is nowhere defined but the judicial decisions 
have over the years, expanded the term keeping in view the changing norms of our society. 
Unjustifiable interference by one spouse in the sphere of the life of the other is one species of 
cruelty. However, no amount of legislation can eliminate these factors from marriage, they 
will remain a part of it. Law can, at best, regulate them. 
                                                 
1  ((1963) 2 All E.R. 966) 
2   (Lehar Singh Mehta, “Husband’s Incapacity to work or to provide Money a cruelty”.  AIR 1976 (J)  
101 to 102) 
3   (Swaraj Garg v. K.M. Garg, AIR 1978 Del 296) 
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CHAPTER- V 
 
EVILS RELATING TO PERSONAL LIFE 
 
1.   Rape  
      Rape is inherently one of the most brutal acts one human being can inflict upon another. 
A rapist not only violates a victims’s privacy and personal integrity, but also inevitably causes 
serious psychological as well as physical harm in the process. The long-range effect upon the 
victim’s life and health is likely to be irreparable and it is impossible to measure the harm, 
which results. Volumes have been written by victims physicians and psychiatric specialists on 
the lasting injury suffered by rape victims. Rape is not a mere physical attack it is destructive 
of the human personality. The remainder of the victim’s life may be gravely affected, and this 
in turn may have serious detrimental effect upon her husband, and any children she may have. 
Short of homicide rape is the ultimate violation of the self, victims may recover from the 
physical damage of knife or bullet wounds, or a beating with fists or a club, but recovery from 
such a gross assault on the human personality is not healed by medicine or surgery.1  
       Rape is virtually a living death for a woman yet the victim of forcible sexual intercourse 
is treated as an accomplice in a society which values chastity as the most important attribute 
of womanhood and does not hesitate to test it by subjecting the woman to the ordeal by fire 
without causing a ripple amongst the onlookers.2 A victim of rape needs sympathy and 
reassurance yet she is ostracized by the society and doubted by the courts. She is compelled to 
relieve the tragedy if she gathers enough courage to prove her innocence. This is probably 
because of our patriarchal culture, we have adhered to double standards in premarital as well 
as extra marital relationship. Transgression of these norms is condoned for men but not for 
women.3  
                                                 
1 (Sarojini Saxena, ‘Femi Juris’, pp.65-66, India Publishing Company, Indore (M.P.) (1994) 
2 (Reference to the episode in Ramayana; Rama had subjected Sita to this test, to prove her virginity 
during her captivity in Lanka) 
3 (Shobha Saxena, “Crimes Against Women And Protective Laws”, pp.52,  Deep and Deep 
Publications, New Delhi (1995) 
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       Hardly a day passes without reports in the newspaper or a magazine of a rape, assault or 
molestation having taken place both in the rural and urban areas. Rape is one of the most 
heinous offences against a woman. It is symptomatic of sexually starved society, which has 
injuriously threatened the women’s very right to liberty and personality. Women are being 
raped at work place, on the streets, in the field, in the secluded places, in their homes by the 
men who are their relatives or in-laws, or neighbours or even strangers and even in running 
trains. Teachers rape their colleagues; doctors rape their patients and nurses. Domestic 
maidservants are molested by the employers or their relatives, factory workers are forced to 
have sexual relations with their incharge/Head. Gang rapes by dacoits, rapes due to family 
disputes or during communal riots is quite common. Another horrifying incidence, is the rape 
of minor girls. Against, rape by custodians of law, namely the police, are matters of common 
knowledge. The widely shared belief that sexual harassment of women is the exclusive 
prerogative of men in the police, in military and in government is thus quite misplaced.  
     In India there is no dearth of cases on point and in particular, on rape by the policemen. Cases 
of Mathura,1  Maya Tyagi, Rameeza Bee, Suman Rani and many others are glaring example of 
custodial rape which get more attention than any other form of rape. Rape by custodians of law 
grabbed country’s collective consciousness only in the 80’s in the most infamous case of 
Mathura. It was Mathura’s judgement that shocked and outraged the sensibilities of many 
women organizations, lawyers, academicians, etc. It raised an unprecendented public outcry and 
others became the pivotal point for a demand to change the laws relating to rape. 8 March 1980, 
the ‘International Women’s Day’, was observed as ‘Anti Rape Laws Day’ by women’s groups 
all over the country. These groups tried to break down the existing myths regarding rape in 
society through leaflets, posters and public meetings. Legal experts, including women, wrote an 
open letter to the Chief Justice condemning the judgment, which ‘snuffs out all aspirations for 
protection of human rights of millions of Mathuras’ and demanded re-opening of the case.  
     The response of the Government to the campaign was prompt. The government referred the 
matter to the Law Commission of India to make a special study of the law relating to rape and 
                                                 
1 (Tukaram v. State, A.I.R. 1979 SC 185) 
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assaults on the modesty of women and related matters. In response to that request the 
Commission came out with a report1 on rape and Allied Offences….suggesting various 
amendments and reforms in The Indian Penal Code. Acting on some of the suggestions made by 
the Law Commission, the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act was brought into force in 1983, 
ostensibly to plug the loopholes of the existing laws on rape. Although the Act did not 
incorporate most of the suggestions made by the commission, nevertheless, it was at least a 
welcome step towards progressive legislation by bringing forth the key issues around the 
definition of rape, consent, burden of proof, press censorship, trial in camera, prescribing the 
minimum and maximum punishment, etc.  
     The murderer destroys only the physical body of his victim, but rapist who commit rape on 
weak and helpless women degrade their very soul.2  A woman’s life is like flower and chastity is 
its fragrance but when her life is twisted by the devils, fragrance is being lost.3  
(1) Definition of Rape 4 
     A man is said to commit “rape” who, except in the case hereinafter excepted, has sexual 
intercourse with woman under circumstances falling under any of the six following description: 
First – Against her will. 
Secondly – Without her consent. 
Thirdly – With her consent, when her consent has been obtained by putting her or any person in 
whom she is interested in fear of death or of hurt.  
Fourthly – With her consent, when the man knows that he is not her husband that her consent is 
given because she believes that he is another man to whom she is or believes herself to be 
lawfully married. 
Fifthly – With her consent, when, at the time of giving such consent, by reason of unsoundness 
of mind or intoxication or, the administration by him personally or through another of any 
                                                 
1 (LCI, 84th Report on Rape and Allied Offences: Some Questions of Substantial Law, Principle and 
Evidence, 1980) 
2(The Rape on Women by J.B. Kripalani quoted in Saxena S., ‘Femi Juris’ India Publishing Comp any, 
Indore (1994), p.75)  
3 (Obiter in Babul Bora v. State (Law Court Report), The Assam Tribune June 24, 1985) 
4 (Section 375, Indian Penal Code, 1860) 
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stupefying or unwholesome substance, she is unable to understand the nature and consequence 
of that to which she gives consent. 
Sixthly – With or without her consent, when she is under sixteen years of age. 
Explanation – Penetration is sufficient to constitute the sexual intercourse necessary to the 
offence of rape. 
Exception – Sexual intercourse by a man with his wife, the wife not being under fifteen years of 
age, is not rape. 
Against Her Will. Clause 1 of this section operates where the woman is in possession of her 
sense and therefore, capable of consenting. It was held in State of Maharashtra v. M.N. 
Mardikar,1 that the right of privacy is included in right to live as guaranteed by Article 21 of the 
constitution and a woman of easy virtue is entitled to privacy as and when she likes. She is fully 
entitled to protect her person if an attempt is made to violate it against her wish.  
      In the Penal Code a distinction is drawn between an act which is done “against the will” and 
an act done “without the consent” of a person. Every act done “against the will” of a person, no 
doubt, is done “without her consent”, but an act done without the consent of a person is not 
necessarily against her will which expression imports that the act is done in spite of the 
opposition of a person to the doing of it.2  Actual violence is necessary so long as the woman’s 
will to resist is overpowered, for example, drugging her into a state of insensibility, coercing her 
into submission by fear or intimidation or, as already mentioned, by personating her husband. In 
the other words, the act must be against the will of the female by overcoming such resistance as 
she offers. But where the woman is physically incapable of offering resistance force done not 
require to be proved. 3 
Without Her Consent. Consent is an act of reason accompanied with deliberation after the mind 
has weighed, as in a balance, the good and evil on each side.4  Consent denotes an active will in 
the mind of a person to permit the doing of the act complained of. 5A woman is said to consent 
                                                 
1 (A.I.R. 1991 SC 207) 
2(Reg. V. Fletcher (1859) 8 Cox CC 131)  
3 (1938) All ER 307 CCA) 
4 (1958 Cr L J 563) 
5 (1990 (i) Crimes 261 (Ker) 
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only when she freely agrees to submit herself, while in free and unconstrained possession of her 
physical and moral power to act in a manner she wanted. Consent implies the exercise of a free 
and untrammeled right to forbid or withhold what is being consented to; it is always a voluntary 
and conscious acceptance of what is proposed to be done by another and concurred in by the 
former. 1 
     In a case the victim of rape was an attractive girl of 19 years. On the evening of 18-4-57, the 
accused was entertaining Deputy Superintendent, Jail on the eve of his transfer. He required one 
K to send his wife for the carnal pleasure of himself and his guests. K who had a very humble 
station in life, after initial protests, was induced to provide his wife to satisfy the carnal lust of H 
and his guests. The girl protested vehemently against this outrageous demand, but under pressure 
of her husband, she was induced to surrender her chastity. It was alleged that H and his guests 
ravished her during the night and she died almost immediately. It was also alleged that her 
shrieks were heard by some advocates living in the neighborhood. It was contended in defence 
that the girl was a consenting party and she surrendered her body to the three persons willingly 
and with the approval and at the bidding of her husband. The contention was replied by Tak 
Chand, J. as under:  “After such verval resistance as Kalu Ram could offer had been overcome, 
his wife indignantly refused to submit to the indecent proposal conveyed to her through her 
husband. It is said that under the husband’s pressure, she, after vehement protestations resigned 
herself to the disgrace that awaited her. There is also the material with the prosecution that her 
shrieks perceived through the walls of the room and were heard by some advocates living in the 
neighborhood just before her voice was finally and fatally silenced, such a submission on her 
part cannot be called, by any stretch of language, consent.”2   
     A willing girl is bound to resist an attempted rape and will not yield her body to a stranger 
without a struggle. Resistance and consequent injuries on her person is to be looked into, to 
negative consent. Consent or compulsion is to be judged on a consideration of the victims 
                                                 
1 (AIR 1967 Raj 159) 
2 (1958 Cr L J 563: AIR 1958 Punj 123) 
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statement, other corroborative evidence and attendant circumstances following the act of sexual 
intercourse.1  
     Submission without resistance is not necessarily tantamount to consent. If a woman, in an 
advanced state of pregnancy offers no resistance, consent cannot be inferred. If non-resistance 
proceeds from her being overpowered by actual force or from her not being able to resist any 
longer, or from the number of persons attacking her she considers resistance dangerous or 
absolutely useless the crime is completed.2  It was held in Idan Singh v. State of Rajasthan 3 that 
it is too much to hold that whenever the prosecutrix is found to have sustained no visible injury 
consent on her part should be presumed. But where the allegation was that the act was done on 
rough ground, the absence of any scratch or visible injury was held to suggest that the sexual 
intercourse was not forcible. Absence of injury cannot always be sine quo non of consent. The 
passive submission may be due to several forces. There is a guilt of difference between consent 
and submission. Mere act of submission does not involve consent. The surrounding 
circumstances, the previous or contemporaneous acts and conduct have to be looked into.4  
     While the accused was ringing the woman back after committing rape on her, she asked for 
some money and from this an argument was advanced that even if sexual intercourse had taken 
place it must be with the consent of the woman. The High Court did not agree with the argument 
and held that any subsequent request for money, even if true, will not mean the consent of the 
woman concerned.5  A prostitute can be raped,6 and it is no excuse that woman was a prostitute, 
for like any other woman she is entitled to the protection of the law and may not be forced but 
the defendant may cross examine the prosecutrix, and may, if she denies it, call evidence in 
rebuttal to show that she is a prostitute as tending to show that she consented.7  When a charge of 
rape is made by a prostitute it is justly received with suspicion and the case is narrowly 
scrutinized. The question turns here, as in all cases of rape, upon adult women, on the fact of 
                                                 
1 (Bijoy Kumar Mahapatra v. State of HP, 1982 Cr.L.J. 2162 (Ori)) 
2 (Lallu Kammal v. State, 1953 Cr.L.J. 1196) 
3 (1977 Cr.L.J. 556 (Raj)) 
4 (1992 (10) Crimes 462 (Ori)) 
5 (1963 (2) Cr.L.J. 562) 
6 (1631 (3) State Tri 401 HL) 
7 (1829 (3) C & P 588) 
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consent having been previously given or not.1  Evidence that she was a prostitute or had a bad 
sexual reputation in the community or had previous sexual intercourse with the accused himself, 
are considered to be relevant both to her credibility and to the issue of consent. 
      Sexual intercourse under influence of drink cannot be said to be intercourse with consent.2  
Subsequent consent does not excuse a rape, although it might be considered proof of prior 
consent.3   
     This clause operates where a woman is insensible whether because of the influence of drink 
or drugs or any other cause, or is so imbecile that she is incapable of giving any rational consent. 
Consent of the woman must have been obtained prior to the act. It would be no defence that the 
woman consented after the act.4  
Distinction Between Will and Consent.  Every act done “against the will” of a woman, is done 
“without her consent” but an act done “without the consent” of a woman is not necessarily 
“against her will”.  The expression ‘against her will’ imports that the act is done inspite of the 
opposition of the woman to the doing of it. Where a man had carnal knowledge of a girl of 
imbecile mind and it was found that the act was without her consent as she was incapable of 
giving consent because of the defect of understanding, it was held that the man was guilty of 
rape.5 The consent of a woman obtained by putting her in fear of death or of injury is not consent 
at all. A sleeping woman cannot consent. Therefore, where a man had carnal knowledge of a 
woman while she was asleep, he would be guilty of rape.6  So also consent given by a woman of 
unsound mind or an intoxicated woman is no defence. Where a man made a girl of 13 years quite 
drunk, and whilst she was insensible violated her person, it was held to be a case of rape 7 
     Consent means an active will of the person to permit doing of the act complained of and 
knowledge of what is to be done or the nature of the act that is being done. Consent implies free 
                                                 
1 (The principles & Practice of Medical Jurisprudence by Taylor, Vol.II, Sixth Edition P.116) 
2(ILR (1952) 2 Raj 817)  
3 (1907 Cr.L.J. 465: 17 KLR 12 ) 
4 (Hawk P.C.C. 16, S.7, p.122) 
5 (Fletcher (1859) 8 Cox 131) 
6 (Mayers (1872) 12 cox 311) 
7 (Camplin (1845) 1 cox 220) 
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and untrammeled right to forbid or withhold what is being consented to, it is always voluntary 
and conscious acceptance of what is proposed to be done b y the other party.1   
Consent Under Fear Of Death Or Hurt. The consent of a woman to a sexual intercourse 
obtained by putting her in fear of death or of hurt is no defence to an accused person but where 
the fear to which the woman is subjected is neither of death nor of hurt, but of being arrested, 
when as a matter of fact there is no warrant of arrest against her, the consent, though obtained by 
fraud, is none the less consent, for she is willing to allow sexual intercourse for a price, which is 
fictitious one because there is no warrant of arrest against her.2  According to Section 90, IPC ‘to 
vitiate consent in cases of rape the threat of injury must be sufficient to who that it instilled fear 
and coerced the women into submission and made her consent involuntarily, only then the 
presumption that consent was not free can be raised.’ 
     There is difference between consent and submission.3  Every consent involves submission but 
the converse is not true. The helpless victim was frightened into resignation, her non-resistance 
was due to the inevitable compulsion, it cannot be considered to be free.4  
     In Lalta Prasad v. State of MP5 the trial court’s conviction of rape was confirmed by the High 
Court but on appeal the Supreme Court reversed it. According to the prosecution Shankuntala 
was a minor girl. The appellant kidnapped her under threat of hurt, took her to various places in 
Rajasthan and M.P. and was with her for one month, he also had sex with her. Both the Courts 
below held the appellant guilty of raping a minor but the Supreme Court said, ‘it was established 
on evidence that the appellant loved the girl, was betrothed to her and was about to be married to 
her but the brother did not like this.’ The girl’s statement in front of the investigating officer was 
not believed, the fact that she was a minor was ignored and the accused was acquitted.  
Consent Obtained by Impersonating Her Husband. Clause (4) of Section 375 IPC makes 
sexual intercourse with a married woman by impersonating as her husband, rape. If a woman 
consents under a mistaken belief, but the man knows that he is not her husband and that her 
                                                 
1 Arjun Ram v. State of Punjab, 1960, Cr.L.J. 489) 
2 ((1`988) 22 QBD 23 (Relied on): AIR 1955 Nag 121) 
3(Arjun Ram v. State of Punjab, 1960 Cr.L.J. 489)  
4 (Nafe Singh v. State of Haryana (1971) 3 SCC 934) 
5 (AIR 1979 SC 1276) 
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consent is given under a belief then he will be guilty of rape if he has sexual intercourse with 
her. The kind of consent envisaged by this clause is also covered by Section 90 IPC. An honest 
misconception by both the parties, however, does not invalidate consent. The misconception to 
invalidate consent must have been induced by the fraud of he ravisher even if he did not actively 
participate in inducing the belief. It is enough if he had the knowledge of it and chose to keep 
quiet when he was under a duty to speak the truth, in order to effectuate his criminal intentions. 
     In a case the accused, a married man tied a thali around the neck of a Christian girl before the 
picture of Christ and thereby induced her to believe that he was her husband. He took her out 
occasionally for sexual intercourse and the girl also agreed, believing the accused to be her 
husband. It was held that he was guilty of the offence of rape.1  
     In Hari Manjhi v. State,2 the accused had only promised to marry the girl and based on the 
promise the girl had agreed to have sexual intercourse with him. The court held that the accused 
was not guilty of rape, he had neither misrepresented nor cheated the girl. She had willingly 
consented for the act.  Similarly, in a case the accused and the prosecutrix both loved each other. 
Acting on his assurance that he will obtain the permission of her parents the girl started 
cohabiting with him, she got pregnant and insisted that the marriage be performed quickly. The 
accused suggested her to have an abortion and promised to marry her after the panchayat 
elections. The girl did not agree and the boy broke off, the accused stopped visiting her. The girl 
was major so the consent was not vitiated.3  
     As the outward appearances may be deceptive, the proof of age should be beyond all doubts 
where the girl is a consenting party. In case from Bombay,4 Shanti, a minor girl lodged a 
complaint under Section 376 IPC against three persons. The probe revealed that Shanti was a 
minor. Her brother and two of his friends had taken her to Mumba Devi temple, where they tied 
a mangal sutra around her neck. Then she was taken to a hut where one of the friends lived with 
her as her husband. The other two men also visited her and had sex with her against her will by 
claiming that according to their custom all brothers will treat her as their common wife. Shanti, 
                                                 
1 (Krishnaraja v. State of Mysore, (1969) 1 Mysore L J 104) 
2 (1990 Cr.L.J. 650) 
3 (Jayanti Rani Panda v. State of West Bengal, 1984 Cri. L.J. 1535) 
4 (AIR 1987 Bombay 327) 
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however, managed to escape and lodged a report. It was decided that Shanti’s age was below 
sixteen years so there could be no valid consent, the marriage with the accused was also not 
valid but surprisingly only one person was accused of rape, the so-called husband and the rest 
were let off. The judge held that presumption of consent under Section 114(a) was rebutted as 
the girl has stayed with the accused for one and a half months, this was against her contention 
that she could not escape. Moreover she posed for a photograph in the temple, this assured the 
court that her resistance was due to her shyness, it was after all, a new experience for her. The 
other two accused managed to go scot- free though they had fully connived with the accused and 
also had sex with Shanti. 
     Dr. Gaur H S also,1 poses a question as to how is it possible for a woman to mistake a 
stranger for her husband? He then himself answers the question as follows: “But such a 
contingency is conceivable where the man approaches her during sleep or in the dark or under 
circumstances when recognition is impossible. The man approaching her is, of course, guilty of 
impersonation, for he intends to pass for husband. He may intend not to go further by using force 
if he is detected, or he may be determined to complete the act even in spite of resistance. Then as 
regards the woman, she may or may not discover her mistake before the act has been 
consummated. If before it is consummated she discovers her mistake and does not resist, the act 
would probably cease to be rape, if consent can be inferred from her non-resistance. It could be 
then said that her consent being ex post facto was no consent at all.” 
     Modi records an unreported case, having a direct bearing on the point, in his Medical 
Jurisprudence, thirteenth edition, page 327. In that case one Mast Ram, a bairagi, falsely 
personated himself as Basorey, the husband of one Mst. Khunia, who has left his home some 
twelve years ago, and whose whereabouts were not known to any of his relatives since then. The 
bairagi deceitfully made Mt. Khunia believe that he was her real husband and had returned from 
a long journey extending over a period of twelve years. He lived with her for some time, but his 
imposture was found out when he was persuaded to visit Lalua, the brother of the woman’s real 
husband, who was a police chaukidar. He was subsequently charged with having committed rape 
                                                 
1(Gaur H S, Penal Law of India, Seventh Edition, page 1848)  
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on Mt. Khunia by falsely personating himself as her husband and was sentenced by the 
Additional Sessions Judge at Banda under section 376, IPC to four years R.I. and fifteen stripes.1 
     Taylor records the case of R. v. Horrisey2 in his medical Jurisprudence3 as follows: “In 
that case the prisoner was awarded three years’ penal servitude on conviction of rape on a 
married woman under the following circumstances. He entered the woman’s room when she 
was alone in bed and asleep. She awoke as the prisoner was finishing sexual connection with 
her, thinking it was her husband. A man having connection with a sleeping woman, by 
personating her husband, i.e., putting himself in a position that she might suppose him to be 
her husband, would be guilty of rape.” 
Consent Obtained by Promise of Marriage.   When a girl above 16 years voluntary agrees 
to sexual intercourse on assurance of marriage, the offence is not rape.4 When the consent to 
intercourse is obtained by falsely inducing her to believe that later he would marry her, 
accused was guilty under Section 376, IPC.5  Accused forcibly committing sexual intercourse 
followed by a promise to marry. Subsequent intercourse on the promise that he would marry 
the victim. Section 376, IPC was attracted.6 If a full grown up girl consents to sexual 
intercourse on promise to be married and continues in the activity till she becomes pregnant it 
is not an act induced by misconception of fact and the accused cannot be charged on a charge 
of rape.7   
     The accused had allured prosecutrix that he would marry her and had sexual intercourse 
with her. Medical evidence showed prosecutrix to be above 16 years of age at the time of 
incident. Prosecutrix consented to act of sexual intercourse fully knowing nature and 
implication of such act. Conviction of accused for offence of rape is not proper. Prosecution 
                                                 
1(Leader, January, 20, 1928, page 6)  
2 (CCC July, 1892) 
3 (Taylor: The Principles & Practice of Medical Jurisprudence, Vol. II, Sixth Edition) 
4 (1990 Cr L J 650 (Cal) 
5 (1989 Cr L J 202: 1988 BLJ 985) 
6 (1987 (1) Crimes 157 (Cal) 
7 (1984 Cr L J 1535 (Cal) 
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failed to prove that accused raped prosecutrix beyond reasonable doubt and accused was 
acquitted.1  
Consent Obtained by Fraud.  Consent must be to the actual act, not to some other act, 
which the victim believes it to be. Consent to a necessary operation is not consent to sexual 
intercourse. Consent or submission obtained by fraud is not a defence to a charge of rape or 
cognate offences.2 A girl of 14 years of age went to a physician for consultation in connection 
with her suppressed menstruation. He had sexual intercourse with her stating that it was a part 
of the treatment. The girl offered no resistance, being ignorant of the act owing to extreme 
youth. The physician was held guilty of rape.3  Similarly, a girl, 19 years of age, consulted the 
accused who professed to give medical advice for money in connection with her illness. He 
advised her that a surgical operation should be performed. The mother of the girl consented to 
the operation. The doctor took the girl to a private room. The girl submitted to the sexual 
intercourse under the belief that the accused was performing a surgical operation. It was held 
that he was guilty of rape, as the consent obtained by fraud is not consent.4   
Consent By A Girl Under Sixteen Is Inoperative.  Clause 6 of Section 375, IPC lays down 
that a man commits rape, if he has sexual intercourse with a girl under 16 years of age, 
consent or dissent being immaterial. Originally the age of consent was only 10 years, but it 
was raised to 16 years by section 3 of the Amending Act XLII of 1949. Man having 
intercourse with a minor girl even with her consent is guilty of offence of rape.5  If there be 
no consent, or if it be against the will of the girl, the age of the girl is immaterial for the 
offence of rape.6  Consent or dissent on the part of the girl below sixteen is not material to this 
offence, which is complete on penetration in any degree without proof of emission.7  
Girl Unable to Understand the Nature of The Act.  It may be a question whether a man can 
have intercourse with a woman without her knowledge while in a state of unconsciousness 
                                                 
1 (Jintu Das v. State of Assam, 2003 (1) Femi-Juris C.C. 247 (Gau) 
2 (1922 (17) Cr All Rep 56 CCA) 
3 (4 Cox DC 223) 
4(1877 (2) QBD 410)  
5(AIR 1932 All 580)  
6 (AIR 1957 Assam 39) 
7 (1932 (1) Mood 337) 
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from natural sleep. Modi1 says, “it is impossible for complete sexual intercourse to be 
accomplished on a nubile virgin during the natural sleep without her knowledge, as the pain 
caused by the first act of coitus would certainly awaken her from sleep. It is, however, 
possible, though indeed rare, for partial penetration, within the terms of the law, to occur in a 
virgin without awakening her from sleep. It is also possible, though highly improbable, for a 
woman to allow coitus during profound sleep without her being conscious of it, if the genital 
parts are large and accustomed to the intermission of the penis.  
     Unlawful sexual intercourse with a woman insensible due to the effect of the intoxicating 
drugs may be rape.2  By Section 90, IPC, consent obtained from a person under intoxication is 
invalid and does not prevent the accused from being convicted of the offence of rape. 
Rape On Prostitutes Or On Woman Of Loose Character.  A prostitute can be raped, and it 
is no excuse that the woman was a prostitute, for the law protects a prostitute against 
involuntary connection just as it protects children and chaste women.3  But when a charge of 
rape is made by a prostitute, it is justly received with suspicion and the case is narrowly 
scrutinized. Something more than medical evidence would be required to establish a charge 
under these circumstances. The question turns here, as in all cases of rape, upon adult women, 
on the fact of consent having been previously given or not.4 The prosecutrix may be cross-
examined as to her acts of indecency, and if she denies it the defendant may call evidence in 
rebuttal to show that she is a prostitute as tending to show that she consented.5   
     The contention that the prosecutrix is a common strumpet or at least not a woman of good 
character is untenable. It must never be forgotton that every woman in this Republic is under 
the protection of law and an offence committed on her cannot be treated with indifference 
notwithstanding any insinuations or suggestions against her character.6   
                                                 
1 (Modi’s Medical Jurisprudence, Thirteenth edition, p.326) 
2(1846 (2) Cox CC 115)  
3 (1631 (3) State Tri 401 HL) 
4 (Taylor’s Principles and Practice of Medical Jurisprudence, Vol.II, Sixth Edition, page 116) 
5 (1829 (3) C and p. 588) 
6 (1962 Cr L J 843: 1961 All Cr R 211) 
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Rape on His Own Wife.  As a general proposition a husband cannot be guilty of a rape on 
his wife, when she is over the age of fifteen. No doubt, the reason for that is that on marriage 
the wife consents to the husband’s exercising the marital right of intercourse during such time 
as the ordinary relations created by the marriage contract subsists between them. The marital 
right of the husband in such circumstances exists by virtue of a consent given at the time of 
each act of intercourse as in the case of unmarried persons. But where the justices have made 
an order on the ground of the husband’s persistent cruelty, containing a provision that the 
wife be no longer bound to cohabit with her husband, the order has the effect in all respects of 
a decree of judicial separation, and one result of it is that both the person and property of the 
wife are protected by it, and her consent given at the time of marriage is revoked. The 
husband is not thereafter entitled to have intercourse with her without her consent, with the 
result that he would be guilty of rape.1  
     Marital rape occurs when a man has sexual intercourse with his wife forcibly or without 
her consent. Such rape has specifically been exempted. The Criminal Law presumes that the 
husband cannot be guilty of rape committed by himself upon his lawful wife, because by their 
mutual matrimonial consent or contract the wife has given up this right, which she cannot 
retract. The rationale behind this exemption was the doctrine of “unity in marriage”. A man 
and a woman are merged into a single legal being upon marriage and that being is the man. 
So how could a man rape his ownself? 
     In the language of Wilson, J., “under no system of law which the courts had to do in this 
country whether Hindu or Mohammedan or that framed under British Rule, has it ever been 
the law that a husband has the absolute right to enjoy the person of wife without regard to the 
question of safety to her.”2 A husband present and aiding the rape of his wife by another man 
is guilty of abetment of rape.   
     However with the revolutionary changes in the status of women, the rule of immunity for 
the rape of a wife also came to be criticized. In India, the exception to Section 375, IPC 
explicitly says that sexual intercourse by a man with his own wife, not being under fifteen 
                                                 
1((1949) 2 All ER 448: See R. v. Miller, (1954) 2 QBD 282)  
2((1890) 18 Cal 49)  
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years, is not rape. Thus, if a wife is above fifteen then forcibly intercourse or intercourse 
without her consent is not rape. This is unreasonable. In case of sexual intercourse with 
consent, it is rape if the girl is not the wife of the man involved and is below sixteen years. On 
the other hand, it is not rape if the girl is fifteen and does not consent but is married to the 
man. 
     The Law Commission in its 42nd Report in 1971 had recommended that sexual intercourse 
by a man with his child wife, that is, one below 15, should be taken out of Section 375, and 
made a separate offence. Consequently an amendment to the Penal Code was proposed but it 
was not accepted by the Joint Committee. However, sexual intercourse with his own wife, 
who is living separately from him under a decree of separation or under any custom or usage 
without her consent is made punishable.1   
     The arguments supporting the marital rape exemption clause are that prosecution of a 
husband for raping his wife will be detrimental to marital harmony and it will also impede the 
reconciliation efforts. State intervention will be an invasion on marital privacy and that rape 
by spouse is not as serious as rape by any other man. It was feared that permitting women to 
prosecute their husbands will open the floodgates on such litigation. There would be 
fabricated and malicious complaints by wives who are not pulling on well with their 
husbands. These arguments are however, not in consonance with the latest social thinking and 
the principle of equality of sexes in marriage. While sex is a normal concomitant of marriage, 
use of violence or force in sexual intercourse is an offence against the dignity of a woman’s 
body and emotions, whether it be in marriage or out of marriage. Though the husband’s 
violent or non-consensual act of intercourse may entitle a wife to bring an action for criminal 
assault or injury or matrimonial relief, yet what is needed is the incorporation of the principle 
of liability for spousal rape in our Penal Law. Not only child brides but also all brides need 
protection. The dignity and freedom of the woman over her body must be honoured. A 
marriage license should not be viewed as a license for a husband to forcibly rape his wife 
with impunity. Why should a line be drawn on rape within marriage and rape outside 
                                                 
1(Section 376A, Indian Penal Code, 1860)  
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marriage. The act of rape is self-explanatory. It is an act of violence. Marriage does not mean 
a woman’s consent to be raped by her husband.1         
Necessity of Penetration.  It is essential part of the proof in rape that there should have been 
not only an assault but actual penetration.2 Partial penetration that does not result in any 
injury to the hymen is sufficient to constitute the offence of rape.3  To constitute the offence 
of rape, it is not necessary that there should b e complete penetration of penis with emission 
of semen and rupture of the hymen. Partial penetration of the penis within the labia majora of 
the vulva or pudendum with or without emission of semen or even an attempt at penetration is 
quite sufficient for the purpose of the law. 4 
     The explanation to Section 375, IPC, states that ‘penetration’ is sufficient to constitute the 
sexual intercourse necessary to the offence of rape. The section does not specify what exactly 
constitutes penetration. It has been held that even partial penetration is sufficient for the 
purpose of Section 375 and it is not essential that the hymen should be ruptured. To constitute 
penetration, it must be proved that some part of the virile member of the accused was within 
the labia and the pudendum of the woman, no matter how little, and that the only thing to be 
ascertained is whether the private part of the accused did enter into the person of the woman, 
and it is not necessary to decide how far they entered. There is a distinction between vulvar 
penetration and vaginal penetration. In order to constitute rape, the statute merely requires 
evidence of penetration, and that this may occur and the hymen remains intact. Even apart 
from the decision it is clear from the language used in Section 375 and from the addition of 
the explanation to the Penal Code, there need to be a complete act of sexual intercourse, and 
that it is sufficient if there is penetration. The use of the word ‘penetration’ without any 
further words of limitation shows that it was intended to cover even partial penetration, e.g. 
vulvar penetration.5  
                                                 
1 (Saxena Shobha, ‘Crimes Against Women and Protective Laws’, Deep and Deep Publications, New 
 Delhi (1995), p.82) 
2 (AIR 1942 Mad 285) 
3 (AIR 1927 Lah 735) 
4 ((1969) 1 Cr L J 689) 
5(1969 Delhi L T 222)  
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     In the case of Reg v. Ferrol,1 Bombay High Court cited by Lyon in his Medical 
Jurisprudence for India, Green, J., directed the jury that “vulval penetration only was 
sufficient under the law of India to constitute rape.The prisoner was charged with rape on a 
child six years’ old. The child had not complained and admitted on cross-examination that she 
had not been hurt. The medical evidence proved that there was no injury to the parts. The 
child was found to be suffering from gonorrhoea, so was the prisoner. It was clear that the 
penetration (if any) had been only vulval.” 
     Where all that the accused had done was to put his penis on the private part of the woman 
and according to evidence there was no attempt to penetrate the same, the act was held not to 
amount to the commission of rape.2  
 
(2) Significance of Age 
 In cases of rape, when rape is alleged to be committed on minors or by minors or when the 
question of punishment is to be decided or when the defendant pleads consent as his defence, 
determination of the actual age of the prosecutrix and the accused is of great importance.  
     The age of consent may perhaps be called the age of maturity or majority. This factor of 
age is always anomalous in different Acts. 
      The law of rape has prescribed the age of the victim as 16 years for consent in general and 
15 years as in the case of married woman.3  
     The provision of punishment of rape also states that a husband is also liable for 
punishment if the woman is under 12 years of age at that time.4  
     The Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 has prescribed the age of marriage of bridegroom and bride 
as 21 years and 18 years respectively. 
     The Child Marriage Restraint Act 1929 (as amended in 1978) defines child as a person 
who if a male is under 18 years of age and if a female is under 15 years of age. It also defines 
a minor as a person under 18 years of age. 
                                                 
1 (1 Hale PC 630) 
2 (Maharaj Bux Singh v. State of U.P., 1980 Cr. L R (Raj) 707) 
3 (Section 375, Indian Penal Code, 1860) 
4 (Section 376, Indian Penal Code, 1860) 
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     The Juvenile Justice Act 1986 defines juvenile as a boy who has not attained the age of 16 
years or a girl who has not attained the age of 18 years. 
     The Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act, 1956 defines ‘child’ as a person who has not 
completed the age of 16 years, and ‘minor’ means a person who has completed the age of 16 
years but has not completed the age of 18 years. 
     It is now clear that the provisions of age limits of offenders under these Acts are neither in 
consonance nor uniform. The provisions of Child Marriage Restraint Act, 1929 are 
contradictory within itself. The age of marriage and the age of consent are not similar as 
prescribed in the Penal Code and the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. It should be uniform in all 
cases. 
Proof of Age. Age may be proved either by direct evidence of the date of birth or by birth 
certificate. Production of the certified copies of he entry in the register of birth or in some 
other public record of birth is admissible in evidence and is necessary to prove the age. Where 
birth certificate is not available the courts have to base its conclusions upon the facts and 
circumstances disclosed on examining the physical features of the person whose age is in 
question, in conjunction with such oral testimony as may be available.1  
     Entries in school register and admission form regarding date of birth constitute good proof 
of age, more so when the institution is a reputed public school. Subsequent changes in the 
date of birth by an affidavit with the motive to get some benefit will not affect the authenticity 
of the original school entries. However horoscope as proof of age is not authentic.2  
     Section 35 of the Evidence Act mentions the relevancy of entry in public records made in 
the performance of duty. Certified copies from the school register and affidavit from the 
father of the girl stating the date of her birth and the statement of the girl to the police with 
regard to her age are proofs under the Evidence Act.3   
                                                 
1 (Siddheshwar Ganguly v. State of W.B., 1958 SCR 74) 
2 (Umesh Chandra v. State of Rajasthan (1982) 2 SCC 202) 
3 (Mohd. Ikram Hussain v. State of U.P., AIR 1964 SC 1625) 
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     Where it is found that the girl is a consenting party, proof of age should be beyond doubt 
since outward appearances may be deceptive, the judge cannot proceed on his own judgment 
about the age.1  
     Where the school certificate was produced showing that the age of the girl was below 16 
years, but according to the medical certificate the age of the girl was above 16 years. There 
was not material throwing doubts on the entries so it cannot be rejected on the surmise that it 
is usual for parents to under-state the age of their children at the time of school admission.  2   
Age of Male.  The law on the subject of infancy in connection with criminal liability is laid 
down in sections 82 and 83 of the Indian Penal Code and nowhere else. A child below seven 
years of age enjoys absolute immunity from criminal liability.3 A child above seven and 
below 12 years of age enjoys qualified immunity from criminal liability.4  
     The accused, a little boy of 12, was found guilty of an attempt to commit rape upon a little 
girl of 4. The girl’s parts were found to be bruised. The accused was convicted of an attempt 
to commit rape.5  A boy of 10 years who has attained sufficient maturity of understanding to 
judge the nature and consequence of his conduct can be convicted of an attempt to commit 
rape.6  
Age of A Girl Ravished Section 375 of Indian Penal Code makes it clear that below sixteen a 
girl is not presumed to be capable of either giving or withholding her consent. When the age 
of the girl is below 16 years, even the consent of girl does not make any material difference, 
and the sexual intercourse would constitute the offence of rape. The evidence regarding age 
of the girl may be either (a) positive or (b) medical. But it should be borne in mind that the 
opinion of radiologist should not be preferred to the positive evidence furnished by the 
Municipal Birth Register, the school admission register and then of the girl’s father, 
particularly when medico-legal opinion is that owing to the variations in climatic, dietetic, 
                                                 
1 (Laxminarayana v. State, 1978 WLN (Cal) 501) 
2(Bhoop Ram v. State of U.P., 1990 Cr L J 2671)  
3 (Section 82, Indian Penal Code, 1860) 
4 (Section 83, Indian Penal Code, 1860) 
5 (1917 Cr L J 943) 
6 (AIR 1915 All 134) 
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hereditary and other factors affecting the people of the different states of India, it cannot be 
reasonably expected to formulate a uniform standard for the determination of the age by the 
extent of ossification and union of epiphysis in bones.1  
     Prosecutrix stated her age 13 years as per school leaving certificate and to be in class 5 but 
she can neither read nor write Hindi or English. Statement so made was totally inconsistent as 
it betrays common sense to believe that a student of class 5 cannot even write in Hindi. 
Ossification test opined age to be between 14-1/2 to 16-1/2 years with a margin of two years 
on either side. Held, prosecution failed to prove that prosecutrix was below 16 years of age at 
the relevant time.2  
      ( 3) Attempt To Commit Rape And Indecent Assault  
An attempt to commit an offence is an act done in pat execution of a criminal design 
amounting to more than mere preparation, but falling short of actual consummation and 
possessing, except for failure to consummate, all the elements of the substantive crime; in 
other words, an attempt consists in the intent to commit a crime, combined with the doing of 
some act adapted to, but falling short of its actual commission; it may consequently be 
defined as that which if not prevented would have resulted in the full consummation of the act 
attempted.3 Attempt is the commencement of action, which, if not interrupted, would have 
ended in the crime, is an attempt to commit the crime and not a mere preparation.4  
     There is no separate Section for commission of the offence of ‘attempt of rape’ like those 
of attempt to murder, or attempt to commit suicide or attempt of committing robbery or 
dacoity. A person commits the offence of ‘attempt to commit rape’ when he intends to 
commit the offence and having made preparations does any act towards its commission; such 
an act need not be the penultimate act it must be an act during the course of committing that 
offence. Attempt begins where preparation ends. 
     Every act of rape or attempted rape does involve an indecent assault, in order that an 
alleged act be consistent with the act of attempt to commit rape, there should be some act by 
                                                 
1(1958 Cr L J 37: AIR 1958 Ker 121)  
2 (Devanand v. State (N.C.T. of Delhi), (2003) 1 Femi-Juris C.C. 312(A) (Del) 
3 (AIR 1927 Lah 580) 
4 (Bachelor and Heaton, JJ: 15 Bom LR 564) 
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the accused beyond the act of preparation. If the act of the accused falls short of an attempt, 
he cannot be held liable for an offence under Section 376 read with 511, IPC. 
     If the girl is embraced or is kissed against her will or she is exposed to some other indecent 
acts, it amounts to an offence under Section 354 IPC, but if the girl is made naked, she is 
fallen on the ground and the accused lies on her naked, and tries to have sexual intercourse 
with her, all these series of acts committed by the accused cannot be explained on any other 
hypothesis than the one that he attempted to commit rape on the girl. If, on account of the 
intervention of the witnesses, the accused was not able to make an attempt to penetrate his 
penis, he can be held guilty of the offence under Section 376 read with Section 511, IPC.  
     Where the accused had not only untied the salwar of the girl but he had taken off his 
pyjama also and he had spread his khes on the ground and closed the mouth of the girl in 
order to stop her from crying. He had slept over her to have sexual intercourse with her. The 
accused stood up when the witnesses arrived. This showed a determined intention on his part 
to commit rape on her and if the witnesses had not arrived he would have committed it. So, it 
was not a case of outraging the modesty of a girl but an attempt to commit rape.1  
     The difference between these two crimes lies in the degree of determination on the part of 
the accused. Indecent assault upon a woman does not amount to an attempt to commit rape 
unless the Court is satisfied that there was a determination in the accused to gratify his 
passion at all events and in spite of all resistance.2  
     Where the accused had opened the cord of the victim’s petticoat and was trying to sit on 
her waist. She pushed him with her legs and cried out for help. The husband on lighting the 
lamp saw that the accused had removed her clothes and was sitting on her. It was held that the 
accused was not guilty of rape he was only in the stage of preparation so it was only an 
attempt to outrage the modesty of a girl.3  
(4)Statement Of The Victim  
                                                 
1(Madanlal v. State of Rajasthan, 1986 RLW 377)  
2(Ankarya v. State of M.P., 1991 Cr L J 751 (MP) (Rameshwar v. State, 1984 Cr L J 786 (Raj) 
3  
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In rape cases direct evidence is seldom available beyond the evidence of the raped woman.1  
It is wrong to start suspecting the evidence of a prosecutrix given in a case of rape or the 
opinion assumption that a woman would not easily admit that she tacitly or expressly 
consented to sexual intercourse.2  
     It is difficult to find out any eye-witness since the rape is committed in secrecy and is 
hidden from the gaze of others; under such circumstances the state of the prosecutrix assumes 
great importance and should not be discarded till there are overwhelming circumstances to 
suggest that her statement is false. 
     A girl or a woman in a tradition bound non-permissive society of India would be 
extremely reluctant even to admit that an incident, which is likely to reflect on her chastity 
has even occurred. She would be conscious of the danger of being ostracized by the society or 
being looked down upon by it including her own family members, relatives, friends and 
neighbours. In view of these and similar factors the victims and their relatives are not too 
keen to bring the accused to book so when the crime is brought to light there is a built-in 
assurance that the crime is genuine rather than fabricated.3  The apex court asserted that in 
Indian setting refusal to act on the testimony of a victim of sexual assault is like adding insult 
to injury. Why should the evidence of a woman or a girl who complains of rape or sexual 
molestation be viewed with the aid of specs fitted with lenses tinged with doubt. To do so is 
to justify the charge of male chauvinism in a male dominated society.4  
     Where the prosecution evidence is not sufficiently strong to warrant a conviction, it is 
unsafe to convict merely on the accusation of the woman who has been raped. It is not 
inconceivable that the real offender may, in some cases, be screened either because he has 
bribed the person aggrieved not to accuse him or because the offender is a member of the 
same family as the person aggrieved.5  
                                                 
1(AIR 1955 NUC (Raj) 437)  
2 (1992 (1) Crimes 886 (MP) 
3 (Bhardwaja Bhojani Bhai Hariji Bhai v. State of Gujrat, AIR 1983 sc 753) 
4 (ibid) 
5 (1922 Cr L J 475: 67 Ind Cas 827) 
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     The father of prosecutrix gave evidence that she was aged 19 years. Evidence of doctor 
that prosecutrix was of 17 years. Prosecutrix deposing that she was only 14 years. Held, 
evidence of prosecutrix runs counter at all other material on record and is wholly unreliable 
and untrustworthy.1  
Corroboration of Victim’s Testimony.  As a matter of law, no conviction without 
corroboration was possible has scarcely been accepted. The only rule of law is the rule of 
prudence, namely, the advisability of corroboration should be present in the mind the Judge. 
There is no rule of practice that there must in every case, be corroboration before a conviction 
can be allowed to stand. It has been held in several decisions of Supreme Court that the 
prosecutrix cannot be considered to be an accomplice. As a rule of prudence, however, it has 
been emphasized that Courts should normally look for some corroboration of her testimony in 
order to satisfy itself that the prosecutrix is telling the truth and that a person, accused of 
abduction or rape, has not been falsely implicated.2  
    Where a middle aged Balsevika was raped by the appellant while she was sleeping in a 
girl’s school. The next day she related this incident to the Mukhia Sevak of the village and it 
resulted in his conviction by the High Court. It was argued that in the absence of injuries on 
the person of the prosecutrix basing the conviction on the sole testimony of the victim was 
fatal to the case and corroborative evidence was imperative of judicial credence in rape cases. 
Conviction will not be illegal even if it is on the sole testimony of the prosecutrix. Judicial 
response to human rights cannot be blunted by legal bigotry. Krishna Iyer J. observed, “Rape 
for a woman is deathless shame and must be dealt with as the gravest crime against human 
dignity.”3  
      In rape cases courts must bear in mind human psychology and behavioural probability 
when testing the testimonial potency of the victim’s version. The court asserted that the rule 
of corroboration is not a rule of law if the narration of the victim is natural and inspires 
                                                 
1 (Jinish Lal Shah v. State of Bihar, (2003) 1 Femi-Juris C.C. 48(C)) 
2 ((1973) 2 SCJ 140: AIR 1973 SC 469) 
3 (Rafiq v. State, AIR 1981 SC 559) 
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confidence in the mind of the judge and if the circumstances and other evidence even slightly 
support the case then there arises no necessity of corroboration.1  
     In State of Maharashtra and Stree Atyachar Virodhi Parishad v. Chandra Prakash Jain2 the 
Supreme Court asserted that if the evidence is worthy of credit it must be relied upon without 
corroboration and if the testimony of the prosecutrix remains unpunctured and unimpaired 
and there is no evidence of her enmity with the accused then the conviction of the accused 
can be sustained on her evidence, without any corroboration, she is, after all, not an 
accomplice but an unfortunate victim.3   
     If the evidence of a rape-victim is believed then there is no bar on the conviction of the 
rapist on her uncorroborated testimony, the acquittal of the accused for absence of 
corroboration is not justified. The victim was bleeding from the vagina and her underwear 
was wet with blood. The mother of the girl had washed the pant and the private parts of the 
girl. The examination of the serologist had confirmed this fact.4  
     When the rapists are reveling in their promiscuous pursuits and half of human kind, 
women, is protesting against its hapless lot, when no woman of honour will accuse another of 
rape since she sacrifices thereby what is dearest to her, the Court cannot cling to the fossil 
formulae and insist on corroborative testimony, even if taken a whole the case strikes the 
judicial mind as probable. Hardly a desensitized judge who sees the conspectus of 
circumstances in its totality rejects the testimony of a victim of rape. It is an insult to tell a 
woman that her story of woe will not be believed unless the same is strengthened further by 
corroboration in material particulars.5  
     A critical analysis of judicial decisions shows that the need for corroboration and the 
nature of corroboration is itself a source of conflicting judicial pronouncements. 
(5) Evidence  
                                                 
1 (Imartilal v. State, 1987 Cr L J (MP) 
2 (1990 Cr L J SC 889) 
3 (1984 Cr L J 74 (NOC) Raj.) 
4 (Nandkishore Rath v. State, 1991 Cr L J 835) 
5 (AIR 1990 SC 889) 
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In rape cases direct evidence is seldom available beyond the evidence of the raped woman 
and in no cases it is more difficult to arrive at a confident verdict whether evidence is false or 
true than in cases in which women allege that they have been outraged or that an outrage has 
been attempted on them. Not only one has to consider the possibility of deliberate falsehood 
but also those who have to arrive at a verdict have to consider the possibility of unintentional 
mis-statements produced by hysterical conditions, which are apt to be found in cases of this 
nature.1  
     It is wrong to start suspecting the evidence of a prosecutrix given in a case of rape or the 
opinion assumption that a woman would not easily admit that she tacitly or expressly 
consented to sexual intercourse.2 Where the prosecution evidence is not sufficiently strong to 
warrant a conviction, it is unsafe to conflict merely on the accusation of the woman who has 
been raped. It is not inconceivable that the real offender may, in some cases, be screened 
either because he has bribed the person aggrieved not to accuse him or because the offender is 
a member of the same family as the person aggrieved.3  
     The court must satisfy itself that the various circumstances in the chain of evidence must 
be established clearly and the completed chain must be such as to rule out reasonable 
likelihood of the innocence of the accused. When the main link in the chain gets snapped and 
the other circumstances cannot in any manner establish the guilt beyond reasonable doubt 
then the court has to be watchful and avoid the danger of allowing suspicion to take the place 
of legal proof. There is a long distance between ‘may be true’ and ‘must be true’ and the same 
divides conjecture from sure conclusions. In this case there was a reasonable doubt about the 
guilt of the accused so the benefit of doubt must go to him.4  
     Cases instituted under Section 376, IPC in India are normally genuine as in most of the 
cases the complainants do not come to put forward the case.5  Offence of rape was allegedly 
committed in dark night and the accused was recognized in the dark night by his voice, 
                                                 
1(AIR 1924 All 411: 81 Ind Cas 629)  
2(1992 (1) Crimes 886 (MP)  
3 (1922 Cr L J 475: 67 Ind Cas 827) 
4(Jawaharlal Das v. State of Orissa, (1991) 3 SCC 27)  
5(1984 SC Cr 25)  
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stature and feature. It was held that such recognition is very feeble type of evidence and 
misleading and it is not safe to convict accused solely on the basis of such evidence of 
recognition.1  
     It is wrong to think that in order to prove the charge of rape, there must be evidence of 
penetration. Both in the committing Court as well as in the statement to the police, the victim 
had stated that she was ravished forcibly by the two respondents. It is not necessary that the 
word ‘penetration’ should be used.2  
     In the offence under Section 376, IPC the conviction can be safely recorded on the 
statement of victim of rape provided her evidence is worth credence and does not suffer any 
infirmity and corroboration of medical evidence is not necessary.3  Before amendment in 
Evidence Act, version of victim girl needed corroboration but after amendment if fact of 
sexual intercourse is proved without her consent, accused is to prove consent. Evidence of 
victim girl is not be rejected unless strong circumstances otherwise are found.4 In a case of 
rape the statement made by complainant immediately after the occurrence to another woman 
is admissible, not as evidence of the truth of the charge alleged, but as corroborating the 
credibility of the complainant and as evidence of the consistency of her conduct. An inference 
adverse to the accused cannot be drawn from the fact that the complainant was very much 
ashamed and even committed suicide owing to the shame brought on her.5  
     In a trial for an offence of rape, the statement of the girl to her mother and the neighbours 
shortly after the incident complaining against the accused is corroborative evidence under 
section 157 and Illustration (j) of section 8 of Evidence Act. Mere finding of spermatozoa on 
the quilt of the accused may not, by itself, have much evidentiary value but it is a strong piece 
of evidence when taken with the evidence given by the girl that the accused had raped her on 
the quilt.6  
                                                 
1(1994 (1) Gau L R 196)  
2 ((1963) 2 Cr L T 715) 
3((1993) 1 Crimes 251 (Raj.)  
4((1994) 1 OLR 323)  
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     Evidence of prosecutrix is to be given due weight. Sole testimony of victim of a sexual 
offence can be a basis for conviction provided it is safe, reliable and worthy of acceptance. 
Victim is not to be treated as accomplice, but could only be characterized as injured witness. 
No woman would falsely implicate a person in sexual offence as honour and prestige of that 
woman also would be at stake.1  
      
Conduct Of The Girl.  If the conduct of a woman who has been ravished is such that she 
lodged a complaint, then the conduct is relevant and the terms in which the complaint was 
made are relevant as conduct but they are not relevant as direct proof of the act. The 
particulars of the complaint may, so far as they relate to the charge against the prisoner, be 
given in evidence, not as being evidence of the facts complained of but as evidence of the 
consistency of the conduct of the prosecutrix with the story told by her in the witness box, and 
as negativing consent on her part. But if she does not go into the witness box there is nothing 
to confirm or corroborate and the statement or complaint cannot be proved under section 8, 
Evidence Act.2  
     A very common allegation flung around in most rape cases is the easy virtue of the woman 
in question. It suits the common sex offender to transfer the blame for his crime squarely on 
the shoulders of the victim as an excuse for which there is no legal sanction but the accused is 
assisted by the reactionary society and the traditional judiciary because the character of the 
victim can legally be questioned.3  That is what the Supreme Court did in Mathura’s case 4  
“Mathura is a ‘shocking liar’ whose testimony is riddled with falsehood and improbabilities. 
The most that one could conclude was that Mathura had sexual intercourse with Ganpat, but 
there is a word of difference between sexual intercourse and rape.” Following the furore after 
this judgment a new amendment had come into force, which implicitly assumed that the 
moral character of the victim is not a relevant consideration in cases of rape. But the 
                                                 
1 (Sudhansu Sekhar Sahoo v. State of Orissa, (2003) 1 Femi-Juris C.C. 116(C) (SC) 
2 (AIR 1931 Mad. 233) 
3 (Section 155(4), Indian Evicence Act) 
4(Tukaram v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1979 SC 185)  
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legislation did not rescind the earlier objectionable clause, despite the recommendations of 
the Law Commission1  
     Our judiciary continued to follow the conservative path. In Suman Rani’s case 2 the 
Supreme Court reduced from 10 years to 5 years, the sentence awarded to two police 
constables accused of raping a woman in the police station, on the ground that the woman 
was of questionable character and easy virtue.  Since the Supreme Court agreed with the 
judgment of the High Court that rape was committed then where is the legal definition to 
suggest that only virtuous women can be raped. In this case the learned counsel for the 
accused rested his arguments on a medical examination, to surmise that the victim was used 
to sexual intercourse. Since she had a boy friend the counsel concluded that she was of 
questionable character and easy virtue with lewd and lascivious behaviour. There was no 
other evidence forwarded to aid this moral certification. But the judges were convinced and 
quoted this in their judgment. For worse are the implications of this decision for the 
prostitutes who may be raped because, at the outset they have no moral and social sanction to 
plead virtue. The judgment, which simply reads thus: “If a woman demands justice from the 
State and protection from the custodians of laws, she must keep her virginity intact.” Far 
more progressive was the judgment of the Sessions Court: “The law against the offence of 
rape and allied offence is for the protection of fallible earthly mortals and not gods and 
goddesses…all said and done, even a girl of easy virtue is entitled to the protection of law and 
cannot be compelled to have sexual intercourse against her will.”  
     Following the furore over this decision the Supreme Court in a subsequent case3 asserted 
that factors like character and reputation of the victim are wholly alien to the scope and object 
of Section 376, IPC. It was clarified that in its judgment delivered in Suman Rani’s case 4  the 
Court has used the expression ‘conduct’ in its lexicographical meaning, for the limited 
purpose of showing as to how the victim had behaved or conducted herself in not telling 
anyone for about 5 days about the sexual assault perpetrated on her and commented that ‘the 
                                                 
1 (84th Report of Law Commission of India) 
2 (AIR 1989 SC 937) 
3(State of Haryana v. Premchand, AIR 1990 SC 538)  
4 (AIR 1989 SC 937) 
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peculiar facts and circumstances of the case coupled with the conduct of the victim girl do not 
call for the minimum sentence under Section 376(2), IPC. ‘It could be said that the Supreme 
Court neither characterized the victim as a woman of questionable character and easy virtue 
nor made any reference to her character or reputation. It is very unfortunate that a controversy 
has arisen following this judgment.’ ‘Even a woman of easy virtue is entitled to the right of 
privacy and none can invade it as and when he likes. She is entitled to protect her person if 
there is an attempt to violate it against her wishes. She is equally entitled to the protection of 
law. Merely because she is a woman of easy virtue her evidence cannot be thrown overboard1 
     Legally, being a victim of sexual assault, a woman is competent to testify,2 but even 
competent witnesses can be asked questions which tend to shake their credibility by injuring 
the character.3 And finally, Section 155(4) of the Evidence Act still remains on the statute 
book, which states that when a man is prosecuted for rape ‘it may be shown that the 
prosecutrix was of generally immoral character.’ 
     It is hardly possible that any self-respecting woman would come forward in a Court of 
Justice to make a humiliating statement against her honour of having been raped, unless it 
was absolutely true.4  However, in a case of rape evidence as regards the general immoral 
character of the woman is relevant under section 155(4) of the Evidence Act.5 The prosecutrix 
may be cross-examined as to her acts of indecency. The defence may call evidence to prove 
general indecency and the prosecution may then call evidence in rebuttal.6 Previous sexual 
intercourse with the defendant is material to consent, and, therefore, the prosecutrix may be 
cross-examined as to instance of such intercourse or other indecencies with him and evidence 
may be called to rebut her denial of it.7  
                                                 
1 (State of Maharashtra v. Madhukar Narain Mandhikar, Pioneer, 8 June 1992, p.9) 
2 (Section 118, Indian Evicence Act) 
3 (Section 146(3) Indian Evidence Act) 
4 (AIR 1923 Lah 291: 75 Ind Cas 77) 
5 (AIR 1926 Cal 820) 
6(R. V. Robbins, (1843) 1 Cox 55)  
7 ((1829) 3 C and P 58) 
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     So far as the rape case is concerned the fact that there was enmity between the father of the 
victim and the accused and there was some litigations between the parties is not material. It is 
absurd to suggest that because of the enmity the rape charge has been foisted.1  
Burden of Proof.  The prosecution has to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable 
doubt. In practice however the conviction for rape depends entirely on the evidence of 
prosecutrix as far as the essential ingredients of the offence are concerned. The other evidence 
is only corroborative. Medical examination and other evidence if possible should prove the 
fact that there has been sexual connection. It must be proved that such connection was against 
the woman’s will or without her consent: the character of the woman, her degree of intimacy 
with the accused, and the place where the offence took place are the circumstances which 
must be considered in their totality.2  
      (6) Medical Evidence.  Medical evidence is commonly required to support a charge of rape 
but it is seldom more than corroborative. It is very rare that case of rape are tried without medical 
evidence. Medical evidence in case of rape may be from the following sources: (1) Marks of 
violence on the person of the prosecutrix or the accused; (2) Marks of violence about the genitals; 
(3) Signs of venereal infection; (4) The presence of blood or seminal stains on the clothes of the 
prosecutrix or the accused; (5) Presence of spermatozoa in vaginal secretion; (6) Examination of 
accused; (7) Signs of loss of virginity.3  
Opinion of Medical Expert.  Opinion of medical expert is admissible under Section 45 of 
the Evidence Act, and facts, which are inconsistent with the opinion of these experts, are also 
admissible under Section 46. The opinion of medical expert is given either in the form of 
certificate or opinion. It is well settled that medical evidence is not an exact science and it is 
difficult for any doctor to furnish his opinion with exactitude and precision as to the time 
when a particular injury was inflicted or the exact time when the sexual act was perpetrated. 
                                                 
1 (AIR 1987 SC 1080) 
2 (Shobha Saxena, ‘Crimes Against Women And Protective Laws’ Deep & Deep Publications, New 
 Delhi (1995), p.68) 
3(Bhatnagar J.P., ‘Law Relating To Women & Their Rights’, Ashoka Law House, New Delhi (1998), 
 p.77)  
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     Ordinarily the value of medical evidence lies only in lending corroboration to other 
evidence and both the accused and the defendant can use it to prove their point, i.e. to prove 
that the injuries could not have been caused in the manner alleged and thereby discredit the 
eye-witnesses.1  But to record a finding of conviction solely on the testimony of a medical 
witness, without substantial corroboration is not prudent. This notion has been universally 
acted upon and it has almost become a rule of law. In a case the Supreme Court has held that 
an expert witness cannot be bracketed with an accomplice. It is not correct to look for 
corroboration as a precondition for the acceptance of his evidence.2  However, the grounds for 
an opinion must be carefully probed and examined.3  
     An expert’s opinion is required to be supported by reasons, which if convincing, makes it 
acceptable. There is no place in the courts for the bald statement of an expert. It is the Court 
to judge whether the opinion has been correctly arrived at. The expert’s opinion unsupported 
by convincing reasons can be refused by the courts.4 As a general rule the court is supposed to 
have a scientific attitude in appreciating the expert’s evidence including that based on medical 
science to avoid an element of judicial superstitions.5  
     Expert’s opinion must be based on his observation and judgment. Medico-legal testimony 
is a check on the evidence of the eye-witnesses. It is a direct evidence of the facts observed by 
the expert on the victim’s body upon examination.6 Where a doctor does not examine a 
patient and makes his statement generally on probabilities, his statement can still be regarded 
as expert evidence.7 It is within the domain and competence of the court to evaluate the 
degree of reliance to be placed on his opinion.8  There is no irrefutable presumption that the 
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medical man is always a truthful witness.1  Books on medical jurisprudence cannot be relied 
upon unless they were shown to the expert.2  
     Section 291 Cr. P. C. provides for the deposition of the medical witness and gives 
authority to the court to call the medical expert in the court, on the application of the appellant 
or the accused and examine him on the subject matter of his deposition. It is the bounden duty 
of the Public Prosecutor to tender in evidence not only the medical evidence and the 
postmortem report of the Civil Surgeon but also the report of the Chemical Examiner and of 
the Imperial serologist.   
Evidence of Non-Medical Expert.  Non-medical expert evidence is provided in disputed 
cases by scientists and other experts doing analytical work in forensic science laboratories. 
The law admitting evidence of experts before law courts is provided in Section 45 of the 
Evidence Act. The court requires opinions from persons who possess specialized knowledge 
and skill in the matter. It is for the judge to decide whether the skill of the person before him 
enough to entitle him to express an opinion on the subject. No exact test can be laid down. 
The expert witness, in every case, need not be a professional expert in all the branches of the 
science. According to Section 293 Cr. P. C. reports of scientific experts are relevant and may 
be used as evidence in any inquiry, trial or other proceedings under this Code. The 
investigating officers should have instructions as well as necessary training in respect of the 
collection, preservation and transmission of stained materials to the examiners.3  
Medical Examination of the Prosecutrix and the Accused.  In cases of rape or attempted 
rape medical examination of the accused and the victim soon after the incident often yields a 
wealth of corroborative evidence. Such an opportunity should not be lost on any account. The 
prosecutrix can be examined only with her consent, but the accused can be subjected to such 
examination.4  The accused can also demand such an examination if he feels that such an 
examination will disprove the charge brought against him.5 The presence of smegma on 
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corona glandis of the accused soon after the incident is proof against complete penetration 
since it is rubbed off during the intercourse. But to be of any value examination must done 
within 24 hours.1 Similarly, the presence or absence of injuries on the prosecutrix or the 
accused may confirm or negative a charge of rape or an attempt to ravish.  
Medical Evidence not to be Preferred to that of Prosecutrix. Rape is a crime and not a 
medical condition, a legal term and not a diagnosis to be made by medical officer, whether 
rape had an urge or not is a legal conclusion, not a medical one. Medical opinion is only one 
amongst many bits of corroborative evidence to be weighed in deciding the case. Any 
conclusion on rape is not to be made by the doctor. It is for the judge to decide.2 If the 
evidence of the prosecutrix stands corroborated, it cannot be rejected merely on the ground 
that her version does not get support from the medical evidence. It cannot be contended that 
the evidence of the doctor should be preferred to that of the prosecutrix.3  
  Whatever may be the medical evidence, the evidence cannot be acted upon in the face of the 
girl’s clear admission before the committing court that penetration did not take place at all.4  
Considering the age, development of genital organ and physical power, the capability of the 
accused to commit rape can be ascertained. The presence of seminal stains, blood, dirt, mud, 
etc. on his clothes or body may afford confirmatory evidence. The presence of marks of 
struggle will negative the plea of consent by the victim. The presence of hair of the victim 
affords corroboration to the statement of the victim. The presence of syphilitic or gonorrheal 
discharge, where the victim suffers from the disease lends corroboration to other evidence. 
     Medical examination of the accused can give wealth of information, but Article 20(3) of 
the Constitution of India provides that no person accused of an offence shall be compelled to 
be a witness against himself. The protection comprehends within its scope not only oral 
statements compulsorily obtained from him but also evidence of whatever can be extracted 
out of him. But due to the amendment of the Criminal Procedure Code in 1973, the accused 
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can be legally examined by a medical practitioner at the request of a police officer and force 
can be used for that purpose.1  
Presence Of Marks Of Injuries.  Marks of violence are more likely to be found on the 
bodies of the grown up women who are able to resist than on the bodies of children who are 
incapable of offering any resistance.2   
     “If the woman has resisted to her utmost, she will probably bear marks upon the body, 
face, neck and limbs of her violent resistance, and, probably, also she will have inflicted 
injuries upon the body of assailant….There are unquestionably girls who become panic-
stricken when an attack of this kind is made upon them, and are rendered incapable of 
offering serious resistance, with the consequence that their bodies do not bear evidence of 
injuries such as might be expected from a severe struggle, while locally there may be all the 
expected signs of the accomplished act of penetration.”.3   
     Where the accused removed the saree of the deceased and gagged her mouth with it, she 
was suffocated and in that condition it was impossible for her to offer any resistance. She 
must have been under a very great physical disability to offer any resistance. A sense of 
shame that must have overpowered her when her saree was removed must have added to her 
misery. The physical condition of the accused was such that he could overpower his victim. 
The manner in which the rape was committed on her clearly left no scope for the victim to 
resent the act especially when the accused was armed with a sickle.4  
     The character and extent of the injury will vary in different cases depending upon the 
nature of hymen, the disproportion between the male and the female parts, the extent of the 
penetration, and the amount of the force used.5  
     Commission of rape without rupturing hymen is possible. There was no forcible complete 
penetration of penis into the vagina. The slight penetration within the labia majora or vulva or 
pudenda without rupturing the hymen constitutes the offence. The hymen of a child is situated 
                                                 
1 (Section 53 of the Cr. P. C.) 
2(Modi’s Jurisprudence, Thirteenth Edition, page 321)  
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more deeply than of a mature person and if penetration had been effected by human agency 
there would have been lacerations or other injuries on her private parts. The orifice of the 
hymen of the children under ten years is very small and will rarely admit tip of the little finger 
and if the hymen of such a victim is ruptured it indicates brutal force.1 The medical 
examination of the rape victim aged below 16 years revealed that she had an elastic hymen 
which can survive sexual intercourse. It was held that rupture of hymen was not necessary in 
case of elastic hymen.2  
     Where the medical evidence did not corroborate the sole testimony of prosecutrix, a minor 
girl and there were no injury mark on private part of prosecutrix mere presence of semen on 
pant of accused after 12 days of incident cannot connect the accused with offence and the 
guilt of the accused do not establish beyond reasonable doubt.3  
     The fact that the marks of struggle have not been found on the spot is insignificant because 
it depends on the nature of the place where the offence is committed. ‘After all, it is not 
wrestling but it was a case, where an adult taking advantage of a lonely lady’s presence, 
forcibly satisfies his sexual lust and the lady could not resist as she was carrying a pregnancy 
of five months apart from being weak in comparison to the adult male member.4  
Absence of Marks of Injuries.  Absence of injuries on the person of the aggressor or the 
aggressed may not be a circumstance in each case to demolish the theory of rape. It depends 
on the facts and circumstances of each case. Absence of injuries on the person of the 
prosecutrix may or may not indicate absence of physical violence. A force need not be actual 
physical force. A threat of violence may at times prompt submission of the prosecutrix to 
sexual act and may not cause any physical injury. Even in cases where the prosecutrix may 
struggle and resist, she may not suffer actual body injury because of other circumstances, like 
the number of persons committing rape, the place where the act is committed and her own 
condition including the manner in which it is committed.5  
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     A married woman was raped and her conduct was very relevant when she narrated the 
entire occurrence to her moth-in-law and this evidence is admissible under Section 6 of the 
Evidence Act. Further, the evidence of the prosecutrix is corroborated by the medical 
evidence. Merely that there was no violence injury on the person of the prosecutrix is no 
ground to reject her testimony. The testimony of the prosecutrix can be acted upon to base 
conviction. Conviction recorded by trial court upheld.1  
(7) Custodial Rape.  The 1983 amendment had brought a change in the Indian Evidence Act, 
a new Section 114-A was added by which in cases of custodial rape, if a woman states in her 
evidence before the court that she did not consent, the court shall presume that she has not 
consented. It is for the accused to prove the contrary, but the peculiar manner in which this 
clause is phrased, has led to glaring loopholes. The presumption is not made absolute but is 
made subject to proving the contrary. It has to be gathered from the attendant circumstances 
arising in a particular case.  
      The implications of shifting the onus of proof were discussed by civil liberty groups, 
press, women’s organizations, bar associations and opposition parties. There was an outcry 
from several indignant males who felt that it would be the easiest thing in the world for any 
man to be framed; a woman has simply to cry rape and get away with it. While the point was 
valid enough no one deemed it fit to ask why a similar question had not been raised all these 
years during which the burden of proof had been on the rape victim. It was feared that women 
would be manipulated into crying rape and the innocent men would be convicted. The fact 
that there were other offences like adulteration and smuggling, in which the burden of proof 
rests with the accused was conveniently overlooked.2  
     This amendment, though not adequate is at least a beginning, a step towards progress. The 
onus of proof regarding rape has shifted to the accused but it is only in cases of custodial 
rape, i.e. rape by policemen, public servants, managers of hospitals and remand homes and 
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wardens of jails who can conveniently take advantage of their position and rape the helpless 
women who come to them for protection. 
     The Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 1983 has resulted in some welcome changes for the 
rape victims. Section 375 and 376 IPC have been substantially changed and several new 
sections have been introduced, viz. Sections 376A, 376B, 376C and 376D, IPC. These 
sections deal with crimes, which strictly speaking do not come under the definition of rape 
but are equally heinous and brutal. The amendment introduced in 19083 has catered for this 
anomaly. Now sexual intercourse in a custodial situation, though it does not amount to rape, 
is a serious crime even if the woman has consented to it. 
     Section 376A punishes sexual intercourse with the wife without her consent by a judicially 
separated husband, Section 376B punishes sexual intercourse by a public servant with a 
woman in his custody, Section 376C deals with sexual intercourse by Superintendent of Jail, 
Remand Home, etc. with inmates of such institutions and Section 376D punishes sexual 
intercourse by any member of the management or staff of hospital with any woman of that 
hospital. These new sections were introduced with a view to stop sexual abuse of women in 
custody, care and control by various categories of persons which though not amounting to 
rape were nevertheless considered highly reprehensible. 
      Section 375B punishes any public servant who is authorized to keep a woman in his 
custody as her protector. It is but fair that he should be punished if he misuses his official 
position by inducing or seducing his protégé to have sexual intercourse with him, the betrayal 
of trust has been made punishable. The word ‘custody’ does not mean only those women who 
are remanded to judicial custody or are taken into custody by arrest, women kept under 
protection, charge, care, guardianship or procured under a search warrant, all are included 
under custody. ‘Seduction’ implies surrender of her body by a woman, who is otherwise 
reluctant or unwilling to submit herself to illicit intercourse in consequence of persuasion, 
flattery or blandishment.1  Inducement or seduction for the purpose of this section may be the 
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result of fear created by a person having authority and custody of a woman. Custody itself is 
liable to create fear and inducement.  
     Custodial rape is an aggravated form of rape.1 It is an assault by those who are supposed to 
be the guardian of the women concerned and are specially entrusted with her welfare and 
safe- keeping. In cases of custodial rape the social power that men have over women gets 
intensified with the legally sanctioned authority and power. Single women, widows with 
young children and women belonging to the lower strata of society who have to eke out a 
living against all odds, become easy prey to custodial rape because they are already deprived 
of the supportive mechanisms. 
Rape By Protectors.  Before 80s, rape by policemen, (the most common kind of custodial 
rape) did exist, but except for the stray cases the crime did not find itself in the glare of the 
media spotlight. Rape by the protectors of law grabbed the country’s collective consciousness 
only in Mathura rape case.2 The Apex Court judgment in this case in 1979 shocked people out 
of their complacency and brought the crime of custodial rape in the lime-light. The crime 
itself had taken place years before: on March 26 1972, when a 16 year old tribal girl who 
worked as a maid servant was brought to the police station on a complaint filed by her own 
brother and was raped inside the police station while her relatives waited outside. 
     It took seven and a half tortuous years before the highest court in the land finally delivered 
it judgment. It was with this judgment that the case explored into a cause celebre. Upholding 
the Sessions Court judgment and reversing the High Court one, the Supreme Court acquitted 
the accused on grounds that were appallingly sexist. Mathura, said the judge was not raped 
since she had previous sexual relations. There were no marks on her body to show that she 
had resisted or put up a fight nor did she raise a cry, so it was proved that she consented. 
     Once the judgment was made public there was an uproar. A mass movement started across 
the country demanding a new and more just law on rape. Bowing to public pressure, a bill to 
amend the law was introduced in Parliament. In 1983 an amendment to the rape law was 
brought into force, which among other things, made the minimum punishment in case of 
                                                 
1 (Section 376(2)(a), (b), (c) and (d)) 
2 (Tukaram and Anr. V. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1979 SC 185) 
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custodial rape ten years1 and shifted the onus of proof of consent on the rapist.2 Seven new 
clauses were added to Section 376(2) IPC that brought policemen, public servants, 
superintendents of jails, managers of remand and rescue homes and doctors within the dragnet 
of law. It made rape on girls below the age of twelve years, gang rape and rape on pregnant 
women an aggravated form of rape and stipulated a minimum sentence to ten years for it, but 
surprisingly this amendment has left out a large number of persons who are also in a custodial 
position and commit rape on unsuspecting victims. In cases of custodial rape the victim does 
not resist because she is further overpowered or overawed by the dominating position of the 
rapist and finds herself totally helpless.  
     Barely eight months after the uproar over the Mathura judgment, another reprehensible 
police crime took place L’affair Maya Tyagi. On June 18, 1980, few enraged policemen shot 
dead Ishwar and his friends, beat the six months pregnant Maya, stripped her naked and 
paraded her through the streets of Baghpat. At the end of the ordeal Maya was raped.3  After 
the report of the judicial commission and CID investigation the prosecution followed a 
difficult course. It was because of various legal wrangles that the trial took eight years to be 
completed. Delivering the judgment the judge said: “It reminds me of the primitive days of 
‘police raj’ where the people were at the mercy of the despot. The gruesome killings and the 
beastly act, which followed, were the handwork of hungry wolves in the guise of the savior of 
the life and property of the people. For the survival of the society it is essential to eliminate 
such evils.” 
     The judgment of this case remains a landmark in judicial history: death penalty for six 
policemen and life imprisonment for the remaining four.4  But most shocking was the 
unrepentant attitude of the policemen sentenced: “We are not guilty. The judgment will not 
hold good in the High Court,” they said in unison after the verdict, “no crime has been pin-
pointed,….now which policeman will touch the criminals.” It confirmed the observation of 
Justice Mulla who had described the policemen as “criminals in uniform.” 
                                                 
1 (Section 376(2), IPC) 
2 (Section 114-A, Indian Evidence Act) 
3 (National Herald, August 20, 1980, p.3) 
4(The Illustrated Weekly of India, Jan 28, 1990, p.12)  
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     The jubilation over the judgment in Maya Tyagi case remained short-lived. It was the 
verdict of the Supreme Court on rape victim Suman Rani.1  On March 21, 1984, a young 
woman, Suman Rani was raped by two policemen in Bhawani Khera police station in 
Haryana. She filed a complaint and after the trial, the accused were given the mandatory 
minimum sentence of ten years imprisonment by both the Sessions Court and the High Court. 
Thereafter the case moved up to the Supreme Court. In January 1989 the Supreme Court gave 
a judgment that again sent shock waves through the country: it reduced the sentence of the 
two rapists by half.  
     The 1983 amendment brought after so much struggle, carried a proviso, clearly meant to 
be applied only to rare cases, that the minimum punishment could be reduced only if there 
were adequate and special reasons, and it was this proviso that the judges used to reduce the 
penalty, citing as reason, ‘the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case coupled with the 
conduct of the victim.’ The outraged response from activists and women’s organizations led 
to the issuing of a clarifications from the judges. Not once did the honourable judges consider 
that it would require tremendous courage on the part of the girl who had been raped at a 
police station to go back to the same place to report the crime. The public protests were to no 
avail and a review petition filed by several women’s organizations was turned down. 
     Thus the legal position is depressing but there are some stray judgments, which keep the 
hope alive. In a case the Supreme Court remarked: “decency and morality in public life can 
be protected and promoted if courts deal strictly with those who violate the societal norms.’ 
When a police officer commits rape on a girl there is no room for sympathy or pity. The 
punishment in such cases should be exemplary. It may be noted for record that the actual 
punishment awarded and confirmed was only five years imprisonment, half of what is 
prescribed by law as the minimum.2  
(8) Gang Rape.  When a woman is raped by one or more in a group of persons acting in 
furtherance of their common intention, each of them is deemed to have committed gang rape 
which is the crudest and the most extreme form of male chauvinism and is treated as an 
                                                 
1(AIR 1989 SC 538)  
2 (State of Maharashtra v. Chandra Prakash Keval Chand Jain, AIR 1990 SC 658) 
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aggravated form of rape under the Penal Code.1 The Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 1983 
included it in IPC. The minimum punishment for this offence is 10 years, but it can be 
extended to life imprisonment also. 
     In India there is no dearth of cases in point. On the night of February 1988, a group of 
policemen helped by home guards and chowkidars plunged the village Pararia in Bihar, into a 
kind of terror that one would relegate to the realm of a nightmare. It was to avenge the assault 
on two of their colleagues, which had taken place a week before. 14 policemen went on a 
rampage of looting destruction and mass rape. 
     These policemen were acquitted on the strength of the defence counsel’s argument that the 
women could not be equated ‘with such ladies as hail from decent and respectable society,’ 
these women were engaged in menial work so they were of questionable character. After the 
judgment there was total silence. No one deemed it fit to speak on behalf of these poor 
women who earned their living by the seat of their brows. It shows that there is no protection 
for the honest poor even from the State.2  
     Prosecutrix dragged and raped by appellants. Proved facts leading to an irresistible 
conclusion that victim was subjected to rape. Victim resisted and cried for help when 
appellants caught hold of her. Her mouth was gagged by means of towel during course of 
sexual assault. Question of her consent to the sex cannot be imagined. Court can act on the 
evidence of prosecutrix and implicit reliance can be placed on testimony of prosecutrix. 
Prosecutrix does not have a strong motive to falsely involve appellants. Trial Court 
committed no illegality in passing judgment of conviction and sentence against appellants.3 
(9) Rape On Minors.  Rape on innocent girls4 is literally murder of innocence. The 
insensitivity of the trauma and the agony is unimaginable, it takes a minute to happen but a 
lifetime to get over. In most instances the child is not a victim of criminals who entice 
children off the streets or playfields, but the crime is committed by an uncle, cousin, friend, or 
a neighbour.  One of the most important ingredients in the 1983 amendment was the clause 
                                                 
1 (Section 376(2)(g), IPC) 
2 (The Illustrated Weekly of India, Jan 28, 1990, p.13) 
3 (Sano Murmu & Ors. V. State of Orissa, (203) 1 Femi –Juris C.C. 492 (Ori.)) 
4 (Section 376(2)(f)) 
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regarding minimum punishment of 10 years, in case of rape of children below the age of 12 
years, but the rapists are let off on the grounds of benefit of doubt. 
     In a very brutal case of child rape the victim was an 11 years old minor. She told her 
mother that the two accuses had raped her and thereafter inserted sticks in her vagina. It was 
done to create an impression that she had got injured with a stick.1  
     Where the accused was a fully grown up male he was accused of raping a five year old 
girl. He had made an extra-judicial confession admitting the rape but later on he retracted 
from the confession. The accused was convicted by both the trial court as well as the High 
Court but the Supreme Court gave him benefit of doubt.2  
   A minor girl was raped and her categorical statement that she was forcibly raped by accused 
and nothing found in cross-examination to disbelieve her statement with regard to sexual 
assault on her. Medical examination report confirmed injuries on body of victim girl As well 
as her private parts confirming her statement. Evidence of victim girl was corroborated by 
medical evidence. Conviction and sentence recorded by trial court confirmed.3  
(10) F I R – Delay. Delay in making a complaint or reporting a crime may often result in 
embellishment, which is a creation of after-thought. The unexplained delay making the 
complaint would certainly affect the bona fides of the case presented at the trial against the 
accused. In rape cases honour of the family is involved, therefore, its members have to decide 
whether to take the matter to the court or not. If this process of decision takes 10 days, the 
case cannot be brushed aside on the ground of delay of 10 days in lodging the report. Where 
the victim was below 16 years of age and in doctor’s opinion she was used to sexual 
intercourse and no injury was detected on the private parts of the girl. On these findings of the 
doctor an argument was advanced that the questioned sexual intercourse was by consent Their 
Lordships of the Supreme Court repelled the contention and held that this fact is of no avail to 
                                                 
1 (Ghuraiyya alias Rohini Baisawar v. State of M.P., 1990 Cr L J 1129) 
2 (Jawaharlal Das v. State of Orissa, 1991, 3 SCC 27) 
3 (Nilanchal Panigrahi v. State of Orissa, (2003) 1 Femi-Juris C.C. 413(A) (Ori)) 
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the appellants as it is proved that Saroj Kumari was below 16 years of age. In such cases the 
question of consent becomes wholly irrelevant.1  
     The peculiar facts and circumstances of the case coupled with the conduct of the girl in not 
telling for about five days about the sexual assault perpetrated on her till she was examined by 
the S I in connection with a complaint given by her father against her paramour, do not call 
for minimum sentence prescribed under section 376. It was made amply clear by the Supreme 
Court this delay weighed heavily in their minds when they reduced the sentence of the 
accused policemen to half. This judgment of the apex court sets a very alarming precedent. If 
penalties could be reduced so drastically merely because there is a delay in reporting the 
crime, it holds truly ominous portents for the future.2  
     In case of delay in lodging FIR no inference can be drawn that complaint is false.3  
     Where the reason for the delay in lodging the first information report was the desire of the 
parents of the girl who was ravished to save the honour of their daughter, such delay is not 
fatal to the prosecution case and the conviction cannot be held illegal.4  
     The Supreme Court has elaborately enumerated the difficulties in lodging a complaint in 
Indian setting and the resultant delay5 yet courts often find delay in lodging the complaint as a 
ground to doubt the testimony of the victim. A victim of rape, specially custodial rape, cannot 
be expected to rush from the scene of the crime. She will not be in a fit condition to go to the 
police station and lodge a FIR in that state of mental and physical injury. 
(11) Provisions of Bail and Anticipatory Bail.  Normally in a case of rape, specially at the 
stage of investigation the question of bail should not arise. It is more so when the prayer is for 
anticipatory bail, but this is not a hard and fast rule. Bail depends in the facts and 
circumstances of a case as well as the discretion of the judge. If the judge feels that the 
                                                 
1 (Harpal Singh v. State of H P, 1981 Cr L J 1) 
2 (State of Haryana v. Ram Lal, AIR 1989 SC 937) 
3 ((1995) 3 Crimes 527 (SC) 
4 (AIR 1970 SC 1029) 
5 ((1983) 3 SCR 289) 
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release of the accused will create problems in the investigation of the case, or the accused will 
use his freedom to blackmail the victim, the bail application should be rejected.1  
     The girl was made dead drunk, while she was under intoxication her clothes were removed 
and she was made naked. Photographs of her naked body were taken and then she was raped, 
thereafter, the petitioner started blackmailing her. The State counsel expressed the 
apprehension that if the petitioner was released on bail he will try to obstruct the complainant 
in appearing as a witness against him so some suitable arrangement will have to be made to 
see that it does not happen. The court granted bail but placed restrictions on the accused. He 
was prevented from meeting the petitioner and was restrained from going to South Extension. 
He was told to maintain peace and good behaviour during the period of bail. He was not to 
leave India without the permission of the court.2  
     The release of persons accused of rape on bail is highly demoralizing for the victim. The 
accused invariably uses this opportunity for blackmailing the victim and manipulates the 
evidence in his favour. Unless very strong reasons exist bail should normally be refused. It is 
distressing to note that policeman, superintendents of jails, managers of rescue and remand 
homes and doctors, accused of custodial rape are often released on bail on technical grounds.  
(12) Punishment For Rape.  Courts must not only keep in view the rights of criminals but 
also the rights of victims of crime and the society at large while considering imposition of 
appropriate punishment. Adequate and special reasons should be recorded for reduction of 
sentence.3   
     A sentence of 2 years’ R I cannot be considered to be excessive for an offence under 
Section 376, IPC, committed by a schoolteacher on a relation of his, who is a married woman. 
The school teachers are expected to guide and mould the character of the future citizens of 
this and therefore, they must themselves set proper standards of social conduct and behavior 
                                                 
1 (Shobha Saxena, ‘Crimes Against Women and Protective Laws’, Deep & Deep Publications, New 
Delhi (1995), p.88) 
2(Tajinder Singh Rana v. State of Delhi, (1986) 24 DLT 339 (Delhi)  
3(1955(4) Crimes 153 (SC)  
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and if they begin to behave like the accused they cannot claim any sympathetic treatment 
from courts.1  
     The pre- amended rape law did not have any provision regarding the minimum 
punishment. The quantum of punishment was left at the discretion of the individual judges. 
The 1983 amendment has laid down the minimum punishment for rape as seven years and the 
maximum as life imprisonment. In cases of custodial rapes, rape on pregnant women, rape on 
girls under 12 years of age and gang rapes, the minimum sentence is ten years imprisonment 2  
However, this amendment has a proviso which empowers a court to impose a sentence of less 
than the prescribed minimum of ten years for adequate and special reasons to be recorded in 
writing, but what those ‘special and adequate reasons’ are is left to the will and the wisdom of 
the judges. The only condition imposed on them is that they must record their reasons in the 
judgment. Punishment can still be less than the prescribed minimum. Those special and 
adequate reasons are often very flimsy yet the judicial seal makes them sacrosanct. It all 
depends on the discretion of the judges. 
     In a case the Delhi High Court struck down a Sessions Court conviction of 14 years to a 
boy of twenty years who had committed rape on an 8 years old girl in broad day light. The 
girl was bleeding profusely when her mother found her. The High Court held that the 
awarding of a 14-year sentence was not legal .The judgment stated that the courts had only 
two options: either life imprisonment or a sentence of maximum 10 years imprisonment. This 
was the special reason for reducing the sentence.3  
     In another case of rape reported in 1985 the Sessions Court convicted the accused with 
imprisonment.  On an appeal against the sentence the High Court of Himachal Pradesh held 
that since the rapist was a child under the Children’s Act, only an enquiry under that act 
should have been held and not a regular trial by the Sessions Court.4 It convicted the rapist 
with imprisonment till the rising of the court. It needs to be emphasized that if the minors 
                                                 
1 ((1962) 1 Cr L J 843: 1961 All Cr R 211) 
2 (Section 376, Indian Penal Code, 1860) 
3 (Jai Bhagwan v. State, 1986 Cr L J 975 (Delhi) 
4 (Himachal Pradesh v. Arjun Singh, 1985 Cri L R 248 (HP) 
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were old enough not only to have sexual intercourse but also forcible penetration causing 
multiple injuries, then they should not be given concessions in punishments.  
     In 1992 Justice Kuldip Singh and Jeevan Reddy of the Supreme Court reduced the 
sentence in the case of rape on a minor girl while disposing the appeal of the Madhya Pradesh 
Government.  The trial court had convicted Sunder Lal and sentenced him to three and five 
years rigorous imprisonment on charges of taking a thirteen years old girl forcibly from her 
house and raping her. He did this while the parents of the girl were away and the child was 
with the servant. The Supreme Court without giving any other reason said: “we reduce the 
sentence on both the above counts to the period of imprisonment already undergone. No other 
reason was given for in the judgment for the reduction of the sentence for this ghastly crime.   
     A large number of rapes on minor girls the amendment has proved to be totally 
inadequate. The compassion of the judges seems to be towards the delinquent rapists and the 
sentence in these cases has not proved to be a deterrent. 
     However, the apex court also took the strict view in some of the rape cases. In a case the 
judges rejected the plea of the appellant for a reduction of sentence. They stressed that 
normally there are two causes of rape: (i) human weakness, (ii) wickedness. In (ii) the 
accused needs no sympathy. In this particular case the accused was the virtual guardian of the 
girl, he misused the confidence placed in him and raped an innocent girl.1  
     Where the offence is committed by a boy of hardly thirteen years old, an inordinately 
long-term of prison sentence in jail is not justified.2  But when the same crime is committed 
by an adult male of 65 years on a girl who is barely 6 years old, the accused should be given 
severe punishment. 3 
     The proviso to Section 376 introduces flexibility and enables the courts to award lesser 
sentence in cases which deserve to be treated sympathetically and leniently because of 
peculiar circumstances. A perusal of the cases decided by the courts convinces the mind that 
                                                 
1 (Gajanand v. State of Gujrat, 1987 Cr. L J 374) 
2 (Kakoo v. State of H.P., 1976 SCC (Cri.) 270) 
3 (Ramkrishna Aggarwala v. State of Orissa (1976) 2 SCC 177) 
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is because of the conservative attitude of the judges and the anti-women bias that this 
discretion has often resulted in injustice to the victim.   
     In a case the Supreme Court held that omissions and contradictions in her cross-
examination noticed and the conviction of the accused is based primarily on her evidence. 
The prosecutrix had not stated that she was forcibly pushed inside the room of the appellant; 
or that the appellant had slapped her and out of fear she did not raise hue and cry but on 
contrary she had hidden herself inside the room. Her statement that she had been paid Rs. 50 
by the appellant and that she had tea with them on the day of occurrence as well, creates a 
serious doubt about the truthfulness of her testimony. Case of prosecution is not appearing to 
be credible and FIR was lodged after due deliberations. Prosecution failed to prove its case 
beyond reasonable doubt. Conviction and sentence of accused set aside.1  
     Accused stayed in house of prosecutrix for more than a year and committed rape many 
times but she only complained to her mother few days after accused left her house. Inordinate 
delay was made in lodging complaint of rape. Prosecutrix never raised any noise or 
complained to the neighbours. No resistance even offered and no external injuries found. 
Forcible rape under threat of putting her parents to death cannot be believed. The age of the 
prosecutrix below 16 years was not proved. The accused held entitled to benefit of doubt.2 
(13) Provisions for Protection of Victims.  Section 228A, IPC, Section 327(2) Cr. P. C. and 
Section 114A, Indian Evidence Act were introduced by the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 
1983 for the benefit of the victim of rape. 
     Section 228A, IPC protects the honour of sexually victimized women. It makes it possible 
for them to depose in court without any fear of social ostracism. 
     Section 114A, Evidence Act raises a presumption of absence of consent in cases of 
custodial rape, rape on pregnant women, rape on minors and gang rapes, just on the evidence 
of the ravished woman. These amendments have partially removed the infirmity from the 
evidence of the victims of rape, which has hitherto unjustly attached to her testimony without 
taking note of the fact that in India, unlike in the West, a disclosure of cases of this nature is 
                                                 
1 (Mohanlal v. State of Rajasthan, (2003) 1 Femi-Juris C.C. 97(SC) 
(Devanand v. State (N.C.T. of Delhi), (2003) 1 Femi-Juris C.C. 312(B) (Del)2  
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likely to ruin the prospect of the girl’s rehabilitation in society for all times to come and 
unless her story was painfully true she would not take such a grave risk merely to malign the 
accused. In cases of rape specially in custodial rapes it is almost impossible to get any 
independent evidence to corroborate her testimony. 
     According to Section 327(2) Cr. P. C. the enquiry into a trial of rape shall be conducted in 
camera. The discretion to allow any particular person to have access to the proceedings of the 
Court, rests with the presiding judge. The court can also do so on an application of the person 
desiring to be present at the proceedings. When the proceedings are being held in camera it 
shall not be lawful for any person to print or publish any matter relating to such proceedings, 
except with the previous permission of the court. Any person who prints or publishes the 
name or any matter, which may make known the identity of any person. Against whom an 
offence of rape has been alleged or found to have been committed, shall be punished with fine 
and imprisonment.1  
     Section 114A, Evidence Act providing that court shall presume that victim did not 
consent, if victim makes statement in court that she did not consent. Mere absence of marks 
of external injury do not negate the prosecution case.2  
     In order to establish an offence under Section 376(2)(g), IPC read with Explanation I 
thereto, the prosecution must adduce evidence to indicate that more than one accused had 
acted in concert and in such an event, if rape had been committed by even one, all the accused 
will be guilty irrespective of the fact that she had been raped by one or more of them and it is 
not necessary for the prosecution to adduce evidence of a completed act of rape by each one 
of the accused. In other words, this provision embodies a principle of joint liability and the 
essence of that liability is the existence of common intention.  All accused will be guilty and a 
completed act of rape by each one accused is not required to be proved.3  
       
 
                                                 
1 (Section 228A, IPC) 
2 (Prem alia Ballu v. State of Haryana, 2003 (1) Femi-Juris C.C. 153 (P&H) 
3 (Ashok Kumar v. State of Haryana, (2003) 1 Femi-Juris C.C. 44 (SC) 
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2. The Custom Of Sati  
Sati, the custom of burning widows on the funeral pyres of their husbands, was not peculiar to 
India but here it persisted the longest, till it was outlawed in 1829 with the efforts of Raja 
Ram Mohan Roy, the father of the Indian Renaissance. He pleaded that it was erroneous to 
consider women as weak in intellect and virtue and deficient in resolution, trustworthiness 
and control over passion.1  He opposed the custom of Sati and polygamy and encouraged 
widow-remarriage and used English education to transform the social system responsible for 
the misery of women. The first step in this respect was the abolition of the inhuman practice 
of sati by Lord William Bentinck very early in the day. 
     The enforced child-marriages; the exposure of the female children by throwing them at the 
junction of the Ganges and the sea, the violence used to make women follow the Sati rule 
and, thus, end their miserable existence, the shameful treatment according to a widow the 
famous kulinism which make marriage a profession rather than a sacrament, made woman not 
only an object of pity but many a woman sighed in the secret recess of her heart and wished 
that she had never been born a woman in the unfortunate country.2  
     The practice of Sati reflects man’s desire to acquire total control over a woman, not only in 
this world, but also in the world hereafter in the name of high- sounding ideals like love, 
devotion, duty and religion. Sati was the manifestation of this baseless and unjustified desire 
of man. 
Commission of Sati Prevention Act, 1987.  In the area of prevention of violence against 
women the enactment of the Commission Sati Prevention Act, 1987 has been a very 
important measure since the CSWI report. The earlier law on the subject was Lord Bentinck’s 
Sati Regulation of 1829, which had been enacted supporting Raja Ram Mohan Roy’s 
campaign for eradication the practice of Sati. The tough 1987 law banning Sati was enacted in 
the background of Roop Kunwar’s case.  
Roops Kunwar’s Case. Roops Kunwar was an 18-year-old university student. Her husband 
was an unemployed university graduate. He died of cancer. On the 4th of September 1987 she 
                                                 
1 (See J.C. Ghose, English Works of Raja Ram Mohan Roy (Allahabad, 1906), Vol. II, pp.123-28) 
2(Shakuntala Rao Shastri: Woman in the Sacred Laws (Bombay: Bhartiya Vidya Bhavan, 1959), p.171)  
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was burnt alive on her husband’s funeral pyre in Deorala, Rajasthan. There were different 
versions regarding the incident. There was one version that it was Roop’s voluntary act. There 
was yet another, that she was forced into the pyre. Activist women’s groups were outraged. 
They organized demonstrations in Rajasthan. The local people, however, retaliated arguing 
that the incident was quite consistent with their ethnic culture. There was even a local media 
report that Roop’s act was reflection of faith in “reincarnation”. After initial delays, Roop’s 
father-in-law and certain other members of the family were arrested for abetment to suicide. 
The National Law on Sati Prevention was enacted by the Parliament a few months later.1 
     Roops Kunwar’s murder in 1987 added one more dramatic symptom to the oppression of 
women in different parts of our country. The response of the Rajasthan Government and the 
society to the sordid episode was as horrible as the commission of sati itself. The government 
did precious little, till the High Court directed it to stop the Chunri celebrations. In fact, the 
Government had a very indulgent attitude towards the whole affair from the very beginning. 
It took the police full two weeks before it could summon up the will to arrest the people 
involved in the gruesome ritual. The State Chief Minister added insult to injury by justifying 
the Government’s inaction saying that this practice (of sati) is highly appreciated by the 
people and regarded as their religious right. The State Home Minister went a step further 
saying “to worship is a civil right granted under the Constitution.  The Government should 
not encroach upon this right. But, he forgot about the rights of the women. “It is not a 
question of women’s rights, stated an editorial in Jansatta, but of society’s religious and social 
beliefs. Those objecting to it are a bunch of Westernized Indians, alienated and out of touch 
with the Indian reality.” Roop Kunwar’s murder is a blot on the society. This murder was 
subsequently appreciated by politicians, by the masses in thousands and by the Dharma 
Raksha Samiti, which claims to speak for the Hinduism itself. They believe that religious and 
social beliefs must not be disturbed even if they are barbaric, trample on women and treat 
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 The National Commission For Women, Government of India, New Delhi, p. 269) 
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them as animals.  But responsible public opinion all over the country has of course 
condemned this barbarity.1  
Charan Shah Case.2 Surrounded by a picture postcard-perfect landscape, this very ordinary 
Bundelkhandi hamlet Satpura in Mahoba district of Uttar Pradesh has made national, even 
international, headlines after the Charan Shah, 55, “willingly” jumped on to the burning pyre 
of her husband Man Shah on 11th November 1999. The local administration and the State 
Government has attempted, mostly without success, to emphasise that this bizarre incident 
was not a re-enactment of the barbaric ritual of sati but a suicide by a distraught widow. But 
many people here say Charan Shah was the reincarnation of Sati Mata who “appeared” in 
Bihuni in flames and “cured several persons of various ailments”. Another story doing the 
rounds is that Charan Shah was “inspired” by a “vision” of Goddess Durga to commit sati. 
Ram Prakash Chowdhary, a village elder, claims that he was present minutes after Charan 
Shah, dressed as a bride, jumped into the flaming pyre. “When we reached the place, she was 
already on the burning pyre. She was not screaming or anything. And, in deference to her 
wishes, we remained mute spectators,” he adds. The dead woman’s sister, Prakash Rani said 
that “Charan first lit three diyas at the cremation ground, had a bath and then, wearing her 
bridal finery, leapt into the flames before anyone could stop her.”  
     The main reason our society glorifies sati to an incredible extent is that sati spells out the 
bottom line of our “Indian ethos”: a woman is worthless without her husband. While every 
day evidence of this root doctrine mounts, it is amusing to hear the routine assertion that 
women in India in the good old days were respected. But no Charan Shah of any era ever left 
us testimony that she was respected. A single woman is considered an incomplete human. 
Indeed, so is a married woman because her reason for being is presumed to be her husband. 
Her individual identity is replaced by her husband’s, not only in village communities but also 
in social groupings based on profession.3  
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An Overview The Commission of Sati Prevention Act, 1987 
Definitions. The “glorifications” of Sati is defined as the observation of any ceremonies or 
the taking out of processions in connection with the incidence or practice of Sati; the support, 
justification or propagation of the practice; or the arrangement of or participation of any 
function to eulogise a person committing Sati; the creation of a trust or fund or collection of 
donations for the purpose of a temple or any other structure with a view to perpetuate or 
honour the memory of a person committing Sati; or the performance of any ceremony for the 
same purpose.1  
      “Sati” means the burning or burying alive of (i) any widow along with the body of her 
deceased husband or any other relative or with any article or thing associated with the 
husband or such relative; or (ii) any woman along with the body of any of her relatives, 
irrespective of whether such burning or burying is claimed to be voluntary on the part of the 
widow or the woman or otherwise.2 
Punishment for Acts Done Under the Act  “Attempt to commit” sati is punishable with 
imprisonment up to one year or with fine or with both.3 
        “Abetment of sati” either directly or indirectly shall be punishable with death or 
imprisonment for life and also to fine and abetment to attempts to commit sati is punishable 
with imprisonment for life and also to fine4 
   “Glorification” of sati shall be punishable with imprisonment from 1 to 7 years, a fine of 
Rs. 5000 to Rs. 30000 and the confiscation of all assets collected in the name of Sati.  5 
     The Collector or the District Magistrate is empowered to prohibit the doing of any act 
towards the commission of Sati, the glorification of sati and the contravention thereof is 
punishable with imprisonment from 1 to 7 years and with fine6 
                                                 
1 (Section 2(b) of the Sati Prevention Act) 
2 (Section 2(c) of the Sati Prevention Act) 
3 (Section 3 of the Sati Prevention Act) 
4 (Section 4 of the Sati Prevention Act) 
5 (Section 5 and 8 of the Sati Prevention Act 
6 (Section 6 of the Sati Prevention Act) 
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      All officers of Government are required and empowered to assist the police in the 
execution of the provisions of this Act and all village officers having knowledge that sati is 
about to be, or has been committed in the area shall forthwith report such fact to the nearest 
Police Station. Whoever contravenes the se provisions shall be punishable with imprisonment 
up to two year and shall also be liable to fine.1 Abetment of Sati. The abetment shall be 
deemed to any inducement to a widow or woman to get her burnt or buried alive along with 
the body of her deceased husband or any other relative; making a widow or woman believe 
that the commission of sati would result in some spiritual benefit to her or her deceased 
husband; instigating a widow to commit sati; participating in any procession in connection 
with the commission of sati; being present at the place where sati is committed as an active 
participant; preventing or obstructing the widow or woman from saving herself from being 
burnt or buries alive and obstructing or interfering with the police to prevent the commission 
of sati.2  
Removal of Sati Temples or other Structures.   The State Government may direct the 
removal of such temple or other structure which has been in existence for not less than twenty 
years and wherein any form of worship or the performance of any ceremony is carried on 
with a view to perpetuate the honour of any person in respect of whom sati has been 
committed. The Collector or District Magistrate is also empowered to direct for removal of 
such temple or structure wherein any form of worship or the performance of any ceremony is 
carried on with a view to perpetuate the honour of any person in respect of whom sati has 
been committed. If the order is not complied with, the State Government or the Collector 
shall cause the temple or structure to be removed through a police officer at the cost of the 
defaulter.3  
Special Courts. The State Government shall constitute the Special Courts for the trial of 
offences under this Act, equivalent to Sessions Court, with judges of equivalent powers.4  A 
Special Court may take cognizance of any offence, without the accused being committed to it 
                                                 
1 (Explanation to Section 4 of the Sati Prevention Act) 
2 (Explanation to Section 4 of the Sati Prevention Act) 
3 (Section 7 of the Sati Prevention Act) 
4 (Section 9 of the Sati Prevention Act) 
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for trial, upon receiving a complaint of facts, which constitute such offence or upon a police 
report of such facts.1  
     All such cases are to be tried without delay, there being required reasons to be furnished if 
trials are adjourned beyond the next day.2  
     The Onus of proof of innocence rests with the accused.3 
     No person who had abetted the commission of Sati may inherit the estate, either whole or 
even in part, of the deceased woman.4  
Constitutional Validity of the Act.5 The Act has been enacted because Sati or burning alive 
of widow is revolting to the feelings of human nature. The Constitutional validity of this Act 
has been challenged before the Supreme Court. It has been pleaded that ‘Sati’ was an ancient 
institution of Hindu religion and there were temples named after Satis. The petitioners argued 
that performance of age old ceremonies of Sati Temples was prohibited and such a restraint 
was violative of rights guaranteed under Articles 25 and 26 (Right to Religion) and Art. 19 
(1) (a) (b) (c) of the Constitution, which ensure right to form association, to free expression 
and peaceful assembly. The legislature has failed to define ‘glorification’ properly in the Act 
and worshipping in ‘Sati’ temples was not an act of glorification.  
     The Indian Penal Code also contains provisions regarding offence relating to religion in 
Chapter XV. Thus on one had Constitution guarantees freedom of religions and religious 
practices, Penal Code provides for punishment, if the observance of religion or religious 
practice is interfered with or a religious sentiment is violated.  
     The debatable point is whether ‘Sati’ is part of religion or it is merely a custom, existing in 
certain parts of the country from time immemorial. Religion speaks of peace, amity, 
brotherhood and love of mankind. Religion does not propagate killing or self sacrifice of a 
living human being due to intimate temporal or spiritual attachment. The act of self 
                                                 
1 (Section 11 of the Sati Prevention Act) 
2 (Section 12 of the Sati Prevention Act) 
3 (Section 16 of the Act) 
4 (Section 18 of the Sati Prevention Act) 
5 (Dasharatha Rama Rao v. State of A.P., AIR 1961 SC 564) 
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immolation is not a part of religion, it is only a custom prevalent from time immemorial. 
Custom may be rites surrounding important events of life such as birth, marriage or death. 
     No religion can enjoin upon a woman the duty to sacrifice herself along with her deceased 
husband. Besides she is absolutely free to disobey any religious or customary sanction to that 
effect, due to the existence of personal liberty clause in Art. 21 of the Constitution. 
     The Act fully conforms to the required paraphernalia for constitutional validity of a 
legislation. The Constitution provides only for freedom of religion. Any customary practice, 
although in existence from time immemorial, may be interfered with by a suitable legislative 
enactment. Under Art. 13(3)(a), even a customary law can be abrogated. Even if there was a 
custom, which has been recognized, by law….that custom must yield to Fundamental Rights. 
     In a recent case1 the Constitutional validity of Sections 5 and 6 of Rajasthan Sati 
Prevention Ordinance, 1987 was challenged that it is violative of Art. 20 of the Constitution. 
The Ordinance was replaced by the Rajasthan Sati Prevention Act, 1987 and the provisions 
remained the same as in the ordinance. The Supreme Court held,  
     “The gist of the offence under Section 5 is the commission of an act, which amounts to 
glorification of sati. It is the commission of act by itself, which is made punishable on account 
of the same having been declared and defined as an offence by Section 5 of the 
Ordinance/Act. The gist of the offence under Section 6 of the Ordinance/Act is the 
contravention of the prohibitory order issued by the Collector and District Magistrate. Section 
5 punishes the glorification of sati. Section 6 punishes the contravention of prohibitory order 
issued by the collector and District Magistrate, which is a punishment for the defiance of the 
lawful authority of the state to enforce law and order in the society. What is punished under 
Section 5 is the criminal intention for glorification of sati; what is punishable under Section 6 
is the criminal intention to violate or defy the prohibitory order issued by the lawful authority. 
We do not agree with the High Court that the ingredients of the offences contemplated by 
section 5 and section 6(3) are the same or that they necessarily and in all cases overlap or that 
                                                 
1 (State of Rajasthan v. Hat Singh & Ors., (2003) 1 Femi-Juris C.C. (SC) 
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prosecution and punishment for the offences under Sections 5 and 6(3) both are violative of 
Article 20(2) of the Constitution or of the rule against double jeopardy.” 
     Even before the enactment of this Act, the act of commission of Sati was never viewed 
with reverence by the Courts in India. Such acts received severest punishment in their hands 1 
     Commission of sati is nothing but suicide. An attempt to commit suicide is punishable, 
similarly attempt to commit sati has been made punishable in part II of the Act. Abetment of 
sati is also made punishable under Section 4 of the Act. Preventing or obstructing the widow 
or woman from saving herself from being burnt or buries, “alive”, voluntary commission of 
sati is equivalent to suicide, but force imposition of Sati on a reluctant widow is nothing but 
murder or culpable homicide. Both of which of one the gravest offences mention under the 
Penal Code. 
     Where the petitioners accompanied the funeral procession of Malsingh, and also took part 
in preparing the pyre on which Roop Kunwar committed sati alongwith her husband, and did 
nothing more, it may be the case of that of abetment of offence.2  
     Ad interim order prohibiting performing of Chunri ceremony within Shri Rani Satiji 
Mandir was passed. Application for vacating ad interim order was filed. Supreme Court held, 
restraint imposed on holding Chunri ceremony should continue without any variation. 
Determination of question whether Chunri ceremony amounts to glorification of Sati, 
however, not held proper at the stage.3  
     Sati worship gradually led to the glorification of this institution. Such glorification of this 
inhuman custom was leading to further fortification of this cruel custom of widow burning. 
Hence this new Act is totally justified in the present socio-economic scenario and it stands 
within the purview of all legal and constitutional justification. 
       3. Female Infanticide and Female Foeticide  
Girl children are neglected in society even prior to birth. The development of modern 
techniques such as amniocentesis and sex-discrimination tests has facilitated people to know 
                                                 
1 (Kinder Singh v. Emperor, AIR 1933 All 160; Tej Singh v. State, AIR 1958 Raj. 169) 
2(Deenalal v. State of Raj., 1988 (1) Crimes 127)  
3 (A. I. D. Women’s Assocn. V. Union of India, AIR 1989 SC 1280) 
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the sex of the foetus. These contributed to the foeticides. According to study, it has been 
reflected that among 1000 foeticides, 995 are of girl foetus. In the prosperous cities, there are 
provisions of sex discrimination tests and the people of upper and middle class are practicing 
these. This has increased the number of female foeticides1   
India and China are, perhaps, the only two countries where there had been a regular practice 
of female infanticide. When the East India Company came to India it found female infanticide 
widely prevalent amongst the higher classes of Hindu community. In the year 1789, Jonathan 
Duncan, a member of the East India Company’s Civil Service, first discovered the prevalence 
of female infanticide among the Rajkoomar Rajputs in Banares. In a letter to Lord Cornwallis, 
he said: “I am well assured that it is indeed, here generally believed and being so, it my duty 
not to keep such enormities however sanctioned by usage, from the knowledge of the 
Government, that no infrequent practice among the tribe of the Rajkoomars to extirpate their 
daughters by causing their mothers to refuse them nurture; whence this race of men do often, 
from necessity, marry into other Rajput families.”2 
     In the year 1794 Sir John Shore gave a greater publicity in the existence of the practice by 
laying the subject before the Asiatic Society for its consideration. Duncan’s remedy was to 
meet the Rajkoomar families and obtain a solemn “Covenant” that they would renounce the 
practice. He also advocated a system of bribing them, as it were, to abandon it, by proposing 
to Government that pecuniary rewards should be offered for all females that might be born 
and reared. But this suggestion was not approved. It should be borne in mind that the 
Rajkoomars killed their female infants for two reasons. First, the practice started from the 
time of Muslim rule when Hindu women were forcibly taken away by the Muslims, and, 
secondly, the father of the girl was not able to find a suitable bridegroom and when found, he 
could not meet the expenses for the marriage.3  
    Duncan was appointed the Governor of Bombay and there his work in putting down female 
infanticide became a matter of history. He found female infanticide prevalent in Surat, Cutch, 
                                                 
1 (Namrata Prasad, Human Rights: Gender Based Violence, published in Yojana Vol 47 Dec 2003 
 No.12) 
2 (Ghosh S.K., ‘Women and Crime’, Ashish Publishing House, New Delhi (1993), p.95) 
3 (ibid., p.96) 
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Gujrat and still more in Rajput ruled princely States. In the neighbourhood of Baroda, 
Rajputs, under the title of Jerejahs, practiced female infanticide universally. The tribe claimed 
to be among the highest purest branches of the Rajput families. The origin of the custom 
amongst Jerejah Rajputs is narrated by Colonel Walker. A powerful Raja of the Jerejah clan 
had a daughter of singular beauty and accomplishments. Failing to get her married to a 
suitable match the princess was put to death and female infanticide from that time was 
practiced by the Jerejahs. Moreover, the practice of the Muslim and Mughal rulers demanding 
the daughters of the Rajput rulers in marriage contributed to the custom amongst Rajput 
ruling families. Affluent rural communities like the Patels of Gujrat and Rajputs are known to 
have practiced female infanticide for ages. The patels in the Kheda district of Gujrat had a 
legacy of female infanticide and as a result, the female ratio came down to 200 at one time. 
The British banned the practice in 1900. The poor resorted to it on account of dowry menace 
and the rich out of a sense of pride – how could a warrior class of people produce girls? 
Certain tribal communities and some poor Muslims in Hyderabad are allegedly get rid of their 
female offspring because they cannot afford to give dowry. It was reported, as late as in 1986, 
that there was rampant practice of female infanticide amongst the poverty-ridden Kallar 
community of Usilampatti taluka in Madurai district of Tamilnadu.1  
     The ghastly topic of organized female infanticide in Rajasthan exploded into open when 
the State Opposition leader, Bhairon Singh Shekawat charged that the family of Brijendra 
Singh, Congress (I) MLA from Bayana in Bharatpur district for female infanticide. A 
Division Bench of the Rajasthan High Court, in its judgment, delivered in October 1988: 
directed the State Government to register a case and investigated by an officer of the rank of a 
DIG of Police.2  
     Among the Bhati community, in Rajasthan, female infanticide had been widely prevalent; 
female infants were routinely killed before they saw the light of the day, outside the mud 
hovels. The methods are as primitive as the tradition. A bagful of sand is used to suffocate the 
child, a heavy dose opium does the trick in other cases or when the new born is tough enough 
                                                 
1 (ibid., pp.96-97) 
2 (The Hindustan Times, October 16, 1988) 
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to resist both, she is simply strangulated. All this is done by the mother while the other 
women goad her to do away with the unwanted sibling.  
    Female infanticide is killing a baby girl after she is being born. Cases of female infanticide 
are seldom reported to the police. It is very difficult to prosecute when the people of whole 
village are involved. The Indian Penal Code 1860 punishes abortion and infanticide both 
directly and indirectly. Section 299 and 300 of the Code view infanticide as homicide. Female 
infanticide cannot be dealt with under section 302, IPC as in other cases of homicide. We 
have to change slowly the mental habits and outlook of these people by education. The 
parents are not murderers; they are victims themselves – victims of tradition, ignorance and 
isolation, poverty and accepted practice of the community. 
Female Foeticide  
     In the last quarter of 20th century the greatest irony of history is the rapidly advancing 
medical technology outpacing the law. The grey areas causing major social upheavals are the 
vital questions relating to amniocentesis, abortion and foeticide. The perplexing scenario 
represented by artificial insemination, reproductive industrialization and surrogate 
motherhood are reducing the woman’s body to a raw material. Today, more poignantly than 
any other issue, the abortion raises the timeless dilemmas of private conscience in the arena of 
public morality and in the context of a struggle over hopeless beings unseen but profoundly 
sensed. 
     The ultimate Hippocratic dilemma1 the nightmare that unsettles a good doctor’s sleep, a 
pregnant patient symbolizing the height of womenlib, has chosen an abortion and the doctor 
performs the procedure by injection of prostaglandin.2  But when some hours later the foetus 
is expelled it is not the 22 week old creature he had anticipated. It is 26 weeks old and alive. 
     Census 2001 indicates the alarming decline of sex ratio in the age group of 0 to 6 years in 
the State of Gujrat, Himachal Pradesh, Delhi, Punjab and Haryana. The main cause of 
declining sex ratio in Indian society is due to female foeticide and female infanticide. Female 
                                                 
1 (“Hippocratic oath” guiding medical doctors, and Oslo Declaration, 1970: “I will maintain the utmost 
 respect for human life from the time of conception”.) 
2 (Harmone like substances that induce labour.) 
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foeticide is aborting the female baby in the mother’s womb. Whereas female infanticide is 
killing a baby girl after she is being born. Foeticide is a violation of an unborn child. A child 
in its mother’s womb is for many purposes regarded by a legal fiction as already born, in 
accordance with the maxim, ‘Nascitutus pro jam-nato habetur. The law in many cases has 
consideration of an unborn child in respect of the apparent expectation of his/her birth. Thus 
in law of property there is a fiction that a child enventre sa mere is a person in being for the 
purpose of (1) the acquisition of property by the child itself, or (2) being a life chosen to form 
part of the period in the rule against perpetuities.1  
Foeticide Through The Ages.  Foeticide was prohibited and classified as murder, equal to 
neglect of Vedas, incest and drinking of spirituous liquors. Man even considered a woman as 
murderer of her husband or of Brahmin or as an outcaste who had undergone abortion. The 
Buddhists, who condemned the destruction of life, laid down that the Bhiku “who 
intentionally destroys a human being by way of abortion is no Samana and no follower of 
Sakeyaputta.” As per Gandhiji, “abortion was more in violation of the principle of the ahimsa 
than the artificial birth control which was morally blameworthy. Holy Quran prohibits the 
killing of child, “Astray have gone those who stupidly kill their children without knowledge 
and deny to themselves of what Allah has blessed them with.” The Didache, an authoritative 
source of Christian law, considered abortion, as a grievous sin and was included in the Ten 
Commandments, which contain the forbidden acts. Every human being including the unborn 
child in the womb of its mother receives the right to life directly from the Almighty God but 
not from parents, society or any other authority. 
Sex Selection Through Modern Technology.  Roughly two centuries ago there were places 
in India when girls were given a pinch of salt as soon as they were born and that was the end 
of them. The evil practice has returned with a vengeance in the garb of high tech sex selection 
accompanied by abortion.  
     Amniocentesis, the withdrawal and analysis of amniotic fluid to identify possible genetic 
abnormalities in an unborn child, is the product of modern technology. Amniocentesis is the 
                                                 
1 (Jessy Kurian, ‘A Cry Unheard, Female Foeticide and Female Infanticide’, published in Legal News 
 & Views (November 2003), Social Action Trust Publication, New Delhi) 
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most widely used method for sex determination. In the mother’s womb the foetus floats in 
amniotic sac. This fluid has some cells of foetus flowing in it. A long aseptic needle is 
inserted through the mother’s abdomen into the amniotic sac and about 20 cc amniotic fluid is 
withdrawn. The insertion is carried out under ultrasonic cover in such a manner that the 
location of foetus is monitored on a screen using audible sound waves. This facilitates the 
insertion of a needle without damaging the foetus. The fluid thus withdrawn is subjected to 
chromosomal analysis, which throws light on the sex of the foetus. This test should usually be 
done between 16th and 18th week of pregnancy. Insertion of needle can damage placenta or 
foetus. It may leave puncture marks over body and may result into eventual abortion. The 
result of sex determination is known after the end of fourth month of pregnancy. If pregnancy 
is terminated after that period it is risky and unhealthy for mother. A repetition of such tests is 
very hazardous for her health. Basically, it is a technique to determine genetic abnormalities 
at the pre-natal state. Chorion Villi Ropsy is a method where the cells of the chorion are 
removed and studied for chromosomal abnormalities. It can be carried out within 12 weeks of 
pregnancy. So the abortion is easier. It is more likely to give impetus to large-scale sex 
determination and female foeticide. There are 10,000 female foeticides in Baroda during the 
last decade. It was also estimated that during 1987 there were 2400 such tests. So that year 
saw the disappearance, before appearing in this world, of 1200 females from their mothers’ 
wombs. What an efficient method of female population control.1  
     According to senior researcher Lori Heise of the World Watch Institute of Washington, in 
Bombay, sex detection tests are often used as the basis for deciding whether a foetus should 
be aborted. Of 8000 abortions performed at one clinic of Bombay, 7999 of the fetuses were 
found to be female.2  According to an estimate there are about 10,000 female foeticide cases 
in Ahmedabad. However, the government of Gujrat has failed to find out the extent of the 
                                                 
1 (Shukla B.M., ‘ Medico-Legal Aspects of Pre-Natal Sex Determination Tests: A Plea For A Uniform 
 Central Act’ in ‘Women And Law, Problems and Prospects’ Ed. By Raizada R.K., Law 
 Department, M.D University, Rohtak) 
2 (Indian Express, Ahmedabad, 12 March 1989) 
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abuse of sex determinations tests. Though it is well known that such tests are being 
extensively carried out all over Gujrat.1  
The Legal Position. (i) Provisions of IPC. The Indian Penal Code, 1860 made causing 
abortion a punishable offence, anyone voluntarily causing a woman with child to miscarry is 
punishable with imprisonment up to 3 years2 However, such miscarriage caused in good faith 
to save the woman’s life is not punishable. If the woman is quick with the child, i.e., the child 
has assumed the form of foetus (normally after 5 months) and she is caused to miscarry, the 
punishment is raised to imprisonment up to 7 years.3  If the miscarriage is caused without the 
woman’s consent, the offence is punishable by imprisonment up to 10 years.4  Similar 
punishment is provided for any act, which causes death of the woman by an act intended to 
cause miscarriage. And if such an act is done without her consent, it is punishable with 
imprisonment for life.5  Any act done with the intention of preventing a child from being born 
alive or causing it to die after birth, unless it is done to save the life of the mother, is 
punishable with imprisonment up to life.6  An act done with knowledge that it might cause the 
death of the pregnant woman, but which causes death of the quick unborn child instead, is 
punishable with imprisonment up to 10 years.   
(ii) Main Features and Impact of Medical Termination of Pregnancy Act, 1971 (MTPA). 
The Indian Law of abortion, the Medical Termination of Pregnancy Act, 1971 came into force 
on April11, 1972. This law has liberalized the abortion rules. The chances of abuse of such 
liberal abortion law have increased. In all the big cities private clinics or hospitals have 
started amniocentesis tests. Within a few years such tests became money spinner. Many 
doctors are doing exclusively this work and women are permitting abortion of the female 
child. For example in June 1982 two doctors of New Bhandari Hospital in Amritsar published 
a circular as under:7 
                                                 
1 (Ila Pathak, “Female Foeticide Should End”, Times of India, Ahmedabad, 14 July, 1988) 
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3 (Section 312, IPC) 
4 (Section 313, IPC) 
5 (Section 314, IPC) 
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“Dear Doctors, 
Most prospective couples in quest of a male child, as the social set-up in India demands, keep 
on giving birth to a number of female children, which in a way not only enhances the 
increasing population but also leads to a chain reaction of many social economic and mental 
stress in these families. Amniocentesis and Antenatal sex determination has come to our 
rescue and can help in keeping some check over the accelerating population as well as give 
relief to the couples requiring a male child.” 
     The doctors claimed that such test would check the population growth and would give a 
chance to avoid an unwanted daughter. The most horrible thing was that the doctors kept the 
foetus of twin, both girls, as a show piece for such women who were hesitant in going 
through the test. The doctors also brought a woman on whom they had performed the test so 
that she could tell other women herself how happy she was, and that she had been able to get 
rid of the foetus of twin girls. 
      A radical change in the law relating to abortions was introduced by the Medical 
Termination of Pregnancy Act, 1971 (MTPA). It legalized abortions in certain circumstances. 
It permitted the termination of pregnancy under following conditions: (a) if it is less than 12 
weeks on a certificate of one registered gynecologists or obstetrician; (b) if it is between 12 
and 20 weeks on a certificate of two registered gynecologists and obstetricians; if (i) 
pregnancy would involve a risk to the life of the pregnant women; or cause grave injury to her 
physical or mental health; (ii) there was a substantial risk that the child if born would suffer 
from physical or mental abnormalities so as to be seriously handicapped; (c) at any time on a 
certificate of two registered doctors if it is immediately necessary to save the life of the 
pregnant woman.   
     The medical termination of pregnancy can only be affected at a government hospital or at 
an approved hospital. All such terminations can only be with the consent of the woman. 
Under the MTPA all abortions after 20 weeks are illegal. Amniocentesis is usually carried out 
in the 16th week of pregnancy. For proper results about sex determination the amniotic cells 
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have to be cultured for 3 weeks. If the abortion is caused after such proper sex determination 
test, it will fall outside the twenty- week period provided in the MTPA. This is most welcome 
to some doctor! Besides, the doctors in order to avoid the law, may not culture the cells for 
the adequate period or may, without such tests, opine that the woman had a female foetus. 
Then the ultimate result is its abortion. Thus they can successfully avoid any liability in law 
and yet flourish in their practice. 
     The most abortions performed after amniocentesis take place in the gestation problematic 
zone. The result of the test may not be ready until the 21st week or even later. According to 
rough estimates in India between 1978 and 1984 around 79000 female fetuses were aborted 
after amniocentesis.1 When the Maharashtra Government came under heavy fire from various 
quarters attacking the gross misuse of amniocentesis and large scale female foeticide, the state 
government finally responded by passing a legislation banning completely the evil practices.  
2  Despite the ban in Maharashtra the female foeticide through abortion had come to stay in 
order cities. High-tech sex selection is more an urban phenomenon due to its availability and 
inexpensiveness. It can be got done for as little as Rs.200/-. 
     The approximation of the scenario is that today increasingly survival is possible for fetuses 
provided they can legally be not aborted. The scheme of the MTP Act acknowledges the 
viability of the foetus at a period much earlier that 28 weeks. Failure to attempt to sustain the 
living infant is a fit case to be treated as attempted child destruction or actual homicide. Legal 
precedents are lacking what few there are, are inconsistent. A great anomaly exists. A child 
born with defects can sue for injuries suffered while in womb for the negligence under the 
law of torts. The criminal law as well as property laws have equipped the unborn with 
necessary legal right. The MTP Act is definitely out-dated in as much as today the viability 
begins in the range of 24 weeks. The gap of 4 weeks i.e., about 30 days is significant which 
transforms the creature from a concept to a living being. In neo-natal intensive care units 
doctors treat 24 to 26 weeks old foetus and they stand a good change of surviving to lead 
                                                 
1 (News Week 14 Jan. 1985) 
2 (Amniocentesis is banned by the Maharashtra Regulation of Use of Pre-Natal Diagnostic Techniques 
Act, 1987) 
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healthy lives. The foetus aborted at about 28th week is a living being, a legal entity and a 
person and one cannot deprive it of its vital ‘life’ which is a clear violation of article 21 of the 
Constitution, as the MTP Act is unjust and unfair. It is high time that the MTP act recognizes 
the realities of medical advancement raising new policy question.1  
Constitutional Validity of the MTP Act.  If we examine this problem in the light of 
constitutional protection of life and liberty under article 21 the things would be more clear. 
Article 21 says that no person shall be deprived of life or personal liberty except according to 
the procedure established by law. The purpose of the amniocentesis test is to ascertain 
whether the child in the mother’s womb is healthy or deformed or abnormal. If the child is 
healthy but a female would the mother be entitled to deprive life to such a healthy child. As 
already said above the amniocentesis test is possible only between 16th and 20th week of 
pregnancy. During this period a child has enough life in the mother’s womb. If the child is 
alive she is a person under article 21 and if she is healthy the procedure established by law i.e. 
under the MTP Act does not provide that such a child be deprived of his/her life whether the 
foetus is of male or female. The Supreme Court has held from time to time that the procedure 
established by law should not be departed from to the disadvantage of the person affected. 
The procedure established by law no longer means any procedure enacted by legislature; to 
satisfy the requirement of article 21 it must be fair, reasonable and just.2  If article 21 is the 
sole repository of the right to life and personal liberty, it is very difficult to think that the 
MTP Act, 1971 can permit the taking away of the life of a female child at the desire of the 
mother. 
     A surgeon has an authority to terminate the woman’s pregnancy if he considers it 
necessary on medical grounds. The limits of law are clear. On medical grounds for the 
protection of the health of mother or on grounds of infirmity of child abortion is permissible. 
But abortion law nowhere permits termination of pregnancies because the healthy foetus is of 
female. In all the countries the physician or surgeon and the patient are deemed to have 
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 of Law Department, M.D. University, Rohtak, (1996) 
2 (Sukh v. Union Territory, 1986 (2) SCC 401 and Sher Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1983 SC 465) 
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committed an offence of abortion of a healthy female child. If the MTP Act violates the 
constitutional principles of life and liberty, such laws need to be examined thoroughly. In fact 
there is a need for public interest litigation against such cases where the women violate not 
only the rules of nature but the constitutional law in depriving life to the healthy female foetus 
of 16 to 20 weeks life. It is not only legal but a sociological question also whether the women 
be permitted to create imbalance in the population ratio of this country. 
     The abortion law did not permit abortion with a view to getting rid of a female foetus. 
Such act is outside the purview of the MTP Act and is patently illegal and the doctors who do 
it must be criminally prosecuted. Amniocentesis per se need not be banned because it is 
beneficial to trace out the genetic disorder. The ban should be only on sex determination. A 
separate law should be passed or a provision should be made to MTP, Act to this effect.  
The Overview of The Pre-Natal Diagnostic Techniques (Regulation and Prevention of 
Misuse) Act, 1994 (in short the PNDT Act) To remedy the aforesaid uncertainties and 
inconsistencies, a strong plea is made to the Union Government to pass a comprehensive 
legislation on the line of the Maharashtra Regulation of Use of Pre-natal Diagnostic 
Techniques Act, 1988. An open letter to the then Prime urged him to intervene and help to 
bring forward immediately a bill to ban the abuse of such techniques by private medical 
sector. To regulate the pre-natal tests the Parliament passed The Pre-Natal Diagnostic 
techniques (Regulation and Prevention of Misuse) Act, 1994. The main features are as under: 
(i) Section 4(2) provides that no pre-natal diagnostic techniques shall be conducted except for 
the purposes of detection of any of the following abnormalities, namely, Chromosomal 
abnormalities, genetic metabolic diseases, haemoglobinopathies, sex-linked genetic diseases, 
congenital anomalies etc.: (ii) Section 4(3) provides that no pre-natal diagnostic techniques 
shall be used or conducted unless the person qualified to do so is satisfied that any of the 
following conditions are fulfilled, namely, age of the pregnant woman is above thirty-five 
years; the pregnant woman has undergone two or more spontaneous abortions or foetal loss; 
the pregnant woman had been exposed to potentially teratogenic agents such as drugs, 
radiation, infection or chemicals; the pregnant woman has a family history of mental 
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retardation or physical deformities such as spasticity or any other genetic disease etc. and 
section 4(4) says that no person being a relative or the husband of the pregnant woman shall 
seek or encourage the conduct of any pre-natal diagnostic techniques on her except for the 
purpose specified in clause (2): (iii) Before undergoing the pre-natal diagnostic procedures a 
written statement of the pregnant woman is made essential under section 5(1) and section 5(2) 
prohibits that no person conducting pre-natal diagnostic procedures shall communicate to the 
pregnant woman concerned or her relatives the sex of the foetus by words, signs or in any 
other manner.: (iv) No genetic clinic, center, laboratory and no person shall conduct or cause 
to be conducted any pre-natal diagnostic techniques including ultrasonograhy for the purpose 
of determining the sex of the foetus is given in section 6 of this Act.                
 Causes for the Failure of the PNDT Act, 1994.  The following are the reasons for the 
failure of the PNDT Act, 1994: (i) The machinery required to enforce the PNDT Act, 1994 at 
the State and District levels was not put into place; (ii) The required allocation of resources 
needed was not provided; (iii) Not a single pre-natal diagnostic center had been registered 
until 2001; (iv) Due to non-maintenance of adequate records by the clinics it is difficult to 
identify the purpose for which an ultra-sound test has been conducted. Thus, the State’s 
complacency coupled with socio-cultural ‘demands of son’s preference’ and the unconcern of 
the Medical Profession led to the failure of the PNDT Act, 1994. Although the Act has been 
on the statute books since 1994, it remained largely ineffective in checking the proliferation 
of ultrasound machines and Mobile Clinics clandestinely offering sex-selection services 
throughout the country.1 
The Pre-Conception And Pre-Natal Diagnostic Techniques (Prohibition of Sex 
Selection) Act, 2002 – A Bold Step  
     Census Report 2001 shows that the sex ratio of 0-6 years fell from 945 females per 1000 
males in 1991 to 927 per 1000 males in 2001. The new figure gives India one of the world’s 
lowest ratios for women to men. The statistical norm is 1050 females for every 1000 males. 
India is being blamed on a strong cultural preference for sons. Impoverished parents’ 
                                                 
1 (Shanmugavelayutham K., Rights of Women, published in Legal News & Views (May 2003), New 
Delhi) 
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reluctance to raise large amounts of money for a girl’s dowry is often cited as the reason for a 
male child. The drop is largely due to the widespread but illegal practice of using ultrasound 
scans to identify female fetuses and then aborting them. Abortion is legal as per Medical 
Termination Act, 1971 when a woman’s life or health is at risk, or in cases of foetal 
impairment, rape and contraceptive failure. The pre-natal diagnostic techniques like 
amniocentesis are being used on a large scale to detect the sex of the foetus and to terminate 
the pregnancy of the unborn child if found to be a female child. Techniques are also being 
developed to pre-select the sex of child before conception. These practices are wholly 
discriminatory to the female sex and affect the dignity and status of women. The proliferation 
of these technologies may, in the future, precipitate a catastrophe, in the form of severe 
imbalance in male-female ratio. It is therefore necessary to bring an amendment in the PNDT 
Act, 1994. 
Objectives of the Act, 2002.  (i) to ban the pre-conception sex selection techniques; (2) to 
prohibit the misuse of pre-natal diagnostic techniques for sex-selective abortions; (iii) to 
regulate the pre-natal diagnostic techniques for the appropriate scientific use for which they 
are intended; (iv) to ensure the effective implementation of the Act at all levels.   
Important Features of the Act, 2002. (i) Recently developed techniques of sex selection at 
the time of conception like Ericsson method (X and Y chromosome separation) and pre-
implantational Genetic Diagnosis (PGD) are also brought under the ambit of the Law; (ii) The 
Act mandates compulsory Registration of all Diagnostic Laboratories. The manufacturers of 
ultra-sound equipment would now be required to sell their products only to those clinics that 
are registered; (iii) All genetic centers, laboratories, clinics and ultrasound clinics are to 
maintain records of all the tests conducted by them. (iv) No person can communicate to the 
pregnant woman concerned or her relatives or any other person the sex of the foetus by 
words, signs, or in any other manner while conducting pre-natal diagnostic procedures; (v) 
The pre-natal diagnostic techniques can be used under the conditions prescribed in the Act; 
(vi) No encouragement to do pre-natal test; (vii) The law provides for the setting up of State 
Level Supervisory Bodies to monitor the implementation of the Act. The board shall meet at 
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least once in six months. Already there is the Central Supervisory Board in operation at the 
Central Level; (viii) Any violation, including unlicensed labs, of the Act leads to seizure of 
equipments. The fine for those who indulge in sex selection procedure has been doubled from 
Rs. 50000 to Rs. 1 lakh, with additional provisions for the suspension and cancellation of the 
registration. 
     In addition to the above provisions it is necessary that the Act should be backed by 
stringent implementation machinery by the State. The roots of the female foeticide can be 
traced to deep-rooted patriarchy and anti women attitudes in the country. The Government 
should carry out women empowerment programmes vigorously. 
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CHAPTER- VI 
 
EVILS RELATING TO CIVIL LIFE OF WOMEN 
 
 
1. Prostitution 
     Prostitution has existed in India since time immemorial.  Prostitution is the crudest 
manifestation of societies where women have been driven to sell their bodies as a means of 
survival. While strict rules of conduct are applied to women, men can maintain their sexual 
freedom and promiscuity, which is considered proof of their manhood. This results in the 
segregation of women into two groups pure and virtuous, and impure and vicious. The latter 
are expected to satisfy the uncontainable vice of male sexuality. Prostitution is referred to in 
Vedas, Puranas, Mahabharata and Ramayana. As a matter of fact public women occupied an 
important place in the city life of ancient India. There are numerous references in ancient 
literature to the “City of Beauties” as they were called. The Puranas state that the very sight of 
prostitutes brings good luck. They had an honoured place because it was believed that 
cohabitation of men with the Apsaras of heaven had resulted in the creation of prostitutes. 
The kings used to keep them in their inner apartments and a visiting prince was entertained by 
free entry into their houses. Kings used to send their sons to prostitutes, to learn the wiles and 
the tricks of women lest they fall prey to women spies employed by the enemy kings. During 
the Mughal period prostitutes lived like nawabs, having access to kings and other dignitaries. 
The British were not in favour of prostitution but they did nothing to abolish it. Brothel 
keeping was not illegal. Most of the efforts that were made to abolish prostitution during 
British period, were limited to check soliciting in public places and to regulate the location of 
brothels. Legislation on prostitution varied from province to province, the law did not make it 
a crime but dealt only with particular aspects of this social vice.1  
                                                 
1 (Sobha Saxena, ‘Crimes Against Women and Protective Laws’, Deep & Deep Publications, New 
Delhi (1995), p. 259) 
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     The Preamble of the Constitution of India provides positive directions to be taken by 
policy makers for the protection of weaker sections of the society and in our society women 
definitely need social protection so that justice, social, economic and political is available to 
them in the true sense of the term. Apart from this the fundamental rights enshrined in the 
Constitution of India also take care of the special position of women and it is in this light that 
article 23 provides right to women against exploitation. This article prohibits traffic in human 
beings and forced labour.1 The judiciary in the case of Raj Bahadure v. Legal Remembrancer2 
has held that traffic in human beings or woman for immoral purposes has been held to be 
prohibited by article 23.3  The directive principles of the state policy which serve as a guiding 
star for various social welfare legislations to be passed in favour of women has also within its 
ambit various articles which show that the Indian Constitution is a “social documents 
concerned with the welfare of all and specially the weak. Article 39 lays down certain 
principles of state policy to be followed by the state. It directs that the citizens men and 
women have the right to an adequate means of livelihood. Clause (d) of article 39 provides 
that there is equal pay for equal work for both men and women; clause (e) states that the 
health and strength of workers, men and women, and the tender age of children are not abused 
and that citizens are not forced by economic necessity to enter avocations unsuited to their 
age or strength; articles 38 which is more social oriented states that the state is to secure a 
social order for the promotion of welfare of the people in which justice, social, economic and 
political shall inform all the institutions of national life. The philosophy under the directive 
principles of state policy is very progressive as it endeavours to prohibit all kinds of 
exploitation of women in all walks of life. 
Prostitution Cancer.  Prostitution is the worst form of exploitation of women and as an 
institution it speaks of man’s tolerance of this exploitation on an organized level in society. 
Woman is looked upon as a sex object and as an outlet for man’s baser instincts. The 
                                                 
1 (Article 23, Indian Constitution, (i) Traffic in human beings and beggar and other similar forms of 
forced labour are prohibited and any contravention of this provision shall be an offence punishable in 
accordance with law.) 
2 (AIR 1953 Cal 522) 
3 (Shama Bai v. State of U.P., AIR 1959 All. 57) 
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condemnation of the women and not of the man is the continuance of the standards of dual 
morality, which prevail in almost most of the countries with regard to men and women. We 
may take pleasure in projecting about the high status of women during the course of history in 
ancient India but the naked truth remains that prostitution is as old as is Indian history. 
Prostitution is commonly referred to as the oldest profession in the world. However, the 
nature and character of prostitution has changed over the year from respectability to its 
currently demeaning position. In ancient Greece, China, Japan, and India prostitutes had a 
distinct social status, for example in India the member of the institution of Devdasis received 
a fixed salary for religious duties and were permitted to supplement the income by their 
sexual favour. Changing socio economic conditions forced prostitutes to operate singly or to 
band in groups in the market to find common housing and territory to resort to being sexually 
indiscriminate.1  
Factors Responsible For Prostitution.  Social anthropologists are of the view that 
prostitution has always been present in the society in one form or another. In the 19th century 
there were customs like the institution of devadasis, which encouraged prostitution.2 Later on 
when the society changed with the advent of rapid industrialization, urbanization was a 
phenomenon which attracted more women to this social evil and these women are certainly 
other than the prostitutes already in profession by customs or otherwise. The various causes 
of prostitution may be categorized as under.3  
     (a) Natural events such as death of father/mother/guardian/husband, or relatives;  
     (b) Economic causes such as poverty and destitution; 
     © Domestic causes such as ill treatment or neglect by parents, husband, or relatives; 
     (d) Social causes such as kidnapping, seduction, deception, bad influence; 
(e) Causes of physiological significance such as sexual urge, illegitimate pregnancy, etc; 
                                                 
1 (Ministry of Education and Social Welfare, ‘Report of the Committee on the Status of Women in 
India, 91-92 (Dec. 1974) 
2 (Such women in the form of customary groups and were attached to temples as devadasis or the 
courtesans patronized by royal and aristocratic families. Also see Ministry of Education and Social 
Welfare, ‘Report of the Committee on the Status of Women in India, p.92 (Dec. 1974)) 
3 (Punekar, S.D. & Rao K., ‘Study of Prostitution in Bombay, 91-92 (1962) 
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(f) Causes related to mental disposition of attitudes such as ignorance, desire for easy life and 
moral values. 
Thus, it is evident that prostitution is widely operating in two forms, firstly, there is a class of 
women who constitute a hereditary class and for them this is more or less an ancestral 
profession; secondly; there are those unfortunate women who are in the profession most of 
the time by reason of causes beyond their control like destitution, economic constraints, 
matrimonial failures and sometime even desire to lead easy life, etc. Taking into 
consideration he three elements of the prostitution i.e. payment, promiscuity and emotional 
disturbances there can be two broad categories of prostitutes – professional and non-
professional (clandestine). Professional or the public prostitute derives her sole and only 
livelihood from this profession in a brothel or in red light districts in big town. The higher 
type in this profession are street walkers and ‘call girls’ who find their clients in hotel-lobbies, 
bars and luxurious establishments. Non-professionals are those who conduct the business in a 
clandestine manner.1  
SITA And Prostitution.  To curb sex business SITA i.e. (Suppression of Immoral 
Trafficking in Women Act, 1956) was passed. The main targets of this Act are pimps, agents, 
managers and keepers of brothels – in other words, those who indulge in prostitution as 
business activities. SITA was enacted by the Parliament to prohibit or abolish traffic in 
women and girls for purposes of prostitution. It is surprising to point out that the Act does not 
aim at the abolition of prostitution and prostitutes as such. 
Salient Features of Suppression of Immoral Traffic in Women and GirlAct, 1956 
(SITA).  
(1) Prostitution is defined under section 2(1) of the Act as “the act of a female who offers 
her body for promiscuous sexual intercourse for hire, whether in money or in kind, and 
whether offered immediately or otherwise, and the expression prostitute shall be construed 
accordingly.” To be called a prostitute under the Act, two ingredients have to be satisfied: (i) 
                                                 
1 (Punakar & Dixit, Economic and Social Status of Prostitutes and Devadasis (Tata Institute of Social 
Sciences)) 
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a female has to offer the body for indiscriminate sexual intercourse and (ii) she should do so 
for some payment.  
(2) Under section 7(1) any woman or girl, 21 years being the cut-off age to be a woman, 
who carries on prostitution, and the person with whom such prostitution is carried on, in 
premises which are within two hundred meters of a public place is liable for punishment with 
imprisonment up to three months. 
(3) Under Section 8(a) of the Act a prostitute can be punished with imprisonment up to 
six months or fine or both for soliciting. A prostitute can be convicted if she makes any 
gestures, says words or willfully exposes herself, even from her own house for the purpose of 
prostitution provided the solicitation was done to cause public annoyance or was offensive of 
public decency. 
(4) Section 8(b) includes soliciting not only by the prostitute but also by any other person 
who solicits for the purpose of prostitution. So pimps and procurers can be penalized under 
section 8(b). 
(5) SITA is in fact a penal statute. The penal provisions directed at persons other than the 
prostitute are laid down in sections 3 to 6, 9, 10 and 18. Section 3 provides punishment for 
brothel keeping. 
(6) Section 2(a) provides penal provisions against brothel keepers and defines brothel as 
“any house, room, conveyance or place or any portion of any house, room or place, which is 
used for purposes of prostitution for the gain of another person or for the mutual gain of two 
or more prostitutes.” 
Demerits of the Act-SITA. 1(1) Under the Act actual intercourse is not needed it is the act of 
offering the body for hire continuously which satisfies the definition of a prostitute, which 
means that a male prostitute is absolutely not covered by the ambit of section 2(f). 
(2) Since prostitution is not illegal the prostitute can carry on her trade wherever she likes 
subject to certain restrictions. It may be pointed out that under the Act the client is not 
punishable, a natural connotation of the section is that a prostitute is banned from public 
                                                 
1 (Ranbir Singh, ‘Plight Of Prostitutes In India And The Law: A Journey from Nowhere To Nowhere’, 
published in the Journal of Law Department, M.D. University Rohtak, (1996)) 
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places and forced to work only in certain areas. The object of the Act is of course laudable but 
in practice it has caused the prostitutes to be placed in a place, which is no less than a hell. 
She is forced to live in an environment, which is unhealthy and highly degrading for a woman 
in this profession. Section 7(1) frankly speaking operates against the interest of the 
prostitutes, not only this, the sexual partner who buys her for his sexual desire gets away 
freely because of the defects in the Act. 
(3) Section 8(a) is a provision which is the most common cause of police harassment of the 
prostitutes. Merely to indulge in some of direction with a stranger, or to behave in such a way 
as to attract the attention of persons of the opposite sex may be regrettable or immodest, but 
per see, it does not amount to any offence under Section 8 of the Act.1  The unfortunate part 
of this act is that it is a penal statute and there is hardly any mention of the welfare provision 
in it. However, section 19 is the only section, which considers that a women or girl who may 
want to get out of prostitution may be placed in a protective home or in the care of a court. 
This is known fact that a prostitute who is in the profession by unfortunate circumstances is 
mostly illiterate and totally ignorant of her rights. At the same time she is in such a web that it 
is very difficult of her to come out and seek the shelters provided by Section 19. The irony of 
fate is that even if they are sent to protection homes which are staffed by social workers, what 
kinds of protection such houses provide is also a sad story to narrate because records of such 
homes is very poor. Time and again in the news such homes are termed as “corruption den”. 
Recently the Supreme Court heard the situation in two such homes- Agra and Delhi-and it 
shocked the judges. The Supreme Court observed that there are ill-clad and diseased women 
pleading to be free, some had gone mad and some were sold back by authorities or supplied to 
policemen or used as domestic labour. In a case it was found that the inmates of the Protective 
Home at Agra were living in inhuman and degrading conditions in blatant violation of article 
21of the Constitution and by reason of their being in socially and economically disadvantaged 
position.2  
                                                 
1 (In re Kamala, AIR 1966 Mad. 312) 
2 (Upendra Baxi v. State of U.P., AIR 1987 SC 191) 
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(4) There is a provision for appointing a special officer who alone can arrest such persons or 
search premises under the Act. Search can be conducted before two respectable witnesses at 
least one of whom shall be a woman. All offences under SITA are bailable. In such 
circumstances no body likes to be a witness and most of the cases fail in the courts of law on 
that account. An important question arises: what can you do if prostitution is carried on in 
your neighbourhood causing annoyance and nuisance? One can complain under section 18 of 
SITA to the magistrate. After show cause notice and hearing, the magistrate can attach the 
building and order to evict the occupiers. The tragedy is that the brothel keeper are not 
punished because in most of cases they plead ignorance of the use of the premises as brothels. 
(5) The sad experience of being inducted into prostitution is not only sexual atrocities but also 
a definite chance of getting sexually transmitted diseases. In spite of the fact that the 
prostitutes are aware of the diseases because they involve lot of physical discomforts, the Act 
has not taken care of the situation. 
(6) The Act has failed (a) to ensure that no minors are involved in prostitution; (b) that 
nobody is physically forced into prostitution; (c) that police harassment is minimized; (d) that 
the women are given alternative facilities so that they do not fall in debt; (e) the health 
facilities are available to women and (f) that the children of prostitutes are brought up without 
the handicaps they now suffer from especially in regard to education. 
Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act, 1956 (PITA) 
In 1986 SITA was amended to do away with the loopholes that prevented it from being 
effective. This Act was renamed Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act (PITA). The amended Act 
has recognized that children and even men can be sexually abused and exploited for 
commercial purposes and should be protected in the way women and girls are. But this Act 
also does not prohibit prostitution or declare it illegal per se but on the other hand under 
section 8 a prostitute is treated as a criminal.  
The features of the PITA.  The features of the PITA are: (i) section 2(a) widens the 
definition of a brothel to include any place used for the purpose of sexual exploitation or 
abuse. This broader definition of a brothel would make it easier to prosecute brothel keepers 
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under section 3 of the Act; (ii) New clauses defining a child as person who has not completed 
sixteen years of age, a minor as a person who has completed sixteen years of age but has not 
completed the age of eighteen years, and major as a person over eighteen years have been 
introduced; (iii) Section 2(g) provides that protective homes should not only allow the woman 
to live in dignity but also to find means of gainful employment; (iv) Section 3 is amended and 
provides that landlords, tenants or other occupiers of the premises may not escape punishment 
for brothel keeping under the defence of ignorance so the new clause seeks to plug these 
loopholes; (v) Sub-section (1) of section 4 increases punishment for living on the earnings of 
prostitution of a child or minor; (vi) The amendments to section 5 are most welcome because 
it provides an increase in the prison term for offenders convicted for procuring minors and 
also makes provisions for life imprisonment for offences against children; (vii)Section 6 of 
the Act increases the punishment for detention of any person in premises where prostitution is 
carried on; (viii) Section 8 provides punishment for seducing or soliciting for the purpose of 
prostitution; (ix) Section 9 offers greater punishment to persons who ease, aid or abet the 
seduction for prostitution, of women or girls over whom they have authority or who are in 
their care and custody; (x) The Acts purport to omit sections 10 and 12 which is backward 
step because it will operate to the detriment of the interest of the prostitute as she is denied 
probation; (xi) Section 13(4) empowers the Central Government to appoint trafficking police 
officers; (xii) Section 15 of the Act empowers special police officers to search without 
warrant any premises where any offence(s) is/are being committed against women or girls. 
Clause 6A of this section prohibits male officers empowered for making search without a 
warrant unless accompanied by at least two women police officers. Section 15(4) provides 
that girls who are to be rescued will be subjected to interrogation by women police officers; 
(xiii) Section 16 of the Act enables a magistrate to direct a special police officer to rescue any 
person who is living, carrying or being made to carry on prostitution in a brothel; (xiv) 
Section 17(3) has been amended to confer discretionary power on the magistrate for interim 
placement of children and minors rescued under section 16, in an institute recognized under 
any Children Act; (xv) Sections 18, 20 and 21A have been introduced for protective or 
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corrective institutions to provide relevant records and documents. This is an important 
amendment for protective homes. Section 22A empowers the central government to establish 
special courts for speedy trial of offences under the Act. 
     The salient features provided by the amendment show that though number of changes have 
been made in SITA but still the majority of defects mentioned above from which, SITA 
suffered have not been removed. For example, even under the new Act alternate employment 
opportunities are not provided effectively. Because if a prostitute comes out of the profession 
she must have a place and a job where she feels safe and secure financially. In spite of the Act 
what the government has failed to appreciate is that no attempts have been made to control 
prostitution the way it should have been made. 
     Under the amended Act far reaching changes have been made in SITA yet it is to be seen 
how far it really helps in mitigating the problems of prostitute and prostitution. Because in 
spite of all these efforts by the legislature the prostitutes remain and prostitution is increasing. 
There is no denying the fact that instead of any check on the problem the social evil is fast 
spreading to almost uncontrollable limits. The evils of prostitution are even migrating to 
smaller cities. A sociological study conducted by Promila Kapoor throws valuable 
information on the recent phenomena of call girls operating in big cities. According to recent 
news- papers reports it is estimated that in Delhi alone more than 5 thousands call girls are 
operating. 
Prostitution and the Indian Penal Code.  The Indian Penal Code lends a helping hand to the 
special laws enacted to curb prostitution by attacking the source of this evil. Section 366-A 
and 366-B, IPC make the procuration of minor girls for illicit sexual intercourse illegal. These 
sections try to prevent prostitution by strict penal action. Sections 372 and 373, IPC make 
selling and buying of girls of any age for purposes of prostitution a heinous crime for which 
even ten years imprisonment and fine can be awarded. These sections conjointly punish both 
the giver as well as the receiver of a minor girl for immoral purposes, illicit sexual intercourse 
or prostitution. Section 372, IPC protects the minors even against her own parents or other 
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lawful guardians. Section 373, IPC strikes at the bawds, keepers of brothels and all others 
who fatten on the profits arising from the general prostitution of girls. 
Constitutional Validity of the Act.  The Act is not constitutionally invalid as offending 
Article 19(i)(g). It is no doubt true that the Act curtails the fundamental rights of prostitutes to 
carry on their trades. But the restrictions, except those imposed by Sections 20 and 4 (2) are 
valid not only because they are not unreasonable, but also because they have been enacted 
under Article 23 and 26 of the Constitution and therefore, override the fundamental rights 
guaranteed by Article 19(i)(g) without any reference to their reasonableness. So far as the 
unconstitutionality of Sections 20 and 4(2) is concerned it cannot invalidate the entire Act 
because these provisions are severable from the rest of the Act. Hardship is no consideration 
while dealing with the constitutionality of an Act. Therefore, if the Act is not ultra-vires on 
any count consideration of difficulty in rehabilitating the prostitutes or that the girls were led 
into prostitution by several causes over which they had no control can be no ground for 
invalidating the Act.1   
     In another case the Bombay High Court held that the provisions of Section 20 of the Act 
would not be hit by Article 14 of the Constitution though this provision which enables a 
Magistrate to direct a prostitute to remove herself from the place where she is residing to a 
place without the local limits of his jurisdiction was an unreasonable restriction upon the 
fundamental right guaranteed under Article 19(i)(d) and (e) of the Constitution.2  
     By now the settled view is that Article 14 does not prohibit reasonable classification for 
the purpose of legislation. The Court held in a case 3 that 
     “The difference between a woman who is a prostitute and one who is not certainly justify 
their being placed in different classes. So too, there are obvious differences between a 
prostitute who is a public nuisance and one who is not. A prostitute who carries on her trade 
on a sly or in unfrequented part of the city or in a town with a sparse population may not be 
so dangerous to public health or morals as a prostitute who lives in a busy locality or in an 
                                                 
1 (AIR 1959 All. 57) 
2 (Begum v. State, AIR 1963 Bom. 17) 
3 (State of U.P. v. Kaushaliya, AIR 1967 SC 416) 
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over crowded town or in a place within the easy reach of public institutions, like religious and 
educational institutions. Though both sell their bodies, the latter is far from dangerous to the 
public, particularly to the younger generation during the emotional stage of their life. Their 
freedom of uncontrolled movement in a crowded locality or in the vicinity of public 
institutions not only helps to demoralize the public morals, but what is worse to spread 
disease only, affecting the present generation but also the future one, such trade in public may 
also lead to scandals and unseemly broils.”   
     In this case the apex Court also considered whether this puts reasonable restrictions on the 
exercise of the Constitution. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court observed that the object of 
the Act is not only to suppress immoral traffic in women and girls but also to improve morals 
by removing prostitutes from busy public places in the vicinity of religious and educational 
institution. It is a fundamental right of personal liberty. No right can be more important to a 
person than the right to select his or her home and to move about in the manner he or she 
likes. Even a depraved woman cannot be deprived of such a right except for good reasons. 
Rejecting the contention as meritless the Supreme Court held, “If in a particular locality the 
vice of prostitution is endemic degrading those who live by prostitute and demoralizing others 
who come into contact with them, the legislature may have to impose severe restrictions on 
the right of the prostitutes to move about and to live in a house of her choice. If the evil is 
rampant, it may also be necessary to provide for deporting the worst of them from the area of 
their operation. The magnitude of the evil and the urgency of the reform may require such 
drastic remedies.”1  
     Sending of rescued women to the welfare homes as empowered by section 17(4) of 
Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act, 1856 was challenged as unconstitutional. The Court held 
that the provision is not violative of Article 14 and 21 of the Constitution.2  
Judicial Responses. Brothel implies that where a single person practices prostitution for his 
own livelihood without another prostitute or some other person being involved in the 
                                                 
1 (ibid.) 
2(Smt. M Vijaya v. Chairman & Managing Director, Singareni Collieries Company Ltd. & Ors., (2002) 
 1 Femi-Juris C.C. 256 © (AP))  
 282
maintenance of such premises his residence will not amount to brothel. It is not necessary that 
there should be evidence of repeated visits by person to the place for the purpose of 
prostitution. A single instance coupled with the surrounding circumstances is sufficient to 
establish both that the place was being used as a brothel and that person alleged was keeping 
it.1 There is nothing in the act, which punishes or makes liable for action a woman, who 
carries on prostitution for her own gain unaided by others or who carries it on for the mere 
pleasure or fun of it.2  
     SITA, 1956 defines ‘prostitution’ as the act of a female offering her body for promiscuous 
sexual intercourse for hire while PITA, 1986 defines it as the sexual exploitation or abuse of 
persons for commercial purposes. Thus present definition is not confined to the act of a 
female offering her body for promiscuous sexual intercourse with her but also includes abuse 
of a male for commercial purposes. The word ‘promiscuous’ implies an indiscriminate 
sexuality. A woman practicing prostitution for her own livelihood without another being 
involved in the maintenance of her house is no prostitution.3  
     The purpose of the Act is not to render prostitution per se a criminal offence, but is to 
inhibit or abolish commercialized vice as an organized means of living.4  Merely to indulge in 
some flirtation with a stranger or to behave in such a way as to attract the attention of persons 
of the opposite sex, may be regrettable or immodest, but per se it does not amount to any 
offence under the Act. If a woman of easy morals gaudly dressed bedecked with flowers and 
behaving in an indecent manner as to offend against public decency by giggling and making 
gestures with her hands talks to any person at a public place, would not amount to soliciting 
for prostitution, unless the actual words uttered by her for that purpose are proved. It excludes 
a permanently kept concubine or woman taken without paying any consideration. There must 
be indiscriminate sexuality requiring more than one customer.5  The phrase ‘for purposes of 
prostitution’ postulates plurality of instances of prostitution. A single instance would not 
                                                 
1 (Krishnamurthy v. Public Prosecutor Madras, AIR 1967 SC 567) 
2(Ram Devi v. State, 1963 All. L.J. 894)  
3 (In re Ratanmala, AIR 1962 Mad. 31) 
4 (Bai Shanta v. State of Gujrat, AIR 1967 Guj. 211) 
5 (In re Kamla AIR 1966 Mad. 312) 
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suffice for purpose of prostitution. But plural and indiscriminate sexuality can be inferred 
from the facts and surrounding circumstances of the case and it is not necessary that the 
evidence of more than one customer of the prostitute should be adduced. 1 
     A place in order to be a public place must be open to the public, a place to which the 
public have lawful access by right, permission, usage or otherwise.2  A public place is one 
where the public goes, no matter whether they have a right to go or not. Many shows are 
exhibited to the public on private property. Yet they are frequented by the public – the public 
goes there.3  
     An assisting police officer can do everything to help the special police officer appointed 
u/s. 13(3).   If an ordinary police can also perform the police duties for the purpose of the Act 
there can be no special reason for making the provision for the appointment of a special 
police officer. The expression ‘police duties’ will include all the functions of the Police in 
connection with the purpose of the Act and in special context of the Act they will include the 
detection, prevention and investigation of offences and the other duties, which have been 
specially imposed on them under the Act.4  
     If the husband lives with his wife and allows his wife to be a prostitute there is no reason 
for not believing that the husband was doing so for the purpose of living on the earning of 
prostitution of his wife. When such presumption is drawn that would be sufficient to 
constitute the house of the applicant a brothel.5  Any person proved to be living with, or to be 
habitually in the company of a prostitute is guilty of an offence. A mere visitor cannot be said 
to be living with or to be habitually in the company of a prostitute.6  
     The word ‘procurer’ takes in not only persons who procure women for others but persons 
who procure women for themselves.7  The word ‘procure’ as used in statute means ‘to acquire 
or to get’ and it necessarily implies the use of persuation, solicitation, encouragement and 
                                                 
1 (T. Jacob v. State of Kerala, 1971 Cri. L. J. 952) 
2 (Sripal – AIR 1934 All 17) 
3 (Wellard, (1884) 14 QBD 63; Hari Singh v. Jadu Nandan Singh Musa, (1916) 40 Mad. 556) 
4 (Delhi Administration v. Ram Singh, AIR 1962 SC 63) 
5 (Soni Bachu Lakshman v. State of Gujrat, AIR 1960 Guj 37) 
6 (Mathura Ram v. State of Bihar, (1969) BLJR 439) 
7 (Cherivan v. State, (1973) 17 Mad L.J.) 
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assistance in achieving the unlawful purpose but the use of promises, threats, violence or 
fraud are not necessarily included within the term.1  A female cannot be indicted for inducing 
or enticing herself into a life of prostitution; nor can she be considered her own procurer 
within the statute penalizing compulsory prostitution, regardless of depravity of female and 
moral guilty because of her participation in moral offence.2  
     The petitioner was recovered from ‘brothel’ on search warrant being issued by Sub-
Divisional Magistrate. Neither medical check of petitioner was arranged nor any criminal 
case was got registered by police against persons running brothel. There was inaction on part 
of District Administration to deal with situation effectively. High Court directed immediate 
departmental action to be taken against SDM concerned for not taking prompt action to get 
criminal case registered against persons running brothel and also for not making arrangement 
for medical check-up of petitioner. Directions were also issued against concerned police 
officers responsible for not taking any preventive and positive action in regard to activities of 
a brothel being run by concerned persons.3  
     In a recent case the scope of section 14 and 15 of Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act, 1956 
was explained. The sub-Inspector of Police conducted raid and search. The contention was 
that search and arrest were contrary to the provisions of the Act. It was held, Sub-Inspector of 
Police is not an officer competent to conduct search under section 15 of the Act because 
section specifically provides for conducting search by Special Police Officer or Trafficking 
Police Officer. Proceedings quashed to prevent abuse of process of Court or otherwise to 
secure ends of justice.4   
     Special Police officer can direct his subordinate officer to arrest without warrant any 
person for an offence under the Act. Direction must be in writing specifying the person to be 
arrested and offence for which arrest is being made. However, Special Police Officer or 
Trafficking Police Officer cannot authorize any of the subordinate officer for conducting 
                                                 
1 (People v. Johnson, 244 NW 251) 
2 (People v. Guardino, 30 NYS 2d 729) 
3 (Priya v. State of M.P. &Ors., (2002) 1 Femi-Juris C.C. 68 (MP) 
4 (Sinu Sainudheen v. Sub-Inspector of Police, (2002) 2 Femi-Juris C.C. 17 (Ker.) 
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search without warrant. Power of search and arrest without warrant vests in special police 
officer or trafficking police officer.1  
     Prosecution cannot succeed unless some specific instances of prostitution are proved. 
Mere fact that accused owner of building/kotha, in absence of any definite evidence to prove 
any specific instances of prostitution or that said kotha was used for prostitution with 
connivance of accused, would not be sufficient to make out offence under Section 3 of the 
Act. Offence under section 4 is also not made out, as PW 3 never stated that she ever paid any 
amount to the accused nor any other girl was examined to prove the same. Conviction and 
sentence passed against accused set aside.2  
     Despite all laws and International Conventions the sordid business of prostitution is 
flourishing, booming and expanding, in different forms, making the life of victims nasty 
brutish and short. Street -walkers, a common type of prostitute, normally stand at busy bus 
stops, gates of cinema and other crowded places. They pick up their clients by suggestive 
hints and gestures. Brothel runners get their clients through middle- men, pimps or madams. 
Call-girls are another variety of prostitutes who are flourishing because of the elite executive 
officials of the new-rich class of society and certain entertainment industries. The call-girl 
culture of prostitution is the indirect impact of the economic and technological development 
of our social structure. Five star hotels, masseur parlours and fashionable bars have call-girl 
system and sale of flesh goes on.  Besides abuse of power, economic, political and 
administrative requirements create circumstances, in which a woman employee is tempted, 
sometimes forced, to barter sexual favours for socio-economic gains for themselves or their 
family members. This new type of prostitution goes unnoticed by the law enforcement 
agencies or even by the public. 
  
 
 
 
                                                 
1 (Sinu Sainudheen & Anr. V. Sub-Inspector of Police, (2002) 2 Femi-Juris C.C. 426 (Ker.) 
2 (Mumtaj alias Behri v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi), (2002) 3 Femi-Juris C.C. 332 (Del) 
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2. Women Workers in Industries 
 
     The problem of women workers has continued since the early days of industrialization. It 
is common in almost all countries, developed and developing. Special provisions of labour 
law exit to deal with the special problems of women workers employed in factories, mines 
and plantations and other establishment. According to 1981 Census 63 millions1 i.e., 26 
percent of the total labour force, were women in agricultural sectors. Out of these the number 
of main female workers was 45 million. The employment of women workers in modern 
industrial system has given rise to several problems. First, a set of major social evil involved 
in the employment of married women worker is the “widespread disorganization of family 
life”.2 The effect of lack of maternal care on the development of a child’s personality may 
continue even in his adult life. The increasing number of juvenile delinquents, still born 
children, abortions, morbidity of women abnormal pregnancy, and premature births clearly 
reflects employment of women.3  Second, Indian women are generally considered a second- 
class wage earners by their employers and even by themselves. Third, the inadequacy of 
family income and the desire to supplement the meager family incomes4 compelled women 
workers to work in agriculture or industry which does not provide them adequate wages. 
Fourth, the employment of women in industry creates a variety of other problems, such as 
hours of work (i.e. during night), overtime, health, safety, welfare, maternity leave, etc. Some 
of the problems and the role of labour law in protecting women workers are discussed in the 
succeeding paragraphs. 
 Provisions of Working Hours for Women Workers.  In order to protect the workers from 
health hazard the law has imposed additional statutory restrictions on employment of women 
workers. The Factories Act, 1948,5 The Mines Act, 19526 and the Plantation Labour Act, 
                                                 
1 (GOI, Census of India (1981), Series I, Part II-B (i)) 
2 (Mathur & Mathur, Trade Union Movement in India (1960), p.72) 
3 (Ibid.) 
4 (Ibid.) 
5 (Section 66(b)) 
6 (Section 46) 
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19511 prohibits the employment of women except between 6 a.m. and 7 p.m.  The Mines Act, 
19522 prohibits the employment of women on any part of mine, which is below ground. 
Moreover, the Factories Act prohibits the employment of women on certain dangerous 
occupations.3 The reasons for providing additional restrictions are three fold; (a) Women 
work in factories, mines, plantations or other industrial establishment in addition to their 
house hold duties find the long hours of work very strenuous. However, to prescribe shorter 
hours by law to women workers as compared to male workers would undoubtedly lead to the 
substitution of men for women. (b) The sex disparity in many big cities, which is already a 
menace to the industrial workers, would be further accentuated by an increase in the 
proportion of men employment while it would be diminished if women were more generally 
employed. (c) If the hours of work are limited there will be less danger of their exceeding the 
capacity of Indian Women. 
Safety Provisions for Women Workers.  The Factories Act4 prohibits the employment of 
women in any part of a factory for pressing cotton in which a cotton opener is at work. 
However, if the faced end of a cotton opener is in a room separated from the delivery end by a 
partition extending to the roof or to such height as the inspector may in any particular case 
specify in writing, women may be employed on the side of the partition where the faced end 
is situated. 
     The Factories Act 5 prohibits a woman to clean, lubricate or adjust any part of a prime 
mover or of any transmission machinery while the prime mover of transmission machinery is 
in motion, or to clean, lubricate or adjust any part of the machine if the cleaning, lubrication 
of adjustment thereto would expose the woman to risk of injury from any moving part either 
of that machine or any adjacent machinery. 
                                                 
1 (Section 25) 
2 (Section 46) 
3 (Section 22(2)) 
4 (Section 27) 
5(Section 22)  
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     The Factories Act1 provides that no person shall be employed in any factory to lift, carry 
or make any load so heavy as to likely to cause injury. State Government may make rules 
prescribing the maximum weights which may be lifted, carried or moved by adjust men, 
women, adolescent and children employed factories or in any class or description of factories 
in carrying of any specified process. 
    The Mines Act, 19522 prohibits the employment of women in any part of the mine, which 
is below ground. Further no woman working above ground shall be allowed to work in a mine 
at an interval of not less than eleven hours between the termination of employment on any 
day and commencement of the next period of employment. 
      The Indian Merchant Shipping Act prohibits recruitment of women except as nurses to 
take employment on board sea-going ships. 
Special Provisions for Health and Welfare  
     The Factories Act,3 Mine Act 4 and the Plantation Labour Act 5 provide for special 
provision for women regarding health, safety and welfare. These provisions, inter alia 
includes separate provision for latrines and urinals, washing facilities, crèches, rest facilities, 
etc. Under the Factories Act 6 every factory should provide and maintain adequate and 
suitable washing facilities for its workers, for the use of male and female. Such facilities 
should be separate, adequately screened, conveniently accessible, and be kept in a state of 
cleanliness. The State Government is empowered to make rules prescribing standards or 
adequate and suitable washing facilities. 
Provisions for Creches.  Creches are not uncommon in many countries of the world. The 
need for establishment of crèches in Industrial establishment in India was emphasized as early 
as 1931, when the Royal Commission on Labour in India, 7inter alia, recommended that 
creches should be provided in every factory employing two hundred and fifty or more women 
                                                 
1 (Section 34) 
2 (Section 46) 
3 Chapter III, IV & V) 
4 (Chapter V) 
5 (Chapter III & IV) 
6 (Section 42) 
7 (See Govt. of India, Report of the Royal Commission on Labour (1931)) 
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workers. At the same time the Commission suggested that provincial governments should be 
empowered to extent the provisions of crèches even in establishment employing less than two 
hundred and fifty women. To give effect to its recommendations the Factories Act, 1934 
empowered the local governments to make rules providing for crèches: The Factories Act re-
enacted in 1948. This Act and the Beedi and Cigar Workers (Conditions of Employment) Act,  
1make it obligatory upon the employer to provide and maintain crèches in every factory 
employing thirty or more women workers. Further the Contract Labour (Regulation and 
Abolition) Central Rules, 1971 specifies the standards of construction and maintenance of 
crèches. In practice, it is, however, found that crèches have not been provided in many 
factories employing 30 or more women workers. 
     Creches, however, did not find a place in the statute book regarding plantations till 1951. 
Section 12 of the Plantation Labour Act, 1951 provides for crèches in plantations employing 
thirty or more women workers. However, in practice, it is found that crèches have not been 
provided in many plantations. Further the facility provided in many cases was found to be 
deficient in one respect or the other. 
     Under Section 58(d) of the Mines Act, 1952, the Central Government is empowered to 
make rules to provide for suitable room for the use of children under six years belonging to 
women working in mines. The Mines Creches Rules, 1966 make it obligatory upon the 
owner/agent/manager of a mine to provide crèches for children under six years of age. The 
rule also provide for the standards of construction and maintenance of crèches in the mines. 
Creches facilities are, however, non-existent in port areas although a good number of women 
workers are employed therein. The number of women workers in a port trust varies from 350 
to 500. 
Provisions for Maternity Benefits  
     The Maternity Benefit Act (Amendment) Act, 1988, the Employees State Insurance, 1948 
which are the premier social security legislation and the Plantation Labour Act, 1951, which 
is the minimum standard legislation for industrial workers (including the female workers) 
                                                 
1 (Section 14) 
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provide, inter alia, for protection of workers by way of payment of cash, medical bonus and 
leave with wages. According to the Maternity Benefit (Amendment) Act, 1988 a woman 
worker who has put in not less than 80 days work in the establishment can claim the 
following benefits from the employer:  
(a) Maternity benefit at the rate of the average daily wage for the period of her actual absence, 
that is to say, the period immediately preceding the day of her delivery and any period 
immediately following that day. The maximum period for which any woman shall be entitled 
to maternity benefit shall be twelve week of which not more than six weeks shall precede the 
date of her expected delivery.1  
(b) Medical bonus of Rs. 250 of no pre-natal confinement and post-natal confinement and 
post-natal care is provided for the employee free of charge.2  
(c) In case of miscarriage, a woman shall be entitled leave with wages at the rate of maternity 
benefit, for a period of six weeks immediately following the day of her miscarriage.3  
(d) In case of illness arising out of pregnancy, delivery, premature birth of a child or 
miscarriage, in addition to the period of absence specified in (a) and (b) above, as the case 
may be leave with wages at the rate of maternity benefit for a maximum period of one month4 
(e) In case where a woman, having delivered a child dies during her delivery or during the 
period immediately following the date of her delivery for which she is entitled for the 
maternity benefit, leaving behind in either case and child, the employer shall be liable to pay 
maternity benefit for that entire period but if the child also dies during the said period, then 
for the days upto and including the date of death of the child.5   
     The aforesaid provisions, of the Maternity Benefit Act apply in the first instance to every 
factory, mine, plantation (including any such establishment belonging to the Government) 
establishment wherein persons are employed for the exhibition of equestrian, acrobatic or 
other performances and shops or establishments employing 10 or more persons. The 
                                                 
1 (Section 5) 
2 (Section 8) 
3 (Section 9) 
4 (Section 10) 
5 (Second poviso to Section 5(3)) 
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Government is also empowered to extend all or any provisions of the Act to any other 
establishment or class of establishment, industrial, commercial agricultural or otherwise with 
the approval of the Central Government by giving not less than two months’ notice of its 
intention of so doing. The benefit is available to women workers irrespective of the number of 
births. 
     The Supreme Court in a case1 was called upon to interpret the term ‘week’2 under the 
Maternity Benefit Act, 1961, it gave the beneficial interpretation on the lines of I.L.O. 
convention, in the interest of women worker. The court accordingly held that computation of 
maternity benefit had to be made for all the days including Sunday and rest day which may be 
a wage-less day. Thus, while a woman worker is not entitled to claim wages on Sunday or 
rest day in the normal period, she according to the above interpretation would be entitled to 
maternity benefits even for such wage-less day. This approach shows the concern of the 
judiciary to provide better security to women workers in cases of confinement, miscarriage or 
sickness arising out of pregnancy of premature birth of a child, etc. 
     The Employees State Insurance Scheme has further extended the scope of maternity 
benefits. Similarly, the Plantations Labour Act, 1951 and the Mines Act, 1952 make it 
obligatory on the part of the respective employers to grant maternity benefits to women 
employees in their concerns. It has been advocated that the grant of maternity benefits 
unrelated to the number of births is inconsistent with our drive for family planning. When the 
rapid growth of our population is exposing the while country to the danger of a serious 
population pressure, there is no reason why a change should not be fostered in the existing 
attitude towards the question of maternity benefits, facilities and amenities extended to the 
women employees. It would seem illogical to continue to pursue a policy of giving benefits 
and amenities without any consideration of their effect on the population problem. For 
example, under the various Acts covering these employees, such as, the Maternity Benefit 
Act, the Plantation Labour Act, etc., certain maternity benefits like leave with pay, free 
                                                 
1 (B Shah v. Labour Court, Coimbatore, (1978) ILLJ 29 (SC) 
2 (The word ‘week’ has not been defined under the Maternity Benefit Act, 1961) 
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hospital facilities, cash payments for delivery expenses and also nursing breaks within 
working hours are available to the women employees regardless of the number of children.1 
Constitutional Provisions for Equal Remuneration   
     Article 39(d) of the Constitution proclaims equal pay for equal work for both men and 
women as a Directive Principle of State Policy, which has to be read into the fundamental 
rights as a matter of interpretation. Article 14 of the Constitution enjoins the State not to deny 
any person equality before the law or the equal protection of the laws and Article 16 declares 
that there shall be equality in opportunity for all citizens in matters relating to employment or 
appoint to any office under the State.2 Construing Articles 14 and 16 in the light of the 
Preamble and Article 39(d), the Supreme Court observed that the Principles “equal pay for 
equal work” is deducible from Articles 14 and 16 properly applied to cases of unequal scales 
of pay based on no classification or irrational classification though those drawing the different 
scales of pay to identical work under the same employer. 
     Again the Supreme Court held that (a) persons doing similar work cannot be denied equal 
pay on the ground that mode of recruitment was different,3 (b) a temporary or casual 
employee performing the same or similar duties and function is entitled to the same pay as 
paid to regular or a permanent employee.4   
     The aforesaid decisions reveal the creative role of judiciary in securing equal pay for equal 
work to both sexes. The Court has brought equal remuneration within contours of the 
fundamental right of equality. 
Main Features of the Equal Remuneration Act, 1976.  To give effect to the Constitutional 
directive and I.L.O. Convention the Equal Remuneration Act, 1976 was enacted. The salient 
features are as under:  
(i) Section 2(h) defines ‘same work or similar nature’ to mean:  
 “Work in respect of which the skill, effort and responsibility required are the same, when 
performed under similar working conditions, by a man or a woman and the differences, if 
                                                 
1 (See Govt. of India, Report of the Commission on Labour Welfare (1969), p.234) 
2 (Randhir Singh v. Union of India, AIR 1982 SC 892) 
3 (Bhagwan Dass v. State of Haryana, AIR 1987 SC 2049) 
4 (Jaipal v. State of Haryana, AIR 1988 SC 1504) 
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any, between the skill, effort and responsibility required of a man and those required of a 
woman are not of practical importance in elation to the terms and conditions of employment.” 
(ii) Section 3 of the Act gives over riding effects to the provisions of this Act. 
(iii) Section 4 incorporates the basic principles of parity of payment for equal work when it 
provided, inter alia, that: (a) an employer shall pay to any worker, employed by him in an 
establishment or employment, remuneration, whether payable in cash or in kind at rates less 
favourable than those at which remuneration is paid by him to the workers of the opposite sex 
in such establishment or employment for performing the same work or work of a similar 
nature. (b) an employer shall, for the purpose of complying with the provisions of sub-section 
(a), reduce the rate of remuneration of any worker.  
(iv) Section 5 attempts to check the discrimination in recruitment in future on the basis of sex 
except where the employment of women in such work is prohibited or restricted by or under 
any law. 
     In a landmark judgement 1 the Supreme Court was called upon to interpret the scope of the 
expression ‘same or similar nature’ under section 5 of the Act. The Court laid down the 
following tests to determine whether the work is ‘same work or work of similar nature: 
     “In deciding whether the work is the same or broadly similar, the Authority should take a 
broad view, next in ascertaining whether any differences are of practical importance, the 
Authority should take an equally broad approach for the very concept of similar work implies 
differences in details, but these would be defeat a claim for equality on trivial grounds. It 
should look all the duties actually performed not those theoretically possible. In making 
comparison the Authority should look at the duties generally performed by men and women. 
Where, however, both men and women work at inconvenient times there is no requirement 
that all those who work e.g., at night shall be paid the same basic rates as all those who work 
normal day shifts. Thus, a woman who works days can not claim equality with a man on 
higher basic rate for working nights on that rate too, and the applicant herself would be 
entitled to that rate if she change shifts.” 
                                                 
1 (M/S Machinnon Macharnizie & Co. Ltd. V. Audrey D Costa, 1987 Lab. I. C 961 (SC)) 
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The Court added: 
     “We do not suggest that there can be no discrimination at all between men and women in 
the matter of remuneration. There are some kinds of work which women may not be able to 
undertake. Men do work like loading, unloading, carrying and lifting heavier things, which 
women cannot do. In such cases there cannot be any discrimination it arises only where men 
and women doing the same or similar kind of work are paid differently. Wherever sex 
discrimination is alleged, there should be a proper job evaluation before any further enquiry is 
made. If the two jobs in an establishment are accorded an equal value by the application of 
those criteria, which are themselves non-discriminatory (i.e. those criteria which look directly 
to the nature and extent of the demands made by the job) as distinct from criteria which set 
out different values for men and women on the same demand and it is found that a man and 
woman employed on these two jobs are paid differentially, then sex discretion clearly arises.”  
(v) Section 6 provides establishment of Advisory Committee for the purpose of providing 
increasing employment opportunities for women. 
(vi) Section 7 provides the appropriate Government to appoint adjudicating authority to hear 
and decide complaints and claims arising out of the non-payment of equal pay to both men 
and women. The Act also provides for appointment of Appellate Authority to hear appeal 
against the decision of the Authority. 
(vii) Section 16 makes an exception where difference in remuneration of men and women 
workers in any establishment is based on factors other than sex. During the preceding years of 
the existence of the Equal Remuneration Act, certain loopholes and lacunae have been 
noticed. 
     The daily rated workers on being regularized in continuous service are entitled to salary 
and allowances on the same rate as paid to regular and permanent employees from the date of 
their continuous service on the basis of ‘equal pay for equal work’ doctrine.1  
     The doctrine of ‘equal pay for equal work’ is attracted only when the nature of duties and 
functions discharged and the work done is similar. Thus, where the supervisors in Education 
                                                 
1 (Jeet Singh v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi, AIR 1987 SC 1781) 
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Department who are temporary government servants selected from the cluster of a few 
villages only and the supervisors who are selected by the Subordinate Services Board after 
competing with candidates from any part of the country and absorbed as regular government 
servants perform similar kind of work, the temporary supervisors cannot be discriminated 
against in regard to pay scales. Whether equal work is put in by a candidate selected by a 
process whereas candidates from all parts of the country could have competed or whether 
they are selected by a process where candidates from only a cluster of a few villages could 
have competed is altogether irrelevant and immaterial for the purposes of the applicability of 
‘equal pay for equal work’ principle.1  
     The classification of employees into regularly recruited employees and casual employees 
rendering the same kind of service which is being rendered by the regular employees doing 
the same type of work by the  P & T Department for the purpose of paying less than the 
minimum pay payable to employees in the corresponding regular cadres particularly in the 
lowest rungs of the department is violative of articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. It is also 
opposed to the spirit of article 7 of the International Convention on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights, 1966 which exhorts all states parties to ensure fair wages and ‘equal wages 
for equal work’.2  
     To overcome these lacunae the Equal Remuneration (Amendment) Act, 1987 has removed 
certain ambiguity of meaning in certain provision of the Act, in the original Act empowered 
the courts to take cognizance on the basis of complaints made by recognized 
institution/organization notified by the Centre/State Governments. 
     In view of the above discussion, we find positive and effective contribution of the 
legislature in protecting the interest of women workers through legislative process. Thus, the 
labour legislation not only prohibits employment of women in a mine below ground, port and 
docks in certain dangerous occupations, near cotton openers, or on or near machinery in 
motion but makes special provisions for working hours, lifting heavy weight, health safety, 
welfare and social security. However, there is no labour legislation to regulate the working 
                                                 
1 (Bhagwan Dass v. State of Haryana, AIR 1987 SC 2049) 
2 (Daily Rated Casual Labour Employed Under P & T Deptt v. Union of India, AIR 1987 SC 2342) 
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conditions of women labourer in small industries, unorganized sectors and domestic services. 
Moreover, the present penal provisions in Labour legislations are insufficient to deter the 
employer. Further a survey reveals that instances are not lacking where women workers do 
not assert their rights for fear of losing jobs. Thus, there is a case of effective implementation 
of the Act. Discrimination between men and women in regard to wages, has not been 
effectively implemented even in organized sector. Further, judiciary has played an active role 
in enforcing and strengthening the constitutional goal of ‘equal pay for equal work’ to both 
men and women The Court has through judicial process has brought equal remuneration 
within the contours of fundamental rights guaranteed under the Constitution.1  
  
3. Women Workers in Agriculture 
India has been a predominantly agriculture country. Agriculture in its broad sense accounts 
for approximately 50 percent of its gross national income and this occupation engaged about 
66.6 per cent of the total working population of this country.2 In spite of this hard fact, the 
agricultural labourers occupy the lowest rung of rural ladder due to illeiteracy, poverty, 
indebtedness and seasonal nature of work. Their social backwardness, lack of organization, 
collective bargaining, heterogeneity, homogeneity, etc., play vital role against them.  3  In the 
process of development, government realized the issue of labour welfare scheme as the 
primary consideration. The workers are not provided their rightful social and or political 
status. The biggest victims of this system are the women workers. As 80 per cent of women 
population live in rural areas and majority of them are labourers in the agricultural sector. It is 
estimated by 1981 census that 83.2 percent of total women work force was engaged in 
agriculture. 
     The emergence of the International Labour Organisation (ILO) on the World Scene greatly 
contributed towards the new thinking which led to the enactments of number of protective 
legislations and brought agrarian reforms in India. The Judiciary has come forward to play an 
                                                 
1 (Srivastava S.C., ‘Labour Law for Women Workers: Problems and Prospects’ in ‘Women Law and 
   Social Change’, ed. By Shamsuddin Shams, Ashish Publishing House, New Delhi (1991)) 
2 (Government of India, India Labour Year Book 1982-83, p.299) 
3 (Government of India Report on the National Commission on Labour (1969), p.394) 
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active role in maintaining socio-economic equilibrium between men and women. Article 
39(d) enshrined in our Constitution provides; “The State shall in particular direct its policy 
towards securing equal pay for equal work for both man and woman.” In a case the Supreme 
Court rightly observed that equal pay for equal work is not a mere dogmatic slogan but it is a 
constitutional goal to be attained through constitutional remedies by enforcement of 
constitutional rights.1 The logic of equal pay for equal work of similar nature was also 
followed by Supreme Court in a number of cases.2   
Analysis of Protective Legislations.  Some of the protective legislations provided to 
agricultural workers are examined as under: 
      (a)Constitution of India, 1950 
The framers of the Indian Constitution have put the State under obligation to make effective 
provisions within the limits of its economic capacity, for example, right to work, education 
and public assistance in cases of unemployment, old age, sickness and disablement, etc.,3 
provisions for just and human conditions of work and maternity relief,4 living wages for 
workers, etc.,5 special care of the weaker section,6 special care and preferential treatment was 
given to women by the framers of the Indian Constitution in consonance with the 
international standard fixed by the ILO. The framers of the Indian Constitution further 
prohibited any kind of discrimination on ground of religion, race, caste, sex, place of birth or 
any of them provided in Articles 15(1) and 16(1). Apart from, the Constitution has given 
preferential treatment in favour of women. 
      (b) Minimum Wages Act, 1948  
This Act was enacted with a view to prevent exploitation of seated labour. It provided for 
revision of minimum rates of wages, fixation of hours of work, overtime wages, etc. Besides 
providing penalties for offences the Act provided for appointment of inspectors to ensure 
                                                 
1 (Randhir Singh v. Union of India, AIR 1982 SC 879) 
2 (Sanjit Ray v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1983 SC 328: P. Savita v. Union of Undia, AIR 1985 SC 1124) 
3 (Article 41) 
4 (Article 42) 
5 (Article 43) 
6 (Article 46) 
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payment of wages and other benefits available under the Act and claim authorities to hear and 
decide claim arising out of non-payment or less payment of wages. However, the Act also 
fixed the number of hours for the workers. The State Governments were allowed to carry out 
the fixation of minimum wages in agriculture profession in a phased manner. Though the Act 
is not success due to various discrepancies in its implementation e.g., poverty and illiteracy of 
agricultural labourers, the scattered nature of the agricultural farms, casual nature of 
employment and unorganized character of agricultural labourers hampered the success of the 
Act in its true spirit. However, the provision of this Act checked exploitation of agricultural 
workers by regulating payment of wages, the hours of work, overtime payment and daily rest 
and weekly off. 
     The Act lacked certain provisions, which should be added in it, for example, the provisions 
for the women agricultural workers like working hours and interval etc. The role of inspector 
should be made more effective by their special training and better pay. The burden of proof of 
payment of minimum wages must be shifted on employer and in the absence of such proof the 
court must presume that the notified wages of the workers have not been paid. 
 (c)The Bonded Labour System Abolition Act, 1976 
This Act was passed with a view to eradicate the evil of forced labour whether men or 
women. It protects the interest of the bonded persons whether men or women against their 
exploitation by the money-landers and their masters. The Act prohibits any person to take any 
advantage which gives rise to bonded labour system. No person can be compelled to render 
any bonded labour or forced labour. The Act extinguished altogether the liability to repay the 
bonded debt. No proceedings can be started against any person for the realization of the 
bonded debt. Further any property whether movable or immovable taken forcibly by the 
creditor in lieu of the bonded debt shall be restored to the victim. The Act prescribed 
punishment up to three years in most of the cases and fine has been prescribed for the 
enforcement of bonded labour. Though the Act put certain checks and limitations on the land- 
owner but the male or female workers are still the tools in the hands of the land owners. 
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(d) The Kerala Agricultural Workers Act, 1974 
This Act is a significant piece of labour legislation and should serve as a model for other 
States. Some main features of this Act need special emphasis.  
Section 7: It confers the benefits of the security of employment for agricultural workers for 
both male and female. It states that land-owners shall not employ any agricultural labour 
other than the one who had worked on the same land during the previous agricultural season. 
Further a land-owner is required to show preference to agricultural women workers employed 
in the previous agricultural operations in the same agricultural land during the same 
agricultural season. An agricultural worker who has worked for the landowner for three 
consecutive agricultural seasons, should not be denied employment merely on the ground that 
he or she has not worked in the previous agricultural season provided his or her absence is 
due to reasons beyond his or her control. 
     It has further provided that land-owner shall not refuse employment during the season to 
an agricultural worker who has not offered himself or herself for employment on any previous 
day due to the reasons which were beyond his or her control. However, there are certain 
circumstances, under which a landowner is not obliged to employ an agricultural worker if 
the worker has been incapacitated due to age or intentionally damages the crops of the 
landowner. 
Sections 17, 17 and 21: These sections deal with the provisions of hours of work for 
agricultural workers, rest intervals and overtime wages etc. According to these provisions the 
maximum hours of work is eight hours per day for adult agricultural worker and six hours for 
an adolescent. 
Section 2(n): The provision of the section deal with the payment of wages for harvest 
operations. Landowners are required to pay the prescribed wages for harvest operations on the 
threashing floor itself before the agricultural produce is removed. 
     Though this Act is a comprehensive legislation mainly made for agricultural workers, but 
the exemption of this Act given under Section 42 is not up to the sweet will of the agricultural 
workers because it has excluded all landowners unto a holding of one hectare from the 
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purview of some of the provisions of this Act which resulted in excluding various landowners 
from the clutches of this Act. The security provisions under Section 7 of the Act are also 
inadequate. As a large number of permanent labourers both men women dropped out every 
year because of death, old age, marriages and there is no provision for the replacement with 
some members of outgoing workers’ family. However, this Act serves as a Model legislation 
for Centre and other States for the fruitful and effective result. 
       (e) The Agricultural Workers Bill 1980  
The above bill was drafted by the Central Government on the pattern of Kerala Agricultural 
Works Act with little modification. But it is yet to be passed. Since, the survey of the 
conditions of Agricultural workers, in general and women agricultural workers in particular, 
confirm that they are exposed to the same kinds of social risks as Industrial workers. The 
degree of insecurity increases due to their peculiar characteristics. Simply to accept the 
traditional forms of social security the special needs of agricultural workers will not be 
enough until and unless their all needs have not been satisfied under this Bill. The women 
agricultural workers are more exposed in absence of special social security measures for 
them. Therefore, the Kerala Agricultural Workers Act, 1974 and the instant Agricultural 
Workers Bill 1980 are lacking various provisions for giving preferential treatment, which 
should be given to the women agricultural workers as compared to the men agricultural 
workers.  
       (f)The Workmen’s Compensation Act, 1923  
The Workmen’s Compensation Act, 1923 is a mechanisms for providing relief to victims of 
work connected injuries. It imposes a liability upon the employer to pay compensation at 
specified rates to the workman or his dependent if he or she suffers a “personal injury 
occurring by accident arising out of and in the course of employment”1 subject to certain 
exceptions laid down in the Act. Certain diseases contracted in the course of employment are 
also regarded as “injuries caused by accident.”2 The Act applied to certain specified 
                                                 
1 (Section 3) 
2 (Sub-sections (2), 2A(3) and (4) of section 3) 
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employment1 including, (i) farming by tractors or contrivances driven by steam or other 
mechanical power or by electricity; or (ii) working, repair or maintenance of a tubewell; or 
(iii) working on any estate maintained for the purpose of growing cardamom, cincona, coffee, 
rubber or tea. However, the Act failed to provide the much needed relief to vast poverty 
stricken agricultural workers who would become victims of accidents arising out of and in the 
course of employment. 
       (g)The Agricultural Workers (Payment of Pension and Other Amenities) Bill  
In a welfare State like India with profound concern for the weaker classes including 
agricultural workers, welfare benefits such as pension are in fulfillment of the directive 
principles of State Policy.2  This is all the more necessary for agricultural workers particularly 
the women agricultural workers who are presumed to be the poorest of the poor. After long 
service for over 60 years both men and women agricultural workers become invalid and their 
family suffers, if not paid any compensation. To meet this hardship, the agriculture workers 
(Payment of Pension, Fixation of Minimum Wages, Compulsory Insurance and other 
Amenities) Bill was a step towards this direction which provides for payment of pension to 
agricultural workers above the age of 60 years at the rate of Rs. 100 per month. This scheme 
has been started in the State of Assam, Haryana, Utar Pradesh, Kerala, Andhra Pradesh, 
Tamilnadu, Punjab, West Bengal and Rajasthan etc. However, the Bill did not receive the 
approval of the Parliament but there is need to explore the possibility of implementing such a 
good scheme. 
       (h)The Agricultural Workers (Debt Exemption and Unemployment Relief) Bill,        
1981 
This Bill was introduced in the Lok Sabha on 13th April 1981. The main object of the bill was 
to provide the exemption of all debts of agricultural workers. Unemployment relief to 
agricultural workers is provided in section 8 of the bill which provides that an agriculture 
worker who does not get employment under any landowner or whose name does not appear in 
the register and record maintained by the landowner to show that he or she is out of 
                                                 
1 (Sections 2(1) and (4) read with second schedule) 
2 (Som Parkash Rekhi v. Union of India, I L L J (1981) SC, p.10) 
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employment for a day or days or who satisfied the local authority that he or she is in search of 
employment, is to be paid by the government an unemployment relief at the rate of Rs. 3.50 
per day for the period of unemployment. It is desirable that legislation be enacted on the lines 
suggested in the aforesaid Bill to mitigate the hardship of agricultural workers. 
     Though certain protective legislations have been provided by the Government for the 
agricultural workers in general and women agricultural workers, in particular but still there is 
an urgent need to provide some other legislations with suitable provisions for their welfare. 
Undoubtedly, the last five decades witnessed that the Government were pro-workers but to 
get this benefit in its proper way, the agricultural workers whether women or men should 
realize the feeling of collective bargaining and the need of proper education so that they may 
derive proper benefits out of these enacted legislations and bills in process. The foremost 
requirement for the implementation of any special security/welfare provisions is to organize 
the agricultural workers. This will build up the required collective bargaining strength in 
women workers. The new dimensions added by the Supreme Court in Asiad case1 has 
established faith of weaker section. The trend of judicial activism gives the hope that in case 
of non-implementation of the existing socio-legal protections, the public interest litigation 
may be invoked. The appointment of national committee on women which is to be carried on 
by a Women Welfare and Development Bureau in the department of women and child 
development and further the appointment of the National Commission on self-employed 
women in Feb.1987 and National Commission on Rural labour in August 1987 create positive 
hopes for their better future prospectives in the country. 
     The aforesaid discussions lead that there should be a comprehensive central legislation for 
agriculture workers. The steps should be taken to evolve a proper and adequate enforcement 
machinery realizing the real problems of the agriculture sector. A way should be found to 
involve village panchayats for the task. As the Workmen’s Compensation Act, 1923 does not 
provide compensation of agricultural workers for injuries arising out of and in the course of 
employment, which result in great hardship to them. Hence, this Act should be suitably 
                                                 
1 (AIR 1982 SC) 
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modified not only to extend its coverage but also to suit the rural conditions and socio-
economic needs of agricultural wage earners. There should be an agricultural workers 
provident fund scheme to provide fund facilities to the agricultural workers. The maternity 
benefit should be extended to the agriculture sectors as much as the Government.  
 
      4. Sexual Harassment and Eve Teasing  
Women are subjected to various forms of molestation, physical and mental torture and eve 
teasing at home, in streets and public places, places of entertainment, campus of educational 
institutions, prisons, rescue homes, crowded places like markets, meals, festivals, railway 
platforms and bus stands, running trains and buses, workplace, etc. The cases are grossly 
under-reported because the victims and their parents and guardians avoid to report cases to 
the police. 
     The stark reality is though women have been adding value to professions they take up and 
endure tough challenges, despite caught in a web of adverse cultural practices/prejudices in a 
male-dominated environment, the prevailing gender inequalities and popular cinema 
portraying women as sex objects, among others, have attributed to a spurt in various forms of 
crimes. That a vast majority of women though at the receiving end of sexual harassment at 
workplace do nothing about it, mostly due to the fear of losing their jobs if they speak up, is 
rather disconcerting. A male intentionally brushing past a female colleague, to an unwelcome 
physical verbal or non-verbal conduct of sexual nature depicts the moral vacuum in the 
present day society. But as various studies have shown, a significant number of women also 
face problems of harassment like eve teasing and molestation essentially because many of 
them are ignorant of their rights. While a section of women in a recent survey felt that those 
who are bold and outspoken had higher chances of being targeted, many justified unwelcome 
advances as being natural if the woman employee was attractive and wore western clothes. 
Though aware about cases of sexual harassment of their friends, many women lack the 
courage to report to anyone, has compounded the problem. Primarily, fear of jeopardizing 
their career often makes it difficult for a number of working women, from clerical staff to 
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even highly qualified nurses, doctors, schools teachers etc., to report sexual harassment and 
get redress.1   
     Eve teasing and its aggravated form, sexual harassment of women, specially at place of 
work are crimes which are almost a recognized male sport. Perhaps it is the response that 
women get for not staying within the Lakshman Rekha of the home. It is probably the result 
of the deep-rooted male psyche to put down women who do not fit in their notions of 
propriety. Sexual harassment crosses all professions, social strata and levels of income. It can 
be as easily found in a film studio as in a file filled government office and in private 
organizations, though some professions seem more prone to it than others. The menace keeps 
women in a state of tension wherever they are. 
      
     This situation poses real problems, specially for the working women. To make the 
situation worse there is no specific law, which deals with this crime in its entirety. There are 
three sections of Indian Penal Code (Sections 509, 294 and 354), which can be exploited to 
deal with such crimes.  According to Section 509 IPC whoever intending to outrage the 
modesty of a woman, utters any word, makes any sound or gesture or exhibits any object, 
intending that such word or sound shall be heard, or that such gesture or object shall be seen 
by such woman, or intrudes upon the privacy of such woman, shall be punished with simple 
imprisonment for a term which may extend to one year, or with fine, or with both. Section 
294 IPC punishes anyone who, to the annoyance of others does any obscene act or sings, 
recites or utters obscene songs in a public place, with three months imprisonment or fine or 
with both. Section 354 IPC punishes anyone who uses assault or uses criminal force to 
women with an intent to outrage her modesty. 
Sexual Harassment: A Low Priority Issue  
     Sexual harassment and eve teasing are treated as low priority crimes. The term eve teasing 
is itself revealing in its indulgent overtones. The women are insulted almost every day, 
everywhere and every time. It is almost a torture for a woman to walk alone on the road. Male 
                                                 
1 (Aarti,‘Curbing Sexual Harassment’, published in Legal News & Views: October 2001, New Delhi) 
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predators stalk the vehicles with the sole purpose of teasing and tormenting young and 
bashful women.1 Often these bus rides early in the morning turn out to be a nightmare for the 
victims. Most of the girls are in a hurry and even if they take upon themselves to up the 
culprits there are no policemen they can turn to for help. This leaves the predators free to take 
full advantage. The passivity of the victims encourages them further. To add to the 
indignation of the victims the other commuters look in silence because they do not want to be 
involved.2  
     Complaints of sexual harassment are usually trivialized by the society and the legal 
institutions even the cases reported by victims, who have reach senior bureaucratic positions, 
of harassment against themselves are treated the same way. The case of Kiran Bedi, a senior 
police official is an apt example. She was transferred out of a prestigious plae in New Delhi 
when she acted strictly with such offenders. Rupal Bajaj, a civil servant in Punjab who 
accused the State’s Police Chief of molesting her, was accused of blowing a trivial incident 
out of all proportions.3   
     The phrase eve teasing has deceptively light hearted and innocent ring about it but the 
reality is crude, sordid and infinitely humiliating to women. Justice Khan of Allahabad High 
Court 4 has made an observation with regard to the ever increasing offence of eve teasing by 
pointing out that – 
     “Eve teasing by road side Romeos is fast on the increase in cities. Unfortunately no 
offence is so easy to commit and so difficult to be booked. The victims of this offence are 
mostly modest and shy girls or young women of respectable families. While on the roads or 
passing in the by-lanes prowling desperadoes cut filthy jokes with them or pass indecent, 
sensuous or sarcastic remarks against them, the poor victims dare not protest in order to avoid 
creating a scene or attracting a crowd on the spot. Publicity of such incidents sometimes leads 
to injurious results against the victims themselves inasmuch as it subsequently provides 
material for groundless scandal and unjustified gossip against their character from interest 
                                                 
1 (Indian Express, September 30, 1989, p.3) 
2 (India Abroad, Dealing with Sexual Harassment, Jan 31, 1992, p.30) 
3 (Decision of Delhi High Court, reported in ‘The Lawyer’, Oct. 1989, p.26) 
4 (Zafar Ahmed Khan v. State of U.P., 1963 Cr. L. J. 213) 
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quarters, the victims are therefore compelled of necessity to suffer the disgrace silently and 
instinctively leave the spot as quickly as they can, without disclosing their identity. The 
offenders are mostly riffraffs and desperate characters. Prudence dictates that even 
respectable passers-by, who happen to see or hear the unholy incident, much to their mental 
anguish, must pretend not to have heard or noticed it and to pass on the place quickly in their 
interest.” This is a very negative attitude. It encourages the offenders to indulge in the crime 
freely and with impunity without any fear of consequence to themselves. 
Sexual Harassment and the Legal Position   
     “Crimes in India Report” classified section 354, IPC as molestation and section 509 IPC as 
eve-teasing. Molestation then was read against those offences that use force or assault to 
outrage the modesty of women. Eve-teasing was recognized as a popular form of harassment 
of women in public spaces, but the popular understanding that it falls short of molestation 
underlay the distinction between molestation and eve-teasing. Eve-teasing was classified as 
those offences that outrage the modesty of women by word, gesture or act, thereby reifying 
popular and normative distinctions between physical and verbal (or non-physical form) of 
harassment. It affirmed the idea that eve-teasing is not an assault and causes lesser ‘hurt’ than 
molestation.  
     There are myriads of forms which sexual harassment and eve teasing take. The mild forms 
take the shape of ogling, whistling, passing comments loud enough for the woman to hear, 
singing songs as a woman passes by, blowing kisses and making loud and often obscene 
sounds at her. It is also there in the form of physical contact such as brushing, pinching, 
pushing and rubbing. In some places these forms of eve teasing have been replaced with 
brazen acts of dupatta snatching and back patting. Some sadists are even found to be carrying 
blades to cut the dresses of girls. 
     There are provisions under sections 509, 294 and 354 of the Indian Penal Code for dealing 
with eve teasing and its aggravated form, sexual harassment but the way these provisions 
have been worded, the complexities of the procedural laws and the type of proof that is 
required, make it very difficult to get the culprit punished. 
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     Theoretically any person who intrudes on the privacy of a woman or utters any word or 
makes any sound or gesture or exhibits any object with an intention that such word or sound 
shall be heard or that such gesture or object shall be seen by the woman, can be booked for 
sexual harassment, but it is not easy to prove the intention which is an essential ingredient of 
this offence. 
     If a man intending to outrage the modesty of a woman exposes his person in an indecent 
manner or uses obscene words intending that she should hear them or exhibits to her an 
obscene drawing, commits this offence. There are innumerable such incidents which happen 
each day but not one reports because no immediate action is stipulated under this Section and 
gathering proof afterwards is almost impossible. The women who are harassed will rather 
ignore such behaviour than fight a losing battle.1  
Insulting the Modesty of a Woman.2  The essential element of this section is to insult the 
modesty of a woman. If a person with an object to insult the modesty of a woman exposes 
private part of this body to her or uses obscene words or exhibits obscene drawings, he 
commits an offence under this section.3 The word ‘Modesty’ has not been defined anywhere 
in the Code. Usually the courts go by the popular meaning and assert that males should 
observe some sense of propriety of behaviour in their relations with women. Pushing the bell-
bottom pant or chadar down than what is normally required is an indecent behaviour.4 
     Law presumes all women to be modest unless proved otherwise, and therefore, section 509 
applies to all women irrespective of age. Where the accused, a University graduate, wrote a 
letter containing indecent overtures and posted it in an envelop addressed to an English nurse 
with whom he was not acquainted. It was held that the accused intended to insult the modesty 
of the nurse; and that the letter though enclosed in an envelop was an object which was 
exhibited to the nurse on whose address it was posted.5  Where the accused entered the 
                                                 
1 (Shobha Saxena, ‘Crimes Against Women and Protective Laws’, Deep & Deep Publications, New 
 Delhi (1995), p.217) 
2 (Section 509, IPC) 
3 (Phiaz Mohammed (1903) 5 Bom. L. R. 502) 
4 (Surrender Nath v. State of MP, 1982 Cr. LR (M. P. HC Notes) 10(2) 
5 (Tarak Das Gupta v. State, AIR 1926 Bom. 159) 
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apartment of a lady, caught hold of her and removed her garments it was held that he had 
intruded upon her privacy.1  
 Section 509 and 354, IPC: Distinction.  Section 509, IPC does not require any element of 
criminal force or assault, which is an essential element of an offence under Section 354, IPC. 
Section 509 applies to cases, which are an insult to the modesty of a woman while in Section 
354 the modesty is intended to be outraged. Both these sections seem to overlap each other to 
some extent but they are different. Assault is an essential ingredient of Section 354, IPC, it 
also includes gestures which is an element of section 509 as well. For a charge under Section 
354 proof of intention is essential. 
     While attempting to snatch a gold ornament lying in the neck of the lady the accused had 
put his hand on her breast. When once he was unsuccessful he repeated the act, it can be 
presumed that he had full knowledge that his hand would come in contact with the breast of 
the lady and her modesty would be outraged. The second repeated attempt of putting the hand 
on the breast conclusively proves the intention of the accused though the primary object may 
be to snatch the chain. The accused was punished ‘because knowledge is sufficient to hold the 
accused guilty of outraging the modesty, the magistrate committed an error in ignoring this 
serious and vital aspect of law’. The High Court set aside the acquittal and rejected the 
request for leniency, holding that leniency in sex offences results in putting a premium and 
endangering the modesty of the weaker sex.2  
Outraging the Modesty of a Girl: Section 354, IPC  
A woman’s modesty is her sex 3 whoever uses criminal force with an intent to outrage it 
commits an offence under Section 354, IPC.  Young or old, intelligent or imbecile, sleeping 
or awake, the woman possesses a modesty capable of being outraged.4  Where a girl of about 
fifteen years of age was coming from her mothers place, the accused suddenly appeared from 
                                                 
1 (Bankey v. State of UP, AIR 1961,All. 131) 
2 (Ramdas v. State of MP, 1982 Cr. L. R. 36) 
3 (1975 Cr. LR (Cut) 236) 
4 (State of Punjab v. Major Singh, AIR 1967 SC 63) 
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a lane he dragged her towards the other side of the lane, and took her to a secluded spot it was 
held sufficient to book the accused under Section 354, IPC.1  
     Unless culpable intention is proved mere touching the belly of a woman in a public bus 
cannot be called a deliberate act of outraging the modesty of a woman with the meaning of 
this section. The intention of the accused is the crux, no conviction can be based on surmises, 
guesses or conjectures in the absence of any evidence.2  So far as the offence under section 
354, IPC was concerned the allegations are not sufficient to fulfil the necessary ingredients. 
Though the assault was there but the intention to outrage the modesty could not be proved. 
The High Court upheld the acquittal while agreeing that the conduct of the accused was 
reprehensible as he had tried to chase the girl.3  
     A female child of seven and a half months was considered to be a woman under section 
354, IPC. The accused had walked into the room where the child was sleeping and committed 
an indecent assault on her. He was held to have committed an offence under this section as he 
had outraged and intended to outrage, whatever modesty the little victim was capable of.4 
     If the woman is a consenting party there cannot be any outraging of her modesty.5 
Obscene Act and Songs   
     Section 294 IPC punishes doing of obscene acts or singing of obscene songs at public 
place, provided the same causes annoyance to others. This section would apply to uttering 
obscene words6 and also making indecent gestures. 7Where the accused addressed openly two 
respectable girls who were strangers to him in amorous words suggestive of illicit sex 
relations with them and asked them to go along with him in his rickshaw, he was held to have 
committed an obscene act.8  
                                                 
1 (State v. Hetram, 1982 Cr. LR (Raj.) 522) 
2 (Jagmal Singh v. State, 1980 Cr. LR (Raj.) 446) 
3 (Ram Das v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1954 SC 711) 
4(State of Punjab v. Major Singh, AIR 1967 SC 63)  
5 (Sadanand, 1972 Cr. LJ 658 (Assam) 
6 (1985 (1) Cri. 419 (MP) 
7 (1985 Cri. Cases 236) 
8 (Zafar Ahmed, AIR 1963 All. 105) 
 310
     In Chandra Kala v. Ram Kishan,1 Mrs. Chandra Kala was teacher and the accused a 
headmaster in the same school. The accused misused his position by cutting indecent jokes 
with her and also cracking jokes about her in the presence of other teachers. After some days 
the headmaster called her to his office when he was alone, he pulled her hand and tried to 
outrage her modesty. She saved herself by pushing him aside, went home and told her 
husband about the incident. Both of them went to the police station to lodge a complaint. The 
trial court punished the accused under Sections 294, 506 and 354, IPC but on revision the 
High Court acquitted the accused on charges under Sections 354 and 294. On appeal before 
the Supreme Court it was held: “In recording the acquittal grave injustice has been 
perpetrated. This is due to the erroneous, almost perverse appreciation of the evidence and 
error of law committed by the High Court. As regards Section 294, IPC there is ample 
evidence to substantiate the crime. The Supreme Court set aside the acquittal and punished 
the accused. 
Prosecution for Sexual Harassment  
     In prosecution for sexual harassment or eve teasing it must be proved that: (i) the accused 
intentionally did some act, recited some song, uttered some words or made some gesture, (ii) 
that such act, singing, reciting or gesture was obscene, (iii) that it was done at a public place, 
and (iv) it caused annoyance either to the person concerned or to those who were present. 
     Where the accused caught hold of a married woman and tried to open the string of her 
salwar with a view of committing rape on her but being hit by the woman with a kulhari he 
fled away. The court held the accused guilty under Section 354 and not under Section 376, 
IPC as he did not show enough determination to have sexual intercourse at all.2  Where the 
accused caught hold of the hand of a sixteen year old girl and dragged her in his room, the girl 
cried and the neighbours came, the accused extricated himself and ran away, he was held 
guilty of sexual harassment.3  
                                                 
1 (1985 Cr. LR (SC) 365) 
2 (Rameshwar v. State of Haryana, 1984, Cr. LJ 786 (Punj)) 
3 (I.T. Rao v. State of AP, 1984 Cr. LJ 1254 (AP)) 
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     An offence of indecent assault on a woman under section 354 cannot be complete unless 
there is the intention or the knowledge that the woman’s modesty will be outraged.1  
     Annoyance is an important ingredient under Section 294, IPC. It is also an offence if the 
annoyance is caused to a person other than the target of the obscene act. Obscene act includes 
rousing lustful desire, e.g., when the accused accosted passing ladies and girls with words; 
hae jani mar dala’ he was held to be guilty under Section 294.2  It covers words as randi, 
chhinal etc addressed to a school mistress. The culpable intention of the accused and the 
reaction of the woman is relevant but its absence is not always decisive, e.g. when the 
accused with a corrupt mind stealthily touches the flesh of a woman she may be asleep etc. 
even then the accused can be held guilty. The accused entered the room where a lady was 
sleeping, with an intention of having sexual intercourse with her but he succeeded only in 
touching her thigh. It was held that he was guilty of outraging the modesty of the girl3  Where 
the accused was found to have entered the kitchen, extinguished the lamp, embraced the 
woman and tried to remove her saree and blouse he had already removed his chaddi but could 
do nothing more, he was held guilty under section 354 IPC for outraging the modesty of the 
woman.4   
Sexual Harassment at Work Place  
     Sexual harassment is assuming new and subtler forms each day, but very few 
organisations have formalized measures to tackle it, fewer even openly acknowledge its 
existence. ‘There is no sexual harassment in our office,’ maintain most of the men. The 
trouble is, sexual harassment is as hard to define as it is hard to take and there is virtually no 
woman who has not experienced it at one stage of her career or the other. Similar is the 
experience of nurses in the hospital and girl students in the colleges. The nurses are harassed 
by the male doctors as well as the patients. ‘Undoubtedly, I caught the eye of a senior 
                                                 
1 (AIR 1928 Pat 326) 
2 (Zafar Ahmed, AIR 1963 All. 105) 
3 (Mathura Lal v. State of Rajasthan, 1976 Cr. LR (Raj.) 82) 
4 (Harshchandra N. Kapade v. State of Maharashtra, (1983) 2 Crimes 98 (Bom.) 
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professor who is notorious for liking pretty women,’ said sister Sushma, ‘he appointed me to 
his ward and life became a living hell whenever I refused to go out with him.’1  
     Sexual harassment at workplace seriously hinders the ability of women employees and 
workers to tackle both work and harassment. To the question – Have your confronted 
anybody who has experienced sexual harassment at work including yourself? Even if you 
have confronted, you cannot clarify what sexual harassment actually is – that is what 
behaviour or conduct constitutes sexual harassment. 
Visakha’s Case  
The Supreme Court in this case2 issued a set of guidelines in this regard which have been 
welcomed by all. In this case in early 1990’s in Rajasthan, a women employee of a 
government sponsored development program complained to the police about an influential 
local family breaking the Child Marriage Prohibition Act. As a consequence of this she was 
raped. The women’s movement supported her cause and she was later awarded compensation. 
The women’s movement was activated by this case, which was indicative of the ways in 
which women’s voices have been silenced, by using rape as a weapon of intimidation.  
     In the backdrop of this incident, leading social activists filed a writ petition in the Supreme 
Court demanding protection to women workers and making the State and the employer 
accountable for ensuring a safe working environment for women. The court while 
acknowledging women’s right to gender equality, prescribed the guidelines and norms to be 
observed in all working places by treating them as law under Article 141 of the Constitution 
and in the absence of suitable legislation in this sphere, International Covenants and norms 
can be relied on, in so far as they are consistent with the Constitutional spirit. 
Guidelines:  
n The Rules of government and public sector bodies relating to the conduct and 
discipline, should include guidelines prohibiting sexual harassment and provide for 
appropriate penalties for the offender. 
                                                 
1 (Indian Express, Magazine Section, Sexual Harassment, Oct. 27, 1991, p.1) 
2 (Vishaka & others v. State of Rajasthan (1997) 6 SCC 241) 
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n Sexual Harassment defined as: such unwelcome sexually determined behaviour 
(whether directly or by implication) as: 
(a) Physical contact and advances 
(b) A demand or request for sexual favours 
(c) Sexually colored remarks 
(d) Showing pornography 
(e) Any other unwelcome physical, verbal or non-verbal conduct of sexual nature. 
n All institutions should set up complaint mechanisms to deal with complaints of sexual 
harassment at workplaces and should consist of a committee headed by a woman in order to 
ensure unbiased inquiry. The court directed that the committee should consist of an NGO 
member with expertise in women’s issues and the majority of members of the committee 
should be women 
n When sexual harassment occurs as a result of an act of third party or an outsider, the 
employer will take all steps necessary to assist the affected person by way of support and 
preventive action. 
AEPC Case 1 
In this case the Supreme Court did not discuss the standards of reasonableness or just and fair 
procedure. The SC saw and dealt with the situation differently. In this case a typist working 
with AEPC made a complaint to the management against the respondent who was a private 
secretary to the chairperson of the council for his objectionable behaviour. The management 
appointed a committee to look into the matter and dismissed the respondent (A.K. Chopra) 
after an inquiry into the incident. The official dismissal was successively set aside by a single 
judge and the division bench of the Delhi High Court on the ground that, although guilty of 
trying to assault the woman, the official has not succeeded in actually molesting her. Hence, 
Mr. Chopra appealed to various forums and finally when the matter reached the Supreme 
Court many firsts were created. The SC enlarged the definitional scope of sexual harassment 
to include “any action or gesture which, whether directly or by implication, air at or has the 
                                                 
1 (Apparel Export Promotion Councils v. A.K. Chopra, 1999 (1) SCC 759-777) 
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tendency to outrage the modesty of a female employee. For offending action to be outrageous, 
actual assault or touch by offender is not essential. Any form of sexual harassment is an 
infringement of human rights as declared in CEDAW (1979) and also reiterated at Beijing 
(1995). That way the SC has accorded not subjecting a person to sexual harassment – a status 
of fundamental rights. Now, any victim of sexual harassment can directly move to the SC by 
filing a writ under Article 32 of the Constitution. 
     Another positive aspect of this judgment was that the court explicitly clarified that 
physical contact is not necessary to lodge a complaint and ‘verbal overtures’ are enough 
grounds to form a cause of action against him. 
Some Cases of Sexual Harassment 
An incident which generated a lot of controversy took place when Rupal Bajaj, a senior IAS 
officer accused the then Director General of Police, Punjab, KPS Gill of sexually abusing her 
at a dinner party.1 This case made the headlines. “I realized that silence only helps the culprit 
to continue with the same kind of behaviour,” said Mrs. Deol about her decision to go to the 
Court. Despite lodging the complaint regarding the incident with the Chief Secretary, the 
Adviser to the Governor, and the Governor himself, no disciplinary action was taken against 
Mr. Gill. The Governor merely reprimanded him for his inappropriate behaviour and barred 
him from attending parties for the future. Mrs. Bajaj informed the Governor that she wanted 
an action to be taken under the relevant administrative procedures and criminals laws. The 
Advisor to the Governor called her the next day saying that Mr. Gill was present and wanted 
to apologize. 
     Finally realizing that even the highest authorities in the State were unwilling to take action 
against the Director General of Police, Bajaj filed the first information report against Gill for 
initiating criminal investigation. She specifically charged him with behaving in a manner that 
offended her modesty during an official party, but pursuant of the orders issued by the IG 
Police, the report was immediately sealed and an investigation ordered. Subsequently Mr. 
                                                 
1 (Times of India, July 20, 1988, p.5) 
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Bajaj filed a complaint against Mr. Gill charging him with the use of criminal force while 
intending to outrage the modesty of his wife. 
     Gill sought to minimize the whole incident. He invoked a rarely utilized provision of the 
Penal Code which states that ‘no action will be a criminal offence if the harm caused is so 
slight that no person of ordinary sense and temper will complain about the harm.1  Mr. Gill 
felt that all women should endure such behaviour while attending official parties, or if 
important figures as himself assault a woman, an apology should suffice to eradicate the 
incident. The High Court concluded, “If the incident occurred it must have been accidental 
and therefore so trivial that it does not warrant criminal penalisation according to Section 95 
of the Penal Code”. 
     The High Court judgment may be interpreted as an outright denial of the allegations in 
contravention of the criminal statutes. Alternately it indicates that the laws are more 
vigorously enforced against the less renowned or politically uninfluential section of the 
population. The casewas dismissed by the High Court and Bajaj has gone in appeal to the 
Supreme Court. 
     Rukmani, a ticketing officer in a reputed Middle Eastern Airlines in Delhi, had to give up 
her lucrative job because the senior manager of the airlines, who was stationed abroad and 
visited the city frequently, demanded lot of sexual attention from her. Her patience broke the 
day he tried to molest her. 2 
 Vishaka and AEPC Judgments As Turning Points for Women’s Rights 
     Sexual harassment is a serious and insufficiently recognized problem at workplaces. What 
precisely constitutes the same, has been opined differently by different people placed 
differently. The act of sexual harassment committed by an offender has a devastating effect 
on the victim in terms of her ability to work. In the Indian context, while trying to assess the 
judicial decisions regarding sexual harassment in Visakha and AEPC cases, one is compelled 
to thing whether an Indian woman a goddess or a slave. She is neither. Being a citizen she has 
every right to be treated at par with her male counterparts.  
                                                 
1 (Section 95, IPC) 
2 (Indian Express, “The 9 to 5 Menace’, Oct. 27, 1991, p.1) 
 316
     While Vishakha’s case was filed as a Public interest litigation by social activists and 
organizations to fight against the wrong (rape) committed on a rural social activist of 
Rajasthan, the AEPC case was filed by the Council itself on the complaint by a female 
employee. In AEPC case, the Council, following the set of guidelines issued by the SC in 
Visakha’s case, appointed an inquiry committee, which dismissed the accused, thereby made 
a commendable beginning to the serious directions given by the SC. Also, the case laid down 
law in clear terms and emphasized that the courts should give due regard to International 
covenants for interpreting domestic law and apply the same to the given case. In AEPC case, 
the court has expanded the definition of sexual harassment and sensitively handled the issue, 
not mentioning even the name of the complainant.  
     The AEPC case has defined that sexual harassment covers and includes “any action or 
gesture which whether directly or by implication, aims or has the tendency to outrage the 
modesty of a female employee”. In Vishakha’s case the court’s attempt to define the 
terminology “sexual harassment was policy oriented. It actually defined the term which was 
lacking in the previous cases of molestation, eve teasing etc. However, with the decision of 
Supreme Court in the AEPC case, “physical contact’ is not the only criterion or basis or 
defining feature to commit the offence of sexual harassment. The AEPC case is turning point 
for women’s rights. A writ can be directly filed before the Supreme Court. For the first time 
an institution took up the role of protecting its decision to remove an employee on the charges 
of sexual harassment. 
     With the definition of sexual harassment, now having been sufficiently enlarged, it is 
important that the meaning of “work place” should be redefined. This change is very much 
needed in view of the changing and challenging employment scenario in India. 
     Both the judgments have tried to “cover up” the inadequacy of the present legislation 
preventing sexual harassment and have also provided the terms of its enforcement which was 
previously almost non-existent. The SC in Vishakha’s case has reposed ultimate faith in the 
Employers that they will set up Complaint Committees and provide for its proper 
enforcement by the employers. 
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     This being the problem of every enterprise, what is required at this juncture, is a joint 
effort by the judiciary to fill the blanks, to answer the questions for ensuring safe working 
environment, the media to embolden women’s spirit by providing adequate publicity to the 
do’s and don’ts at the workplace. Unless such a combined effort to empower female 
employees is made, it is unlikely that such complex sexual harassment problems would be 
eliminated from the workplaces. 
The NCW Draft Bill, 2003 and Vishakha Guidelines on Prevention of Sexual 
Harassment of Women at Work Place  
     In an attempt to translate the Vishaka Guidelines1 of the Supreme Court of India into an 
Act, the National Commission for Women (NCW) has drafted a Bill titled ‘Sexual 
Harassment of Women at Their Work Place (Prevention) Bill, 2003’. The chairperson of 
NCW, Dr. Poornima Advani said, “Although the guidelines laid down by the Supreme Court 
are as binding as the provisions of any Act,2 but generally, people find the provisions of an 
Act more serious than the Court’s guidelines. The Court has also made it clear in the Vishaka 
that there is a need for an appropriate law to be made on the subject.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 (Vishaka and others v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1997 SC 3011) 
2 (Imtiaz Ahmad, ‘Beyond the Original Message: The Islamic conception of women is not founded on 
the principle of gender equality’ published in Hindustan Times, New Delhi, May 30, 2001) 
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CHAPTER – VII 
 
ROLE OF JUDICIARY IN ESTABLISHING FEMI-JUSTICE 
     One of the oldest and most persistent bases of discrimination has been gender. In 1873 the 
exclusion of women from law practice was upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court on the specious 
plea that “the paramount destiny and mission of women are to fulfil the noble and benign 
offices of wife and mother.”1 These archaic notions were not confined to the judiciary alone. 
As late as 1961 the U.S. Supreme Court said that “woman is still regarded as the center of 
home and family life.” 2 
     The close scrutiny of the decisions of the courts reveal that in the earlier phase the Indian 
Courts relied heavily on the American decisions and allowed discrimination against women 
on the ground of sex. It is clear from the decision of Madras High Court where admission to a 
woman in Mahatma Gandhi Memorial College, Udipi was refused on the ground that the 
college was open to men only and college did not have the women on the ground of ‘sex’ was 
upheld as reasonable classification. Raj Manner, C.J. evolved technical approach and held 
that since college was not a state there was hardly any question of violation of Article 15(i). 
The Court laid emphasis on Article 29 and was of the view that Article 29(2) did not include 
‘sex’ as a prohibitory ground for discrimination so it could be hardly of much avail to the 
petitioner. The Court did not agree to read Articles 15(1) and 29(2) together.3  
     Indian judiciary has applied the principles of social engineering and distributive justice in 
some areas like dealing with, stridhan, divorce and property rights for women and has also 
appreciated the protective discrimination in favour of women. Whenever necessary, the 
Supreme Court has not failed to warn the Government as well as State Governments of its 
responsibility towards women’s rights must not be trampled upon.4 The role of judiciary is 
proved from the number of judgments pronounced by the Supreme Court which can be 
                                                 
1   Bradwell v. State, (1873) 83 US (130) 
2  Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S.57, 61-62 (1961) 
3   University of Madras v. Shantibai, AIR 1954 Mad. 67 
4  Quoted by Kamal Jeet Singh, “A Probe into Judicial Response to Women Welfare in India”, Supreme 
Court Journal, Vol.3 (1993) p.2 
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termed as stepping stones towards the promotion of women’s right in socio, economic and 
political environment. 
     In our Constitutional scheme, the Supreme Court has been assigned the role of ensuring 
and enforcing social justice as envisaged in the Preamble and the Directive Principles of State 
Policy, alongwith the two other branches of the government –the Executive and the 
Legislative.1 While discussing the judicial response to women welfare, an attempt has been 
made to analyse the role of the Judiciary in safeguarding the interests of the women and to 
examine whether or not the Supreme Court has succeeded in fulfilling the role assigned to it 
by the framers of the constitution, i.e., to administer justice in manner so as to achieve or 
promote the welfare of women. 
Judicial Responses in Constitutional Matters  
     The founding fathers of our Constitution granted freedom, liberty and equality to woman 
but they were also pragmatic realists and knew that misuse and exploitation of liberal 
principles do frustrate its own aim and purpose, which was the welfare of the woman. As such 
they read freedom a need for protection while prohibiting injustice of discrimination on the 
basis of sex which victimized woman. They could also see justice of discrimination when it 
protected the essential interest of woman.2   
     Gender discrimination has not presented serious juridical problems in India. Article 15(3) 
of the Constitution of India provides for protective discrimination in favour of women. It 
modifies the requirement that the State shall not discriminate on the basis of sex, specifically 
permitting special provisions in favour of women. This provision reflects the profound 
concern of the Founding Fathers for women and their place in a male dominated society. As 
observed by the Supreme Court in Muthamma v. Union of India, 3“The struggle for national 
freedom was also a battle against women’s thralldom.”  B.N. Rau, the constitutional adviser 
                                                 
1   See, Uma Gupta, “The Supreme Court of India and Social Justice” – Journal of Constitutional and 
Parliamentary Studies, Vol. XVII, Nos. 3-4 (1982) p.259 
2   Sharma R.N., “Constitutional Protection to Women and Judicial Responses” in “Women, Law and 
Social Change”ed. by Shamsuddin Shams, Ashish Pub. House, New Delhi (1991) 
3  AIR 1979 SC 1868, 1870 
 320
found support for this provision from his discussion with Justice Frankfurter, who 
emphasized that special provisions might have to be made in favour of women.1  
     Laws providing for reservation of seats for women in local bodies2 and educational 
institutions,3 according special treatment for women in the matter of bail,4 and making more 
advantageous provisions for maintenance in favour of wives without similar provisions in 
favour of husbands, have been judicially upheld.5  Protective discrimination apart, two 
justifications have been advanced for laws discriminating in favour of women: first, that the 
discrimination was not based solely on sex but also on other factors, namely, the weaker 
position occupied by women in Indian society,6 and second, that these laws compensated for 
past discrimination and disabilities suffered by women as a class. The reduction of disparities 
in economic conditions between men and women caused by the long history of discrimination 
against women has been recognized as an important objective.7  
     A Judgment of the Supreme Court in 1979, Muthamma v. Union of India,8 contains some 
indication of the applications of the strict scrutiny standards in the sphere of public 
employment. The India Foreign Service Rules which required that a woman member of the 
service should obtain the permission of the Government in writing before her marriage is 
solemnized and that no married woman shall be entitled as of right to be appointed to the 
service were branded by the court as a “hangover of the masculine culture of manacling the 
weaker sex.”9 The Court observed that the requirements of certain types of employment, the 
sensitivities or handicaps of either sex, and the peculiarities of societal factors may warrant 
selectivity and differentiation, but save where differentiation is demonstrable, the rule of 
                                                 
1   Shiva Rao, The Framing of India’s Constitution – A Study, p.187 
2   Dattatreya v. State of Bombay, AIR 1953 Bombay, 313 
3   Sagar v. State, AIR 1987 A.P. 165, C 174 
4   Choki v. State, AIR 1957 Rajasthan 10 
5  Thamsi Goundan v. Kanni Ammal, AIR 1952 Madras 529. The ground of decision in this case is that 
women as a class are weaker than men. It is not clear whether the weakness referred to by the Court is 
physical or economical. 
6   Similar reasoning as Red v. Reed (1971) 404 US 71, 76-77 
7   This reasoning would seem to be in accord with Califano v. Webster 430 US 313, 318. (1977). The 
challenged statute operated to compensate women for past economic discrimination. 
8   AIR 1979 SC 1968, 1970 
9  Ibid. 
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equality must govern.1 Applying this standard, the Court invalidated the impugned Indian 
Foreign Service Rules. The case was moot because, at the time of hearing, an undertaking 
was given by the government that the rules would not be applied, as they were to be deleted. 
     In Air India v. Nargesh Meerza,2  the Court has to grapple with the problem of gender 
discrimination posed in the challenge to statutory regulations made by Air India, which 
imposed these disabilities on air hostesses: (a) they were not allowed to marry within four 
years from the date of their entry into service, (b) their services were terminated on their first 
pregnancy and (c) the age pf retirement of air hostesses was 35 years, extendable to 45 years 
at the option of the Managing Director as against the retirement age of air flight pursers at the 
age of 55 or 58 years. The Court upheld the first restriction taking “into consideration an 
overall picture of the situation and the difficulties of both the parties.” The Court in striking 
down the second and third disability ruled that it was manifestly unreasonable and arbitrary 
and “was proof positive of denigration of the role of women and a demonstration of male 
chauvnism.” 3 
     Air India’s proposed new regulation under which only an unmarried woman on first 
pregnancy would have to retire from service was characterized as wholly unreasonable 
because it to “take into consideration cases where a woman becomes a victim of rape or other 
circumstances resulting in pregnancy by force or fraud for reasons beyond the control of the 
women” and “the distinction of first pregnancy of a married woman and that of an unmarried 
woman does not have any reasonable or rational basis and cannot be supported.”4  
     In Government of A.P. v. P.B. Vijay Kumar,5 the Court gave a new dimension to Article 
15(3) by holding that reservation for woman in State employment is also permissible under 
that provision notwithstanding separate provision in this regard under Article 16. In this case 
an A.P. Government rule which provided for : (i) preference for women in jobs better suited 
for them; (ii) preference upto 30% for women for which they are equally suited with man; and 
                                                 
1  Ibid., p.1870 
2   AIR 1981 SC 1829 
3  Ibid., p.1851, para 82 
4   Ibid., p.1851, para 51 
5   AIR 1995 SC 1648 
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(iii) direct recruitment to posts reserved exclusively for women was upheld. The Court held 
that Article 15(3) was wide enough to cover any special provision for women including 
reservations in jobs. Article 16 does not come in the way of such reservation. The two articles 
must be harmoniously construed. Both of them aim at egalitarian society and authorize 
special provision for the upliftment of its weaker sections. Women are historically and 
otherwise a weaker section of our society for whose upliftment Article 15(3) is made which 
should be given widest possible interpretation and application subject to the condition that 
reservation should not exceed 50% limit as laid down in Indra Sawhney case. The court has 
also upheld a Orissa Government Order reserving 30% quota for women in the allotment of 
24 hours medical stores as part of self-employment scheme.1  
Judicial Responses in Criminal Matters  
     In India the exclusion of a women from the offence of adultery (Section 497 of the Indian 
Penal Code) exempting her from punishment (whereas a man on conviction may be sentenced 
to serve five years) has been ruled to be non-discriminatory.2 In a subsequent case decided in 
1988 the Court proceeded on the premise that “it is the man who is the seducer and not the 
woman”3 and that a woman in India, because of the peculiar position she occupies in Indian 
society is generally a victim of the crime. No studies or reports or data were cited for this 
conclusion, but the court was apparently impelled by the desire not to tilt further the balance 
already loaded against women in socio-economic matters. It is also an historical hangover 
from the days of Lord Macaulay who prepared the first draft of the Indian Penal Code in 
1837. 
                                                 
1   Gayatri Devi Pansari v. State of Orissa, (2000) 4 SCC 221: AIR 2000 SC 1531 
2   Yusuf v. State of Bombay AIR 1951 Bombay 470, affirmed by Supreme Court in AIR (1954) SC 
321 
3   Sowmithri Vishnu v. Union of India, AIR 1985 SC 1618. Compare with Michael M. v. Sonoma 
Country, 450 US 464, 475-76. A Californian law which punished a male who engaged in sexual 
intercourse with an underaged female but exempted a female who had sexual intercourse with an 
underaged male was held not to be in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s equal protection clause. 
The Court held that the statute rested not on the assumption that males are generally aggressive but on 
the need to protect young girls on whom the consequences of sexual intercourse and pregnancy fall 
more heavily than on males. 
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     Macaulay’s reasons for not including women in the crime of adultery were that “the 
condition of women of this country is unhappily very different from that of the women of 
England and France. They are married while still children. They are often neglected for other 
wives while still young. They share the attention of a husband with several rivals. To make 
laws for punishing the inconstancy of the wife while the law admits the privilege of the 
husband to fill his zenana with women, is a course which we are most reluctant to adopt… 
and we are not inclined to throw into a scale already too much depressed the additional 
weight of the penal law.” The Law Commission in 1972 recommended that the exemption of 
a woman from the offence of adultery be deleted because, with the general advancement in 
the status of women and especially their education, they can now be held responsible for their 
own actions so as to have no further need for any artificial protections. The recommendation 
was not accepted. Adultery as a ground for divorce is available to both men and women in 
India under the general law of the land as well as under the particular laws dealing with 
different communities. 
     The Supreme Court judgment in what is popularly known as the Mathura Case1 evoked 
sharp reaction. In that case a young girl around 16 years of age was called to the police 
station, detained there and raped by the persons in charge. The Sessions Judge was prejudiced 
by the doctor’s report that Mathura was not a virgin and had been used to sexual intercourse 
and therefore, came to the conclusion that she must have been a consenting party to the 
intercourse and acquitted the two policemen. Disagreeing with the decision of the lower court 
the High Court convicted the two policemen. The Supreme Court shared the prejudice of the 
Sessions Court against Mathura and allowed the appeal and acquitted the policemen. The 
Supreme Court decision reflects double standards of morality in respect of men and women. 
It was described by four university teachers in an open letter to the Chief Justice as “an 
extraordinary decision sacrificing human rights of women under the law and the 
Constitution.”2  
                                                 
1   Tukaram v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1979, SC 185 
2   An open letter to the Chief Justice of India, 1970 (4) Supreme Court Journal, 17, 19. 
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     In State Government of NCT of Delhi v. Sunil and another1 the Supreme Court held that 
from the woeful and eerie features described by the doctor no Court could possibly escape 
from the conclusion that the little child was violently molested, ravished, raped and 
sodomised besides penile penetration having been made into her mouth. The remnants of 
extensive mangling of the tender body of the child would reflect the possibility of more than 
one rapist subjecting the child to such beastly ravishment. No court could afford to ignore the 
report of the doctor who conducted the autopsy with meticulous precision about all the 
features noticed, merely on the strength of what another doctor had scribbled in the MLC at 
the initial state. The culprit cannot escape conviction from the offence of rape and culpable 
homicide not amounting to murder on account of minor discrepancies in evidence. 
     Sexual intercourse with her consent obtained by giving her false assurance of marriage 
cannot bring the accused under clutches of offence of rape although from the moral and 
humanitarian angle of view, the inhuman conduct of the accused in abandoning the 
unfortunate girl to face her fate all alone after making her pregnant might be highly 
reprehensible.2  
Judicial Responses in Dowry and Matrimonial Cases  
     In dowry cases, the Supreme Court of India has endeavoured to give justice even to the 
relatives of woman who commit suicide for want of dowry. In a famous case of Brij Lal v. 
Prem Chand,3 the court has held the husband of deceased wife liable for abetment of suicide. 
The Court, as a matter of severe punishment, enhanced the sentence of fine from Rs. 500 to 
R. 20,000 and also directed accused husband to pay a sum of Rs. 18,000 to the father of the 
deceased for bringing up minor son.4  
     The philosophy contained in Section 304B has been rightly highlighted in Soni Bhai 
Devraj Bhai Babu Bhai v. State of Gujrat,5 in the following words: “Section 304B and the 
cognate provisions are meant for eradication of the social evil of dowry which has been the 
                                                 
1   (2001) 1 Femi Juris C.C. 1 (SC) 
2   Araj S K v. State of West Bengal, (2001) 2 Femi-Juris C.C. 29 (Cal) 
3   AIR 1989 SC 1661 
4   Ibid at 1661 
5   (1991), 3, Supreme Court Journal p.221 
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bane on Indian society and continues unabated inspite of emancipation of women and the 
women liberation movement. This all pervading malady in our society has only a few luckly 
exceptions inspite of equal treatment and opportunity to boys and girls for education and 
career. Society continues to perpetuate the difference between them for the purpose of 
marriage and it is this distinction which makes the dowry system thrive.”1 The apex court of 
India has very earnestly worked hard to eradicate the problem of dowry deaths and has on 
several occasions held the accused guilty of murder for the death of bride caused due to 
burning. The Court very lucidly held that, “Bride burning is a shame on our society. Poor 
never resort to it. Rich do not need it. Obiviously because it is basically an economic problem 
of a class which suffer both from ego and complex.2  
     The word ‘Dowry’ in Sec. 304-B has to be understood as it is defined in Sec. 2 of the 
Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961. When a young married lady was harassed, ill-treated and 
instigated to commit suicide, she jumped before running train, received serious injuries but 
did not die. After examining various penal provisions, accused persons were found to have 
committed offence under Sec. 498-A and not under Secs. 306, 304-B and 116.3   
     In view of the practice of polygamy among the large Muslim community in India it 
survived the constitutional challenge on the grounds that it was based on considerations that 
were very vital and compelling to those who believed and who still believe in sanctity of their 
personal laws. The institution of polygamy did not constitute discrimination against women 
only on the ground of their sex.4 These cases involved discrimination on the basis of religion 
and gender which may explain the strained reasoning adopted by the Court.5  
     Laws prohibiting or banning bigamy by Hindus whilst permitting Muslims to practice 
polygamy were upheld on the grounds that the essence of classification was not based only on 
religion but on the recognition of the fact that Hindus and Muslims in India have traditionally 
                                                 
1   (Ibid.) 
2   (1991) 1 Supreme Court Journal p.50 
3   Satvir Singh v. State of Punjab, (2001) 2 Femi-Juris C.C. 80 (SC) 
4   In retrospect, one can appreciate the insistence by the framers of the Constitution on the addition of 
the word “only” in Art.15(1) 
5   Soli J Sorabji, ‘Women, Constitution and the Courts ’in ‘Women, Law and Social Change’ ed. by 
Shamsuddin Shams, Ashish Pub. House, New Delhi (1991) 
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had their own “personal laws” based upon their respective religious texts. The State, the Court 
held, may decide to bring about social reform by stages which may be limited to one 
community, depending upon which community was more ripe for reform.1  The ostensible 
reason for that conclusion was the reluctance of Courts to strike down laws that introduced 
monogamy among a vast section of the people, the Hindus. The real reason was the anxiety 
not to ruffle the sensibilities of the Muslim community. By way of comparison, the United 
States Supreme Court readily upheld a federal law making polygamy a crime at at time when 
the Mormon Church regarded it as a religious duty.2  
     The Court could not take cognizance on police report in respect of offence punishable 
under Section 494, IPC in view of specific bar created under Sectin 198, Cr. P C. The 
cognizance of offence punishable under Chapter XX of the Indian Penal Code could only be 
taken upon a complaint made by some person aggrieved by the offence.3  Thus,  most of the 
cases of bigamy go unpunished.  
     Before enacting Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 provisions for restitution of conjugal rights and 
divorce were incorporated which were foreign to the Hindu culture. The provisions of section 
9 of the Hindu Marriage Act providing for restitution of conjugal rights were challenged 
before Andhra Pradesh Hingh Court in T. Sareetha v. T Venkata Subbaiah.4 It was argued on 
behalf of the petitioner that the remedy of restitution of conjugal rights is barbarous, 
uncivilized and an engine of oppression against wife and therefore, it is violative of Articles 
14 and 21 of the Constitution. The Court declared section 9 as unconstitutional and the 
grossest form of violation of any individual’s right to privacy. It denied the woman her free 
choice whether, when and how and by whom various parts of her body are to be sensed and 
her body was to become a vehicle for the procreation of another human being. It has a 
tendency of degrading of human dignity and monstrous to human spirit. 
                                                 
1   State of Bombay v. Narasau Appa, AIR 1952 Bombay 85, Sambu Reddy v. G Jayamma, AIR 1972 
A.P. 136, Sonu Bai v. Bala, AIR 1983, Bom. 156 and also see Joseph Minattur, “On the Magic of 
Monogamy and similar Illusions”, Islamic Law of Modern India (Indian Law Institute,” New Delhi; 
Bombay; N.M. Tripathi, 1977 
2   Reynolds v. United States, 98 US 145 (1878) 
3   Smt. Kumkum Saxena v. Sessions Judge, Rampur & Ors., (2003) 1 Femi Juris C.C. 290(All) 
4   AIR 1983 AP 635 
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     In another case 1 Delhi Court adopted the contrary view and upheld the validity of section 
9 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. Justice Avadh Behari Rohatgi observed that the object of 
restitution decree is to bring about cohabitation between the estranged parties so that they can 
live together in the matrimonial home in amity. The leading ideas of the section is to preserve 
the tie of marriage. The remedy of restitution aims at cohabitation and consortium and not 
merely physical sexual intercourse. Therefore, it is fallacy to think that the restitution of 
conjugal rights constitutes the starkest form of Governmental invasion on marital privacy. 
Justice Rohatgi emphasized that introduction of constitutional law in the home is most 
inappropriate. It is like introducing a bull in a china shop. It will prove to be a ruthless 
destroyer of the marriage institution itself and will be a fruitful source of dissension and 
quarrelling. Therefore, in the privacy of the home and the married life neither Article 14 nor 
Article 21 have any place. 
     The Supreme Court in Smt. Saroj Rani v. Sudershan Kumar Chadha2 while supporting the 
observations made by Justice Rohatgi in Harminder Kaur’s case3 upheld the validity of 
section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 and observed that the purpose of decree for 
restitution of conjugal rights is to offer inducement for the husband or wife to live together in 
order to give them an opportunity to settle the matter amicably. Thus, it serves a social 
purpose as an aid to the prevention of break up of marriage. Therefore, section 9 is not 
violative of Article 14 or 21 of the Constitution. 
     When husband was living with another lady and was leading adulterous life. Such conduct 
of husband compelling wife to live with her parents and husband’s offer to keep wife with 
him was found full of hollowness. He cannot be allowed to take advantage of his own wrong 
conduct. His humiliating treatment with wife disentitles him from obtaining relief of divorce 
on the ground of desertion and cruelty by wife under sections 13(1)(i-b), 13(1)(i-a) and 
23(1)(a), Hindu Marriage Act, 1955.4 
                                                 
1  Smt. Harminder Kaur v. Harmander Singh Chaudhary, AIR 1984 Delhi 66 
2  AIR 1984 SC 1526  
3   AIR 1984 Delhi 66 
4  Chetan Dass v. Kamla Devi, (2001) 2 Femi-Juris C.C. 6 (SC) 
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     A Divorce on the ground of cruelty and desertion is not available to a Christian husband 
petitioner under sec. 10 of the Indian Divorce Act, 1869. No reliable evidence was found in 
support of wild allegations made by husband against wife that she is living in adultery with 
many persons and leading life of a prostitute and hence no decree of divorce can be passed in 
favour of husband.1 Section 10 treats Christian wives differently on the ground of religion and 
sex. Christian woman to prove adultery to put an end to marriage even if she succeeded in 
proving cruelty whereas husband can break marital bond if he succeeds in proving adultery 
along. Such discrimination per se is violative of Arts.14 and 15 of the Constitution.2  
 
Judicial Responses in Maintenance and Women’s Right to Property Matters  
     In a ruling3 arising out of the claim of a divorced Muslim woman, Shah Bano, for 
maintenance from her former husband, the Supreme Court unhesitatingly upheld the statutory 
right to maintenance of divorced Muslim women under the general law of the land,4 
notwithstanding the Muslim “Personal Law” under which the Muslim husband’s liability for 
maintenance is smaller both in amount and duration. The Court held that “the religion 
professed by a spouse or by the spouses has no place in the scheme of these provisions. 
Whether the spouses are Hindus or Muslims, Christians or Parsis, pagans or heathens is 
wholly irrelevant…. Section 125 is truly secular in character.”5 
     Not unexpectedly, this judgment caused a furore among the orthodox sections of the 
Muslim community, who condemned it as an unjustifiable interference in the personal law of 
the Muslims. As a result of intense Muslim pressure and lobbying, Parliament has enacted the 
Muslims Woman’s (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986, which is aimed at undoing 
the effect of the Supreme Court judgment in Shah Bano. 
                                                 
1   K.A. Philip v. Susan Jacob and others, (2001) 2 Femi-Juris C.C. 209 (Ker) 
2   Debra Clare Seymour v. Pradeep Arnold Seymour, (2002) 2 Femi-Juris C.C. 298 (Del) 
3   Mohd. Ahmed Khan v. Shah Bano Begum, AIR 1985 SC 945 
4   Sec. 125 if the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1973 
5  Ibid., pp. 948-949 
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     Even after passing of MWP Act, 1986, the Apex Court played beneficiary role towards the 
Muslim women. In a case 1 the Supreme Court held that “right of a divorced Muslim wife to 
maintenance under the Act of 1986 is not confined to the iddat period only. Husband is bound 
to make and pay a maintenance to the wife and if he fails to do so, then wife is entitled to 
recover it. Reasonable and fair provision for maintenance is not limited only for the iddat 
period but it would extend to the whole life of divorced wife unless she gets married for a 
second time.” 
     Under section 3, Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986, a divorced 
Muslim wife is entitled to get reasonable and fair provision and maintenance only up to date 
she got married for second time. A former husband’s obligation or liability to provide 
reasonable and fair provision for future livelihood of his divorced wife after the period of 
iddat extends only up to date of her re-marriage and if not married, till her death.2  
     Claim of maintenance can be filed by wife under different statutes i.e., Code of Criminal 
Procedure, 1973, Sec. 125, Sec. 18 of Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956 and Sec. 
25 of Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. But once she gets maintenance under Sec. 125 of the Code, 
her subsequent claim under other Acts has to be considered keeping in view that order for 
maintenance and amount granted to her in proceedings under Sec. 125 has to be given set-off 
while granting maintenance under other Acts. The Court again held that primary liability is on 
husband under Sec. 18 of Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956 and Sec. 20 of this 
Act is available only when Sec. 18 is inapplicable. Court if directs husband to pay 
maintenance to wife, it cannot simultaneously direct son also to pay maintenance to his 
mother.3  
     The Supreme Court came to the rescue of women in succession matters. It was argued 
before the Supreme Court that Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 confers full 
ownership over husband’s property to widow.4 The Court while upholding the 
                                                 
1  Danial Latifi v. Union of India, (2001) 3 Femi-Juris C.C. 20(SC) 
2   Rasiya v. State of Kerala, (2003) 1 Femi-Juris C.C. 9 (Ker); (2001 (2) HLR 528 (SC) followed 
3   Merubhai Mandanbhai Odedara and another v. Raniben Merubhai Odedara, (2001) 1 Femi-Juris 
C.C. 138 (Guj) 
4   (Pratap Singh v. Union of India, AIR 1985 SC 1695 
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constitutionality of the provision observed that it was enacted to remedy to some extent the 
plight of a Hindu woman who could not claim absolute interest in the property. 
     When a widow is given right under Will, such right will become her absolute right in 1956 
by virtue of Sec. 14(1), Hindu Succession Act, 1956. Thus, she can transfer that right to 
anyone whom she desires.1 In absence of any pleading to the effect that properties were given 
to the widow by way of maintenance, finding of High Court that property in her possession 
was in lieu of maintenance which could be enlarged into full ownership rights on her is not 
sustainable under Sec 14(1) of Hindu Succession Act, 1956. Properties were ancestral 
properties and other heirs would also get a right by birth. Entire property could not have been 
given to widow by way of maintenance.2  
     The scrutiny of the discussion on judicial response to women makes it manifestly clear 
that the Supreme Court of India has responded in a positive manner. Some of the cases 
significantly advance the cause and dignity of women: where a service rule whereby marriage 
was a disability for appointment to foreign service was declared unconstitutional;3 where 
pregnancy as a disqualification to continue in public employment was declared ultra vires of 
Article 14 and 16(1) of the Constitution;4 granting equal right of maintenance under Section 
125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 to divorced Muslim women notwithstanding the 
personal law;5 on women’s right to her stridhana;6 where dowry demand was held enough to 
amount to cruelty;7 where the woman refused the husband’s application for a blood test to 
disprove paternity as it would be slanderous, embarrassing and humiliating for woman;8 
where the Supreme Court observed that rape was not only an offence under the criminal law 
but it was violation of the fundamental right to life and liberty guaranteed by Article 21 of the 
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Indian Constitution;1 where the rape was held to be violative of the right to privacy;2 where a 
married daughter was allowed accommodation in parental house3 and where Supreme Court 
provided adequate safeguards to working women against sexual harassment.4 
     Though the Supreme Court has exhibited a dynamic attitude in ensuring gender equality, 
judicial activism is yet to percolate to the lower levels of the judicial system. Moreover some 
of the much talked about reforms such as legal aid etc. have not taken off at all. Women 
access to justice becomes much more difficult because of the cultural barriers that arise from 
gender. 
     One must not forget that the Supreme Court of India is not an answer to all our problems. 
Nor can it be said to have always seriously hindered in our achieving what we wanted to 
achieve. Even if the Supreme Court has not been “the social as of the revolution, it has 
certainly, not being in thwarting what the nation wanted to achieve.”5 Social justice is the end, 
judicial justice is the means, the Legislative and Executive operation are human (behaviour) 
engineering and together all the three Branches of Government have to act in comity and 
unison so that the constitution may fulfill what the founding father designed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1   Bodhisathwa Gautam v. Subhra Chakraborty (1996) 1 SCC 490 
2  State of Punjab v. Gurmit Singh AIR 1996 SC 1993 
3   Savita Somvedi  (1998) 2 SCJ 46 
4  Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan AIR 1997 SC 3011 
5 See Rajeev Dhavan, “Sense and Non-sense about the Supreme Court” National Herald, New Delhi, 
February 18, 1978. 
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CHAPTER – VIII 
 
CONCLUSIONS AND SUGGUSTIONS 
 
     India functions as if one half of the population does not exist. Rarely is a policy framed 
keeping women in mind because men in decision-making positions remain so oblivious of the 
life women live and what they undergo. The discrimination is manifested by disparity 
between men and women in every sphere, be it literacy, access to health or wealth, death in 
child birth if not killed in the womb itself, occupation of a fraction of the seats in Parliament 
and violence at home and in the community. 
          It is hard being a woman in India. Even though a number of amendments have been 
passed to make law ‘just’ towards women, it weighs heavily against them. Their control over 
land and property is dismal. Inheritance rights actually favour men while discriminating 
against women. The excuse of men in maintaining the status quo is that they cannot interfere 
in the sphere of religion. And if there is one thing that has been used to keep women 
subjugated, it is religion. Religion deems that a woman should behave in a certain way and so 
she shall. It is the men who decide what rights they should have and it is always all male 
groups of religious experts who claim to know what is best for women. 
     Justice, in this country presents an unfriendly face towards women. The atmosphere of 
thanas and courts is so intimidating that women would rather keep quiet and suffer 
humiliation, violence and intimidation than seek justice. The coming years are not going to be 
easy for women. They will have to fight every inch of the way as they did to get the dowry 
and rape laws amended, to get onto panchayats and other grass roots bodies and the way they 
will have to, to get into Parliament. It is a national shame that India loses thousands of women 
in the prime of their lives every year in childbirth. All that is needed for checking these easily 
preventable deaths, is a society that acknowledges that the life of a woman is worth saving 
and a health care system that realizes that half of the population is female and should provide 
services for the.      
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     The status of Hindu women during the Vedic era was at par with men. A home without the 
wife is like wilderness. In every social and religious ceremonies, she was associated with and 
actively involved. In the post-Vedic era, the status of Hindu women gradually deteriorated 
and she was regarded as subservient to her counterpart i.e. male in all social and cultural 
activities. This condition could not improve even during the British rule. In the later part of 
the 19th century, national leaders and social reformers tried their best to improve upon the 
status of Hindu female. After independence, the Constitution of India envisaged socio-
economic equality to all Indian citizens, irrespective of caste, creed or sex. No efforts have 
been spared in passing non-discriminatory legislation for the upliftment of socio-economic 
status of Hindu woman by the Indian Parliament.       
     According to Manu the men and women are different from each other from top to toe. 
Each one is suited for different types of work. Therefore, Manu allowed men to hold superior 
position than women to whom was assigned the inferior job of kitchenary and bring of 
progeny. In the words of Manu she lacked the ability of true appreciation and balance of mind 
and did not possess much depth of reason that is why she was not allowed to go out of the 
home. If she left the house and moved unescorted by her close relations her bodily impurities 
could multiply that is why Manu did not contemplate equality between men and women in 
different walks of life. Manu merged the identity of women in men. Thus debarring her in 
claiming a separate and independent identity, status and personality, she had to grow and 
develop the personality, under the umbrella of the men, which in real and practical life was 
unfeasible. In other words Manu did not allow her any kind of liberty, or freedom either of 
speech or expression or movement nor he permitted her to have her own identity. 
     During Muslim period, the evolution of harem, growth and prevalence of polygamous 
marriages and its tolerance and tacit accord and recognition given to it, further sealed her fate 
and fortune. The Muslim rulers blocked all means for the development of her personality. 
Illiteracy added fuel to fire in her already degraded isolated and deteriorated condition. 
Perhaps that was the background, which led the social reformers and the rulers during the 
British period to raise a hue and cry to give her not a full fledged status but this gave a 
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foundation of new movement to plead for her cause. Stoppage of Satipratha, Bal- Vivah and 
Widow’s right to property Act, 1937 atleast could provide her a sign of relief. In one of her 
novel Ashapurna Devi, a winner of “Gyanpeeth Award” narrated that any daring Hindu lady 
in Bengal had to take a thousand dips in the river Ganges, if she was detected reading English 
language. 
      The misfortune is that the society for whom the law is made is reluctant to accept it by 
law alone. One could not achieve results and confer benefits unless the members are too 
willing to take the benefit of law. The British period, it is observed arrested the growth and 
development of Hindu law and the Hindus for two reasons: (i) that the Britishers were too 
reluctant to change the law of gentoos and of the Musalmans, and  (ii) The piecemeal 
legislations passed by them provided only a temporary relief for the time being. For that 
reason it is said the Hindu females instead of gaining anything substantially, were loser in the 
longer run of life. This led the social reformers to restart the movement with more vigour and 
with a slogan that why they should not be treated at par with men.  
     India became free in 1947 and constitution of India was passed in 1950. A new society 
thus took birth. It was a society based on democratic norms. It was a concept of Prof. Deicey 
that from Coolie to the Prime Minister every one should be treated by the same law of the 
land the like should be treated alike. Equality before law in true democracy is a matter of 
right. It can not be a matter of charity or favour or grace or discretion are the words of Justice 
S.R. Reet Ledge who expressed the view in a address to the Fifth open meeting of legal Aid 
work, American Bar Association Convention, Indiana-Polis, September 29, 1921. 
     Article 14 of the Constitution expressly prohibits discrimination on the basis of race, 
religion, caste, sex and place of birth and guarantees equality before the law and equal 
protection of laws irrespective of race, religion, caste, sex etc. Thus the constitution has 
ensured equal status to all i.e. not only between men and men, women and women but also 
between men and women. This constitutional spirit found a distinct place and recognition in 
Hindu law legislations passed in the years 1955 and 1956. In every sphere of domestic life the 
Hindu woman was treated at par with man whether it was the case of matrimony or marital 
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rights or right to adopt and be adopted or to exercise the rights of guardianship over the minor 
children. The Hindu Succession Act, 1956 conferred a substantial and positive proprietary 
status on her and this showering of constitutional blessings could become a solid back ground 
for enriching her property rights. 
     Article 14 recognizes women as a class. Article removes disability attached to women by 
passing the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. This Act has declared unequivocal term the property 
of the women will belong to her as her absolute property. Further Section 8 of this Act has put 
female heirs at par with male heirs. In C.B. Muthamma v. Union of India,1 the court upheld 
the principle of equality before law and held that denial of right to employment to married 
woman was discriminatory on the ground of sex. The Orissa High Court in Radha Charan v. 
State,2 held that the rule was discriminatory on the basis of sex if a married woman was 
disqualified from being selected at post of District Judge. Mr. Justice Fazal Ali in Air India v. 
Nargesh Meerza and others,3 held the rule violative of Article 14 if Air India Employees 
service Regulations provided that an Air Hostess was to resign from service: (a) upon 
attaining the age of 35 years, or (b) on marriage if it takes place within 4 years of service, or 
(c) upon first pregnancy whichever occurred earlier. Article 15 provides that no 
discrimination can be made by the State in matters of rights, privileges and immunities on the 
basis of sex and it also provides the making of special laws in favour of women and children.  
     The opposition to the provision of maintenance to divorced Muslim women is based on 
two counts. One is that a Muslim marriage is a civil contract. Once the contract itself is 
terminated the parties are absolved of any responsibilities towards one another. The other is 
that under Islam a divorced woman enjoys an unfettered right of remarriage and is entitled to 
payment of mehr and return of dowry. Both provisions ought to take care of the economic 
hardships that she is likely to face after the marriage is terminated. Both arguments are based 
on legalism. Whatever the legal status of marriage in Islam, an average Muslim woman safely 
presumes that her husband, whom she would serve and for whom she would bear progeny, 
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2   AIR 1969 Ori. 237 
3   AIR 1981 SC 1829 
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would look after her. Even if her confidence in this is assailed by the consciousness that the 
sword of divorce hangs heavily upon her, she suspends her misgivings on this count in favour 
of the hope that her marriage would last. It is on this hope that she concedes to her husband’s 
wish on the wedding night to forego her mehr.1  
     Implementation of the provisions prohibiting child marriages is a prime need at present. 
Though the declaring child marriage as void could create a chaos in the society, the law 
should take any other alternate drastic step for preventing child marriages. It is suggested that 
the enforcement agencies and officers in the social welfare department should report the 
incident of child marriage so as to penalize erring parents of brides and bridegrooms which is 
much in vogue in Rajasthan even today. Registration of marriage may be made compulsory 
and that would be possible only when the brides and bridegrooms are of the required age. 
      By far the most serious tragedies that occur—dowry deaths, suicide, impoverishment of 
widows—arise out of women’s failure to use the legal safeguards and redress provisions with 
reference to marriage, divorce, dowry and property. Their inability to use the law is further 
aggravated in situations in which they have to fight a husband or a father. In the role 
allocation within Indian culture, these are the persons upon whom women normally depend to 
handle court matters. Better legal aid facilities are needed to enable women to use the legal 
system against these persons.  
       Every morning one comes across in the newspapers sickly report of ‘dowry deaths and 
criminal cruelty to women’, to realize that women in India are still treated as play things and 
faithful servants of their male counter-parts. 
      The amendment has been carried out in ‘The Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961’ with an intent 
to make it more effective in curbing the practice of giving and taking dowry and the resultant 
harassment of women by their husbands and in-laws. Recognized welfare institutions or 
organizations have now been permitted to lodge complaints before the Magistrate for the 
harassment of women in their matrimonial homes on account of dowry demand. A survey of 
“why women burn” conducted in 1983 reveals that the oppressive attitude towards a married 
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woman by her husband and in-laws remains on two counts: either because of insufficient 
dowry or on her giving birth to a female child.  
     The National Family Health Survey interviewed 90,000 women in the age-group of 15-49, 
reported that up to 58 to 65 per cent women had been beaten by their husbands, fathers, 
brothers or sons for reasons ranging from ‘neglecting’ the home, being ‘disrespectful’ to their 
in-laws, and going out without informing their husbands.1  
         Prostitution is a social problem, having its roots in economic adversity, social 
suppression and biological position of the women. It is one of the most heinous offences 
against the dignity of women and a slur on the face of a civilized society. The Constitution of 
India declares its faith in the dignity and worth of human being, by incorporating the 
cherished goal of humanity, justice-social, economic and political for all. It prohibits immoral 
traffic in human beings and declares it to be an offence punishable under Article 23. To fulfil 
this there is the Suppression of Immoral Traffic in Women and Girls Act, 1956 (now the 
Prevention of Immoral Traffic Act). Under this Act, prostitution as such is put to an end but 
has it been checked! It has taken newer forms. 
     There are inherent demerits in the Act, for example, the externment order for the 
prostitutes is like depositing garbage at others’ doors. The alarming dimensions of this 
exploitation are not known. The call girl culture is introduced. Five Star hotels, Massage 
Parlours and Fashionable Bars, all have callgirl system and sale of flesh. The well advertised 
entertainment offered by Bars, Hotels, Turkish Bath and Massage in big cities is often a thing 
in disguise for actual prostitution market. This is a new form of prostitution which goes 
unnoticed by the society and law enforcement authorities because it does not fall in any 
category of offences connected with prostitution. The rising demand of available goods of 
comfort in urban and metropolitan cities, the carelessness of the parents, the club society of 
highups are new dimensions of sexual exploitation of women in present day society. 
     Every Hindu male desires fidelity before and after marriage from a Hindu woman. He may 
move regularly to prostitutes and may lead an adulterous life even then he expects that his 
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bride should be a virgin and should remain virtuous throughout her life. Incidental act or 
sexual exploitation without her consent or under compelling circumstances may ruin the 
future of a Hindu woman. Thus the Hindu male dominated society has double standards, 
having less respect for women. Therefore, prostitution in all forms need to be prohibited and 
delinquents should be severely punished.  
     The labour legislations have further provided protection to women labourers but it is 
observed that these laws lack effective implementation in their right spirit. The report of the 
National Committee on status of women (1974) has highlighted this aspect and suggested 
measures to improve upon the conditions of women but the saddest aspect of it is that no 
concrete steps have been taken by the government to keep real protection to women 
labourers. The piecemeal protection provided under different labour legislations has failed to 
fully protect the interest of female workers. The Fundamental Rights and Directive Principles 
enshrined in the Constitution under various articles, provide special favour to women and 
direct the State to teat men and women equally. Article 38(2) directs the State to eliminate 
inequalities in status, facilities and opportunities. Article 39 provides that equally all men and 
women have the right to have an adequate means of livelihood and further, that there shall be 
equal pay for equal work for both men and women. To achieve this objective the State has 
passed the Equal Remuneration Act, 1976. Article 42 provides that the labour must be 
provided just and humane conditions of work and maternity relief. Article 43 provides that 
the State shall endeavour to secure a ‘living wage’ and ‘decent standard of life’ as a result of 
which the State has made suitable amendments in Factories Act, Mines Act, Plantation Act, 
etc. In 1987, The Parliament has amended the Equal Remuneration Act, 1976, having in view 
the pathetic condition of the unorganized sector, in order to ensure equal wages to all 
including women. The States have been directed by the Centre to enforce the provisions of 
the equal Remuneration Act strictly.         
     The judicial activism helped in the process of equalization between men and women in the 
post independent period but the constitutional mission of equalization could not be achieved 
fully due to following reasons: (i) general ignorance of law. (ii) Indifferent and hostile 
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attitude of the law enforcing agency. (iii) Economic backwardness and lack of community 
support for women seeking justice against discrimination. (iv) Ignoring the socio-economic 
implications of laws. 
              Law is the best instrument to provide that, but for being effective law requires the 
cooperation of other agencies. Therefore a holistic view of these crimes against women is 
essential to enact pragmatic laws and to make their enforcement effective. This project proves 
convincingly that legal solutions are the easiest and the best they cannot succeed in isolation. 
The help of other agencies is essential to be successful in curbing these crimes. 
     The efforts of the legislators and the law enforcers have not succeeded so far because their 
whole concentration was only on legal measures, moreover, their attempts were superficial 
and symptomatic: instead of trying to get at the root of the problem the legislators 
concentrated on various symptoms, which are only manifestations of the disease and not the 
disease itself; with concentrated efforts the symptoms may disappear for sometime but the 
root cause remains, therefore the disease reappears with greater vigour after sometime. 
     These crimes pose a very complex legal problem and cannot be solved without changing 
certain social and legal realities; but these realities cannot be changed by a stroke of pen or 
the enactment of strict laws. Centuries of thinking cannot be altered in a jiffy, still, a start has 
to be made. The attack has to be made simultaneously at many fronts keeping in view the 
various pitfalls and limitations. This project has proved that most of the existing protective 
laws are like fire fighting measures and they are no solutions. Instead of a proper doze of 
antibiotics the patient is given a limited doze of oxygen, and is left to die as soon as the 
supply of oxygen is stopped. This is probably the reason why the plethora of laws that were 
passed in eighties to combat dowry deaths, cruelty, prostitution, sexual harassment, rape, etc. 
proved ineffective. Laws have their own limitations, social evils cannot be banished by legal 
enactments, other means of social control must be simultaneously employed; relying solely 
on laws is like legislating a child out of naughtiness. Till the compulsions that are responsible 
for the evil practice are removed the evil cannot be contained. The findings and humble 
suggestions are put under the following headings. 
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      The Indian problem really lies in the fact that women do not make proper use of the 
existing legal and political rights and facilities. There are several reasons for this. The mass of 
Indian men and women are not yet fully aware of their new rights and opportunities. The 
bureaucracy they must deal with in order to exercise these rights, or to obtain redress for 
grievances, is too complex, too slow, too distance, and even too expensive for them to use. It 
has none of the immediacy, the approachability and the visible efficacy of the case or tribal 
council or the village panchayat, which they, as an essentially rural people were accustomed 
to use. 
 
1. Law Relating to Women’s Right to Property  
Findings.  According to Manu a wife, a son and a slave could have no property and that the 
wealth, which they earn, was acquired for him to whom it belonged. But Stridhan property 
belongs to women only. Gautama distinctly admitted the right of a woman to hold a separate 
property and provided for its succession. Henry Maine in his “Early History of Institutions” 
states that “It is certainly a remarkable fact that the institutions seems to have developed 
among the Hindus at a period relatively much earlier than among the Romans.” 
     In Mitakshara jurisdiction, including Bombay and the Dayabhaga School it is an 
established view that the share obtained on partition and property inherited by a female from 
males is not stridhan but woman’s estate. The characteristic feature of woman’s estate is that 
the female takes it as a limited owner and on her death it devolves upon the next heir of the 
last full owner. The Hindu Woman’s Right to Property Act, 1937 gave the widow a share 
equal to the share of a son and, in default of the son, took the entire property but the Act did 
not operate to regulate succession to agricultural lands in the Governor’s provinces. The 
widow could not of her own alienate the property except for special purposes and this 
restriction did not amount to the infringement of the fundamental right. The woman’s estate 
has now been converted into stridhan under section 14, Hindu Succession Act, 1956 and it is 
converted in to her absolute estate. 
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     Hindu Succession Act, 1956 introduced equal rights to sons and daughters in the property 
of the father as well as the mother. The most unacceptable matter is that in the case of the son, 
the mother is a Class I heir, where the daughter is concerned she is their in line and comes 
only after the heirs of husband. It perpetuates son preference and biases against the daughter. 
The Mitakshara law of coparcenary continues to operate especially in the absence of specified 
female and/or male heir(s) of class I of the schedule to the exclusion of new law of intestate 
succession envisaged by the Act. Removal of unchastity as a disqualification is a laudable 
change in the Act Similarly; remarriage of a widow does not divest her of her husband’s 
property. 
     The existing rule of survivorship coupled with that of partition – both emanating from the 
age-old concept of Mitakshara coparcenary – are bound to cause hardship in practice, 
especially to the detriment of Hindu females. Sivaramayya rightly holds that the retention of 
Mitakshara coparcenary is a discrimination against daughters, cannot be seriously 
controverted. This entrenched discrimination still speaks volumes against women in law and 
society.1 
Suggestions.  The Hindu Succession Act, 1956 has abolished ‘Stridhan and ‘woman’s estate’ 
and declared that woman shall be an absolute owner of the property. To give Hindu women a 
perfect equality with men and to make effective the legislative provisions of the Act, 
following suggestions are made: - 
(a) The differences between agnates and cognates to inherit the property of a male Hindu 
should be abolished in order to give equal rights to women.  
(b) The law of inheritance of Hindu female’s property requires another amendment in 
succession law. The division of property of a female Hindu for the purpose of succession into 
three classes is not justifiable and it shows a retrogressive step, which is to be abolished. 
(b) A restriction must be imposed on the testamentary power of a Hindu male who wants to 
disturb the usual line of inheritance. 
                                                 
1   See, Sivaramayya, B., “The Hindu Succession (Andhra Pradesh Amendment) Act, 1985: A Move in 
the wrong Direction”, 30 J.I.L.I. 167 (1988) 
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(c) The un-codified Hindu law relating to Joint Family, partition, religious endowment etc. 
requires codification though a central legislation. 
 (e) Looking to the constitutional mandates for equality and socio-economic justice along 
with proven inefficacy of relevant provisions of the Hindu Succession Act, abolition of 
Mitakshara coparcenary should no longer be deferred by the Parliament if evil impact of the 
system has to be remedied in the interest of Hindu females. 
2. The Law Relating to Women’s Right to Maintenance 
Findings. Manu declared: “The aged parents, a virtuous wife and an infant child must be 
maintained even by doing hundred misdeeds.” The divorced wife is a cursed human being 
abhorred by society and remarriage is also very difficult. The maintenance itself is a matter of 
hatred. A Hindu wife does not want to be dependent upon her husband. She wants to be 
financially independent and lead a life with dignity and self-respect. But her social status is 
such that maintenance becomes must in her case. Wife’s work is misappropriated only as an 
expression of love and affection. Society is yet to devise a mechanism to accord financial 
value to the work done by her. Wife needs economic umbrella for her survival and well- 
being.  
     A Hindu wife can claim maintenance from her husband under civil as well as criminal 
branch of law. There is divergence of opinion among different High Courts on several vital 
issues. There is no unanimity in grant of interim maintenance under Section 18 of the Hindu 
Adoptions and Maintenance Act as well as Section 125 of the Criminal Procedure Code. 
Sometimes the grant of maintenance has been kept in abeyance so as to pressurize the wife to 
agree to the terms and conditions put forward by the husband. Presumably it is considered to 
be in best interest of wife, without realizing that the object of maintenance is entirely 
different. The true scope of the words ‘pendency of proceedings’ occurring in section 24 of 
the Hindu Marriage Act is yet to be decided satisfactorily. 
     Under section 18 of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, it husband happens to be 
indigent person, he cannot be compelled to pay maintenance to the wife and thus it brings 
misfortune to the life of wife. The wife will have to prove herself chaste for claiming 
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maintenance under section 18. Similarly, conversion to any other religion disentitles her to 
claim maintenance under section 24 of the Act. Thus, the forfeiture of maintenance on the 
ground of un-chastity and conversion to another religion brings miseries in the life of a wife. 
On the ground of un-chastity the order of alimony passed under section 25 of the Hindu 
Marriage Act, 1955 can be rescinded leaving the wife destitute. 
     According to section 125(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure the wife who is unable to 
maintain herself is entitled to claim maintenance. The term ‘wife’ includes a woman who has 
been divorced by or has obtained divorce from her husband and has not remarried. The 
Mohammedan Law allowing maintenance to divorced wife during the period of iddat and did 
not bar grant of relief u/s 125 for period beyond iddat and until her remarriage. This extended 
definition of ‘wife’ had been considered necessary in Muslim Law in view of the existence of 
some peculiar rules permitting a husband to divorce his wife at any time at his will. The 
inclusion of ‘divorced wife’ in the definition of ‘wife’ was intended to prevent the 
unscrupulous husbands frustrating the legitimate maintenance claims of their wives by just 
divorcing them under the above said personal laws and was aimed at securing social justice to 
women belonging to the poorer classes The Supreme Court held in Shah Bano Case that there 
is no conflict between the provisions of section 125 and those of the Muslim Personal Law on 
the question of the Muslim husband’s obligation to provide maintenance for a divorced wife 
in case she is unable to maintain herself. In fact, if the divorced Muslim wife is able to 
maintain herself, the liability of the husband to provide maintenance for her ceases with the 
expiration of the iddat period, otherwise she is entitled to take recourse to Section 125 of Cr. 
P. C. 
     The position of divorced Muslim women in India became degraded by the enactment of 
Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986. It is, however, possible for the 
Muslim spouses to opt to be governed by sections 125-128, Cr. P. C., by virtue of section 5 of 
MWP Act, 1986. This has been observed that the said Act has not been in the interest of 
Muslim women because a Muslim husband will never like to be governed by the provisions 
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of Cr. P. C. However, some of High Courts and Supreme Court of India1 held that right given 
to a divorced Muslim woman to claim maintenance under Section 125, Cr. P. C. is not 
curtailed by provisions of MWP Act, 1986. A reasonable and fair provision extending beyond 
iddat period must be made by husband within iddat period in terms of section 3(1) of MWP 
Act, 1986. Act has no section, which nullifies order passed by Magistrate under section 125, 
Cr. P. C. The conclusion is that the provisions of MWP Act as made available to the divorced 
Muslim woman are in addition to the claims available to them under section 125, Cr. P. C. 
     The circumstances which debar a wife to claim maintenance under Section 125, Cr. P. C., 
are that she must be chaste and has not remarried, she must not refuse without sufficient 
reasons to live with her husband and the wife must not be living separately by mutual consent  
     The remedies u/s 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act and under section 125, Cr. P. C. are not 
alternative but they are concurrent and optional to the party entitled to make avail of. 
Suggestions.  (i) The maintenance amount should be determined depending upon the facts 
and circumstances of each case but it should not be such a meager sum as just to allow the 
wife to keep her body and soul together, just to prevent wandering around in the streets. 
(ii) It must be made the duty of the husband to disclose his total income and non-disclosure of 
any income should be made punishable. 
(iii) Maintenance should be made payable from the date of refusal by the husband to maintain 
the wife and not from the date of filing of the petition. This will give some solace to the wife. 
This has been observed that when she is without funds she virtually begs from near relations 
or friends for her survival. This aspect requires special attention. 
(iv) Some times the maintenance petition is dismissed for default on certain antics played by 
the husband. With the result she is denied maintenance from the date of filing of the petition. 
It is submitted that even if the petition is dismissed in default should be restored on 
reasonable excuse. 
(v) The wife, who has been neglected to be maintained by her husband, may have to change 
place of residence. Sometime she is required to stay with father, brother, sister etc. It is 
                                                 
1   Ali v. Sufairi, 1988(2) KLT 94 and Danial Latifi v. Union of India, (2002) 3 Femi-Juris C.C. 20 (SC) 
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submitted that jurisdiction clause should be modified so that petition for maintenance can be 
filed at a place where a neglected wife ordinarily resides. 
(vi) Registration of marriages should be made compulsory. If the marriage is registered then 
its validity should be presumed. Any technical flaw in the performance of ceremony etc. 
should not be allowed to be raised. 
(vii) Whenever the petition is filed for either under section 18 of the Hindu Adoptions and 
Maintenance Act, 1956 or under section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 the 
interim maintenance must be allowed. The real purpose of maintenance is defeated if delay is 
caused and one can visualize her needs in the time of distress. 
(viii)One should be allowed maintenance, under section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, 
even for the period when the court stays all further proceedings in a case where husband fails 
to comply with the maintenance order of the court. 
(ix) Special Magistrate should be given the power to try maintenance cases so that the ladies 
should not be put any embarrassment or humiliation in the court of Metropolitan Magistrate 
or Judicial Magistrate where hardened criminals are tried. 
3. The Law Relating to Child Marriages 
Findings.  Issues like age at marriage, procedures for contacting and executing marriage, 
customs of dowry and wealth, divorce and separation, widowhood and remarriage are vitally 
relevant for assessing women’s status. Marriage, whether considered as a sacrament or a 
contract, gives rise to status. It has been said, “marriage is an institution which is the 
foundation of the family and of society, is basic to morality and civilization and on the secular 
side marriage is an important institution requires to be regulated by law. Lord Westbury 
emphasized this importance in Shaw v. Gould that, “Marriage is the very foundation of civil 
society, and no part of the laws and institution of a country can be of more vital importance to 
its subjects.” 
     The child marriages are rampant, particularly in Northern India and as such, the curse 
continues to the plight of the lives of such girls. In case of death of the husband, the girl child-
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wife becomes a widow and there is no chance of her re-marriage and she will have to be burnt 
alive in some of the states in India. 
     Child marriage is one of the burning problems in Indian society and such marriages are not 
performed in a concealed manner, rather it is well attended by relatives and invitees of both 
the parties. The evil thrives because of illiteracy and anxiety of the parents to marry off girls 
as soon as possible. On Akshay Tritiya or Akha Teez thousands of children are married in the 
most blatant violation of law, which bans this practice. Most politicians fight shy of touching 
this sensitive subject as it could cost them very heavily during the elections. 
     To eradicate the evil of child marriage, the Child Marriage Restraint Act was passed in 
1929 with the object to eliminate the dangers to the life and health of a female child and to 
avoid early deaths of such minor mothers. The penal provisions do not invalidate the fact of 
marriage nor do the penal provisions apply to a child. The punishment for male adult 
contracting child marriage and to those who performs, conducts or directs any child marriage 
is too mild. The present law is lukewarm in this regard. The Act does not take into account 
the performance of preparatory ceremonies of such a marriage like engagement etc. A 
minor’s marriage without the consent of the guardian can be held to be valid on the 
application of the doctrine of factum valet. 
     No court other than a Metropolitan Magistrate or a Judicial Magistrate of the First Class 
can take cognizance of, or try, any offence under this Act after the expiry of one year from the 
date of offence. This dilutes the efficacy of the law. Injunction prohibiting marriage in 
contravention of this Act shall not be issued against any person unless the court has 
previously given notice to show cause against the issue of the injunction. This requirement of 
the law may defeat the purpose of social justice where there is imperative need of judicial 
intervention to save the welfare and interest of the child. 
     The Child Marriage Restraint Act only restrains a marriage of minors and that is its 
objective, but does not prohibit the marriage rendering it illegal or invalid. The minor spouses 
who get married are not punished under the Act.1  Mere allegation about marriage of child is 
                                                 
1 Parasram v. Naraini Devi, AIR 1972 All. 357 
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not enough, the complainant must prove that the said marriage has been solemnized according 
to law or custom of the community. 
     Under Mohammedan Law every Mohammedan who has attained puberty i.e. the age of 15 
years, may enter in to contract of marriage. Marriage is a civil contract and not a sacrament 
under Muslim law. So even under Muslim law marriage contracted by a minor is valid and 
legal. But there is no provision in the Child Marriage Restraint Act, where Muslims are 
exempted from the operation of this Act. 
     The restrictions of age for marriage have legally been disregarded under the Child 
Marriage Restraint Act as well as under Hindu Law. It is true, legislation lays down the base 
for social change, but it may be submitted that by merely passing an Act and then allow and 
watch it being violated can cure nothing but perpetuate the existing situation. One is sure to 
be critical of a law which lays down minimum age for marriage, Section 18 of H.M.A. and 
Section 3 and 4 of Child Marriage Restraint Act, of which even provides for punishment, but 
is least serious about its implementation. However, there is a lone bold and remarkable 
decision from Andhra Pradesh High Court in Gadela v. Gadera,1 which laid that a minor’s 
marriage in violation of the Hindu Marriage Act shall be void ab initio. For the first time in 
the history of social reforms in India a religious marriage in violation of the statutory 
requirement as to the age of the parties has been declared to be null and void and thus 
judiciary has set the healthy trend to prohibit child marriages. 
     However, this piece of legislation remains a dead letter because of the prevalent social and 
religious customs, poor economic conditions, inadequate vocational employment and 
ineffective enforcement machinery. The police, on its part, cannot stop such marriages or 
arrest a person without a warrant or a court order. The malaise is so deep rooted and all 
pervasive that courts of law and policing by outside forces can do little to control. 
Suggestions.  (i) Registration of marriages should be made compulsory. It will help greatly in 
putting an end to child marriages as at the time of marriage parties to the marriage should be 
asked to enter respective age of the persons marrying. 
                                                 
1    AIR 1975 A. P. 193 
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(ii) Marriage should be made invalid if it is solemnized in contravention of the age clause of 
the Act. 
(iii) In order to achieve the purpose of the legislation in meaningful way, the law should aim 
of discourage and deter primarily, those persons whose decision and action ultimately lead to 
the performance of child marriage.   
(iv) Performance of preparatory ceremonies of child marriage like engagements etc. should be 
made punishable. 
(v) The period of limitation given in the Act, as one year should be enhanced till the child 
attains the age of majority. 
(vi) Apart from educating the people about the Act through seminars at village levels, the 
provision of the Act should be made more stringent with deterrent punishment for the 
contraveners. The Child Marriage Prevention Officers should be appointed under section 13 
of the Act to prevent child marriages and for effective prosecution of the persons violating the 
Act.1  
(vii) Despite the permissible age of marriage for girls being stipulated as 18, the age for 
marital consummation under the Indian Penal Code is 15 years. This is a serious 
contradiction. 
4. The Law Relating to Dowry and Bride-Burning   
Findings. The dowry is a deep-rooted evil in the society. It started as customary presents with 
love and affection. The daughter then was not entitled to a share in the joint family properties 
when she has a brother. Hence, the father out of affection or other consideration used to give 
some cash or kind to the daughter at the time of marriage. 
     Marriages are not made in Heaven but marriages are mad on earth. In our tradition- ridden 
society two of the most pernicious evils are dowry and extravagant marriages. So much so, in 
many cases parents are unwilling to spend on their daughter’s education just to save money 
for the dowry. 
                                                 
1    Rashtra Mahila, Vol.3, No.27, January 2002 published by the National Commission for Women; 
Smt Susheela Ghosala v. State of Rajasthan 
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     The system of dowry has ruined many families and created many unhappy homes. Of late 
it has been seen that not only brides but also prospective teen-aged girls, out of sheer 
frustration, seeing the worried look on the face of their parents all the time, are driven to 
commit suicide. 
     To prohibit the evil practice of giving and taking of dowry the Dowry Prohibition Act was 
passed in 1961. It was the first penal legislation to ban this evil practice, but even today the 
dowry continues to be the pivot around which all Indian marriages revolve and has resulted in 
the death of a large number of married women. A Parliamentary Committee was appointed to 
examine the working of Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961. Taking the cue from the Supreme 
Court decision in Pratibha Rani1 case, the Joint Committee of Parliament recommended a 
number of changes. The Dowry Prohibition Act 1961 was amended in 1984 and again in 
1986. Sections 304-B and 498-A, IPC, 113-A and 113-B, Indian Evidence Act and 198, Cr. P. 
C. was added to deal with the problem of dowry suicides and dowry murders. Giving or 
taking of dowry as a consideration for marriage or demanding or abetting the same is made 
criminal offence under the Dowry Prohibition Act. 
     The Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 consists of only ten sections. Section 2 defines dowry. 
Sections 3 and 4 pertain respectively to the offence and penalty of giving and taking of dowry 
and of demanding dowry. With respect to the offence of demanding dowry directly or 
indirectly, Section 4 provides that prior sanction is required to prosecute under this section. 
Section 5 deals with the invalidity of an agreement for giving or taking of dowry and section 
6 with what is to become of the dowry once received. Section 7 and 8 pertain to cognizance 
of cases and offences. 
     Practically everything paid or agreed to be paid or demanded to be paid in connection with 
marriage has been brought within the purview of the definition. Dowry is the property, which 
a woman brings to her husband at marriage. Dowry does not include Mehr.2 Mere demand of 
dowry is not an offence unless it is given or agreed to be given but mere demand of dowry 
may be an offence under section 498-A, IPC. The dowry does not include presents given on 
                                                 
1   AIR 1985 SC 628 
2   Section 2 
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behalf of the bride to the bride or bridegroom without any demand provided they are entered 
in a list maintained as per rules. Such presents must be of customary nature and of excessive 
value having regard to the financial status of the person by whom such presents are given.1  
The offence under section 4 of the Act is completed when demand for dowry is made and 
consent for meeting the demand is not necessary. 
     The recipient of the dowry proceeds is required in law  (Section 6) to transfer the same to 
the wife within the prescribed period failing which he is liable to be prosecuted on a 
complaint by her at a place where she resides. A proceeding can be initiated under section 
406, IPC for return of the dowry. 
     No court inferior to that of a Metropolitan Magistrate or a Judicial Magistrate of the First 
Class shall try and take cognizance of an offence under this Act except upon its own 
knowledge or a police report or a complaint by the person aggrieved or a parent or other 
relative of such person or by any recognized welfare institution or organization.  (Section 7)  
If a police report disclosing commission of offences or a complaint is filed beyond the period 
of one year from the date of the commission of the offence, it is not cognizable. Every 
offence under this Act shall be non-bailable and non-compoundable. The provision for 
appointment of dowry prohibition officer is laid down in the Act. 
     The Dowry prohibition Act was amended to banish dowry, which was the root cause of the 
dowry deaths but these changes were not enough. One important reason for the 
ineffectiveness of the Act was, perhaps, a major defect in the IPC in the definition of cruelty, 
which preceded all cases of bride burning or suicides by newly wedded brides. Indian Penal 
Code defined cruelty as a conduct, which resulted in physical and bodily injury to a person2 
and a wife had to undergo medical examination and produce evidence that physical injury 
was inflicted upon her. Mental cruelty was considered a ground for her to seek divorce but it 
was not a ground for any penal action to be taken against the husband. Further, though the 
demand for dowry was punishable under the Dowry Act, the harassment inflicted by the 
husband and his family was not punishable under the Penal Code and thus, the wife was left 
                                                 
1   Section 3 
2   Section 338, IPC 
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with no option but to commit suicide in order to put an end to all the misery or her husband or 
in-laws eliminated her from the scene by murdering and deposing that it was a case of 
accidental death. 
     In 1983 section 498-A was added in IPC by making both physical and mental cruelty by 
husband or the relatives of the husband a cognizable and non-bailable offence. Now any 
conduct, which is of such a nature, as is likely to drive a woman to commit suicide or to cause 
grave injury to her life or limb or health is cruelty. But a limiting factor of this offence is that 
the court can take cognizance of this offence only upon a police report or when a complaint is 
made by the aggrieved woman or her relatives.1  
     In 1986 ‘dowry death’ was incorporated in the Penal Code under section 304-B. This 
section is attracted when the death of a woman is caused by burns or bodily injury or occurs 
otherwise than under normal circumstances and this occurrence is preceded by cruelty or 
harassment by the in-laws in connection with a demand for dowry. It is immaterial whether 
she committed suicide or was murdered. It suggests that the framers had intended and 
contemplated the liability of the death being fastened on the in-laws. The difference between 
sections 304-B and 306, IPC primarily remains in regard to the demand of dowry, which is an 
essential ingredient of section 304-B and is not so for the purpose of an offence under section 
306, IPC. Section 304-B can be taken as an aggravated form of section 306 in regard to the 
death of a woman. 
     The introduction of sections 304-B in IPC and 113-B in the Evidence Act has shifted the 
burden of proving the innocence on the person against whom there is an allegation of causing 
dowry death. The dying declarations have a very unique and critical position in cases of bride 
burning, these statements should not be accepted on their face value as they do not disclose 
the actual cause of death. It is the ethos of Indian culture that a wife will never blame her 
husband. Dying declaration can be relied upon if the prosecution satisfies the court that it 
could not have been recorded by the doctor or the magistrate. It is not prudent to base the 
conviction on a dying declaration made to an investigation officer. According to a noted 
                                                 
1   section 198, Cr. P. C. 
 352
social worker, Mrs. Tara Ali Beg, This phenomenon of burning young girls for dowry does 
not exist anywhere else in the world. Indians must examine the cruelty inherent in the long 
and unquestioned traditions pertaining to conjugal relations. A major shift from the 
patriarchal system is highly desirable. 
Suggestions.  (i) The onus of proving that there was no demand for dowry should be with the 
person against whom there is an allegation of taking or abetting the taking of dowry. 
(ii) There should be an amendment in section 6(3) of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 
wherein it is to be provided that the husband should not succeed to the dowry or the property 
of the wife, in case he is responsible for her death whether it is by way of murder or suicide. 
(iii) Social welfare officers should be appointed to mobilize public opinion and channelise 
social values against the practice of dowry. 
(iv) Special tribunals should be set up so that bride- burning cases of dowry offences can be 
tried expeditiously. 
(v) The appointment of dowry prohibition officer must be compulsory to ensure the 
implementation of the provisions of the Act. 
(vi) The list of presents received by bride and bridegroom should be maintained strictly as per 
the rules made under the Act to check upon excessively expensive presents. Registration of 
the list of dowry articles must be made compulsory. 
(vii) The provisions should be made to control the auxiliary expenses on marriage such as 
decoration, number of guests in barat, criminal waste of food etc. 
(viii) The prescribed period of one year for the filing of complaint under Dowry prohibition 
Act should be increased to seven years at par with section 304-B, IPC. 
  (ix) The judges should step in the shoes of the deceased while trying cases of dowry death 
and    keep the compulsions of women in mind. 
  (x) In the cases of dowry deaths a thorough inquiry by the court or by CID must be made    
legally compulsory to find out the truth because there is no end to human ingenuity to devise     
methods to commit crimes. 
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(xi) The witnesses who turn hostile should be summarily tried by the court and should be duly 
punished unless they give genuine explanation for retracting from the statement given earlier. 
(xii) Trials for dowry death should be time bound and must be completed within ninety days. 
(xiii) A restriction should be imposed by law disabling the offender husband from getting 
married till the case is finally decided by the judiciary.  
(xiv) As per provisions of the Dowry Prohibition Act, both the giver and the taker of the 
dowry are punishable. As a result, complaints for dowry extortion are not being lodged. 
Hence, the persons giving dowry should be excluded from liability.    
      5.The Law Relating to Arbitrary Divorce 
(a) Divorce Under Hindu Law 
Findings. As marriage is a civil contract, it is the logical next step to recognize that it is also a 
dissolute union. Marriage has always been considered as a social institution and therefore, it 
is a special contract which could not be put to an end like an ordinary contract. The grounds 
of divorce may be looked at from two aspects: (i) Marriage is an exclusive union and if it is 
not an exclusive union, it ceases to be marriage. The adultery, cruelty and desertion are 
destructive of the very foundation of marriage as marriage also implies that parties will live 
with each other in harmony and in mutual confidence; (ii) These grounds are the matrimonial 
offences committed by one of the parties to marriage and therefore the marriage can be 
dissolved. 
     Divorce put the marriage to an end, parties revert back to their unmarried status, and are 
once again free to marry. After Marriage Laws (Amendment) Act, 1976 there are nine fault 
grounds in section 13(1) on which either the husband or the wife could sue for divorce, two 
grounds of breakdown of marriage four fault grounds in section 13(2) on which wife alone 
can seek divorce and a new section 13-B under which divorce by mutual consent is 
recognized. 
    According to Hindu religion Sudra and women cannot become sanyasi and therefore they 
cannot seek divorce on this ground.1   A wife may present a petition for divorce if the 
                                                 
1  Section 13(1)(vi), HMA, 1955  
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husband, after marriage, has been guilty of rape, sodomy or bestiality. If the wife is below 15 
years, it will amount to rape by the husband. The law under this section is silent whether the 
wife can seek the divorce on the ground of rape by the husband.1 Impotency is a ground of 
divorce for wife but the husband cannot seek divorce in case the wife is barren. Similarly, the 
women are only victims under the newly created section 13(1A) in HMA, 1955. 
     Section 29(2), Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 retains the customary grounds and mode of 
divorce and grounds and forum of divorce under special enactments. No provision of the 
Hindu Marriage Act applies to customary divorce such as one year’s bar to divorce (the fair 
trial rule) and bars laid down in sections 23, 24 and 25, HMA, 1955. No petition in the court 
is required. The customary divorces may still be obtained through the agency of gram 
panchayat or cast tribunal or cast panchayats, by private act of parties, orally or in writing. A 
custom recognizing divorce must fulfil all the tests of valid custom. The court can interfere on 
the ground as to whether the principles of natural justice were followed. Some special 
enactment of the Madras Province and the erstwhile States of Travancore and Cochin 
regulated marriages and divorce in these communities. These enactments have not been 
repealed by Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. When divorce is sought under these enactments none 
of the provisions of the Hindu Marriage Act applies to it. 
     Section 14, HMA, 1955 lays down that no marriage may be dissolved unless period of one 
year has elapsed since the solemnization of the marriage and it is known as fair trial rule. It is 
submitted that the rationale of this rule is understandable in respect of divorce by mutual 
consent but not in respect of divorce based on the guilt of the respondent. For instance, if 
within a month of the marriage the respondent commits adultery, the petitioner is to wait for 
another eleven months. 
     Section 15, Hindu Marriage Act lays down that when a marriage has been dissolved by a 
decree of divorce and either there is no right of appeal or, if there be such a right of appeal, 
the time for appealing has expired without appeal, it shall be lawful for either party to 
marriage to marry again. The provision still seems to be clumsy. However the Supreme Court 
                                                 
1   Section 13(2)(ii), HMA, 1955 
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held that the parties should wait till the disposal of the appeal including SLP and marriage 
performed in violation of section 15 will be void.1  
Suggestions. (i) The divorce should be made simpler, cheaper and expeditious as a new 
theme. 
(ii) The illiterate and uneducated women should be duly informed about their rights through 
mass media including the press, social organizations, and education class should also do it in 
vigorous manner and with inspired effort to help them in a real sense. The legal aid clinics 
should provide necessary information to illiterate mass. 
(iii) Approaching the court for relief it is observed involves expenditure of money. It is 
another sad story that economic solidarity is still too far from the women. The Government 
should make her financially sound or should help her monetarily instead of merely providing 
the law in words. 
(iv) There must be coordination between law and law enforcing agencies to protect the rights 
of the women. 
(v) No provisions of Hindu Marriage Act applies in customary divorce and divorce under 
special enactments. The women are only victims of such divorce. It is submitted that divorce 
under custom and special enactments should be abolished. 
(vi) In case of child marriage and the wife is below 15 years of age, the husband is guilty of 
rape with his own wife. The provisions of section 13(2)(ii), HMA are not clear whether the 
wife can seek the divorce on the ground of rape by husband though she can repudiate the 
marriage under section 13(2)(iv). The next situation arises when husband is convicted for rape 
with his own wife below 15 years of age and the wife has neither sought the divorce on the 
ground of rape nor she repudiated the marriage before attaining the age of 18 years, it is 
submitted that in such a situation the law should be amended for dissolution of marriage on 
the petition of either party as they cannot live in peace and harmony in future. 
(vii) The ground for divorce under section 13(1)(vi), HMA is renouncing the world by 
entering any religious order i.e., to become sanyasi. According to Hindu religion a sudra and 
                                                 
1  Mohini v. Avinash Prasad, AIR 1987 SC 581 
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woman cannot become sanyasi and therefore this ground being discriminatory should be 
abolished. 
(viii) No resumption of cohabitation by either of the parties after passing of a decree for 
judicial separation or for restitution of conjugal rights is a ground for divorce under newly 
created section 13(1A) in HMA, 1955. It is submitted that this ground should be abolished as 
the women are only victims. 
(ix) One year fair trial rule under section 14, HMA should also be abolished as it suits to 
divorce by mutual consent only. It is very difficult to wait for one year in case the respondent 
commits adultery as the petitioner has to spent sleepless nights.  
(b)Divorce Under Muslim Law.      
Findings. Islam is perhaps the first religion in the world, which has expressly recognized the 
termination of marriage by way of divorce. In England divorce was introduced only hundred 
years back. In India among Hindus, it was allowed only by Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. 
According to Amir Ali, the Prophet of Islam is reported to have said, “With Allah, the most 
detestable of all things permitted is divorce” and “if woman be prejudiced by a marriage, let it 
be broken off.” Divorce, desertions and polygamy give sleepless nights to Muslim women. 
While a Muslim woman has to go to court to seek divorce, her husband does not even need to 
seek legal recourse for pronouncing talaq. The galaxy of Muslim intellectuals declares that 
the sole reason of Muslim backwardness was triple talaq and polygamy phenomena. 
  Talaq is an act of repudiation of marriage by the husband in exercise of his power, which has 
been conferred on him. Any Mohammedan of sound mind, who has attained puberty, may 
divorce his wife whenever he desires without assigning any cause. Talaq may be effected by 
talak ahsan, talak hasan, talak-ul-bidaat or talak-I-badai, talaq by tafweez, talak under 
compulsion, ila, zihar, khula and mubara’at and apostasy from Islam. Judicial divorce can be 
obtained under the Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act, 1939. The rights and obligations 
arising on the completion of a divorce are right to contract another marriage, immediate 
payment of dower, cessation of mutual rights of inheritance, cohabitation becomes unlawful 
and remarriage etc 
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Suggestions.  (i) Mere renunciation of Islam by a married woman or her conversion to any 
other religion cannot by itself operate to dissolve her marriage but she may sue for dissolution 
on any of the grounds mentioned in Section 2 of Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act, 1939. 
Apostasy from Islam of the husband operates as a complete and immediate dissolution of the 
marriage. The Act should be amended to abolish such discrimination.  
 (ii) It is submitted that divorce by triple pronouncement and under the influence of liquor or 
intoxication should not be allowed as liquor is also treated as haram in Muslim law. There is a 
need for some regulations, which may help to penalize those who give triple divorce in a 
single breath. Caliph Omar who penalized those who gave triple divorce by having them 
flogged. 
(iii) A Khula divorce is effected by offer from the wife to compensate the husband if he 
releases her from his marital rights and acceptance by the husband of the offer. It is submitted 
that such an oppressive mode of divorce must be abolished. 
(iv) If a wife is not ready and willing to perform her part of marital duties even under 
compulsion, her suit for divorce under section 2(ii), Dissolution of Muslim Marriage Act, 
1939 will be dismissed. The wife should not be forced for marital duties if she feels 
apprehension of ill- treatment from her husband. 
(v) Enforcement of actual payment of the mehr to the wife must be made stringent. 
(vi) The codification of Muslim law on divorce will not contravene any Islamic principles. 
For instance, women are entitled to judicial divorce under maliki law, while hanfi law allows 
women to stipulate conditions in their marriage contracts and talaq under Shia law has to be 
pronounced verbally in the presence of two competent witnesses. 
(c) Divorce Under The Indian Divorce Act, 1869  
Findings.  In marital relief and divorce among the Christians is governed by the Indian 
Divorce Act, 1869. The Act is applicable where both the petitioner and respondent profess 
Christian religion. Any husband may seek divorce on the ground of adultery. Any wife may 
seek divorce on the ground that the husband has changed his religion or the husband has been 
guilty of ‘incestuous adultery’ or bigamy with adultery or rape, sodomy or bestiality or 
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adultery coupled with cruelty or desertion. Every decree for dissolution of marriage made by 
a District Judge shall be subject to confirmation by the High Court. 
Suggestions.  (i) Under provisions of section 10 the husband is entitled to a dissolution of 
marriage on the ground of the wife’s adultery, but the wife is not so entitled unless she proves 
that the husband’s adultery is coupled with cruelty, bigamy or desertion. Thus the provision is 
discriminatory on the ground of sex alone and would be ultra vires Article 15 of the 
Constitution. It is submitted that the Act should be suitably amended. 
(ii) The provision under section 17, The Indian Divorce Act, 1869 that every decree for 
dissolution of marriage made by a District Judge shall be subject to confirmation by the High 
Court will prolong the process to get justice. Therefore the provision for confirmation of 
decree by the High Court should be abolished. 
6. The Law Relating to Matrimonial Offences  
(a) Bigamy  ‘Marrying again during the life of the husband or wife’ is punishable under 
section 494 of the Indian Penal Code. This section does not apply to any person whose 
marriage with such husband or wife has been declared void by the competent court. This 
section makes no distinction on the basis of religion and applies to all Hindus, Christians and 
Parsis whether male or female. But in case of Muslim it applies only to females but not to 
males unless he marries a fifth time during the subsistence of four earlier marriages. This 
section aims to check sexual immorality, equality in sexual relationship and protection of 
women from exploitation by males. 
     To attract the provisions of section 494, IPC it is necessary that his or her first marriage 
was valid and the validity of first marriage shall be determined on the basis of the personal 
law. At the time of marriage both the partners to marriage must be alive. The word ‘marries’ 
used in this section means “marries by some form of marriage known to and recognized by 
the law.” In a bigamy case the essential ceremonies constituting second marriage must be 
proved. If the second marriage is not solemnized in the form recognized by the law it would 
be simply an adulterous union. 
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     Hindu law does not recognize polygamous marriage, therefore, if a Hindu woman who has 
a living Hindu husband marries either a Muslim or Christian even after embracing Islam or 
Christianity commits bigamy. When a person apostates from Islam his marriage comes to an 
end and the wife will not be guilty of bigamy if she goes through second marriage. 
     Section 495 deals with the aggravated form of bigamy. When a married man by posing 
himself an unmarried man, induces an unsuspecting woman to become his wife, but in reality 
his concubine, he is guilty of one of the most cruel fraud. Such man should be punished with 
exemplary severity. Such wife is not entitled for any maintenance. In such cases it is mostly 
the poor and illiterate women who suffer. Both the wives are deprived of the conjugal love 
and happiness as well as the matrimonial home. The need of a roof over their head makes 
women reconcile to the cruel fate for the other course is to be on the street. Most of the time 
the natal family is unwilling to take her back the victimized wife, the initial sympathy fades 
away very fast. 
     A Muslim man can keep at a time four wives and even marrying a fifth women is not 
punishable, the marriage is only irregular and not void. In other Muslim countries of the 
world e.g. in Turkey, Egypt, Lebenon, Sudan, Malaysia, Iran, Pakistan and Iraq there are 
strict controls on polygamy by the courts or by administration bodies.1   
Suggestions. (i) If we are effectively root out polygamy from this country we must amend 
Section 494, IPC and section 17 of the Hindu Marriage Act in such a way that anyone who 
goes through a form of marriage during the life time of his or her spouse will come within the 
mischief of the offence of bigamy. 
(ii) Muslim Personal Law prevails over section 494, IPC. Moreover, section 494 treats the 
Muslim women discriminately as a Muslim wife is guilty of bigamy if she contract second 
marriage but a Muslim husband is not guilty on the same ground. It is submitted that such 
discrimination should be abolished. 
(iii) Mens rea i.e. guilty mind is a necessary element of the offence under section 494. Where 
an accused when he contracts the second marriage acts on the bonafide belief that his marital 
                                                 
1   Imran Ali S.M., ‘Women and Personal Laws’, in ‘Women’s Link’, Oct-Dec., 2003, Vol.9 No.4 
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ties with his previous spouse has been severed under the deed of divorce entered into between 
the parties he is entitled to acquittal of the charge of bigamy. It is submitted that such persons 
should be held guilty of bigamy even though they acted in good faith as they have already 
ruined the life of a woman. 
(iv) Section 494, IPC should clarify that it is not essential that the second marriage should be 
solemnized with all the ceremonies. If there is an overbearing evidence that the man and 
woman are living together as husband and wife and there is circumstantial evidence to prove 
it, the court should declare it to be a case of plural marriage and punish the offender. The 
principle of factum valet should be followed. 
(v) A Muslim man can keep at a time four wives and even marrying a fifth women is not 
punishable, the marriage is only irregular and not void. As there are strict controls on 
polygamy by the courts or by administration bodies in other Muslim countries of the world 
e.g. in Turkey, Egypt, Pakistan, Iran, Iraq, same provisions should be made in India too.  
(b) Adultery. Adultery is an infringement of the rights of the husband. It is an anti-social and 
illegal act and any peace-loving citizen or any person of good morals would not like that 
adultery should be permitted to be indulged in before his very nose. Adultery is a flagrant 
violation of a woman’s dignity. She is the property of her husband and cannot even fight 
independently to regain her lost prestige. 
     Section 497, IPC punishes the offence of adultery committed with a married woman 
without the consent or connivance of her husband. The main feature of this offence is that 
male offender alone has been made punishable. This offence is committed by a third person 
against a husband in respect of his wife. If an act of sexual intercourse takes place between a 
married man and an unmarried woman or with a widow or with a married woman whose 
husband consents to it, adultery shall not be deemed to have been committed. Adultery is 
committed only with the married woman. The marriage must be valid one. 
     Adultery is not an offence per se. It is an offence only when it is without the consent and 
connivance of the husband. No court can take cognizance of this offence unless there is a 
complaint by the husband. The definition and the way this offence of adultery has been 
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treated in IPC reveals the anti-women bias in our society. It does not confer any right on the 
wife to prosecute the husband who has committed adultery. In case of adultery by the wife, 
the husband is given a right not only to seek divorce but also to prosecute the man who had 
illicit relation with his wife. But when the husband commits the same offence the wife is not 
given any right to prosecute either her husband or his mistress. The only legal course open to 
wife is to seek separation. This is a clear case of discrimination. Thus the wife is left either to 
brood in silence tolerating the immoral acts of her husband or opt for the painful decision of 
breaking her home.  
     Section 497, IPC does not violate Article 14 of the Constitution as sex is a sound 
classification and Constitution itself provides for special provisions in favour of women. Thus 
the law permits neither the husband of the offending wife to prosecute his wife nor the wife to 
prosecute the offending husband for being disloyal to her.1  
Suggestions.  An unmarried woman is no man’s property, the brothers and father are only 
trustee and as such a man has license to have sexual intercourse with unmarried woman as it 
does not amount to adultery. It is submitted that every sexual intercourse other than the 
marital should be made punishable in order to upkeep the good morals in the society. The 
wife of the adulterer should have legal right to prosecute her husband. The husband should be 
given deterrent punishment if he does not keep the sanctity of his marriage intact. 
(c) Torture Against Womanhood (Wife Beating and Cruelty).  Cruelty and wife beating is 
a crime, which goes unreported. Husbands who ill-treat their wives do it with utter impunity 
because neither the police nor the public will interfere in a matter, which is so private. For a 
man, beating his wife is a private privilege of marriage, a way to unload himself of all the 
angers and frustrations of his daily life without any fear of reprisal. Most of the women 
sincerely believe that a husband has a right to beat his wife. 
     The term ‘cruelty’ has been given a defined meaning in section 498-A, IPC under two 
heads; (a) any willful conduct which is such a nature as is likely to drive the woman to 
commit suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or health of the woman; or (b) 
                                                 
1   Sowmithri Vishnu v. Union of India and another, 1985 Cr.L.J. 1302 SC 
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harassment of the woman where such harassment is with a view to coercing her to meet any 
unlawful demand for any property or valuable security. 
     Matrimonial cruelty under Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 are denial by the spouse to have 
sexual intercourse or excessive intercourse, excessive drinking, high age differential, 
illiteracy and unemployment etc. 
Suggestions.  (i) The Explanation (b) to Section 498-A must be deleted and a new 
explanation be added to make it clear that cruelty to wife by the husband or his relatives, ‘for 
any reason’, comes under this section. A woman is harassed and tortured not only because the 
demands for dowry remain unfulfilled but also on suspicion of infidelity, jealousy, 
maladjustment, etc. The new explanation must define both, wife beating and criminal cruelty 
and should also include the daily incidents of wife beating and harassment. 
(ii) The neighbours and friends of the victim should be authorized to make a complaint and to 
get a FIR registered. Women’s organizations should also be given locus standi so that they 
can help the victim and intervene on her behalf. 
(iii) Cases of cruelty should be investigated by women police officers, as the victim will feel 
more comfortable on reporting cases of cruelty. 
(iv) There has been much debate on the issue of domestic violence. Taking cognizance of 
women’s movement the Government drafted Bill known as “The Protection from Domestic 
Violence Bill, 2001.” The Bill is pending before the Parliament. The Bill is expected to 
provide civil remedy to the victims of domestic violence. 
 
7. Rape Laws 
Findings.  Rape is virtually a living death for a woman. A rapist not only violates a victim’s 
integrity, but also inevitably causes serious psychological as well as physical harms in the 
process. Rape is symptomatic of sexually starved society, which has injuriously threatened 
the women’s very right to liberty and personality. Women are being raped at work place, on 
the streets, in the fields, in their homes and even in running trains. Teachers rape their 
colleagues; doctors rape their patients and nurses. Domestic maidservants and factory workers 
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are being molested by the employers. Rape of minor girls, gang rape,  rapes during communal 
riots and rape by custodians of law 1 is quite common. It was Mathura’s judgment that 
shocked and outraged the sensibilities of many women organizations and as a result the 
Criminal Law (Amendment) Act was brought into force in 1983 to plug the loopholes. 
     If a girl above 16 years consents to sexual intercourse on promise to be married and 
continues in the activity till she becomes pregnant it is not an act induced by misconception of 
fact and the accused cannot be charged on a charge of rape. The law does not give any relief 
to the girl even though her life is ruined and prospects of marriage are very thin. 
     A prostitute can be raped and it is not excuse that the woman was a prostitute, for the law 
protects a prostitute as it protects chaste women. However, out judiciary continued to follow 
the conservative path. In Suman Rani’s case  (AIR 1989 SC 937) the Supreme Court held 
thus: “If a woman demands justice from the State and protection from the custodians of laws, 
she must keep her virginity intact.” The sentence awarded to two police constables was 
reduced from 10 years to 5 years. It shows that only virtuous women can be raped. However, 
if a prostitute does not get money from a customer for sexual intercourse, she may allege the 
offence of rape.  
     A husband cannot be guilty of a rape on his wife, when she is over the age of fifteen. The 
arguments supporting the marital rape exemption clause are that prosecution of a husband for 
raping his wife will be detrimental to marital harmony and there would be fabricated and 
malicious complaints by wives who are not pulling on well with their husbands. State 
intervention will be an invasion on marital privacy. These arguments are, however, not in 
consonance with the principle of equality of sexes in marriage. The dignity and freedom of 
the woman over her body must be honoured. A marriage license should not be viewed as a 
license for a husband to forcibly rape his wife with impunity. A line should not be drawn on 
rape within marriage and rape outside marriage. 
     In rape cases direct evidence is seldom available beyond the evidence of the raped woman. 
It is wrong to start suspecting the evidence of a prosecutrix as a girl in a tradition bound non-
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permissive society of India would be extremely reluctant even to admit that an incident, 
which is likely to reflect on her chastity has even occurred and her relatives are not too keen 
to bring the accused to book. The corroboration of victim’s testimony is not a rule of practice 
but a rule of prudence, if the narration of the victim is natural and inspires confidence in the 
mind of the judge. The court should not cling to the fossil formulae and insist on 
corroborative testimony. A critical analysis of judicial decisions shows that the need for 
corroboration is itself a source of conflicting pronouncements. That is what the Supreme 
Court did in Mathura’s case, “Mathura is a ‘shocking liar’ whose testimony is riddled with 
falsehood and improbabilities.” 
    Rape is crime and not a medical condition, a legal term and not a diagnosis to be made by 
medical officer, whether rape had an urge or not is a legal conclusion, not a medical one. 
Medical opinion is only one amongst many bits of corroborative evidence to be weighed in 
deciding the case. Any conclusion on rape is not to be made by the doctor, It is for the judge 
to decide. 
     The Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 1983 has resulted in some welcome changes for the 
rape victims. Section 375 and 376, IPC have been substantially changed and several new 
sections have been introduced, viz. 376A, 376B, 376C and 376D to curb the custodial sexual 
intercourse. Now sexual intercourse in a custodial situation, though it does not amount to 
rape, is a serious crime even if the woman has consented to it. In custodial rape case of 
Mathura, the accused police constables were acquitted whereas in Maya Tyagi case the 
judgment of Supreme Court remains a landmark in judicial history: death penalty for six 
policemen and life imprisonment for the remaining four. Thus the legal position is depressing 
but there are some stray judgments, which keep the hope alive. 
     Delay in making a complaint or reporting a crime may often result in embellishment, 
which is a creation of after thought. The release of persons accused of rape on bail is highly 
demoralizing for the victim. The accused invariably uses this opportunity for blackmailing the 
victim and manipulates the evidence in his favour. Courts must not only keep in view the 
rights of criminals but also the rights of victims of crime and the society at large while 
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considering imposition of appropriate punishment. The 1983 amendment has laid down the 
minimum punishment for rape as seven years and the maximum as life imprisonment. A large 
number of rapes on minor girls, the compassion of the judges seems to be towards the 
delinquent rapists. The conservative attitude of judges in exercising the discretion and the 
anti-women bias has often resulted in injustice to the victim. 
     The Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 1983 has introduced some provisions in IPC, 
Cr.P.C. and Evidence Act for the benefit of the victim of rape. Section 228A,IPC protects the 
honour of sexually victimized women. It makes it possible for them to depose in court 
without any fear of social ostracism. Section 114A, Evidence Act providing that court shall 
presume that victim did not consent, if victim makes statement in court that she did not 
consent. According to Section 327(2) Cr.P.C. the enquiry into a trial of rape shall be 
conducted in camera and publication of proceedings in camera is prohibited. Section 
376(2)(g), IPC read with Explanation I thereto, provides that in case of gang rape, if rape had 
been committed by even one, all the accused will be guilty. 
Suggestions. (i) If a girl above 16 years of age consents to sexual intercourse on promise to 
marry, such intercourse should amount to rape if the man denies to marry otherwise the future 
life of the girl will be ruined. 
(ii) The law protects a prostitute as it protects a chaste woman from the offence of rape. 
Therefore, the judiciary should follow the conservative path that only a virtuous woman can 
be raped. 
(iii) A line should not be drawn on rape within marriage and rape outside marriage. A 
marriage should not be viewed as a license for a husband to forcibly rape his wife with 
impunity. 
(iv) The court should not cling to fossil formulae and insist upon the corroboration of the 
victim’s testimony. 
(v) Any conclusion on rape is to be decided by the judge and not to be made by a doctor 
because rape is a crime and not a medical condition. 
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(vi) The courts must not only keep in view the rights of criminals but also the rights of 
victims of rape and society at large while considering grant of bail and imposition of 
punishment. 
(vii) In rape cases common defence is the character and conduct of the victim. If she has a 
boyfriend the court accepts her of easy virtue and accused get acquitted. The judiciary should 
be sensitized towards victim’s plight.       
(viii) Facilities for medical examination are not adequate. The doctors are not known for 
independence for police cases. 
(ix) The present law does not distinguish between child rape and rape on adults though most 
of the reported rape cases are those of children and many of them involve the natural father or 
other very close relatives. 
(x) Prominent politicians have suggested capital punishment for the rapist. Human rights 
activists, however, do no favour it. Women’s organizations are also against this. The law on 
rape is outmoded, needs to be reviewed, and amended immediately. 
(xi) In rape cases sensitive counseling, willingness of parents, supportive attitude of society to 
assist in rehabilitation of the victims alone can foster change. 
(xii) It is essential to show that “law can be real tough, acquittal is not easy, rigorous 
punishment is to follow, trial to be completed speedily and accused to be punished without 
fail.” 
(xiii) The Law Commission has recommended review of rape laws to prevent custodial rape 
and sexual abuse. Most importantly, it has proposed replacement of word “rape” by “sexual 
assault” as per the suggestions of the National Commission for Women.1  
(xiv) The compensation must be paid to the victim of rape. The healthy trend has already 
been show by the National Human Rights Commission by directing the Andhra Pradesh 
Government to pay monetary and other compensation to four young women who were raped 
in the state.2   
 
                                                 
1   172nd Report of The Law Commission of India 
2   ‘Rashtra Mahila’, Vol.3, No.27, January 2002 published by the National Commission for Women 
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Law Relating to Custom of Sati 
Findings. Sati, the custom of burning widows on the funeral pyres of their husbands persisted 
in India till it was outlawed in 1829 with the efforts of Raja Ram Mohan Roy, the father of 
the Indian Renaissance. The practice of Sati reflects man’s desire to acquire total control over 
a woman, not only in this world, but also in the world hereafter. Commission of Sati 
Prevention Act, 1987 was enacted in the background of Roop Kunwar’s case and on the 
recommendations of CSWI report. Roop Kunwar was 18 year old and a university graduate 
who was burnt alive in 1987 on her husband’s funeral pyre in Deorala, Rajasthan. Roop 
Kunwar’s murder is a blot on the society. The masses in thousands and some of the 
politicians believe that religious and social beliefs must not be disturbed even if they are 
barbaric, trample on women and treat them as animals. But responsible public opinion all 
over the country has of course condemned this barbarity. Charan Shah 55, willingly jumped 
on the burning pyre of her husband in 1999 in Mahoba district of U.P. was another incident of 
sati. 
      Attempt to commit sati and glorification of sati is made punishable and abetment of sati 
shall be punishable with death or imprisonment for life under the Commission of Sati 
Prevention Act. The District Magistrate is empowered to prohibit the doing of the act of sati. 
All officers of Government are required and empowered to assist the police in the execution 
of the provisions of this Act and all village officers are to report forthwith the cases of sati 
and whoever contravenes these provisions shall be punished. No person who had abetted the 
commission of sati may inherit the estate of the deceased woman. The Act is not violative of 
Article 21, 25 and 26 of the Constitution as religion speaks of peace, amity and love of 
mankind and it does not propagate killing or self -sacrifice of a living human being. Sati 
worship gradually led to the glorification of this institution. Such glorification of this inhuman 
custom was leading to further fortification of this cruel custom of widow burning. Hence this 
new Act is totally justified and it stands within the purview of all legal and constitutional 
justification. The Act passed with so much fanfare has remained on paper and the 
glorification of Sati in Deorala and Satpurva in Mahoba and other temples has not stopped. 
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Suggestions.  (i) The most obvious infirmity of the Bill is the acceptance of Sati as suicide. 
The law provides that the woman who tries to commmit sati will be sentenced to six months 
imprisonment under section 309, IPC. It shows that the act of sati arises out of the free choice 
on part of the woman but sati can never be suicide because the woman does not light her own 
funeral pyre. It is submitted that the section on the commission of sati should have charged 
the perpetrators of the crime with murder. 
(ii) It would have been better if the word Sati has been omitted from the Bill and words 
“widow immolation” were used. The practice of sati is indirectly glorified by referring to it as 
sati and not murder. 
(iii) The widow who attempted to commit sati is a victim of her social environment and 
pressures, therefore, she should not be treated as a criminal. 
 
9. The Law Relating to Female Infanticide and Female Foeticide  
     The female infanticide was widely prevalent among higher castes of Hindu, poor Muslims 
of Hyderabad as they cannot afford dowry, Bhati community of Rajasthan and poverty-ridden 
Kallar community of Usilampatti taluka in Madurai district of Tamilnadu. Female infanticide 
is killing a baby girl after she is being born. Cases of female infanticide are seldom reported 
to the police. The IPC punishes abortion and infanticide both directly and indirectly. Section 
299 and 300 of the IPC view infanticide as homicide.      
     The development of modern techniques such as amniocentesis and sex-discrimination tests 
has facilitated people to know the sex of the foetus. These contributed to the foeticides. 
Female foeticide is aborting the female baby in the mother’s womb. The perplexing scenario 
represented by artificial insemination, reproductive industrialization and surrogate 
motherhood are reducing the woman’s body to a raw material. The IPC, 1860 made causing 
abortion a punishable offence under sections 312 to 315. 
     The Medical Termination of Pregnancy Act, 1971 has liberalized the abortion rules and as 
a result in all the big cities private clinics or hospitals have started amniocentesis tests as 
money spinner. To remove the uncertainties in MTP Act, The Pre-Natal Diagnostic 
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Techniques (Regulation and Prevention of Misuse) Act (PNDT Act) was passed in 1994. The 
Act provides no PNDT except for detection of abnormalities given in the Act, no PNDT 
under the age of 35 years and no person conducting PND procedures shall communicate the 
women the sex of the child. The Act remained ineffective as no machinery was provided to 
enforce the provisions of PNDT Act at State and District level. Not a single pre-natal 
diagnostic center had been registered until 2001. 
     Census Report 2001 shows that the sex ratio of 0-6 years fell from 945 females per 1000 
males in 1991 to 927 per 1000 males in 2001. The new figure gives India one of the world’s 
lowest ratios for women to men. Abortion is legal as per MTP Act, 1971 when a woman’s life 
or health is at risk, or in case of foetal impairment, rape and contraceptive failure. The PNDT 
like amniocentesis are being used on a large scale to detect the sex of the foetus and to 
terminate the pregnancy of the unborn child if found to be a female child. Techniques are also 
being developed to pre-select the sex of the child before conception. It was therefore 
necessary to bring an amendment in the PNDT Act, 1994 and as a result Pre-Conception and 
Pre-Natal Diagnostic Techniques (Prohibition of Sex Selection) Act was passed in 2002. The 
object of the Act, 2002 is to ban the pre-conception sex selection techniques and misuse of 
pre-natal diagnostic techniques for sex selective abortions. The law under Act, 2002 provides 
that no person can communicate to the pregnant woman concerned or her relatives or any 
other person the sex of the foetus by any means, the setting up of State Level Supervisory 
Bodies to monitor the implementation of the Act and any violation, including unlicensed labs, 
of the Act will lead to seizure of equipments, fine up to 1 lac and cancellation of registration.  
Suggestions.  (i) All stakeholders, the State, the Medical Profession, NGOs, activists, women 
and health groups, journalists and media etc. come together to see that the provisions of the 
PCPNDT Act, 2002 are implemented to its fullest extent. 
(ii) The roots of the female foeticide can be traced to deep-rooted patriarchy and anti-women 
attitudes in the country. The Government should carry out women empowerment programmes 
vigorously. 
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(iii) The Act should be backed by stringent implementation machinery by the State and the 
Act should be complemented by people based advocacy. 
(iv) The Indian Medical Council Act, 1956 and The Medical Council’s Code of Ethics, 1970 
should amend the Act and Code to harmonise with PCPNDT Act, 2002. 
(v) Indian Constitution has recognized the right to life under Article 21 as also in several 
cases.1 But this is hardly available to the unwanted girl child. The right of the girl child as 
may be interpreted from Article 21 should be inferred as right to be born and not to be aborted 
only because she is a girl, right to remain alive after birth and not to be killed at any moment 
after birth and right of the girl child to her mind, her body, right to childhood and right to a 
healthy family environment. 
(vi) In a society that celebrates the birth of sons and mourns the birth of daughters, bringing 
about a change in the mindset of the community is a daunting task. The first step is the 
formulation of effective legislation followed by strict implementation and monitoring coupled 
with education of the community. 
     Each and every one should protect the cause of women and uphold the dignity of girl 
babies. All should propagate against such inhuman activities and educate the masses about the 
drastic consequences of female infanticide and female foeticide as Gandhiji said “Each One 
Teach One” for a woman too is the Masterpiece of God’s Creation. 
 
10. The Law Relating to Prostitution 
     Prostitution has existed in India since time immemorial. Prostitution is the crudest 
manifestation of societies where women have been driven to sell their bodies as a means of 
survival. While strict rules of conduct are applied to women, men can maintain their sexual 
freedom and promiscuity, which is considered proof of their manhood. The condemnation of 
the women and not of the man is the continuance of the standards of dual morality. 
Prostitution is commonly referred to as the oldest profession in the world. The women are in 
profession by reason like destitution, economic constraints, matrimonial failures and 
                                                 
1   Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, AIR 1978 SC 597 
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sometime even desire to lead easy life etc. Taking into consideration the three elements of the 
prostitution i.e. payment, promiscuity and emotional disturbances there can be two broad 
categories of prostitutes – professional and non-professional (clandestine). Professional or the 
public prostitute derives her sole and only livelihood from this profession in a brothel or in 
red light areas in big towns. The higher types in this profession are street- walkers and ‘call 
girls’ who find their clients in hotel-lobbies, bars and luxurious establishments. 
     To curb sex business SITA i.e. Suppression of Immoral Trafficking in Women Act, 1956 
was passed. The main targets of this Act are pimps, agents, managers and keepers of brothels 
– in other words, those who indulge in prostitution as business activities. SITA was enacted 
by the Parliament to prohibit or abolish traffic in women and girls for purposes of 
prostitution. It is surprising to point out that the Act does not aim at the abolition of 
prostitution and prostitutes as such. A male prostitute is absolutely not covered by the ambit 
of section 2(f) and a client is not punishable under the Act. The unfortunate part of this act is 
that it is a penal statute and there is hardly any mention of the welfare provision in it other 
than section 19, which provides the placing of a prostitute in a protective home or in the care 
of a court if she wants. 
     In 1986 SITA was amended to do away with the loopholes that prevented it from being 
effective. This Act was renamed Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act (PITA). The amended Act 
has recognized that children and even men can be sexually abused and exploited for 
commercial purposes and should be protected in the way women and girls are. But this Act 
also does not prohibit prostitution or declare it illegal per se but on the other hand under 
section 8 a prostitute is treated as a criminal. Section 2(g) provides that protective homes 
should not only allow the woman to live in dignity but also to find means of gainful 
employment. The Act also prohibits male officers empowered for making search without a 
warrant unless accompanied by at least two women police officers. The Act does not provide 
alternate employment opportunities if a prostitute comes out of the profession. 
     Despite all laws and International Conventions the sordid business of prostitution is 
flourishing, booming and expanding, in different forms, making the life of victims nasty, 
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brutish and short. Call-girls are another variety of prostitutes who are flourishing because of 
the elite executive officials or the new rich class of society. Five star hotels, masseur parlours 
and fashionable bars have call-girl system and sale of flesh goes on. Besides abuse of power, 
economic, political and administrative requirements create circumstances, in which a woman 
employee is tempted, sometimes forced, to barter sexual favours for socio-economic gains for 
themselves or their family members. This new type of prostitution goes unnoticed by the law 
enforcement agencies or even by the public. 
Suggestions. (i) There is no denying the facts that nothing has been done on the front of 
providing rehabilitation to the prostitutes. If they are treated as out-cast by the society for 
which the society itself is responsible will aggravate the situation rather than solve it. 
(ii) The question, which is always looming large is whether prostitution can be eradicated at 
all even after passing of PITA in 1986. A clear- cut objective policy on prostitution should be 
evolved to abolish prostitution per se rather than treating it as a necessary evil. 
(iii) The emphasis under the PITA is on punishing traffickers and not on prostitutes and 
prostitution as a social menace. The customers must be declared to be offenders. 
(iv) The major root cause of prostitution in majority of cases is poverty and in India where 
more than 50 percent population lives below poverty line it is very difficult to eradicate evils 
like prostitution only through legislation. 
(v) Knowing fully well that evils like prostitution cannot be erased over-night efforts should 
be made by the government to provide proper health care to prostitutes.  
(vi) The problems is not that we do not have enough laws but most of the laws are on paper or 
do not bite.  
(vii) Social workers in every locality should keep a vigilant eye on such practices and compel 
the police to take cognizance of such acts and make efforts to help the prostitutes. Law alone 
is just insufficient to curb and control such a cancerous evil operating in the society, which 
has very deep roots.  
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 (viii)The calculated efforts are required to be made by courts, legislature, enforcement 
agencies and social workers to fight the evil of prostitution operating at all levels in various 
forms otherwise the pledges made in the preamble of the Constitution sound hollow.   
 
11. Law Relating to Women Workers   
     Special provisions of labour law exit to deal with the special problems of women workers 
employed in factories, mines and agriculture. The employment of women workers in modern 
industrial system has given rise to several problems. They are widespread disorganization of 
family life, women are considered a second – class wage earners and the employment of 
women in industry creates a variety of other problems, such as work during night, overtime, 
health, safety, maternity leave etc. 
     The Factories Act and Mines Act prohibits the employment of women except between 6 
a.m. to 7 p.m., to lift or carry or make any load so heavy as likely to cause injury. Special 
provision for women for urinals, washing facilities, crèches rest facilities etc. are also given in 
the Acts. The Maternity Benefit Act provides 12- week maternity leave, six week in case of 
miscarriage and one month in case of illness arising out of pregnancy. Construing Articles 14 
and 16 in the light of the Preamble and Article 39(d), The Supreme Court brought the 
principle “equal pay for equal work” within the contours of the fundamental right of equality 
and also held that a temporary or casual employee performing the same or similar duties and 
functin is entitled to the same pay as paid to regular or a permanent employee.1  
     India being a predominantly agriculture country, the agricultural labourers occupy the 
lowest rung of rural ladder due to illiteracy, poverty, indebtedness and seasonal nature of 
work. Their social backwardness, lack of organization, collective bargaining, heterogeneity, 
etc play vital role against them. The biggest victims of this system are the women workers. It 
is estimated by 1981 census that 83.2 percent of total women work force was engaged in 
agriculture. 
                                                 
1  Randhir Singh v. Union of India, AIR 1982 SC 892 and Jaipal v. State of Haryana, AIR 1988 SC 
1504 
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     The Constitution has given preferential treatment in favour of women. Minimum Wages 
Act was enacted with a view to prevent exploitation of seated labour and it has also provided 
for revision of minimum rates of wages, fixation of hours of work, overtime wages etc. 
However, the Act has no provision for the women agricultural workers like working hours 
and interval etc. The Bonded Labour System Abolition Act, 1976 was passed with a view to 
eradicate the evil of forced labour whether men or women. Though the Act put certain checks 
and limitations on the land-owner but the male or female workders are still the tools in the 
hands of the land owners.  
     The Kerala Agricultural Workers Act, 1974 is a significant piece of labour legislation and 
should serve as a model for other States. The Act provides that land-owners shall not employ 
any agricultural labour other than the one who had worked on the same land during the 
previous agricultural season. The provisions for maximum hours of work is eight hours per 
day for adult and six hours for an adolescnt are given in the Act. As a large number of 
permanent labourers both men and women dropped out every year because of death, old age 
marriages and there is no provision for the replacement with some members of outgoing 
workers’ family 
. It is obvious that positive and effective contribution of the legislature in protecting the 
interest of women workers through legislative process. However, there is no labour legislation 
to regulate the working conditions of women labourer in small industries, unorganized sectors 
and domestic services. Moreover, the present penal provisions in labour legislations are 
insufficient to deter the employer and women workers do not assert their rights for fear of 
losing jobs. The Workmen’s Compensation Act, 1923 does not provide compensation of 
agricultural workers for injuries arising out of and in the course of employment and it results 
in great hardship. The steps should be taken to evolve a proper and adequate enforcement 
machinery realizing the real problems of the agriculture sector. 
Suggestions.  (i) There is no labour legislation to regulate the working conditions of women 
labourer in small industries, unorganized sectors and domestic services. 
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(ii) The present penal provisions in labour legislations are insufficient to deter the employer. 
The machinery for inspection is also inadequate. The lady factory inspector should be 
appointed for women workers. 
(iii) The Act imposes the entire burden of providing maternity benefit on the employer. This 
has led to a tendency among some employers not to employ married women and even 
discharge women workers, on sign of pregnancy. 
(iv) To implement effectively the different Acts pertaining to welfare of women workers, 
State Governments are to set up women’s cells. 
 (v) The women agricultural workers lack the opportunity of land ownership rights which is 
the personal source of income. It is, therefore, desirable to restructure the land reform 
measure so as to extend its benefit to women workers in agriculture sector.     
(vi) A comprehensive legislation in the light of the Kerala Agricultural Workers Act, 1974 
should be enacted. Special treatment should be given to women agricultural workers under 
such legislation. The provisions for health, safety and welfare of women agriculture workers 
may be made alongwith other facilities on the pattern of Factories Act, 1948. 
(vii) The Government should take special care of proper marketing for agriculture produce, 
which will enable agriculturist class to pay more to the women agriculture workers who are 
greatly engaged in agriculture occupations. 
 
12. Sexual Harassment and Eve Teasing  
     Women are subjected to various forms of molestation, physical and mental torture and eve 
teasing at home, in streets and public places, places of entertainment, campus of educational 
institutions, prisons, rescue homes, crowded places, running trains and buses, workplace etc. 
The cases are grossly under-reported because many of them are ignorant of their rights. 
Primarily, fear of jeopardizing their career often makes it difficult for a number of working 
women, from clerical staff to qualified nurses, doctors, school teachers etc., to report sexual 
harassment and get redress. 
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     “Crimes in India Report” classified section 354, IPC as molestation and section 509, IPC 
as eve teasing. Molestation then was read against those offences that use force or assault to 
outrage the modesty of women. Eve teasing was recognized as a popular form of harassment 
of women in public spaces, but it falls short of molestation underlay the distinction between 
molestation and eve teasing. There are provisions under sections 509, 294 and 354 of the 
Indian Penal Code for dealing with eve teasing and its aggravated form, sexual harassment 
but the way these provisions have been worded, the complexities of the procedural laws and 
the type of proof that is required, make it very difficult to get the culprit punished. If a person 
with an object to insult the modesty of a woman exposes private part of his body to her or 
uses obscene words or exhibits obscene drawings, he commits an offence under section 509, 
IPC. A woman’s modesty is her sex whoever uses criminal force with an intent to outrage it 
commits an offence under section 354, IPC. The intention of the accused is the crux of this 
section. Section 509 does not require any element of criminal force or assault, which is an 
essential element of an offence under section 354, IPC. Section 294 IPC punishes doing of 
obscene acts or singing of obscene songs at public place, provided the same causes annoyance 
to others. 
     The trouble is, sexual harassment is as hard to define as it is hard to take and there is 
virtually no woman who has not experienced it at one stage of her career or the other. Sexual 
harassment at workplace seriously hinders the ability off women employees and workers to 
tackle both work and harassment. The Supreme Court while acknowledging women’s right to 
gender equality, prescribed the guidelines and norms to be observed in all working places by 
treating them as law under Article 141 of the Constitution.1 In another case 2 the SC enlarged 
the definitional scope of sexual harassment to include “any action or gesture which, whether 
directly or by implication, air at or has the tendency to outrage the modesty of a female 
employee and no physical contact is necessary. That way the SC has accorded not subjecting 
a person to sexual harassment – a status of fundamental rights. Now, any victim of sexual 
harassment can directly move to the SC by filing a writ under Article 32 of the Constitution. 
                                                 
1  Vishaka & Others v. State of Rajasthan, (1997) 6 SCC 241 
2  Apparel Export Promotion Councils (AEPC) v. A.K. Chopra, 1999 (1) SCC 759-777 
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     Both the judgments have tried to “cover up” the inadequacy of the present legislation 
preventing sexual harassment and have also provided the terms of its enforcement which was 
previously almost non-existent. The SC in Vishaka’s case has reposed ultimate faith in the 
Employers that they will set up complaint committees and provide for its proper enforcement 
by the employers. This being the problem of every enterprise, what is required at this 
juncture, is a joint effort by the judiciary to fill the blanks, to answer the questions for 
ensuring safe working environment, the media to embolden women’s spirit by providing 
adequate publicity to the do’s and don’ts at the workplace. 
     In an attempt to translate the Vishaka Guidelines of the Supreme Court into an Act, the 
National Commission for Women (NCW) has drafted a Bill titled “Sexual Harassment of 
Women at Their Workplace (Prevention) Bill, 2003.” The Chairperson of NCW, Dr. 
Poornima Advani said, “Although the Guidelines laid down by the Supreme Court are as 
binding as the provisions of any Act,1 but generally, people find the provisions of an Act 
more serious than the Court’s guidelines. The Supreme Court has also made it clear in the 
Vishaka case that there is a need for an appropriate law to be made on the subject. 
Suggestions. (i) The employer institution should provide moral, psychological and legal 
support to the victim by allowing her to participate at every state of inquiry. 
(ii) To ensure safe working environment, the media to embolden women’s spirit by providing 
adequate publicity to the do’s and don’ts at the workplace, the institutions themselves by 
formulating strong institutional policies against sexual harassment. 
(iii) The Supreme Court has made it clear in the Vishaka case that there is a need for an 
appropriate law to be made on the subject. In view of this decision the National Commission 
for Women has drafted a Bill titled “Sexual Harassment of Women at their Workplade 
(Prevention) Bill 2003.” It is submitted that Parliament should enact this law and similar 
directions are to be made to the States also. 
 
                                                 
1  Article 141 of the Constitution 
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(iv) Sexual Harassment should be made a cognizable and non-bailable offence and provide 
for expeditious summary trial of the culprits. 
(v) A new section, consolidating and amending the scattered law on sexual harassment should 
be inserted in the IPC to make sexual harassment of a woman a full-fledged crime. 
(vi) Courts should treat sexual harassment of women and girl seriously so that dignity of 
women can be maintained and decency in public life can be restored. The rules of evidence 
must be simplified for proving this offence. 
 
                SOME PERSISTING PROBLEMS THAT NEEDS REFORMS 
Legal Literacy as an Instrument for Women’s Empowerment 
     Legal Literacy is the educational process of acquiring critical awareness about rights and 
the law, the ability to assert rights; and the capacity to mobilize for a change. “Women in 
India have all the rights, except the right to assert their rights”, remarked a well-known 
judge.1 This is a sad commentary on the world’s largest democracy. Where women know the 
law, their rights and obligations, they will be more functional citizens; this essentially 
supports the prevailing unequal status quo in gender relations. Mere knowledge of the law is 
sufficient to ensure the enjoyment of rights. This is fallacious, since ‘enjoyment of rights’ is 
not an automatic process. In most societies, laws and their applications are skewed against 
women, especially poor women, but even where the laws are responsive, powerful social, 
cultural, psychological and political constraint hinder women’s enjoyment of rights. 
     Most of laws do not recognize women’s legal rights to decision-making, control over 
resources, inheritance etc. Three mechanisms are key to this process; (i) unjust laws that are 
discriminatory and limit the scope of women’s rights, (ii) prejudicial enforcement of laws 
favourable to women by police or gender biased judgments in courts, (iii) ignorance of the 
laws and of law-making processes by women or the role they might play in changing the 
law.2  
                                                 
1  Janaki V., ‘Role of Legal Literacy’ published in Social Welfare, March 2003, Vol.49 No.12 
2   (ibid) 
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     As an instrument for the empowerment of women, legal literacy programmes must be 
preceded by consciousness raising of women, who reflect critically on unequal power 
relations sustained by the law in various ways. Understanding and breaking the power 
relationship between women is also vital for women in the process of sensitization towards 
others’ problems. Legal literacy should be incorporated with other programmes at various 
levels of government and voluntary efforts. Law should be made easily available and 
accessible to all people, irrespective of their social milieu. Law must be a means to an end i.e. 
gender justice, and not an end in itself.  
Domestic Violence  
    According to Justice A.S. Anand, “Women comprise 66 percent of the world’s illiterates 
and 70 percent of the world’s poor. Violence against women, clubbed with these 
inequalities/deprivations is, to my mind, total denial of their human rights”.1  
      Domestic violence against women and girls is a routine affair in most families in one way 
or other. Dependence of women upon men has made it a right of the men to treat women in a 
manner they think correct. Traditional attitudes towards women around the world help 
perpetuate the violence. Domestic violence is a pattern of coercive behavior. It could be 
physical, verbal or sexual, perpetuated usually by men against women to maintain power and 
supremacy. 
     The Vienna Accord, 1994; The Beijing Platform of Action, 1995 and the Committee for 
the Elimination of Discrimination against Women(CEDAW) are the main foundation of 
rights in respect of women of which 166 countries are members including India. But in spite 
of all treaties and conventions, violence against women is rampant in the society. Evidently, 
with a genuine intention to curb such violence, a bill known as “The Protection from 
Domestic Violence Bill, 2002” was introduced in Lok Sabha on 8th March, 2002. This seems 
to be an appropriate step taken by the government since section 498A of the IPC has proved 
insufficient and it does not cover wide range of other offences. 
                                                 
1  Pathak Manjushree, ‘Domestic Violence and the Law’, published in Social Welfare, December 2003, 
Vol50 No.9 
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     The main object of the bill is to protect the rights of women who are victims of violence of 
any kind occurring within the family and to provide for matters connected therewith or 
incidental thereto. The Bill seems to be drafted hastily without giving proper attention to the 
problems that are faced by womenfolk in their day- to -day life. Firstly, the word ‘habitually’ 
in section 4(1) means that the respondent is in a habit of assaulting the aggrieved person. This 
section may be amended properly, because domestic violence against women is not a habit, it 
is a crime. Secondly, the Bill is silent about the violence that may take place on women in the 
paternal family. Lastly but not least, for the disposal of a case on domestic violence, the 
aggrieved person has to wait for three months. This period should be reduced as far as 
practicable. After marriage, a woman/wife becomes a family member of the shared house-
hold. If her right to stay in the shared house is violated, severe punishment should be given to 
the respondent or other family members who are responsible for such violence. 
     The short-comings and loopholes should be carefully considered and eliminated before the 
Bill is passed as an Act of Parliament. In this regard guidance from the United Nation’s 
framework for model legislation on domestic violence can be taken. The definition of 
violence given by the U.N. Resolution as well as the model draft prepared by the “Lawyers 
Collective” – New Delhi in this regard may be taken as the basic guidelines for defining 
domestic violence to cover all categories of women with the broadest possible sense. 
     The most crucial operative part of the Bill is the implementation of the provisions in the 
right perspective. The previous record of implementation of such legislations is not 
satisfactory. Unless legal awareness is strengthened, specially in the rural areas, the proposed 
Bill would fail to achieve the desired result and objectives. 
     The laws are nothing but paper tigers, many of them outdated which make them 
susceptible to manipulation to suit vested interests, to the detriment of those whom the law 
seeks to protect. Christian divorce laws, Shah Bano case, dowry, rape, sexual harassment, 
prostitution…the list is endless. No wonder our citizenry find the law an ivory tower that is 
out of bounds for the ordinary individual. The sad but dismal truth is that in spite of all the 
legal protection in various aspects meant for different sections of the population, despite their 
 381
flaws, it lacks the collective will to come out openly when rights are violated, unless it affects 
personally. When people are ready to fight for their rights at the workplace, through morchas, 
demonstrations, strikes, there is marked reluctance to do so when it comes to problems within 
the home as in marital violence, dowry harassment, molestation, incest, prostitution etc. 
Constitutional guarantees in favour of women in India and laws enacted for their benefit and 
protection have not had much impact on women’s lives, though judicial activism has provided 
weapons for social activists and reformers. 
     Some concrete reforms are needed in favour of women to ameliorate their condition. The 
content and ambit of the gender just laws must be comprehensive covering areas of marriage, 
divorce, inheritance, guardianship, rights of residence, compulsory registration of marriage, 
rights of matrimonial property, domestic violence as well as access to resources, right to 
work, equal wages and benefits. 
      “Women is the central figure in our society which inspires confidence, inculcates and 
prepares children to pursue their goals relentlessly. History bears testimony to the fact that 
heights of patriotism, selflessness, fearlessness and determination are imbibed in children 
only through the persistent efforts of mothers. But unless woman is provided the pre-
requisites of education for developing her vision, proper health care and social security, 
respect and status, her efforts are likely to fall short to accomplish the ultimate objective of a 
strong civilized and prosperous nation.”1 
     Law can be ahead of public opinion in matters of social policy, but if the gulf is too wide, 
there is every likelihood of its non-observance either unconsciously or deliberately. This is 
tragically true in respect of laws relating to women, which are flouted by one and all in Indian 
society, irrespective of their caste, creed and religion. Even the law enforcing agencies, 
believe it to be ornamental legislations, not seriously intended for implementation. The 
offenders do not consider themselves guilty under these laws and the victims do not perceive 
the conduct immoral. 
                                                 
1   Quoted by “ Ashok Kumar Singh”, ‘Laws Relating to Women’, Supreme Court Journal, Vol.1 
March (1993) p.52 
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     As India is a signatory to the “Convention on Elimination of All kinds of Discrimination 
Against Women (CEDAW)”, it is under an obligation to respond with genuine and 
meaningful legal strategies to combat evils relating to women. India ratified CEDAW in July 
1993, thereby committing itself to amend or repeal laws inconsistent with the Convention and 
to ensure that discriminatory practices against women are brought to and end.1 
      
     
 
 
                            
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1   Oishik Sircar, “Law Report Cruel to Women”, published in Social Welfare Vol.50 No.11, February 
2004 
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